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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study was to give an account of what it means to be a hospital consultant in a 
national health service that has been undergoing change for almost three decades. Classic 
grounded theory was used to identify the main concern of hospital consultants sampled for the 
study and how they resolved this concern on a routine basis. Data were obtained from three 
sources: interviews, observation and document analyses. Classic grounded theory procedures of 
constant comparison and theoretical sampling were used and Rolling with the Punches emerged 
as the pattern of behaviour through which the hospital consultants dealt with their main 
concern, which was managerialism. Rolling with the Punches involves four modes: Stabilising 
Temporarily, Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Adjusting to/Living with. The mode of behaviour 
was contingent on a central and on-going Weighing-up process, in which the hospital 
consultants used their personal narratives, beliefs and commitment structures to make sense of 
what was happening and what they could possibly do about it. Hence, the mode of behaviour 
was contingent, historicised and in flux. The Weighing-up process can set off triggers that can 
lead to a change of mode that need not be linear.  
 
Key words: doctors, managers, grounded theory, weighing up, stabilising temporarily, resisting, 
subverting, quibbling, limiting the impact, lying low, faking it, living with, adjusting to, going 
with the flow, complying, waiting it out. 
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CHAPTER 1 SETTING THE SCENE 
1.1 CAVEAT TO THE WRITING OF THE THESIS 
This study was undertaken according the tenets of classic grounded theory (GT). This means 
that the identification of the main concern, and its routine resolution by the participants of the 
study was the key organising principle of the study. In terms of how research is traditionally 
conducted, Chapter 3 (methodology and methods), Chapter 4 (the GT) and Chapter 5 (literature 
review) and Chapter 6 (integration into the GT) should perhaps be written up first, with the 
other chapters following thereafter. However, to conform to institutional presentational 
requirements, a more traditional presentational strategy has been followed, despite the fact that 
the research did not start with the identification of a gap in the literature, the formulation of a 
research question and hypotheses to be tested. It started with conversations with participants, 
observations and the examination of relevant documents pertaining to the research site. This 
caveat was introduced to avoid impressions of methodological slurring (Suddaby, 2006), 
remodelling of GT (Glaser & Holton, 2007), forcing and preconception (Glaser, 2012a). 
1.2 INTRODUCTION AND NEED FOR THIS STUDY 
The initial impetus for this study arose from multiple encounters with hospital consultants in a 
big English acute National Health Service (NHS) hospital trust. It is just so sad that the principal 
creative, intellectual and social capital of the hospital (Walshe & Smith, 2011) is fed up and is 
exhausted by a sense of siege. Hospital consultants can cope with the life and death issues that 
are routinely part of their work. However, they tend to struggle with managers, targets, and 
inspections, serious incidents declared by managers or the consequences of the need to balance 
the books.  
Some of the complaints that arose in these multiple encounters were that contracts to be 
prepared for tender or an existing contract had been lost to a competitor, confidential data had 
been sent to the wrong person, the water from the borehole tasted like s#!t, for various reasons 
surgery had been performed on a wrong site, a swab had been left inside a patient, the wrong 
gas had been administered to a patient, key national performance targets had been missed, the 
Care Quality Commission had just issued an adverse report about the quality of healthcare being 
delivered, the hospital had been placed under special measures because the cost improvement 
programme had been unsuccessful, the auditors of the annual accounts had issued a qualified 
report, and the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) had been reorganised and documents 
had to be prepared again and new relationships built. In this hospital the mandatory Accident 
and Emergency (A & E) Department targets are almost always missed. The managers wanted to 
push the patient – who could breach the waiting-time target – under the nose of a clinician so 
that the target could be met while the clinician wanted to deal with another patient who was 
about to go into cardiac arrest. There were not enough beds so managers shouted at clinicians 
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to authorise a discharge so that the patients could be “evicted” from wards to make beds 
available. The managerial hospital is one where clinical priorities and managerial prerogatives 
are constantly in a tussle. The hospital, where the research was conducted, has a reputation as a 
tough place.  Some nursing staffs were not willing to take fulltime posts. They came to work as 
agency or locum staff, which enabled them to pack up and go home at the end of their shift. As a 
result, doctors ended up having to start with little, incomplete and often no information every 
time they saw a patient in the wards.  
This was when I decided on the research area. I knew that I had to talk to the doctors to find out 
what was happening and how they were coping. I felt that if it was possible to get access to 
them, then I could listen to the consultants, perhaps observe what was happening, and consult 
available online Trust documents.  Policy documents on the NHS were also available. However, I 
realised that I would have to start with frontline staff to see how the tensions played out at the 
coalface of the NHS.  
While the media does appear to treat bashing the NHS as a national sport, throughout my 18 
months of fieldwork I met mainly dedicated hospital doctors. When it comes to their patients 
and their colleagues most of them are wonderful. However, many hospital doctors have 
difficulty tolerating managers and management. A total of 49 interviews were conducted and 
observations were made during almost 100 visits to the hospital. Access was made easier 
because my partner was a consultant at the same hospital at the time that the research was 
being conducted. About 50 Trust and NHS documents were retrieved. 
This study was conceived as a classic GT study; i.e. I intended to find out what the main concern 
of the hospital consultants was and how they went about resolving this concern on a routine 
basis. The research proposal indicated that the managerial transformation of the professional 
bureaucracy with a focus on market-based competition, management-based control systems 
and metrics-based performance management was a big concern to hospital consultants, with 
their professional commitments to clinical autonomy, collegiality and peer review. It was 
necessary to go to the coalface (Barley, 2008), to the inhabitants of the institutions (Hallett & 
Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002) to hear from them what was going on (Glaser, 2001a) in 
an area of life that is important socially, economically, politically and morally. The close look at 
what was happening at the peripheries of the healthcare delivery system enabled me to grapple 
with some of the big scholarly debates that are outlined in the chapters that follow. However, 
the foray into the scholarly debates was delimited by the GT that is covered in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 1 identifies the motivation for studying the managerial transformation of the English 
acute NHS hospital and how hospital consultants deal with it on a daily, routine, non-dramatic 
basis. The background and context of the managerial transformation of the NHS and its 
institutions are provided. The chapter concludes with an outline of the chapters that follow.  
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1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING HEALTHCARE 
The NHS is a huge player on the United Kingdom (UK) political, economic and moral landscape. 
It had a 2013/14 budget of over £113bn, which represented about 9% of the UK GDP, and 
employs over 1.3 million staff. It sees 1 million patients every 36 hours (NHS Confederation, 
2015). 
In a local economy, a hospital can be a big employer. The hospital that was studied employs 
almost 5 000 staff (Trust 2013/14 annual report). For the sake of anonymity and confidentiality 
references o the name of the hospital and its official documents are not provided in the 
reference list. They can however be made available, upon request, to substantiate any of the 
claims made in this report. The study of healthcare organisations has been relatively neglected 
despite their size and importance and the rich intersection of the fields of organisation studies, 
medical sociology and health policy (Currie, Dingwall, Kitchener, & Waring, 2012a; Davies, 
2003). This study shows that the hospital – as an organisation – has undergone significant 
changes from the 1960s when it was a major area of study (Davies, 2003). A need exists to 
understand organisations as major social actors in our time (Currie et al., 2012a; Davies, 2003).   
1.4 MANAGERIALISM 
One of the dominant features of the acute hospital over the past three decades has been its 
managerial transformation. That involved the introduction of market-based competition, 
management-based control systems, and metrics-based performance-management systems. 
Clinical practice has been bureaucratised and standardised (McDonald & Harrison, 2004; 
Spyridonidis & Calnan, 2011). The question is: what is the sociological impact when these 
technologies of control are imposed on a professional bureaucracy (Farrell & Morris, 2003; 
Timmermans & Oh, 2010)? How does the imposition of managerial control over the creative, 
intellectual and social capital of the hospital (Walshe & Smith, 2011) affect the functioning of 
clinicians? This study examined what happens when managerialism and medical 
professionalism “embrace”. Is it a generative dance (Currie et al., 2012a) or is it a danse macabre 
(Degeling, Maxwell, Kennedy, & Coyle, 2003)? That is, how do hospital consultants see the 
process and how do they cope? 
1.5 THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE IN ENGLAND 
This study was conducted in an English acute NHS hospital trust. Wales and Scotland have 
devolved authority over the NHS and differ in some important aspects. The NHS is a very 
complex organisation that offers different healthcare services to different groups of people. Data 
were obtained from an official source (NHS Confederation, 2015): 
 Two hundred and eleven CCGs are responsible for ensuring that national health 
priorities are translated into local health economy plans. They controlled more than 
80% of the NHS 2013/14 budget of £113bn.  
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 Primary care is provided through walk-in centres in the community, 8 000 general 
practitioners (GPs) and 853 private and non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
providers that operate from 7 331 different sites.  
 Ten ambulances trusts handle responses to emergency calls and calls for routine 
transport of patients to and from hospital for emergency or day treatments. 
 One hundred and fifty-six acute hospital trusts, including 100 foundation trusts, provide 
acute and A & E care. The policy of successive governments has been for all NHS hospital 
trusts to become more independent from central government operational controls as 
NHS foundation trusts.  
 Government policy increasingly blurs the distinction among the publicly owned and 
operated healthcare sector, the private healthcare sector and the NGO healthcare sector.  
 As mentioned above, the 2013/14 budget of the NHS is £113bn in nominal terms. The 
NHS employed 1.3 million staff, of which more than 80% were frontline staff. These 
included 150 273 doctors, 377 191 qualified nurses, 155 960 scientists, therapists and 
technicians and 37 078 managers. This study focuses on the 40 394 hospital consultants 
in acute hospitals, who in 2011/12 were employed at a cost of £5.6bn (Committee of 
Public Accounts, 2013; The Comptcontroller and Auditor General, 2013) . 
 In the year 2013/14 the NHS saw one million patients every 36 hours; 11.030 million 
operations were performed; 21.779 million A & E visits; 15.462 million hospital 
admissions and 80.060 million outpatient appointments took place.   
This study focuses on the 40 394 hospital consultants in acute hospitals employed at a cost of 
£5.6bn (The Comptcontroller and Auditor General, 2013). The NHS is clearly a huge and 
complex organisation that does require management (The Commission, 2011). Managerialism 
goes to the heart of medical professionalism. It has implications for the framing of clinical 
autonomy, control over work, collegiality and duty to the patient (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; 
Brock, Leblebici, & Muzio, 2014). 
1.6 MANAGERIALISM IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 
The NHS has been the subject of concerns about effectiveness, efficiency and quality from its 
birth in 1948 (Klein, 2013; Pollock, 2005). Tension always existed between the political and 
moral aspirations that underpinned the establishment of the NHS and the affordability of the 
project. Hospital Activity Analysis, the Resource Management Initiative, the Griffiths general 
managers and the development of performance indicators (Gray, Jenkins, Flynn, & Rutherford, 
1991; Klein, 2013) pre-dated the New Public Management (NPM) wave of the 1980s (Clarke & 
Newman, 2006; Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 1996b). The 
development of information technology (IT), the rising expectations of the public with respect 
to public services and the early 1980s fiscal crisis coincided to change the relationship between 
the state, the professions and the public services sectors. Managers were appointed on contracts 
that made them responsible for outcomes. Short-term pressures collided with the compassion, 
patience, and diligence and care associated with dealing with people who are often at the doors 
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of loss and death. The balance of power had shifted in favour of the managers. Clinicians 
however, still exercised their reconstituted clinical prerogative on the clinical frontline. 
Managers controlled costs by outsourcing non-core services such as housekeeping, cleaning, 
and catering; cutting staff; and closing beds, wards and theatres. Doctors had opposed the 
appointment of original general managers in the NHS in the 1980s (Griffiths, 1983, 1992; Klein, 
2013). The 1990 NHS and Community Care Act further empowered managers by creating a 
quasi-market and by giving managers greater operational oversight over hospital consultants. 
The latter were to be directly employed by the hospitals on employment contracts and 
managers had greater involvement in the drafting of the job descriptions, employment contracts 
and clinical excellence awards of the consultants. Developments in IT facilitated greater 
management scrutiny of consultant work content, workloads and productivity (Flynn, 2007). 
By the 1990s, hospital consultants had taken on clinical-managerial roles as clinical leads, 
clinical directors and medical directors. Thus, the mood had shifted from hostility towards 
general managers (Griffiths, 1983, 1992) to ambivalence about clinical-managerial roles (Klein, 
2013). Soft bureaucracy (Courpasson, 2000) had replaced the hard edge of general 
management. The boundaries between management and medical professionalism were 
blurring. Traditional professionalism was being replaced by professionalism within 
organisations (Evetts, 2003; Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf, 2007a). Clinical audits, 
clinical governance (Scally & Donaldson, 1998) and the introduction of evidence-based practice 
(Grol & Grimshaw, 2003; Timmermans & Berg, 2003) indicate a shift in clinical autonomy away 
from the rank-and-file medical professional whilst an administrative and knowledge elite 
collaborated with policy elites in framing the national service frameworks, clinical guidelines, 
protocols and pathways that were key outputs of the National Institute of Clinical Excellence 
(NICE). The public sector Weberian iron cage was being transformed into a Foucauldian glass 
house (Gabriel, 2008). The delivery of healthcare had become a performance (Exworthy, 
2010a). 
The managerial hospital empowers managers to cut costs, respond to rising expectations of the 
public for high quality health services and control the clinical frontline (Bevan & Hood, 2006; 
Propper, Sutton, Whitnall, & Windmeijer, 2008). 
1.7 WHAT THE STUDY CONTRIBUTES 
How do hospital consultants respond? The embrace of managerialism and medical 
professionalism has been described as a danse macabre (Degeling et al., 2003). Relations 
between doctors and managers have been poor to say the least (Davies, Hodges, & Rundall, 
2003; Edwards, Marshall, McLellan, & Abbasi, 2003). Sociologically, managerialism is 
conceptualised to have led to de-professionalisation (McKinlay & Arches, 1985; McKinlay & 
Marceau, 2002; McKinlay & Stoeckle, 1988), proletarianisation (Haug, 1973, 1988) or 
restratification (Freidson, 1985). These are big, abstract pictures. I believed that one needed to 
go to the coalface (Barley, 2008), meet the inhabitants of the institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 
2006; Hughes, 1971; Scully & Segal, 2002) and the carriers of the contradictions, congruencies 
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and tensions (Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002). It was 
important to hear from them their concerns (Glaser, 2001a) as they routinely, without drama 
(March, 1981) or struggle (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a), resolve for themselves the meanings 
of being a doctor in the managerial hospital. So this study addresses some of the relatively 
neglected enigmas that are swirling at the micro-foundations of institutional theory, which has 
become a major lens for studying organisations (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Zilber, 2013).  
Given the focus on identifying a main concern and its resolution, the research explores how 
individuals – who stand at the crossroads of multiple contradictory logics and demands – frame 
the intentions and efforts that inform their observed behaviours (Lok, 2010; McPherson & 
Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). This requires a nuanced account of agency 
(Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Powell & 
Colyvas, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Thus, the study contributes understandings of 
the contingency, fluidity and serendipity of the institutional projects that actors pursue. These 
fluidities stand in contrast to the fully formulated, strategically pursued institutional visions 
that are implied by “purposive” actions aimed at creating, disrupting and maintaining 
institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). The study offers an 
understanding of a complex process by which embedded actors formulate workable balances of 
the constellations of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & 
Lounsbury, 2011) that are at play in the hybrid managerial hospital (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Pache & Santos, 2010).  
The study also shows that the implied managerial-professional incompatibility of a danse 
macabre (Degeling et al., 2003) requires a keener examination. The focus has to shift to 
accounts of how individuals routinely balance, interrogate, negotiate and reconcile competing 
demands, in the course of meeting the demands of their everyday work. Their actual work 
instantiates the non-dramatic accomplishment of living with the paradoxes of the managerial 
hospital. In getting on with their work (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a), they consciously have to 
navigate the wickedness (Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 2005) of the social organisation of 
healthcare. This is done routinely and non-dramatically (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985, 
1990). That means identifying and using the spaces and constraints of the negotiated order 
(Strauss, Schatzman, Ehrlich, Bucher, & Sabshin, 1963) of the hospital as a complex adaptive 
system (Checkland, 1999; McKelvey, 1999; Nelson et al., 2002). In so doing, they are reconciling 
the constellations of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) and institutional complexity (Greenwood et 
al., 2011). The apparent contradictions between managerialism and professionalism are being 
reframed on the clinical frontline. This study shines a light on that frontline. Being a doctor in 
the managerial hospital requires constant self-surveillance and constitutes an on-going effortful 
accomplishment (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Managerialism and 
medical professionalism in the acute hospital do not function in splendid isolation from one 
another. Rolling with the Punches is an integrated set of hypotheses about medical 
professionalism within a managerial context. It is not whether but how and to what extent 
managerialism and medical professionalism are mutually implicated.  
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1.8 SUMMARY 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, Setting the Scene, an introduction to the study was provided and an 
indication of continued relevance of applying a sociological lens to organisational phenomena 
given. This study generates a classic grounded theory. Managerialism had emerged (Chapter 4), 
as the major concern of the participants and Rolling with the Punches is a pattern of behaviours 
through which they routinely addressed their main concern. An overview of the NHS was 
provided so that an understanding of the managerial evolution could be gained. The focus on 
efficiency, effectiveness and transparent quality are not necessarily as trouble-free as some 
would claim.  
1.9 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER CONTENT 
A summary of the content of each of the chapters that follow provides an outline of the structure 
of the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 provides some background to the day-to-day world in which hospital consultants 
deliver clinical services to patients. This study focuses on the micro-foundations of the NHS 
delivery system. The research is a GT of the main concern of, and its routine resolution by, 
hospital consultants in an increasingly actively managed hospital. The absence of the downing 
of stethoscopes and white coats or clanging of bedpans on a picket line does not mean that there 
are no deep problems. However, to get a sense of what is happening, one needs to look at how 
the managerial hospital is enacted on the frontline (Barley, 2008; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a).  
This chapter gives an account of what the acute NHS hospital is like. This section of the thesis 
shows how the main concern of the participants is constituted. What are the contradictions that 
the hospital consultants are balancing as situated improvisations (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 
2012)? How does the managerial context temper their radicalism (Meyerson & Scully, 1995)? In 
understanding the background, one might get a picture of the feedback loop from observed 
behaviours as instantiations of their agency which reflect their intentionality (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998). That agency feeds back as a loop that codetermines the make-up of the 
managerial hospital as a structure (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Giddens, 1984; 
Hughes, 1971). 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3, Methodology and Methods, discusses the rationale for choosing GT as a 
methodological approach and how the data were obtained through semi-structured interviews, 
observational field notes and document analysis. It also gives a detailed account of the grounded 
theory methodology (GTM) and a short description of the acute NHS hospital where the study 
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was conducted, with the ethical considerations. Text boxes provide accounts of how the 
methods were applied in the study. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 presents the GT, Rolling with the Punches. Managerialism emerged as the main 
concern for hospital consultants. A market-based competitive hospital, with control systems led 
by managers, a metrics-based performance-management system, scientific bureaucratisation 
and standardisation of their clinical practices meant that hospital consultants were losing 
control over their relationships with their patients and the content of their work. Participants 
dealt with managerialism through different modes of behaviour. Stabilising Temporarily, 
Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Adjusting to/Living with are the different modes by which 
hospital consultants are Rolling with the Punches. The connecting link between these modes of 
behaviour is the Weighing-up process, in which participants consider what changes in the 
managerial hospital mean to them and what they can do about them. By weighing up, 
participants are evaluating their current situation against the near future. Weighing up does not 
always result in mode shifts so that participants might choose to stay in a mode, revert to a 
previous one or skip modes. Moreover, whilst one trigger may result in a mode shift for one 
person it may not mean the same thing for another person. And even if it means the same thing, 
it may not result in the same mode of behaviour. It should be emphasised that this study does 
not make value judgements about the Weighing-up processes and modes of behaviours in which 
participants engage. These processes are meaningful to the individuals concerned and that is as 
far as the study goes. It is not the only, or a complete, account of all the behaviours in which 
participants engage but it does account for much of the variation in behaviours that are 
observed.  
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 presents the literature review. It should be possible to read the thesis without 
necessarily reading Chapter 5 by going straight to Chapter 6. It would shorten the document and 
avoid repetition. However, Chapter 5 provides signposts in the literature that are relevant to the 
main concern and its routine resolution. The theoretical framework that is described in Chapter 
4 delimited the literature review. Since Rolling with the Punches is a theoretical account of a 
latent pattern of behaviours in which the participants resolve their main concern, this literature 
review added body to the view – discussed in Chapter 4 – of what it means to be a hospital 
consultant in a managerial NHS hospital. The review focuses on the sharp end where a 
constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) creates an institutionally complex (Greenwood 
et al., 2011) hybrid organisation (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Managerialism seeks to control the clinical frontline by reframing its professionalism into an 
organisational professionalism (Brock et al., 2014; Muzio, Brock, & Suddaby, 2013; Muzio & 
Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf, 2007a; Postma, Oldenhof, & Putters, 2015). An organised 
professionalism would underpin observed professional behaviours that are consistent with 
managerial performance management (Exworthy, 2010a; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a). Thus 
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clinical practice would be standardised (Greenhalgh, Howick, & Maskrey, 2014; Timmermans & 
Berg, 2003). Moreover, healthcare providers would compete for contracts to deliver services 
(Le Grand, 2009a; Propper et al., 1998; Timmermans & Oh, 2010). Since this is a grounded study 
that started with the identification of a main concern of the participants and its routine 
resolution, it was necessary to take a closer look at the observed behaviours as a routine, non-
dramatic (March, 1981; Smets et al., 2012) instantiation of their multi-dimensional and dynamic 
agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Then one had to look back further as to how that nuanced 
agency iteratively constrains and shapes the emerging managerial hospital (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971). Rather than starting from 
abstract theories and their associated hypotheses to the field, the GT approach required that 
one trace theoretical lines in the opposite direction. 
A classic GT approach to the literature review is delimited by the emerging theory but is open to 
an eclectic mix of bodies of literature that facilitates the making of a novel theoretical 
contribution. That literature became data that were constantly compared and theoretically 
sampled to confirm the core category, its subsidiary concepts, their properties and dimensions 
and the theoretical relationships between the concepts. This understanding generated a better 
appreciation of how the participants construct and reconstruct the managerial hospital in their 
routine, everyday work. Out of this process emerged a better understanding of effort, 
intentionality and agency in shaping the hospital as an institution.  
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the GT (Chapter 4) and the literature review (Chapter 5). 
It shows how the concepts that emerged in the GT are used in a wider array of fields than those 
where one would normally find experts who have dominated the fields of sociology of 
healthcare, healthcare management and healthcare policy. It shows that one should take an 
explicit account of history in examining the managerial hospital so that the ebb and flow of the 
main concern and its resolution can incorporate a maximum amount of variation. It indicates 
the contingency, historicity and fluidity of understandings and responses.  The literature brings 
to the fore the understandings and agency of the participants which lie at the heart of the classic 
grounded theory methodology. It also shows the inter-dependencies between structures, 
agency and observed behaviours. The accounts of the managerial hospital and responses 
thereto by the participants in the study are not final statements of what is happening in the 
research context. It is an integrated statement of hypotheses that await affirmation and 
confirmation with new data. Chapter 6 suggests that Chapter 4 is but a pause. The grounded 
theory lives. 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 draws the different strands of the thesis together by discussing the technical 
adequacy; theoretical, empirical and practical contributions (Colquitt & Ireland, 2009); the 
limitations; and the directions for future research. 
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This study focuses on the micro-foundations of the NHS delivery system. It is a GT of the main 
concern of, and its routine resolution by, hospital consultants in an increasingly actively 
managed hospital. Thus, Chapter 2 provides some background to the day-to-day world in which 
hospital consultants deliver clinical services to patients. 
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter was written after the main concern and its resolution had been identified, as 
detailed in Chapter 4. The chapter provides a background to the precipitation and 
metamorphosis of the routine anxieties of many of the hospital consultants. 
An ageing population, rising demands for quality healthcare and tight national budgets mean 
that governments have been searching for efficient ways of delivering healthcare (Ferlie & 
Shortell, 2001; Joumard, André, & Nicq, 2010). Hospitals have been the focus of attention 
because of the central role that they play in the delivery of healthcare. In the English NHS, the 
acute hospital represents 47% of the costs of the budget (Roberts, Marshall, & Charlesworth, 
2012). Hence, any attempt to control costs, meet rising public expectations for quality 
healthcare and control the clinical frontline (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Propper et al., 2008) would 
have to pay significant attention to the acute hospital sector. Within this sector by September 
2012 there were 40 492 hospital consultants at a cost of £5.6bn (Committee of Public Accounts, 
2013; The Comptcontroller and Auditor General, 2013). 
The perspectives and behaviours of hospital consultants are significant issues because the 
following figures (NHS Confederation, 2015) show how important the provision of healthcare 
by acute hospitals is: 
 The NHS has one million patient contacts every 36 hours; 
 In 2013/14, the acute hospitals: 
o Performed 16.516 million operations;  
o Admitted 15.462 million patients; and 
o Had 82.060 million outpatient attendances. 
From the same source, we learn that compared to its peers – Austria, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA - the UK had the 
lowest number of doctors and hospital beds per 1 000 population. Its average length of stay in 
hospital was lower and its percentage of national income spent on healthcare was also lower. 
Despite these figures, the NHS is under pressure to be even more efficient. The NHS could face a 
funding gap of £30bn between 2013/14 and 2020/21 (Appleby, Galea, & Murray, 2014; Hawkes, 
2012). A few factors drive hospital productivity. These fall into three areas: the external 
environment, hospital management and hospital operational processes (Hurst & Williams, 
2012). The external environment includes national policies that link hospital income to clinical 
activity and the performance-management system. Hospital management has a significant 
impact on hospital productivity. It includes good general management, clinical engagement and 
clinical pathway designs. Hospital operational processes involve reducing length of stay in 
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hospitals and moving patients and staff into community settings, improving staff productivity 
through meeting demands with fewer staff and reviewing the skills-mix used to deliver services. 
In the midst of an increase in demand and a funding squeeze, the scrutiny of NHS organisations 
has intensified from the regulator, the Care Quality Commission, and other official inquiries 
such as the Francis Report (Francis, 2013) and the Keogh Report (Keogh, 2013). So the NHS has 
to do more with less while being closely watched. 
I undertook this study because I know a number of the doctors at the hospital. They have been 
complaining for some time about what is happening. For them, every day seems to be a bad day. 
A “bad day” does not refer to patients because acute hospitals are places for dramatic 
interventions. The anguish of the hospital doctors involves the management of the hospital. 
Management declares some or other crisis virtually every week. This means that time for 
supporting professional activities (SPAs) is cancelled and direct clinical care (DCC) is delivered 
instead. SPAs include teaching, research, audits, reading, attending conferences, formal 
discussions with colleagues and visits to other hospitals. DCC sessions involve clinics, patient 
contacts and operations. Normally, when SPAs are “taken”, the consultant receives time in lieu 
at a later stage. However, when crises become chronic problems then SPA time is lost because 
the hospital is unable to replace it. 
What is happening on the ground? The details are to be found in the Trust documents available 
online from 2008. References have been made to documents but the actual documents have not 
been cited – or recorded in the references – to protect confidentiality. If needed, the actual 
statements could be verified.  
2.2 THE RESEARCH SITE 
The hospital is located in a large city in England. It serves about 750 000 people, making it one 
of the largest English acute NHS trusts. The population is diverse, with about one-third having 
low socio-economic deprivation, another third having average deprivation and another third 
having high socio-economic deprivation. The hospital operates from multiple sites but the main 
hospital is located in the area with low deprivation, with the other hospital closer to the areas 
with average and high deprivation. Services are fragmented and duplicated between sites 
because the organisation was formed from the merging of a number of organisations. Names 
and faces may have changed but the rationalisation of services is another wicked problem 
(Raisio, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973). A wicked problem is difficult to formulate and solve 
because it is essentially a social problem. One does not solve it but manages as one goes along. 
This hospital has a cumulative financial deficit of £277m (by 2013). It had a deficit in 2013/14 
of about £38m and the projected deficit for 2014/15 is about £40m. The audited financial 
statements have had adverse comments for every year that the Trust documents are available 
online. The hospital has been under special supervision for much of the time reported in these 
documents. Its income is not guaranteed but the hospital has contractual relationships with four 
CCGs in the geographical area in which its patients reside. Moreover, it has a contractual 
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relationship with NHS England to provide breast and dental services. Sexual health services are 
provided on contract with the local authority. So the hospital has to prepare documents, 
monitor its competitors and its own performance against contract, and make necessary 
operational interventions to keep to the terms of the contracts because failure to do so could 
result in penalty clauses being invoked by the CCGs. Competitive tendering for contracts 
requires that a hospital has to manage the relationship with commissioners. 
Just about everything that could go wrong in a hospital appears to go wrong in this hospital. 
There are severe shortages in the A & E Department. Consultants do not want to work there 
because it has a poor reputation. Registrars are unhappy to go there because of the poor 
consultant cover and a lack of time to study because it is just “work, work and work”. Registrars 
measure time from one professional examination to the next. Nurses are uninterested in 
becoming fulltime staff, preferring agency or locum positions because staff shortages make 
caring for increasingly frail and clinically dependent patients very hard. Mandatory national A & 
E targets are missed routinely and the hospital has to put in place corrective targets that it 
invariably cannot meet. Moreover, with capacity constraints associated with a Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) hospital, this hospital does not have enough resources to receive patients at its 
main hospital and also not enough wards to admit them.  
The hospital was built with a targeted number of A & E visits of 90 000 and it currently 
processes over 145 000 attendances. So, patients end up in the wrong ward and being moved 
multiple times during one hospital stay. That is a nightmare for the patient and the family. But it 
is also a problem for the staff having to deal with “bed-blockers” and their associated 
administrative burdens. Staff shortages and the use of agency and locum nursing staff mean that 
continuity of care is lacking. Hospital consultants, who intermittently contact their patients, 
often know more about the patient than the nursing staff and healthcare assistants. In fact, as 
part of cost-cutting exercises, cheaper, unqualified and under-trained healthcare assistants 
replace qualified nursing staff. 
Difficulties in primary and social care result in normally avoidable arrivals and admissions. 
They also complicate discharge planning. A patient may be well enough to be discharged but has 
to remain in hospital until the out-of-hospital arrangements are considered safe. The 
management of the outpatients is a problem as patients are often booked into the wrong clinic 
and see the wrong clinician. Patients are often not properly informed about the date, time and 
venue of their outpatient appointment. Clinics are also frequently rescheduled or they run late 
because of missing notes or the late arrival of staff. In operating theatres, staffs do not 
consistently follow infection-control procedures. Nursing documentation and record keeping do 
not meet conventional standards. This is worrying because in a hospital the spatio-temporal 
rhythm (Zerubavel, 1979) time is recorded in documents. When those documents are 
incomplete, the management of patients is compromised.  
The 2014/15-improvement plan of the hospital addresses issues such as the financial shortfall, 
the management of the workforce, problems in A & E, outpatient and inpatient process 
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management and clinical governance. It aims to rationalise the business processes that underlie 
these problems. A hospital functions as a complex adaptive system. It is made up of subsystems 
that function independently and have loops and feedback loops that facilitate communication 
between subsystems. Whatever happens in one area could potentially affect other areas of the 
hospital delivery system. As mentioned above, the hospital claims that problems in the 
community and primary care systems result in a deluge of avoidable arrivals at A & E. The 
combination of a poor reputation and financial cuts to meet a statutory financial obligation 
results in staff shortages in A & E and a shortage of wards, beds and theatres. The result is a 
hospital where the clinical staffs on the ground have fewer resources with which to attend to 
highly clinically dependent patients. As an example, patients end up in the wrong ward among 
patients who are acutely ill. These patients end up getting inadequate attention because they 
are in place until a more appropriate bed in a more appropriate ward becomes available. Given 
staff shortages, nursing staff have to attend to bigger patient loads; hence, they prioritise 
providing patient care and hope that they will remember to fill in details in the records later. 
From the 2013/14 annual report, this hospital has 244,720 A & E visits at its two main sites i.e. 
40 per hour. At the same time, given 7 730 births per year, this means 21 births per day.  
 
Table 2.1: Summary highlights from the 2013/14 annual report 
Category 
Per Day (253 working 
days/year) 
Per Hour or Per Day 
* Where appropriate 
Outpatients 2 338 
292 per 8 hour regular office 
hours 
Births* 365 days 21 0.88 per hour (24-hr days) 
Inpatients 725 30 (24-hr day) 
A & E 670 27 (24 hr day) 
 
So, we see a hospital that handles 292 outpatients per hour and almost one birth per hour, 
admits 30 patients and has 27 A & E arrivals that have to be seen by a clinician within 4 hours. 
Factor into the way these numbers play out the fact that the management of outpatient clinics 
does not meet conventional standards, there are shortages of midwives and obstetricians, there 
is a shortage of qualified nurses and available hospital beds and in A & E there is a shortage of 
consultants and middle-level doctors. At the same time, notice the row of ambulances in the A & 
E drop-off zone. The hospital receives about 150 ambulances per day. The target is a 20-minute 
hand-over procedure. The large number of regular ambulances has turned the driveway into a 
virtual ward.  
The hospital management has a statutory duty to balance the books.  This often means cutting 
clinical staff numbers – especially qualified nurses - closing wards and theatres. However, the 
hospital also has to meet other mandatory national performance targets. Many of the key 
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performance targets that relate to the four-hour A & E waiting time, the cancer pathway and GP 
referrals have been systematically missed (CQC Quality Report, 2013). This document is not 
referenced for the sake of confidentiality. According to the CQC Quality Report for 2013, for the 
workload in A & E, the hospital had 50% of the consultants needed. Nursing staff shortages 
meant that the nurses met the immediate clinical needs of patients but record keeping was 
accorded a lower priority. This was exacerbated when patients – with incomplete records – 
were transferred between hospital sites that are a few miles apart. The same report records that 
the hospital had three “never” incidents; i.e. serious incidents that posed severe risks to patients 
but could have been prevented had the necessary precautions been taken. These incidents were 
swabs left inside a patient during an operation; wrong site surgery and the wrong gas 
administered during an operation. In the annual report for the year that ended on 31 March 
2014, the Trust stated that the Coroner had issued a report that a doctor had administered 
penicillin to a patient with a known allergy to penicillin. Although it did not contribute to the 
death of the patient, this should not have happened. The same report also noted that the 
information governance procedures of the Trust were below required levels. Personal sensitive 
information about a patient was sent to the wrong fax number. The Information Commissioner 
did not issue a sanction under Section 1 of the Data Protection Act 1998 but the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the hospital had to provide the commitment that it would not be repeated and 
that the data-management activities in the hospital would comply with the relevant data-
protection principles. The same report stated that the water supply of the Trust – at one of its 
main sites – was decommissioned because of high levels of Escherichia coli. The matter was 
rectified but it appears to be a metaphor for the overall state of the Trust. Yet, the wards, 
corridors and offices of the PFI-funded building were bright and airy. In many cases, patients – 
other than those who were directly affected by particular incidents – did not even know about 
the drama below the surface.  
The management tries to do what is necessary to cut costs and balance the books. This means 
reorganising the delivery of the services and cutting staff costs. Efficient delivery means that the 
duplication of services at the two main sites has to be rationalised. The hospital management 
has had plans for this rationalisation for a long time. The aim is to centralise all unplanned 
emergency and complex care at the new hospital site, which is located in the area with low 
socio-economic deprivation. All planned elective and diagnostic services – for adults and 
children – and rehabilitation services are to be located at the other main site, which is about 
three miles away in the area with a combination of average and high socio-economic 
deprivation. Maternity services, which are highly visible, would be centralised at the newer site.  
These structural changes can only be effected once the situation at the newer site has stabilised. 
However, the new site cannot stabilise because the hospital does not own the site and all 
alterations have to be made by the private consortium that owns the PFI. It can cost £300 to 
change a light bulb in a PFI hospital. Moreover, stability might be a mirage because of a lack of 
staff to carry this out as the PFI hospital was built on erroneous assumptions about patient 
throughput, efficiencies and therefore staffing levels. Even if the staff were to agree to the 
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rationalisation of services, the consultation required at a local level with communities, patients 
and representatives of the public, including CCGs (purchasing healthcare services on behalf of 
patients), the local authority (which is responsible for community health services) and local 
councillors and Members of Parliament (NHS England, 2013), present significant stumbling 
blocks.  
Stabilisation can make “business sense” but it must be clinically led and have public support. If 
clinicians believe that the changes do not have much to do with the quality of care to patients 
but are more about financial considerations, it is often hard for them to accept. When local 
councillors and Members of Parliament agree about the financial issues but the political costs 
may be just a bit too high for them, it is a case of turkeys not voting for Christmas. Hospital 
managers and clinicians also would like to treat people at home to prevent avoidable arrivals 
and admissions. How can people, with chronic conditions be treated at home when the local 
authority budgets for these services have been cut over a ten-year period? How does an acute 
hospital step into the breach when the hospital itself is in a financially desperate state and has a 
poor clinical reputation? Who will relocate a family to work at a place like this despite the fact 
that it is a regional referral centre for neurosciences medical conditions, a regional centre for 
hyper acute strokes and a major cancer treatment centre? These medical specialities suggest 
that despite the underlying drama and the hospital’s poor reputation and on-going need for 
long-term financial life-support, it still has pockets of excellence.  
Some of the few things that the management can do are to cut the numbers of qualified staff and 
increase the numbers of unqualified and untrained staff, double-book their lists so that 
clinicians do more in a day, take away SPAs and require more DCC work, and close wards and 
theatres. In an environment like this when one adds an ever-increasing demand, with increasing 
numbers of avoidable clinically dependent ageing patients, the mandatory 4-hour A & E waiting 
time target, the 62-day cancer pathway target and the 18-week referral to treatment target, 
managers do anything to meet the target and lose sight of the purpose of the hospital. Clinicians 
take pride in their work and there is no widespread culture of deliberate poor work. On the 
contrary, people seem to want to do their best but work stress and structural problems can 
result in the serious incidents mentioned in the CQC Quality Report for 2013. Each of these 
incidents has huge impacts on everyone in the hospital. They are professionally damaging and 
emotionally exhausting and associated with huge drama and trauma. The hospital is turned 
upside down as people try to find out what happened and why it happened and some may even 
do a bit of blame shifting. When sensitive, personal data are sent to the wrong address it is a 
nightmare. Then when your water is undrinkable it may just be the end of the line.  
All of the above interventions by the management are achieved with expensive assistance from 
big brand management consultants with PowerPoint presentations and Excel sheets, which do 
not appear to take account of the wickedness of the social organisation of healthcare delivery 
and the spatiotemporal rhythm of the hospital as a complex adaptive system. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter set out the background to the study. It provided the context within which 
the main concern of the participants was formulated and in which they routinely sought to 
resolve that main concern. Chapter 3 advances an argument for the use of the classic GT as the 
appropriate research methodology for the conducting of the research and its suitability for my 
temperament and level of experience as the researcher. The chapter also explains how this 
methodology was used during the research project.  
3.1.1 Methodological Approach 
In the research proposal for this study, the purpose of the thesis was specified as being to 
identify the main concern of the participants and how they routinely resolve that concern. It 
was clear that there would be a need to understand how the hospital consultants made sense of 
their workplace and how that understanding informed their observed behaviours. Quantitative 
questionnaires or surveys would have created avoidable problems in these matters, especially 
with respect to how and why things are as they are (Miller, Dingwall, & Murphy, 2004). Having 
considered the alternatives, I decided to use a qualitative research methodology.  
An ethnographic approach (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) to making observations was an 
option but, owing to practical difficulties in the research environment (Pope, 2005), the 
complete observer role (Gold, 1958) would not be the most appropriate option.   
A decision to use classic GT is a full commitment to the totality of the classic GT process. This is 
the approach of Barney Glaser. Other “versions of grounded theory” exist; for example, 
constructivist GT (Bryant & Charmaz, 2010; Charmaz, 2006) and Straussian GT (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990).  There still are huge debates around adjusting the GT methodology (Bryant & 
Charmaz, 2010; Glaser, 2003; Glaser & Holton, 2004, 2007; Locke, 2001). I decided to follow the 
classic GT methodology rigorously, even though this was likely to take time as the process of 
abstracting concepts from fractured data through constant comparison is time consuming 
(Glaser, 1998). The development of concepts requires an openness and theoretical sensitivity to 
go where the data may lead. This suggests the maintenance of a degree of distance from the 
data, allowing for it to process subconsciously and tolerating the confusion and frustration 
along the way (Holton, 2007a, 2007b). Given my own temperament and academic training in 
sociology and philosophy, I am comfortable with the slow percolating processes of classic GT. 
3.1.2 Methodological Approach 
Classical grounded theory is a general research methodology that can work with any theoretical 
perspective and any type of data. The research methodology is neutral but the researcher is not. 
Hence, my chosen theoretical perspective is a version of pragmatism called Innocent Realism 
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(Haack, 2008). The epistemological framework i.e. the theory of knowledge that is consistent 
with innocent realism is foundherentism  (Haack, 2007). Innocent realism argues that the world 
is a reality that is largely, but not completely, independent of what you, I or anyone else believes 
about it.  However, it is not independent of what the community of researchers would believe it 
to be at the end of the inquiry. The opposite of real is fictional and imaginary. There is one real 
world that consists of natural things (rocks and tsunamis) and human artefacts (social 
institutions, theories and imaginary constructs). Innocent realism argues that human beings 
indeed claim, sometimes fallibly, to know some things about the world. Those claims about the 
world can either be true or false. Innocent realism suggests that truth and falsity depends on 
what is claimed (which is a function of human convention) and how things in the one real world 
actually happen to be. That opens a huge philosophical can of worms, with those who believe 
that truth is that which can be agreed or that with which one can get away with conversationally 
(Rorty, 1979). I do believe that there are things like hospitals, and that we are able to make 
claims about hospitals in the same ways that a police officer would try to establish facts from a 
crime scene or a plumber trying to find the cause of a water leakage. Academic inquiry is but a 
continuation of everyday enquiry with a number of “helps” (Haack, 2000). There is no doubt 
that the NHS exists and that it is not a figment of our imagination. We are also able to make truth 
claims about the hospital. That is not “truth” with a capital “T”. So, we can argue about whether 
clinicians or managers hold the balance of power in hospitals. If one researcher were to argue 
that the balance of power lies with managers and another argues that it lies with clinicians then 
both cannot be equally valid and true whilst being mutually exclusive.  The NHS acute hospital 
and the balance of power therein, at any given time, exists separately from what individuals 
believe it to be.  
The epistemological position that I adopt is that of foundherentism (Haack, 2000, 2007). It 
strikes a path between foundationalism and coherentism whilst avoiding their shortcomings. It 
suggests that the plumber does not start looking for the cause of the leak with the idea that 
finding the cause of the leak is a hopeless exercise or that one only has interpretations of where 
the leak might originate and that all such truths are equally valid. The purpose of scientific 
enquiry is but an enhanced form of investigation that aims to discover truth. The opposite of an 
enquiry for the establishment of truth is a sham. In this case, the enquirer investigates to collect 
evidence in support of a position that is immune to evidence. With an enquiry one observes a 
phenomenon of concern, makes informed conjectures about possible causes, works out the 
consequences should these conjectures be true, checks the conjectures against all the evidence, 
chooses a conjecture that best fits the evidence and prepares to adjust the conjecture against 
further evidence. Scientific enquiry is continuous with everyday enquiry with a bit of help from 
theoretical models, sophisticated controls, technology and institutions. Foundherentism 
suggests that the degree to which one is justified in making certain claims about the world 
depends on the evidence that one can obtain as well as the coherence with other claims that one 
accepts. Haack presents the ways in which one solves a crossword puzzle as an illustration of 
foundherentism. One has confidence in a particular entry depending on the clue at hand (partly 
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foundational) and the ways in which the proposed entry fits in with other completed entries 
(partly coherent).  
I accounted for my theoretical and epistemological perspectives in a bit of detail because it 
orientates the research (Creswell, 2013). 
3.2 THE GROUNDED THEORY METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section gives an account of key classic GT processes. Text boxes are used to provide 
indications of how these processes were applied in this study. 
Theoretical sampling and constant comparative analysis were the methods through which data 
were collected and analysed. The study took place within the context of a single acute health 
care trust – with multiple constituent sites - because gaining ethical approval from and access to 
multiple healthcare trusts can be complex and difficult (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Pope, 2005).  
 
ACCESS IN THIS STUDY 
The Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical) of the University of the Witwatersrand granted 
ethics clearance on 16 September 2011, Protocol Number H110911. The hospital granted ethics clearance 
on 6 March 2012, as R & D 941. The insider had convinced a divisional director of the relevance of the 
study to the concerns of the hospital. This divisional director supported the application for ethics 
clearance from the hospital’s Research and Development Department. The department required that the 
insider, a member of staff, be named as a co-researcher on all the application forms to the Trust, that a 
formal questionnaire be included in the application pack and that the early results be presented as an 
audit to the hospital consultants in a named clinical department. The University also required that a 
questionnaire be included as part of the research proposal. The questionnaire is a departure from classic 
GT (Glaser, 1998). Research into Glaser’s approach to GT solved the problem for me. Glaser writes that 
one should meet the institutional requirements and conduct the study by following the full package of GT 
steps and the methodology will correct the earlier compromises (Glaser, 2001a). However, I intended to 
“instil the spill” (Glaser, 1998) by asking general questions about the main concerns that participants 
faced on a daily basis and how they went about resolving those concerns. 
 
Ethics approval and access were sought in one trust and a case study was made part of the 
design considerations. Here a point must be emphasised that GT is a general research 
methodology that generates an integrated set of hypotheses that transcend person, time and 
place (Glaser, 1998). I took account of case study considerations as noted herein but advise 
against reading the research as if it had followed a case study methodology. I am merely having 
a dialogue with some elements of qualitative research methodology without necessarily 
straying into the theoretical debates between classic grounded theory and qualitative research 
methodologies. By engaging with non-GT thoughts and practices, I believe that I keep my own 
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commitments to classic grounded theory honest. I spent the next few lines writing about case 
study methodology and its potential relevance to this study to show that classic grounded 
theory has its own criteria and advantages and therefore classic grounded theory methodology 
was chosen.  
This study concerns a current problem that had been unfolding in a real-world context, with the 
boundaries between the issue being studied and the context not being clear-cut and multiple 
sources of evidence being used. The literature review presented in Chapter 5 clarifies the lack of 
specificity and boundedness, with references to “wickedness” and “complex adaptive systems”. 
A case study approach is recommended for exploratory, descriptive and explanatory studies 
where either existing theory has proved to be inadequate or new insights are sought 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). An instrumental case study approach is useful when one is seeking insight 
into an issue or to refine a theory (Stake, 1994). This study aimed at providing new 
understandings of what has been described as a danse macabre (Degeling et al., 2003), an 
unhappy relationship between doctors and managers (Davies et al., 2003) and as a problem 
without a solution (Edwards et al., 2003). Thus, the criteria for a case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Stake, 1994; Yin, 2014) have been met, with the hospital being the case. However, although case 
studies are good at providing in-depth descriptions of the practice and context (Murphy & 
Dingwall, 2003), concerns exist about the generalisability of their findings (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007). This study did not aim to generalise its findings because the principal goal was 
to establish the main concern of the participants and how they went about routinely resolving 
this concern. Hence, a deep understanding across a range of contexts would suffice (Charmaz, 
2006). Yin offers criteria to judge the quality of a case study; i.e. construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 2014).  
However, as noted earlier this is a classic grounded theory study. It has its own criteria: fit, 
relevance, workability and modifiability that are different from those for a case study (see 
Section 3.9 of this chapter). Moreover, because of the process of abstraction, a GT transcends 
time, place and person (Glaser, 1998). This meant that generalisability would not be a problem 
in this study because, as the researcher, I had committed the study to a rigorous adherence to 
the GT methodology and methods.  
3.2.2 Data Collection 
GT is a general research methodology that aims to generate conceptual theory from data. There 
are at least six sources of data for use in case studies (Stake, 1994; Yin, 2014). These sources 
include documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation and 
physical artefacts. Classic GT can use any data be they quantitative or qualitative. A fundamental 
GT principle is that “all is data” (Glaser, 1978, 1998, 2001a), which meant that I was not 
restricted to specific types of data. The case study sources of data just provided categories of 
potential data. Classic grounded theory allowed me to go beyond that. I could use any data, be it 
qualitative or quantitative. Moreover, the data are never inappropriate or wrong. What is 
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needed is to figure out the data for what they are (Glaser, 2001a) and work with them to 
determine what is happening. Hence, Glaser argues that the data might be:  
 Base-line (the best description that the participant can provide);  
 Proper-line data (what the participant thinks is appropriate to tell the researcher, 
irrespective of what the reality might be);  
 Interpreted data (data provided and processed by experts who treat their data as 
objective but in reality the data are altered); and, lastly,  
 Vague data (where the participant has no vested interest in telling the researcher 
anything so the participant is unclear).  
The researcher should follow GT inductive procedures to generate abstract concepts 
systematically, irrespective of the type of data (Glaser, 1998). 
 
MS201004-8 Memo on method 4 April 2012 Memo Number 8 
The doctors appear very guarded. It is important to put them at ease by getting them to talk freely and, as 
Barney says, “instil the spill” (Glaser, 1998). In that way, the data about their main concern and their ways 
of dealing with that concern should later emerge. Many are afraid because they almost have nowhere else 
to go. They have to work in the NHS or leave the service, which can mean emigration. So, one has to 
reassure them so that they talk freely. Leaving no trace seems important to them. The presence of the 
insider contact does help. 
3.2.3 Getting Started 
The aim of classic GT is to find out the main concern from the perspective of participants and 
how they go about resolving that concern. The role of the researcher is to let the natural 
organisation of social life in the research context emerge by listening to participants and 
observing them rather than by approaching them with preconceived topics and hypotheses, 
which may be of little or no relevance to them (Glaser, 2003; Glaser & Holton, 2004). Staying 
open to whatever the participants say and doing what matters to them (Glaser, 1998) are vital. 
The orientation for the researcher is to be open to what is actually happening and not to 
attempt to apply preconceived notions from professional interests or extant theories and 
frameworks (Glaser, 2003). The general problem, the problem as perceived by specific 
participants, the codes that may explain the general problem, the codes that may integrate the 
theory and the theoretical perspective are all potential candidates for preconception that should 
be avoided (Glaser, 2012a).  
3.3 RESEARCH POPULATION 
Researchers in healthcare settings who seek ethical approval need to have a clear idea of their 
research population.  
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RESEARCH POPULATION IN THIS STUDY 
There are 156 acute NHS trusts, which include 100 foundation trusts (NHS Confederation, 2015). By 
September 2012, the NHS as a whole was employing about 40 394 hospital consultants at a cost of £5.6bn 
(Audit Commission, 2013). 
 
The aim of the study, however, was to seek data that would contribute to the development of 
categories of an emerging theory (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009; Glaser, 1998). I used theoretical, 
rather than statistical considerations (e.g. representativeness and randomness). Decisions about 
data are determined by theoretical considerations not volume (Glaser, 2012b). In grounded 
theory studies, the researcher should stay in the field until the point of theoretical saturation 
has been reached while taking account of resource and time constraints. I was unable to say 
how many participants would be chosen from the population but aimed at holding interviews 
with between 30 and 60 doctors who had varying experiences of being permanently employed 
by an acute NHS trust. That would allow the perspective of the participants to emerge (Glaser, 
1992) and avoid the saturation of researcher preconceptions (Artinian, Giske, & Cone, 2009), 
thus increasing the likelihood of the emergence of a dense conceptual GT (Glaser, 1998). It is 
worth repeating that the substantive GT, although it is generated within a given data set, is 
transcendent of time, person and place, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1 above. However, it will 
not be a sole, comprehensive or complete account of what is happening in the substantive area. 
The substantive GT that emerges at the end of the study just has to account for much of the 
variation in the behaviours of participants as they resolve their main concern. 
3.4 PILOT STUDY 
The pilot study was conducted in two phases because of difficulties in the field. The first four 
research encounters were considered a pilot study. The purpose was to refine the approach to 
the field (Yin, 2014), the language to be used, and to make sure that the research process would 
be appropriate for achieving the research aims; viz. to identify the main concern of the 
participants in the substantive area and how they continually go about resolving that concern. 
In this regard, the importance of no preconception (Glaser, 2012a) and managing the 
complexities of actually conducting the research in the healthcare setting (Breckenridge & 
Jones, 2009; Pope, 2005) were paramount. 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION FOR THE MAIN STUDY 
The initial pilot study had indicated that the approach to the field, the seeking of consent and 
the conducting of the open-ended interviews would secure good quality data from which a main 
concern could be identified and a conceptual account of the resolution of that concern (i.e. a 
core category) could be generated. By then, I knew that I was ready to proceed with the main 
section of the data-collection process. The data were derived mainly from 49 interviews with 
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doctors from various specialities, with varying levels of clinical experience and clinical 
management experience. The doctors interviewed included males and females (Appendix 8). 
 
DATA SOURCES 
Data were secured from three sources: interviews, observation and document analysis. In classic GT “all is 
data” p.8 (Glaser, 1998), which allowed for formal interviews, informal discussions, observations, and 
studies from documents to be treated as data for recording in field notes and later analysis. 
Open-ended interviews provided the primary source of data. The interviews enabled me to develop an 
understanding of how the participants made sense of their workplace and the contradictions and tensions 
found there (Barley & Kunda, 2001). The initial interview framework differed from the interview 
schedule in the research proposal and the ethics applications because it evolved under the guidance 
theoretical sampling. The participants gave accounts of the issues that they faced, the tensions and 
congruencies between those problems and how they went about crafting their professional space within 
the context. It showed how their embeddedness shaped their multi-dimensional contingent and dynamic 
agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Greenwood & Hinings, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2011; Hwang & 
Colyvas, 2011; Seo & Creed, 2002).  
I sought written informed consent from the participants before the interview (Appendix 5). Only a 
handful agreed to provide written informed consent. . This was strange because the image of doctors in 
an acute hospital is that of very brave people who rescue patients from the jaws of death. They wanted to 
remain anonymous. They were afraid. Forty-nine interviews were conducted and analysed. This was 
sufficient (Charmaz, 2006; Mason, 2010) to reach theoretical saturation. The interviewees represented 
participants from all specialities, age groups, genders, levels of experience, and hierarchical levels. 
Given the initial difficulties of gaining access, the concerns of participants to remain under the radar and 
the constant uncertainties of an acute hospital environment, I used snowball sampling (Pope, 2002). Data 
were collected as field notes and analysed immediately after the interview or later in the day if the time 
allowed.  
All interviews were conducted at the hospital. Initially, meeting times and places were agreed in advance 
but often became difficult as doctors were called away to deal with the immediate life-and-death 
priorities of an acute hospital. I decided that, to get the interview data to be available at short notice, for 
doctors I would make use of an insider who would gather the data when doctors were available. The main 
issue was to get the participants to speak about what mattered to them. Classic GT methodology would 
facilitate the patterning out of those concerns. I conducted a second pilot study with another five 
interviews to test how the interview was conducted by the insider and the field note processes. 
Difficulties were ironed out. I made myself available to the insider as soon as the interview had been 
completed. I coded and analysed the data soon thereafter, after having been briefed by the insider. The 
insider was very comfortable with the process because it enabled the collection of the data for the 
internal audit that meets the immediate concerns of the hospital. I kept a summary of the research 
encounters to keep track of the interviews (Appendix 8).  
Another source of data was observation (Gold, 1958; Pope, 2005). It was a case of complete observer. This 
part of the data collection I could do by myself with maximum flexibility because the hospital is always 
open for business. The participants were aware that in hanging around, I was doing research and the 
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other staff were also aware of this. I relied on insiders to make introductions and all newcomers were 
informed of my presence and role. They were given the opportunity to have their actions and utterances 
deleted from the observation studies. People felt comfortable and after a while, I became part of the team, 
although I was just watching and listening. It helped that I did not make any notes during these times. I 
would make the notes after stepping out of the settings. Observations enabled me to see how the 
participants actually went about making sense of their workplace and how their relationships played out 
in context (Barley & Kunda, 2001) and how meanings were crafted inter-subjectively (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971) between members of different professional groups who 
delivered care to patients. I could get a view of individual-level agency and the messiness and serendipity 
that it implies (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011) rather than the manufactured 
purposefulness that retrospective accounts might present (Chia & Holt, 2009). 
I also extracted documents – especially records of the Trust Board – from the website of the Trust and 
official documents from the Department of Health and its executive agencies. The Trust Board documents 
reflected how the hospital management framed the field-level logics that emanated from the Department 
of Health. Thus, the interview and observation data were triangulated – a process in which methods that 
examine the same phenomenon are combined (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) – with organisational-level and 
field-level data as evidence of institutional complexity (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2011). I 
was able to retrieve minutes of monthly Board meetings for the past seven years and documents about 
clinical and financial strategies. Altogether, I retrieved about 50 documents over an 18-month period. 
From the documents I could extract contextual data for participant behaviours and choices (Merriam, 
2009; Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006), and track significant changes (Bowen, 2009) in the evolution of the 
institution being studied. Thus, documents added a richer understanding of the research context of my 
study. Document analysis can be used as a source of data (Andrews, Higgins, Andrews, & Lalor, 2012; 
Glaser, 1963) in a GT study. I treated the documents as data that were written into the field notes and 
subjected to theoretical sampling and the constant comparative analysis methods for conceptual 
abstraction. 
In qualitative research studies data from different sources are triangulated to minimise researcher bias 
and establish the credibility of the quality of the data (Bowen, 2009). Researcher bias is not a concern in 
classic GT because the methodology of constant comparison and theoretical sampling significantly 
reduces bias and the emerging theory transcends time, person and place (Glaser, 1998). Triangulation, in 
this study was not for confirmation but richness. Constant comparison, theoretical sampling and 
memoing ensured that if data from any of the three sources were relevant then it would earn its place in 
the emerging theory. 
 
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
The adoption of classic GTM is a commitment to a full set of mandatory procedures for data 
collection and analysis. Failure to carry out these procedures affects the quality of the GT.  
“To skip a step, particularly the middle ones associated with memoing and sorting, is to produce a 
theory with less conceptual density, less integration, less conceptual qualification, too much 
descriptive and conceptual flatness in places, and missed connections obvious to the statute 
reader.” p.16 (Glaser, 1978) 
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This study adhered to the classic method of data collection and analysis because I trust in 
emergence (Glaser, 1998, 2012a). I am inexperienced in conducting academic research and 
classic GT continually helps people like me to deliver PhDs that matter.  
Data analysis took place on three levels: the fracturing and constant comparison of data until 
interchangeable indices emerge; the conceptualisation of data into concepts, categories and 
their properties around a core category; and, lastly, the integration of concepts and categories 
into a dense, conceptual theory of relationships between concepts and categories (Artinian et 
al., 2009; Glaser, 1998). This study generated a substantive GT. A formal theory is presented as 
part of the future research suggestions in Chapter 7. 
 
DATA COLLECTION: NOTE TAKING 
I did not skip any classic GT steps because I had to follow a research methodology that has continually 
delivered conceptually dense and deep, highly integrated theories (Glaser, 1978). During the interviews, 
data were collected as mind maps. This assured the participants that their words were not being recorded 
verbatim. Afterwards the mind maps were written up as field notes on A4 sheets with double spacing and 
wide margins (Appendix 9). The constant comparative method allowed for two things to happen: first, the 
empirical mass of data was reduced to manageable proportions and, second, the field notes were 
transformed into categories and concepts (Glaser, 1992). The second part followed much more easily 
than the first because, with the first, I had to go through a tunnel of confusion and uncertainty as to 
whether I was on track.  
 
3.6.1 Constant Comparative Method 
“The constant comparative method is the continuing interplay between data collection and 
analysis and violates the clear separation between data collection and analysis as in positivist 
research design.” p.636 (Suddaby, 2006) 
The aim of constant comparison is the development of interchangeable indices that allow the 
researcher to move from the chaos of empirically fractured flat data to abstract concepts, 
categories and properties that provide theoretical umbrellas for the underlying indices. 
Adherence to the constant comparative process is important for the development of complex 
and conceptually dense GTs. 
“Using the constant comparative method gets the analyst to the desired ‘conceptual power’, with 
ease and joy. Categories emerge upon comparison and properties emerge upon more comparison. 
And that is all there is to it.” p.43 (Glaser, 1992)   
How many indicators are needed to saturate a concept? A concept should be at a higher level of 
abstraction than an indicator (Glaser, 2011; Glaser & Strauss, 2012). However, if it is too 
abstract it will incorporate too many indicators. If it is insufficiently abstract then it will 
embrace too few indicators and will not achieve conceptual density. Researchers construct 
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conceptual boundaries; hence, preconception always lurks in the shadows. However, it also 
illustrates the pragmatism and creativity in the GT methodology (Bryant & Charmaz, 2010; 
Suddaby, 2006). All concepts are provisional. The constant comparative process implies that 
concepts, with their properties and dimensions, have to earn their relevance in the theory by 
the systematic generation and analysis of data (Holton, 2007a). Constant comparison increases 
an analytic appreciation of the empirical data (Charmaz, 2006). The constant comparative 
process teased out theoretical links with existing data and provided leads for further data 
collection. In the constant comparative process, analytic questions were asked, hypotheses 
formulated, and hunches and assumptions recorded in theoretical memos. The search for 
additional data was grounded in the constant comparative process. GT uses theoretical 
sampling not selective sampling. In selective sampling, existing theory and hypotheses impose 
parameters for data collection.  
3.6.2 Coding 
The GT process consists of two coding stages: substantive and theoretical coding. Substantive 
coding, in turn, consists of two stages: open coding and selective coding. These stages are 
discussed in more detail below. 
3.6.2.1 Open coding 
Open coding is the fracturing and close analysis of data (events, actions, objects, interactions, 
gestures) from field notes. It is the first stage of the movement from the empirical mass of data 
to categories and concepts. In this study, coding was undertaken manually. Field notes were 
written on A4 sheets with a large right-hand margin. An example is attached as Appendix 9. 
Some researchers develop their own coding cards with reference numbers and indicators. I 
followed Glaser by coding in the margin to allow the relevant details to emerge slowly and 
pattern out whilst irrelevant details receded (Glaser, 2011; Holton, 2009). Memos recorded 
ideas on relationships between codes. These were later developed throughout the research 
process and sorted at the theoretical coding stage (Glaser, 1978). 
The following rule of thumb was applied to avoid under-coding and over-coding (Glaser, 2011). 
An incident (i.e. a piece of data in a document or a field note) was labelled after asking the five 
basic questions (see next paragraph). A label needs to have more than one incident to earn the 
status of a substantive code to prevent the researcher from being overwhelmed by thin codes 
and the codebook from becoming too unwieldy (Holton, 2009). The incidents are then 
indicators of the substantive code. The fractured data were closely analysed for similarities and 
differences so that they could be named or coded. I labelled the data on a line-by-line or 
segment-by-segment basis in as many ways as possible; i.e. there are no constraints during open 
coding without any consideration of relevance (Glaser, 1978). Being open to the nuances in the 
data was important for the complexity and density of the GT at the end of the study. Key 
operating rules were constant vigilance of the slippery slope of preconception, tolerating 
confusion, not talking but jotting down memos and trusting in emergence as the data was being 
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worked through line-by-line. Some researchers have raised concerns that fragmentation results 
in the de-contextualisation of the data (Ereaut, 2002; Locke, 2001). Classic GT proves that if the 
methodology is followed without adjustments, whatever is relevant should emerge as such 
because it will have earned its presence in the theoretical framework.  
I avoided impressionism and looking for themes, in this way avoiding the slippery slope into 
conceptual description (Glaser, 2001a). Asking the following five basic questions of every 
incident and writing codes in the margin allowed me to stay close to the data on a line-by-line 
basis: 
 “What is this study of?” 
 “What category does this incident indicate?” 
 “What is actually happening in the data?” 
 “What is the main concern actually being faced by the participants?” and 
 “What accounts for the continual resolving of this concern?”  
(Glaser, 1998; Holton, 2009) 
Coding means looking for patterns in the data and keeps the analysis on a conceptual rather 
than a descriptive level (Holton, 2007a). The questions keep the researcher on track regarding 
the main concern of the participants (Artinian et al., 2009). Coding is a move away from the 
immediacy and concreteness of an incident, event and utterances to concepts and then theory 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). To code is to adopt a theoretical perspective on the data and to name 
or label that theoretical stance (Charmaz, 2006). 
OPEN CODING IN THIS RESEARCH 
The ways in which participants dealt with their main concern were coded as: asking questions, 
dismissing, undermining, pretending, complying with, keeping head down, faking, deflecting, agreeing, 
disagreeing, hanging in, playing for time, distracting, diverging, side-tracking, drawing away, parrying, 
fending off, blocking, drifting, deviating, staving off, altering course, objecting, grumbling, commenting, 
moaning, prevaricating, niggling, griping, nit-picking, protesting, trivialising, carping about, splitting hairs, 
chopping logic, picking fault, querying, complaining about, evading, deceiving, reneging, undermining, 
discrediting, toppling, unseating, dissolving, undercutting, weakening, dissimulating, misrepresenting, 
double-dealing, limiting, complying, assenting, following, deferring to, concurring, acquiescing, adhering, 
yielding, fulfilling, reconciling, assimilating, blending in, getting used to, combining, amalgamating, 
compounding, mixing, synthesising, going along, comparing, considering, thinking through, deliberating, 
reflecting, ruminating, chewing over, appraising, analysing, looking into, probing, assessing and musing 
on.  
In each case, the empirical incidents were coded by gerunds such as the above to move from an incident, 
through to a code and a concept to a category to represent increasing levels of abstraction. Thoughts on 
relationships between were recorded in memos that were initially descriptive rather than analytical.  
I was very muddled initially because of being mired in constantly asking the same five questions and 
things not appearing to go anywhere. I kept on producing gerunds that did not appear to advance the 
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research. I wanted to speak to someone, anyone, but always remembered what I had been taught in the 
GT workshops and books and from classic GT senior fellows not to talk but to tolerate the confusion and 
trust in emergence.  
 
3.6.2.2 Coding and the use of software to aid the coding processes 
In qualitative data analysis (QDA) and GTM, there are divergent views on the use of computer-
aided data analysis software. 
Using this software means that the coding is faster, large amounts of data can be analysed and 
data can be analysed more systematically, according to specific criteria. Also because the 
researcher does not necessarily do the coding and analysis manually, the results are arguably 
more credible (Gibbs, 2013). 
Manual coding, however, retains the close link between the researcher and the data. GTM is a 
delayed action methodology (Glaser, 1998). Time must be allowed for preconscious processing 
as indicators slowly brew into abstract concepts and categories. Memoing is a deliberate 
recording of the process of abstraction. Fast coding and analysis can lead to non-grounded 
outcomes that can be linear, thin and lacking in conceptual density (Glaser & Holton, 2004). 
With computer-aided data analysis one can actually go a long way in the process without having 
a clue of what one has found (Pope & Mays, 2009). Manual coding is considered more efficient 
than computer-aided data analysis (Macmillan, 2005).  
Classical grounded theorists do not necessarily completely follow Glaser with respect to his 
preference for manual coding. Some committed classical grounded theorists have found the 
NVivo 2.0 program useful for selective coding and the memoing process (Giske & Artinian, 
2007). A combination of manual and computer-assisted methods in QDA would likely achieve 
the best results (Welsh, 2002). Welsh, like Giske and Artinian, advocates using software for 
memo management but finds it easier to figure out manually how themes and memos relate to 
one another on a large piece of card with pieces of paper and handwritten notes. In a review 
(Lewins & Silver, 2007) of some of the most commonly used software program for QDA, 
potential is informed by the features, strengths and weaknesses of the software options. The 
range of software programs is so diverse that no single program would fit every situation. 
Software is not neutral and its influence is contingent on the methodological know-how of the 
user in the context of particular software packages (Friese, 2011). 
 
MS111012-10 Memo on Method 11 September 2012 Memo Number 10 Manual Coding vs 
the Use of Software 
Temperamentally, I preferred, and used, manual coding because of the close interaction with the data and 
continued involvement, which facilitates preconscious processing. However, I might explore the 
possibilities for the use of data analysis packages in a future project and contrast and compare the 
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“grounded theory” with a manually generated classic GT. For now, I just do not have the money or time to 
learn how to use a software package. 
It is important to keep in mind the GT principles of remaining open and trusting in emergence. The 
application of specific criteria – as required by software packages, might result in forcing the data into 
predetermined frameworks. The main concern could be distorted and taint the understanding of how that 
concern is resolved. 
 
3.6.2.3 Theoretical sampling 
Classic GT is a general methodology that seeks to develop, through a process of induction, a 
theory that is “grounded” in the data from which it has been derived (Glaser, 2002a). Data 
collection, coding and analysis happen concurrently. As soon as the first data are “open-coded”, 
the emerging ideas, hunches and concepts are used to determine where to look for the next data 
set. This process is known as theoretical sampling, as the data-collection process is directed by 
the emerging theoretical concepts (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009; Glaser, 1978). These concepts 
are initially imprecise and are subject to constant comparison so that they are refined and either 
earn their relevance in the theory or recede into irrelevance when they do not pattern out 
(Holton, 2007a). During open coding, theoretical sampling is a very broad process as the 
researcher seeks to identify issues in the substantive area that are of concern to the 
participants. As these concerns pattern out and a main concern emerges, theoretical sampling 
narrows down towards the clarification of the main concern and its continual resolution. 
“It [theoretical sampling] focuses questions more and more on the direct emergence of the 
theory. Questions constantly change with the requirements of the emergent theory and 
theoretical sampling.” p.157 (Glaser, 1998) 
Theoretical sampling aims to clarify a pattern, concept or hypothesis. Later in the data-analysis 
process theoretical sampling can be used to verify category saturation (Artinian et al., 2009). 
Because of difficulties in conducting research within a hospital environment (Pope, 2002) 
theoretical sampling unfolded within snowball sampling constraints. 
 
THEORETICAL SAMPLING AND ETHICAL APPROVAL  
KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE PRIZE AND HOLD ON 
Theoretical sampling requires a preparedness to go where the data leads. That means, in this case, 
seeking to identify the main concern of the participants and how they set out to resolve this concern on a 
routine basis. Institutions require specificity. The University required a detailed interview schedule for 
the proposal and ethics approval. The hospital required detailed research protocols that provide 
exhaustive details on the sample and what as the researcher I intended to do with them for me to secure 
access and ethics approval. These are potential slippery slopes for preconception. This matter has been 
very difficult to resolve. Barney Glaser argues that one must do what meets institutional requirements 
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(Glaser, 2001a; Xie, 2009) and then go into the field using classic GT methods. Where one draws lines can 
be a matter of judgement. Things are not always clear and do get messy, and confusing, often.  
THEORETICAL SAMPLING AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS  
It is not possible to “instil the spill” (Glaser 1998, p.111) from documents in the ways one can do with 
interviews. However, the basic questions still guided the document analysis and served the purpose of the 
study, which was to identify the main concern and the variation in its resolution by the participants. The 
documents provided salient details of the structural, cultural and situational context of the main concern 
and its resolution (Bishop, 2006; Van den Berg, 2005). The emerging theory provides indications of 
where to search for documentary validation; i.e. data for the claims made by the participants. Hence, the 
documentary analysis was guided by the emerging theory. However, data from documents added richness 
when they proved to be relevant – through constant comparison and theoretical sampling- to the main 
concern and its routine resolution. 
 
Since theoretical sampling guides further data collection under the direction of the emerging 
theory, this means that the researcher follows intuitions and hunches that are always recorded 
in memos. Close examination of the data, identifying similarities and variations, raises questions 
that are recorded on memos and directs targeted data collection. A process of iterative 
movement takes place between focused data collection, analysis and memo writing. This means 
that theoretical sampling helps to define conceptual content, boundaries, properties and 
theoretical relationships even between indices. Data overload is minimised because theoretical 
ideas are continually tested against empirical reality. Theory development is grounded rather 
than being flights of fancy. As the theoretical ideas are tested and the skills of the researcher 
improve, so confidence is gained (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1998).  
I wrote memos during the theoretical sampling process. These memos recorded the evolution of 
categories and, when diminishing returns on further data collection and analysis were reached, 
I made the pragmatic decision that theoretical saturation for that category had been reached 
(Glaser & Strauss, 2012; Suddaby, 2006). I then proceeded with data collection and analysis for 
other categories, all of which remained provisional and had to earn their place around the core 
variable or category. That theoretical vision guided the data collection and analysis strategy so 
that the outcome of the study would meet the criteria for a GT; i.e. fit, relevance, workability and 
modifiability. 
3.6.2.4 Core category: its role and selection 
The goal of the research was to generate a theory that fits with the concerns of participants, was 
relevant to their daily lives, works in their context and is modifiable (Glaser, 1998). Central to 
the generation of the theory is the core category, which, once identified, delimits further 
investigation around it, thus minimising data overload. The main concern is a very concrete 
answer to the five fundamental questions raised during open coding. It emerged after about 15 
interviews and observation sessions. Along the way, there were a few pretenders to the status 
of main concern and it required significant theoretical discipline to stay on track. The 
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conceptual rendition of the main concern and its continual resolution took many (18) months. 
Gaining access to the hospital where this research was conducted and then meeting 
participants, together with the processes of constant comparison and theoretical sampling, took 
about two-and-a-half years.  
The core category explains how the main concern is resolved and therefore it accounts for much 
of the variation in the pattern of behaviour of participants. Therefore, “the core category 
integrates the theory and renders the theory dense and saturated” p.93 (Glaser, 1978). The 
identification of a core category is the step that changes the analysis from mere description of 
concepts and themes to the development of a theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Once I had 
identified the main concern, I consistently looked out for possible core categories via theoretical 
sampling and selective coding.  
The core category must earn its position among the underlying categories; i.e. it must emerge 
from the data and meet criteria for the selection of a core category (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Among these criteria are the following:  
 It must be central.  
 That means it must, more than any other category, be related to many categories and 
their properties.  
 That means it must be at the heart of the analysis.  
 It occurs frequently in the data and can be seen as a stable pattern related to more and 
more variables. 
 It relates meaningfully and easily to other categories. 
If that happens, then the core category accounts for much of the variation in the data.  Failure to 
occur frequently does not render a category useless. It only means that it is not the core 
category in this study. 
The core category embraces the variation of the data better than any other category. Frequent 
occurrence and centrality suggest that the core category relates easily to all the other 
categories. However, this also means that saturation for the core category takes longer than for 
non-core categories. Non-core categories that appeared compelling initially were “proceeding 
cautiously” when the main concern was initially thought to be dealing with ambiguity. However, 
proceeding cautiously did not meet all the criteria for a core category as mentioned above. I had 
to review the main concern and its resolution. The main concern was labelled “managerialism” 
and Rolling with the Punches was found to be the category that best integrated the theory.  
MEMO ON METHOD: NAMING THE CORE CATEGORY 
This was the statement that jumped from the page when I was trying to decide on something that had more 
grab to serve as the fulcrum for the theory. 
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“Doctors are not inclined to take ill-considered decisions. As individuals, we have too much invested in the 
system, especially our pensions. So, we just try to make the best under the circumstances. You roll with the 
punches and keep a knuckle-duster in case you need a knockout punch.” (Surgeon nearing retirement) 
I then had to go back to the earlier data to code for rolling with the punches. 
 
I decided to focus on Rolling with the Punches as core category for this PhD study. Proceeding 
Cautiously could perhaps serve as a core category for a post-doctoral study.  
 
MEMO ON METHOD: HAVING TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PROCEEDING CAUTIOUSLY AND 
ROLLING WITH THE PUNCHES 
Change in the NHS generated multiple ambiguities and paradoxes for the participants. This was a problem 
for them and they really needed to watch themselves as they decided to do what it took to survive day by 
day.  
Managerialism as a way of seeing the hospital, talking about it and acting within it appears to be a more 
comprehensive statement of the participants’ problem than dealing with ambiguity. Rolling with the 
Punches is an in vivo quote from a participant describing how he gets by and it resonated with the ways 
that other doctors dealt with their workplace realities. Rolling with the Punches emerged after I had gone 
some way towards adopting the Proceeding Cautiously category. The latter category still lacked some of 
the theoretical glue that held the other concepts and categories together. When the participant who used 
the phrase “rolling with the punches” said it, it was as if a light had gone on. His admission that exit was a 
difficult, if not impossible, option accurately sketched the constraints that the participants faced. They 
had to position themselves constantly to minimise damage, look for places to hide, keep a stiff upper lip 
and exploit gaps when they could do so. To continue the metaphor: sometimes one might not have the 
will to roll with the punches and one just takes the blows to the chin and the body. When I had identified 
the core category I went back to the data and with an open mind, though not an empty head (Dey, 1993), 
looked at whether the concepts would better fit either Proceeding Cautiously or Rolling with the Punches. 
Proceeding Cautiously was less central to the subcategories of Stabilising Temporarily, Resisting, Limiting 
the Impact and Living with/Adjusting to change. Rolling with the Punches integrated the latent patterns of 
behaviour better.  
 
The core category should be immediately recognisable to participants who read the conceptual 
account of what was happening in the substantive area. It should have “grab” for them (Glaser, 
1978). This later – in the audit presentation associated with this study – proved to be the case. It 
should be recalled that the study was registered as an internal audit with the R & D department 
of the hospital and the initial results were to be presented as an audit. The eyes of the 
participants lit up when they could see a pattern of behaviour that explained what was 
happening in their substantive context. This also served as an opportunity that qualitative data 
analysis would label as member verification of veracity. From a classic grounded theory 
perspective, member verification is unnecessary because the individual participant is aware 
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only of his/her understandings and responses. The grounded theory is an integrated pattern of 
responses to a shared understanding of a main concern. However, a grounded theory could 
provide a pattern within which the individual participant could theoretically make sense and 
find a place. This happened at this audit presentation.  
Having identified the core category, further data collection was delimited to that which was 
relevant to the core category and those categories which were related to the core variable 
(Holton, 2007a). This is another classic GTM mechanism to prevent data overload. A classic GT 
core category aims to promote parsimony; i.e. the maximum variation in the data should be 
captured in as few categories as possible. Data collection continued until the core category was 
sufficiently elaborated and its properties, dimensions and relationships with sub-core 
categories identified. This process continued until the point of theoretical saturation, which is 
discussed below. 
3.6.2.5 Selective coding 
Selective coding means that open coding has ended and the analyst has discovered the core 
variable (Glaser & Holton, 2004; Holton, 2007a). Selective coding takes place after the main 
concern and its continual resolution (conceptualised as the core category) have been identified 
and confirmed; further data collection and analysis are limited to those variables that are 
related to the core category and the emerging theoretical framework (Glaser, 1978). This 
process facilitates the clarification of the theoretical logic, thus reducing the number of high-
level concepts and categories. This in turn allows for a reduction of the number of categories, 
thus enabling theoretical integration and the emergence of a parsimonious theory. As this 
process unfolds and the theoretical bits and pieces start falling into place, a novice researcher 
can start believing. “Yes we can” might be a rallying cry to the highest office in a land but it also 
celebrates receding confusion and rising excitement in the emergence of a GT. 
3.6.2.6 Theoretical saturation  
Theoretical saturation was indicated when the process of constant comparison did not generate 
new directions for theoretical sampling and codes, and new data, attained through the process, 
did not add new insights (Charmaz, 2006). This is the point at which the researcher stops 
looking for new data. I stayed in the field long enough for the perspective of the participants to 
emerge (Glaser, 1992). This is a key process for lifting the study from the description of an 
empirical mass of data to a theoretical account of the underlying fractured indices. Otherwise, 
the saturation of preconception may be an unintended outcome.  
The sample size in classical GT should be governed by saturation (Glaser, 1998; Glaser & 
Strauss, 2012). A healthy tension between the GTM and the judgements of the practitioner and 
researchers should prevent fundamentalist tendencies in choosing a sample size (Suddaby, 
2006). One must nevertheless remain vigilant against premature cessations of fieldwork. In a 
survey of qualitative PhD studies (Mason, 2010), the sample size for saturation associated with 
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various research approaches is numerically analysed. For GT, the mean sample size appeared to 
be around 20-30 participants, and in GT studies theoretical saturation would not require more 
than 60 participants. This study required 49 participants. This point was raised more for 
information purposes rather than to specify a cut-off point for sampling. Initial open coding 
generated a write-up of four to six pages of notes of what I had heard, seen or read. Each line on 
a page could generate at least two or three open codes. Thus, one could end up with sixty to 
ninety codes per page. After a while, the codes were aggregated into categories, concepts and 
dimensions. Under the guidance of constant comparison, theoretical sampling and memoing, I 
reached a point where a data collection activity no longer generated six pages of notes with 
ninety codes per page. As I approached theoretical saturation, I only generated half a page to a 
page of notes and perhaps ten new codes. These new codes were reduced to three or five as 
theoretical relationships were explored with the existing coding bank. At that point, I felt I had 
probably reached theoretical saturation. Time and money might discipline one’s fervour for new 
data collection and analysis. 
The adequacy of theoretical sampling is reflected in the quality of the generated theory with 
respect to the level of theoretical integration.   
3.6.2.7 Theoretical sensitivity and literature review 
In classic GTM, the researcher consults the literature only after the main concern and its 
continual resolution has emerged; i.e. after the core variable has been identified.  
Theoretical sensitivity involves the researcher’s remaining  “... sensitive to the data by being 
able to record and detect events happening without first having them filtered through and 
squared with pre-existing hypotheses and biases.”p.3 (Glaser, 1978)  
It meant thinking about the data in theoretical terms. The five questions that guided the open 
coding process in my study facilitated theoretical sensitivity since I maintained a theoretical 
stance with respect to the data and my ideas were grounded in data through constant 
comparison and memoing.  
Theoretical sensitivity requires two things of the researcher: analytic competence and analytic 
temperament (Holton, 2007a). The analytic temperament must let the data “speak” through 
constant comparison (remaining vigilant about preconception, which is often deceptive), keep 
analytic distance and tolerate the confusion that is necessarily part of classic GTM while trusting 
in the power of the methodology to transcend the confusion. During the confusion, the 
researcher should just put pen to paper and write. This reveals preconscious processing, which 
is vital for conceptual emergence (Holton, 2010). 
Literature was used to develop the theory that emerged from the collection and analysis of data. 
Literature in the substantive area under study was not reviewed at the beginning of the study as 
a precaution against the literature contaminating, stifling or hindering my efforts to generate 
categories (Glaser, 1992).  
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3.6.2.8 Theoretical coding 
Theoretical codes are abstract statements that emerge during the process of sorting piles of 
mature memos that relate to a substantive GT (Glaser, 2013b). They integrate the substantive 
concepts with fit and relevance into a theory. Staying open and trusting in emergence facilitated 
remaining relevant at every stage of the classic GT. 
“Without substantive codes, theoretical codes are empty abstractions” (Glaser, 2005, 2013b). 
Substantive codes are the conceptual umbrellas (i.e. concepts and categories) that provide 
shelter to the multitude of interchangeable indices in their embrace. Theoretical codes are 
conceptual connectors “... that develop relationships between categories and their properties” p. 
38 (Glaser, 1992). Substantive codes provide abstract summaries of underlying fractured 
indicators. Theoretical codes link the substantive codes. The quality of the theoretical codes 
depends on the calibre of the substantive codes. 
“Theoretical coding is needed to rescue the theory, to enable the theory to be brought into relief 
from the flatness of descriptive codes where ... theoretical codes implicitly conceptualise how 
the substantive codes will relate to each other as a modelled, interrelated, multivariate set of 
hypotheses in accounting for resolving the main concern.” p.11 (Glaser, 2005) 
Theoretical coding is the process by which the saturated concepts are brought back together 
and integrated into a theory. Theoretical codes are theoretical statements about relationships 
between substantive codes and concepts. The theoretical codes – which may arise from inside 
or outside of the substantive area – support the emergence of creative, original GTs that have 
grab rather than being mundane (Glaser, 2005; Holton, 2007a). They can confirm substantive 
codes, express relationships between these codes and refine categories and their properties 
(Holton, 2009).  
Over the years, Glaser has defined a number of coding families with the aim of sensitising 
researchers to the possibilities for codes but the theoretical codes themselves have to emerge 
from the data rather than being preconceived and imposed (Glaser, 1998; Hernandez, 2009). 
The utility of Glaser’s list has, however, been criticised (Kelle, 2007) as being either too 
advanced for novice researchers who lack wide theoretical knowledge or superfluous for 
experienced researchers who indeed have deep and wide theoretical knowledge. While Kelle’s 
position is well argued, I chose to follow Glaser’s coding categories because classic GT 
consistently delivers innovative GTs. Moreover, novices appear to flourish when they remain on 
the straight, narrow and increasingly well-trodden lanes of classic GT.  
Theoretical codes can emerge from the wide reading of literature outside a substantive area 
being studied, in vivo codes, memoing and sorting of memos, and the development of theoretical 
models (Glaser, 1978, 2005, 2013b; Hernandez, 2009). Rolling with the Punches emerged as the 
in vivo core category that best accounted for the resolution of the main concern of the 
participants. It could also be defined as a basic social process (Glaser, 2005, 2013b). Theoretical 
coding clarified the relationships between the substantive codes and processes. It became clear 
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that Weighing up occurred continuously and often triggered changes in observed behaviours. 
Hence, time and change were involved in the theoretical code. It was not initially clear how they 
would relate. Stabilising Temporarily is a mode of behaviour that is adopted at the earliest stage 
of a career as a hospital consultant. Later on, the participant adopts a range of behaviours at 
various times, including Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Living with/Adjusting to. Thus, a 
basic social process (BSP) is the theoretical code that optimally links the emerging theoretical 
framework. It allows for a range of different behaviours, over time, through which participants 
resolve their main concern. Some of these behaviours may be considered to be negative (Glaser, 
2005) but this study does not place moral judgements on behaviours. A classic GT identifies the 
main concern of the participants and then provides a theoretical map of their ways of resolving 
that main concern; i.e. the conditions, consequences, properties and processes involved.  
These behaviours were not always linearly followed but zigzagged back and forth. This path 
depends on, amongst other factors, the make-up of the person and the material circumstances 
that prevail at the time. Each mode of behaviour is distinct and occurs at a particular point in 
time. Each stage also has distinct implications for subsequent stages. For the participant, the 
mode of behaviour may seem idiosyncratic but a sociological perspective may identify a pattern 
(Glaser, 2005). The acute hospital is but a set of varying conditions that reflect the main concern 
and its resolution. After having processed the ideas as sketched in this paragraph, I was able to 
understand that in this study the core variable Rolling with the Punches was also a BSP. Every 
classic GT has a core variable but it may not always have a BSP as a theoretical code. A BSP is a 
type of core variable but not all core variables are BSPs (Glaser, 2005, 2013b). The BSP unfolds 
into distinct phases over time, with at least two stages (Glaser, 1978, 2005). This is what the 
Rolling with the Punches variable does. A typology (Delbridge & Fiss, 2013; Snow & Ketchen, 
2014) could also have been chosen as a theoretical code in this study but the dynamic 
perceptions and behaviours over time would have compromised the reliability and mutual 
exclusivity of the different types. Thus, I was persuaded that a BSP was the more appropriate 
theoretical code and that for my study it was the most suitable way to frame the connections 
between the various observed practices in an integrated conceptual pattern. 
 
THEORETICAL CODING IN THIS STUDY 
The main theoretical code, Rolling with the Punches, is a BSP with four different modes of behaviour that 
occur in different stages: Stabilising Temporarily, Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Living with/Adjusting 
to managerialism. I did not choose a typology as the theoretical code because I struggled to clearly 
demarcate the different types of behaviours and how the behaviours change over time. 
The central process of Weighing up, which, as mentioned, occurred continuously and triggered changes in 
the observed behaviours, could be a cyclical loop that feeds back to all the other modes in the grounded 
theory. 
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The core category, Rolling with the Punches, appeared to work better as a BSP than as a typology. The BSP 
fit smoothly and required fewer variables. It provided a more parsimonious yet theoretically dense and 
complex account of how the main concern was resolved. 
 
3.6.2.9 Memoing 
A key GTM procedure is the writing of theoretical or analytical memos in the main “versions” of 
GT. During the constant comparative process, theoretical insights emerge. The researcher 
should always stop to record these as memos that are theoretical ideas about codes and 
conceptual relationships (Glaser, 1978). Memos are private and personal records of encounters 
with the methodology and the data, codes and categories and there are no rules as to how they 
should be written (Glaser, 2013a). The researcher registers what he or she feels about an 
incident, data, code or category, such as why is it important, what to do with it, how to enhance 
it and how to explicate its meanings and dimensions. 
Memos are of three types:  
 Observational notes (what the researcher observes in the field);  
 Methodological notes (what the researcher is going to do in the field); and  
 Theoretical notes (notes about theoretical ideas that emerge in the social context). p.61 
(Bryant & Charmaz, 2010) 
If the researcher suffers writer’s block, memoing and free-writing help to get over the bumps in 
the road (Charmaz, 2006). Little increments of coding, constant comparison of indices, and 
analysing and collecting data germinate and mature and later blossom into theoretical memos 
(Glaser & Holton, 2004). A well-executed GT study is the result of hard work, creativity, 
experience and perhaps a bit of good luck (Suddaby, 2006).  
The recording and management of theoretical memos were vital to the formulation of rich GT. 
As advised, I kept copies of memos on file and have a chronological set to visit and revisit as I 
carried forward the coding and analytic processes towards the generated theory (Charmaz, 
2006). Memos are the theoretical glue that keeps the research together. But they are more like 
the glue on a post-it sticker because memos change and are shifted around. The basic goal of 
memos is to record freely conceptual ideas and intuitions, about patterns in the data, into a 
memo fund that can be easily sorted or grouped and written up, resulting in a complex and 
dense multivariate theory (Glaser & Holton, 2004). 
Memo writing is a key step to raising the analysis to a conceptual level. It must be undertaken 
from the start of the data collection and analysis processes. Failure to write memos means that 
the study does not use classic GTM. The theoretical ideas in memos are vital to theoretical 
sampling and ensure that data collection remains guided by the merging theoretical ideas that 
emerge in the data. Memos are also the evolving record of conceptual links in the data. 
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Memoing, while collecting and analysing data, slows down the enthusiasm of the researcher so 
that conscious and preconscious processing can take place (Holton, 2007a).  
 
MEMO ON MEMO WRITING IN THIS RESEARCH 
Classic GT requires that there must always be time to write a memo. Memoing should not be delayed. 
Therefore, at each stage of the data-collection and analysis processes, I stopped to record memos for the 
memo bank. Stop, do not talk, and jot is the creed for memo writing (Glaser, 2013a). Most of the time, I 
gave each memo a date, a name and address of source in the data. At other times, I was just too tired and 
confused, so merely recorded the idea. I trusted in emergence when I tried to trace when and why I had 
recorded some of these memos.  
During the open-coding phase, I accumulated over 500 memos. Some consisted of a few words or a few 
lines and sometimes – later – a few pages. Memos consisted of short notes about concepts and ideas on 
theoretical sampling. Examples of these memos can be found in Appendix 12. 
Later memos were more developed as concepts were saturated and their dimensions and properties 
became clearer. I dated and labelled most of these memos to keep track of the evolution of theoretical 
insights. 
During theoretical coding, I wrote memos to explore the relationships between concepts and a statement 
of theoretical relationships for an integrated theory. This phase involved the sorting and resorting of piles 
of memos to decide between Proceeding Cautiously and Rolling with the Punches as core categories. This 
process resulted in Rolling with the Punches being chosen as the core category that best resolved the 
main concern of the participants. The main concern is not the only concern nor is the core category the 
only way that the concern is resolved. It is a complex statement accounting for much of the variation in 
the behaviour of the participants. 
 
3.6.2.10 Sorting and writing up 
Theoretical coding and sorting of memos happen simultaneously (Holton, 2009). Theoretical 
coding is the abstract model that emerges as mature substantively coded memos are sorted, 
thus integrating the substantive codes (Glaser, 2013b; Glaser & Holton, 2004). As the researcher 
moves iteratively between data collection, coding and analysis, emerging ideas, questions and 
hunches about theoretical linkages between data and codes, codes and categories, and 
categories and core variable are recorded in memos. Early memos contain unstructured ideas 
and the constant comparative method leads to higher-level reflection that is captured in 
advanced memos (Charmaz, 2006).  
When the researcher has established the point of theoretical saturation of the categories, the 
memos are sorted by category and compared (Glaser & Holton, 2004). As theoretical 
relationships were revisited and verified, so categories were consolidated and merged. 
Parsimony was facilitated as memos were integrated. The integrated theoretical relationships 
generated the main story line; i.e. the conceptual framework for the full articulation of the GT 
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through an integrated set of hypotheses. This process required paying close attention to the 
conceptual logic while being creative and allowing for serendipity and emergence to guide the 
process. Unexpected turns in the development of theoretical relationships resulted in further 
memos that refined theoretical relationships and the optimal location of concepts within the 
theory. In this way, the theory became dense, complex and parsimonious.  
A researcher could also make cards with titles of memos and place them on a flat surface, such 
as a floor, table or against a wall, where they can be freely moved around. Clusters of cards and 
diagrams also make the story line clear (Charmaz, 2006). Charmaz suggests that various 
theoretical codes be tried for fit. However, this could allow the researcher to force preconceived 
and extant frameworks on the memo bank. To avoid this, I trusted in emergence, as slow, 
confusing, frustrating and tortuous as it sometimes could be. Following the classic GT steps 
without deviation or preconception and trusting in emergence had me reach the threshold 
where I had something meaningful to say. 
GT advocates no preconceived outlines for writing. Theoretical sorting of memos is the critical 
step before writing. Memos are sorted by a deliberate reflection on theoretical links between 
categories, with the researcher continuously explicating that, which has so far remained 
implicit. Diagrams could make the relationships among theoretical categories clearer. In one 
study (Giske & Artinian, 2007), the researchers asked someone to draw a picture of the 
theoretical relationships that they had found because they had difficulty in putting the 
relationships into words. It took some time (13 revisions over a four-year period) before their 
final theoretical model was presented.  
The aim of sorting is to develop a parsimonious yet rich and conceptually dense theory. Some 
researchers choose to use computers to sort their memos but this has the potential to blunt the 
creativity inherent in the GT process (Glaser & Holton, 2004). When sorting is largely completed 
–a pragmatic decision in the end – and the main conceptual account is ready to be told, with the 
fewest possible concepts, the widest possible scope, explaining as much variation in the 
phenomena under study as possible, then the researcher is ready to write the first draft of the 
theory (Charmaz, 2006). The researcher would have a GT that fits the data, works, is relevant 
and is saturated. It would meet the criteria for a classic GT. When one has gone through this 
process then there is likely an appreciation for the appropriateness of the criteria of classic 
grounded theory as opposed to those from different qualitative approaches to conducting 
research. Classic grounded theory is not superior to other research methodologies. It only 
claims its right as a general research methodology that can work with any type of data to 
generate an integrated set of hypotheses about a main concern and its routine resolution. 
While the first draft of the theory is written only after the sorting of the memos is complete, 
writing up the GT should not be considered something that happens at the end of the study 
(Glaser, 2012b). It is a process that starts from the first days of the researcher’s going into the 
field, taking field notes, constantly comparing, conducting theoretical sampling and not talking 
but stopping to write memos about concepts, categories, dimensions, properties, methods and 
  
 
 
40 
theoretical relationships between concepts. Once a core category and sub-core categories have 
emerged, more mature memos are written about the relationships between the concepts, thus 
integrating the concepts. When those mature memos have been sorted and even more memos 
written about that process, theoretical completeness follows and the final stage of writing up 
unfolds.  
Writing up is not conducted from memory or a tabula rasa but is the writing up of the data, 
concepts and theoretical relationships that are already recorded in mature memos. The 
discipline of stopping to write memos leads to this point. Not writing those initially confusing, 
descriptive and sometimes nonsensical notes in the earliest days of the research and not 
constantly taking a theoretical stance with the basic questions will likely lead to the desperate 
plea: “How do I start writing?” A classic grounded theorist – even a novice – is prepared from 
the first hesitant steps into the field to write and is ready to write up a substantive GT at the 
point of theoretical completeness as mature memos have been sorted. A substantive GT is not a 
final or complete account of what is happening in a substantive area. The substantive GT is a 
conceptual account of latent patterns within a given data set. 
 
MEMO ON METHOD: SORTING WITHIN THIS RESEARCH 
I followed the classic GT method rigorously and built a considerable fund of memos from the first 
interviews and open, selective and theoretical coding. Memos on observations in the field and theoretical 
ideas about concepts and categories were also stored in the memo bank. Those memos that were related 
to the concepts were grouped together and questions were asked about the concepts and their 
dimensions and properties. Answers to these questions were recorded as memos. Memos that were 
relevant to more than one concept were duplicated and placed in more than one pile. 
The theoretical coding involved the sorting of piles of memos and moving them about. The biggest pile of 
memos related to Rolling with the Punches. The piles of memos were a visible manifestation of how the 
core category was related to most of the other categories and how it took much longer than the other 
categories to saturate. 
A requirement for sorting is patience. There are many mirages along the path. Confusion and exhaustion 
can lead to temptation to slip into preconception. Staying open is an on-going accomplishment. 
MEMO ON WRITING UP IN THIS RESEARCH 
During the writing-up stage I continued to write memos because in writing up the theory further ideas 
arise. A key consideration was to remain theoretical and conceptual rather than descriptive and 
comprehensive.  
The theory had emerged from the processes of constant comparison, coding, theoretical sampling, and the 
identification of a main concern and the core category that resolves that main concern. This accounted for 
much of the variation in the pattern of behaviour of participants within the research context. Once the 
theory had stabilised around the core category and relationships between categories, theory dimensions 
and properties, the writing-up phase “began”. Incidents from the data were used to illustrate components 
  
 
 
41 
of the theory without slipping into accurate description. The theory is an abstraction of the empirical 
mass of data. 
It took me more than six months to sort out the theoretical codes and begin writing the draft. It was a bit 
longer than Glaser’s time-frame (Glaser, 1998). Life got in the way of the PhD.  I reached the readiness 
moment after about 18 months of working with the data.  
I consulted the literature after the stabilisation of the emerging theory and the “beginning” of writing up. 
My aim was to look at the various issues that were raised by the emerging GT and then find how the 
theory is shaped and reshaped by literature from relevant substantive areas. I treated the literature as 
data for constant comparison (Glaser, 1998; Holton, 2009). 
 
3.6.2.11 Formal or substantive theory 
A GT is an analytical understanding of a problem in a substantive area (Charmaz, 2006). A GT 
study can generate one of two types of theory: substantive or formal theory.  
In a substantive GT study, the researcher aims to develop a theory of what is happening in the 
data in one area of study (Glaser, 2012b; Glaser & Strauss, 2012). The present study generated a 
substantive GT of how doctors in public sector acute hospitals have resolved their concerns 
with the use of private sector management techniques for almost three decades (Ferlie, Lynn, & 
Pollitt, 2005; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011; Simonet, 2013). The substantive GT emerges within the 
data set that the researcher has accessed. Theoretical saturation, theoretical completeness and 
the readiness to write are milestones for the substantive GT. It can also be a starting point for a 
formal theory through comparative analysis of different groups in other substantive areas so 
that its general implications can be clarified (Glaser, 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 2012). A formal 
theory does not emerge from a single case study. It emerges over time with sufficient data 
analysis, in a number of cases, over a number of years.  
In the present study, the formal and relevant literature review was conducted after the GT had 
emerged and stabilised (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1998). That was undertaken to check for 
similarity and difference to sharpen concept and construct formation and the hypothetical 
relationships between constructs. The GT delimited the literature reviewed to relevance to the 
emerging theoretical framework rather than popular scholarly literature on the relationships 
between doctors and managers. 
3.7 CRITERIA FOR THE QUALITY OF A GROUNDED THEORY STUDY 
This section discusses criteria for the quality of a GT study. These issues (in Section 3.7) are not 
central to a classic GT study (as discussed in Section 3.8) and are included for the sake of 
comprehensiveness. 
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3.7.1 Respondent Validation 
Some researchers who use GT rely on respondent validation (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008) to 
counter researcher bias and subjective interpretation during analysis. However, the 
introduction of respondent validation can be seen as just another level of data that require 
further analysis (Elliot & Lazenbatt, 2005; Emerson & Pollner, 1988; Seale, 2000). A GT study is 
a conceptual rendition of what the participants do as a group; therefore, the individual 
participant may not recognise the conceptual account of his or her own behaviour (Glaser, 
1998). Hence, from a classical GT perspective there are some reservations about respondent 
validation. 
GT does not require the researcher to go back to respondents for validation (Elliot & Lazenbatt, 
2005). Given the difficulties in conducting research in a healthcare environment (Breckenridge 
& Jones, 2009; Pope, 2005), I considered that respondent validations would likely be too 
difficult to obtain. If GT is done well then the iterative processes of theoretical sampling, 
constant comparison and memoing enable the researcher to routinely check that the emerging 
findings do fit and are relevant to the data (Glaser, 1998). Categories, properties of and 
emergent theoretical linkages are contingent until they earn their place in the emerging theory. 
The emerging fit between the emerging theoretical constructs and new data analysis should be 
sufficient to ensure validity. The data and research process are described in sufficient detail in 
this thesis to demonstrate the claimed fit between data and theory.  
The best argument for the validity of a GT is the affirmation by a knowledgeable person that the 
GT explains how the world of the participants works. When categories do provide frameworks 
that tie together disparate experiences, participants are often better able to manage their 
substantive contexts. The understanding of main concerns and their continual resolution opens 
up possibilities for participants to understand what is happening in their world (Artinian et al., 
2009).  
In the application for ethics approval and access for my study, I stated that respondent 
validation would be used. Actually, my main reason for doing so was for the purpose of securing 
multiple entries to the research site. When the results of the audit were presented to a group of 
doctors at the hospital, their responses validated the theory, although the audit was not 
necessary from a GTM perspective. 
3.7.2 Consistency Checks 
An outside competent and interested person (e.g. fellow PhD candidate or person with 
experience in GT) could carry out consistency checks by taking a sample of text and category 
descriptions. The person could then take the category descriptions and look for text from the 
sample that fits the categories. Similarly, an independent coder – perhaps a trusted friend 
(Costa & Kallick, 1993) – could also take the sample text, develop codes and make comparisons 
(with the codes assigned by the researcher) for coding consistency. Codes can then be refined. 
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The independent coder would look at the consistency of the analytical process and the outputs 
to deliver dependability and confirmability judgements (Lincoln & Guba, 1986).  
However, classic GT does not require a third person to confirm the quality of the analytical 
process and outputs. Concepts, categories and properties are subject to constant comparison, 
theoretical sampling and memoing, which constitute a constant process of verification during 
the theory-generation process (Glaser, 2001b). They have to earn their places in the theory and 
are adjusted as new data are collected and analysed. Given the interpretive nature of the 
research and the epistemological stance of the researcher, consulting a third person could have 
been a risky and inconclusive option. It helps to draw a distinction between talking to an 
aggressive, uninformed critic and a knowledgeable, diplomatic and sensitive critic (Glaser, 
1998). Sometimes talking too early can result in unintended forcing and preconception of the 
data. This is a potentially difficult issue from the time that a PhD student chooses classic GT as 
research methodology until the defence of the dissertation. I trusted my academic supervisor 
and Fellows at the Grounded Theory Institute for advice rather than a non-grounded third 
person.  
3.7.3 Internal Consistency 
Do the various parts of the theory fit together and explain the data? If GT has been performed 
properly then internal consistency should follow. Internal consistency can be undermined by 
preconception and researcher bias (Glaser, 2012a; Glaser & Strauss, 2012) and inquirer bias 
(Patton, 2015). The constant comparative process is a way of reasoning and dealing with the 
preconceptions that constitute the issue of reflexivity. Biases can be recorded as memos and 
earn their way into the emerging theoretical framework (Glaser & Holton, 2004).  
Internal consistency was also ensured through the way the participants were chosen and the 
data collected and analysed. Despite using snowball sampling, with the aim of following 
theoretical sampling, research participants were still chosen from all demographic categories 
associated with permanently employed hospital consultants at the chosen acute NHS trust. This 
facilitated triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Patton, 2015) across, for example, different 
sites of the same hospital trust, specialities, length of employment, gender and level of 
involvement in management. The hospital trust consists of a number of different providers that 
have been amalgamated over time. They are often a few miles apart and operate almost 
independently. This meant that the participants spent too little time with the researcher to be 
explicitly affected by the research and the researcher (Giddens, 1984; Landsberger, 1958). 
Moreover, data were collected from different sources; i.e. open-ended interviews, ethnographic 
observation and document analysis. Data were collected and comparatively analysed, under the 
guidance of theoretical sampling, for the main concern and its routine resolution. Rigorous 
adherence to the full package of classic GT procedures promoted internal consistency. As noted 
earlier, triangulation is a qualitative data procedure that is not requirement in classic grounded 
theory. The constant comparative, theoretical sampling and memoing processes by themselves 
dealt with the issues of researcher or participant bias as well as data analysis skewing of data. 
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3.7.4 Reliability 
“Reliability” refers to the consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by 
the same observer on different occasions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). 
Reliability was achieved through a systematic and clear documentation of the research 
processes, especially the data-selection, analysis and synthesis procedures. However, it should 
be emphasised that in classic GT the aim is a conceptual account of a phenomenon and not 
accurate description. The patterns – reliably generated through a process of constant 
comparison and theoretical sampling – are always open to extension and modification by new 
data (Glaser, 2001a). 
3.8 CRITERIA FOR JUDGING A CLASSIC GROUNDED THEORY STUDY 
Classic GT has its own criteria by which to judge the quality of a GT. These standards are: 
conceptual fit, workability, relevance and modifiability (Glaser, 1978, 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 
2012). 
3.8.1 Fit 
Fit is an aspect of external validity and shows the match between the concepts and the incidents 
that they represent. “Fit” refers to the extent to which the theory corresponds with the 
substantive context from which the data has been derived. I tried to remain open throughout 
the research process; I trusted in emergence, avoided preconception and forcing as far as 
possible, and was constantly committed to the full package of classic GT steps. The process has 
to be that one moves from data collection to the conceptualisation of a core category and its 
subcategories through constant comparison, theoretical sampling and saturation, sorting and 
writing up of mature memos, which are constantly tested, confirmed and welded together with 
a theoretical code into a parsimonious theory. The theory is grounded in the data from which it 
has been derived and thus provides a suitable theoretical account of the variation in the 
underlying data. The fit of a GT can be tested for emergent congruence by constant comparison 
with new data from a new situation. Fit is probably the most important of the four criteria for a 
classic GT (Artinian et al., 2009; Glaser, 1998). 
3.8.2 Relevance 
Relevance means that the concepts are appropriate for what is actually happening in the 
substantive area. It emerges with fit. The GT is relevant, suitable and significant if it allows the 
main concern of the participants and its continual resolution to emerge during the research. 
Since a GT is about the identification of the main concern of participants in a substantive area 
and its continued resolution, it is the participants who should be the judges of the relevance of 
the theory. When a GT is relevant to participants it has grab (Glaser, 1978, 1998; Holton, 2008).  
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3.8.3 Workability 
“Workability” refers to the capacity of the theory to explain and interpret what is happening in 
the area under study and predict what is likely to happen. The theory paints a picture that is 
readily recognised by those who inhabit the substantive area because it refers to the main 
concern and how participants actually go about the daily resolution of that concern. The theory 
is a conceptual account of what is happening in a substantive area, the process by which the 
main concern is framed and how it is resolved routinely. It works. 
3.8.4 Modifiability 
“Modifiability” refers to the capacity of the theory for adjustment when existing data are 
compared to new data. A GT is not a statement of truth or a final pronouncement about what is 
going on in a substantive area. More data can always be considered. Its inductive logic of inquiry 
leads to a tentative set of integrated hypotheses that is grounded in data. As new data are 
considered, the processes of constant comparison, theoretical sampling and memoing are 
activated again. This ensures that the existing theoretical framework should earn its place in the 
light of new data and modifiability reflects that animate quality of a GT. A conceptual account of 
a main concern and its resolution is abstract of time, place and people and is modifiable by data 
from a new situation. In such a context a GT can be tested for emergent fit (Glaser, 2001a). A GT 
is therefore dependable (Glaser, 1998, 2001a) and has potential for future development 
(Artinian et al., 2009). 
For access purposes, this GT was originally framed as an audit – with further development as a 
PhD study – for ethical approval purposes. This was a requirement from the Research and 
Development Office of the hospital trust where the research was conducted. The approval 
process included a condition that the initial results of the audit had to be presented to some of 
the hospital consultants. This was achieved with the presentation of the GT before the literature 
review was started. When the audit was presented to the department in which the original audit 
was registered, it already had “grab”, it fitted the consultants’ experiences and was relevant to 
them. It allowed them to see what was happening in a patterned way, and why and how it was 
happening. It also provided socially legitimated options for the consultants to deal with their 
main concern. That was a moment to savour. As painful as their daily experiences were to them, 
the GT had empowered them. It also was an encouraging milestone for a novice grounded 
theorist. One could call this an instance of member verification but that would be another nod 
qualitative data analysis that is not necessary in classic grounded theory methodology. 
Institutional requirements might sit more comfortably with these acknowledgements. 
3.9 AUDIT TRAIL FOR THE STUDY 
An audit trail can add rigour and transparency to qualitative research (Bowen, 2009) as a way 
of revealing the methodological and theoretical decisions made during the research process. An 
audit trail is usually not considered necessary for a classic GT study because classic GT has its 
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own procedures for delivering rigour, accuracy, credibility and validity. Auditing is a 
requirement in descriptive studies whereas conceptualisation is abstract of time, place and 
person (Glaser, 2014). A classic GT study that follows all the procedures of the methodology 
should meet the criteria by which to judge the quality of the study: conceptual fit, relevance, 
workability and modifiability. However, Bowen argues that an audit trail can promote 
trustworthiness and credibility in GT because the methodological and theoretical decisions 
made throughout the research process would be transparent and open to scrutiny. It should be 
noted that the concerns that Bowens raises are probably more related to QDA concerns with 
accuracy (Glaser & Holton, 2004). 
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Table 3.1: Audit trail for the grounded theory study (adapted from Bowen, 2009) 
Research Phase Evidence Location 
Ethical approval and 
oversight 
Association of Social Anthropologists of the 
Commonwealth Ethical Guidelines for good practice  
Appendix 1 
Summary of Research Governance Framework for 
Research within the Hospital Trust. Ethics Approval 
for oversight purposes from acute NHS Trust 
* Identifying details for the trust have been redacted. 
Appendix 2 
University of the Witwatersrand Human Research 
Ethics Committee (Non-Medical) Clearance Protocol 
Number H110911 
Appendix 3 
Participant Information Sheet Appendix 4 
Consent for Interview Form Appendix 5 
Consent for Participant Observation  Appendix 6 
Initial Interview Guide. Semi-structured for face-to-face 
interviews. Evolved as the study progressed. 
Appendix 7 
   
Literature review The initial literature review related to context for the 
study, existence of the problem and methodology to 
meet institutional requirements. Relevant literature 
was reviewed after the emergence of the GT of the 
phenomenon under study. 
Chapter 2  
Chapter 5 
Participant selection Participants were limited to permanently employed, 
full consultants (some consultants are employed on 
sub-consultant grades and were excluded). They had to 
be knowledgeable and willing to talk about their 
working lives. 
 
Data collection and storage Primarily in-depth, open-ended face-to-face interviews. 
Data were collected and analysed simultaneously 
under the guidance of constant comparison, theoretical 
sampling and theoretical saturation. Data were stored 
separately in both computer and hardcopy files. 
Confidentiality and anonymity applied. 
 
Raw data Field notes, site documents and archival material  
Summary of research encounters Appendix 8 
   
Partially processed data Example of field notes from interview/observational Appendix 9 
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Research Phase Evidence Location 
study 
Example of open-coded data from 
interview/observational study 
Appendix 10 
Example of open-coded data from group 
meeting/observational study 
Appendix 11 
Examples of early memos Appendix 12 
Example of process of abstraction from field notes, to 
open codes and selective codes and final concept 
Appendix 13 
Conceptual/Theoretical 
framework 
Main concepts in the theory Appendix 14 
Trustworthiness techniques Triangulation (multiple sources of data; i.e. interview, 
observation and document analysis about the same 
phenomenon) of data collection. Participants were 
chosen from various demographic categories under the 
guidance of theoretical sampling. Demographic details 
were not preconceived as relevant. Aimed to speak to 
as wide a range of consultants as possible so that the 
main concern and its resolution could be determined 
from a wide range of situations within the substantive 
context. Open-ended interviews and ethnographic 
observation data, site documents, archival data. 
Explication of process of abstraction from raw data to 
emerging theory. 
 
Final write-up of research 
report 
Included context, conceptual definitions, research 
design, research methodology, data collection and 
analysis (including coding process). Detailed discussion 
of classic GT methodology and processes. 
Comprehensive account of the emerging theory. 
Integration of the relevant literature. Detailed 
description and discussion of the GT. Illustrations 
(tables, charts and figures). Limitations and 
contributions (theoretical, empirical, methodological) 
of the study. Implications for management practice. 
Recommendations for future research. References and 
appendices. 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 
and 7 
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CHAPTER 4 ROLLING WITH THE PUNCHES: A GROUNDED 
THEORY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a presentation of the main contribution of this research study. It was developed 
using the GTM as described in Chapters 2 and 3. The GT Rolling with the Punches identifies the 
main concern of doctors who work in the publicly owned acute hospital sector of the NHS and 
provides a theoretical framework of how they go about resolving that main concern in their 
everyday activities in the workplace. 
The data were obtained from open-ended interviews with 49 diverse hospital consultants. The 
emerging theory accounts for the preponderance of behaviour in the substantive area, with the 
prime mover of this behaviour being the main concern of the participants. A GT is an abstraction 
and conceptualisation of data into concepts and categories, which are integrated into a theory. 
The theory is not true or false but is a set of plausible and grounded hypotheses about what is 
happening in a given substantive area. The theory of the current study was found to meet the 
criteria of classic GT in that it fits the data, it works (i.e. it substantially explains a 
preponderance of behaviour in the substantive area) and, given that the theory fits and works, it 
is relevant. The GT, however, is not a final statement. It is only a conceptual abstraction based 
on the data available at the time. It has the potential to be modified as new data become 
available. This means that it meets the criteria of a well-crafted GT; i.e. it fits, it works, is 
relevant and is modifiable (Glaser, 1992). 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
 The first part of the theory introduces and explains the main concern of participants; i.e. 
managerialism within the acute hospital.  
 Next is an explanation of the on-going Weighing-up process, which lies at the heart of 
resolving the main concern.  
 Thereafter, the chapter presents the core category Rolling with the Punches and its 
related categories of Stabilising Temporarily and a typology of Rolling with the Punches’ 
behaviours: Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Living with/Adjusting to the change.  
The experience of managerialism is primarily individual but it also has social dimensions and 
changes over time. Thus, the Rolling with the Punches GT is a multi-level dynamic theory of the 
interaction between the participant and the environment. 
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4.2 THE MAIN CONCERN 
“Acute hospitals have to achieve a 5% efficiency saving (ignoring accumulated deficits; i.e. historic 
efficiencies not made), with flat income streams; reduce bed capacity as care is to move into the 
community, whilst maintaining operational performance, quality and safety. … Hospitals face an 
insurmountable task that requires systemic solutions. The rationalisation of services and hospitals 
is needed. The system needs to be fixed; i.e. social, community, primary acre as well as housing.” 
(Hospital CEO, consultant)  
The main concern of the participants is managerialism, which is an increasing use of private 
sector approaches in the delivery of public sector healthcare. These changes affect the 
structuring of the work environment, what is being done and also how it is to be done. 
Managerialism challenges the consultants’ sense of self, personally and professionally. 
Doctors feel that they have lost control over their workplace. In every area, non-clinical 
managers make the decisions. 
“It used to be clinicians driving the bus and administrators helping them. 
We used to control our time and budgets. Today we do not have control over either of these. 
Managers take the liberty of telling us what to do and when to do it.” (Consultant microbiologist) 
“The people who make the decisions have never sat in front of a patient.” (Consultant radiologist) 
“In the hospital today we drown under the management-inspired paperwork, policies, procedures, 
guidelines, targets, reports, reorganisations, re-disorganisations, mission statements, sprinkled 
with business bullshit of corporate this and corporate that. I do not care about these things. I want 
to help patients.” (Consultant surgeon) 
Doctors deal with real people, who come through the doors of the hospital with hopes and fears 
associated with illness, but feel that the patient has been lost despite the clamour around 
patient-centredness. Doctors find that they are working in a world that speaks a different 
language. This language provides consumers (i.e. patients) with choice, money following the 
patient, payment-by-results and purchaser-provider split. They work in an environment of 
transparency, accountability, targets and performance-management, benchmarking and league 
tables. The hospital is portrayed as being open 24/7/365 and as a cost- and profit centre. 
Doctors feel that bureaucratic appraisals, clinical governance and revalidation have replaced 
their peer-to-peer accountability processes.  
“Hospitals have been experiencing a Cultural Revolution of money, management and targets 
before anything else.” (Consultant physician) 
The economic fundamentalism of management clashes with the ways that doctors frame who 
they are and why they actually arrive at work every day. “Managerialism” refers to the negative 
impact of these changes in the way the hospital is spoken about, how it functions and how those 
who work in it are expected to function. Managerialism is about the consequences of “hitting the 
target, ticking the box and missing the point” (Consultant cardiologist). 
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4.3 RESOLVING THE MAIN CONCERN 
4.3.1 An Overview of “Rolling with the Punches” 
Doctors resolve the main concern of managerialism by Rolling with the Punches. It is the core 
variable of the GT that emerged through the constant comparative analysis of, and theoretical 
sampling for, the data. This pattern of behaviour is a basic social psychological process that 
explains how the participants try to ameliorate the robust managerial transformation of where 
they are working, what they are doing and how they go about doing their work. It emerged from 
an analysis of the ways in which the participants spoke of and behaved in their workplaces. 
Rolling with the Punches is a pattern of behaviour that is composed of five interacting elements: 
Weighing up, Stabilising Temporarily, Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Adjusting to. The 
behavioural components of the theory lie on a continuum from resistance to total compliance.  
 Weighing up, the link between all the stages, is concerned with identifying and 
assessing what is happening in the environment;  
 Stabilising Temporarily is a stage that is gone through by almost all newly qualified 
consultants; 
 In Resisting doctors decide that they will try to use managerialism against itself or slow 
it down;  
 This stage is followed by Limiting the Impact, in which participants have a greater 
acceptance of managerialism with intentions of finding ways around its reach; 
 The final stage is Living with/Adjusting to managerialism. In this stage, participants 
decide to live with the robust approaches, systems and techniques of the private sector 
in the publicly owned acute hospital. 
4.3.2 Weighing up 
Weighing up is a fundamental on-going assessment in the process of Rolling with the Punches. 
The process of interpreting and determining the significance of what is happening is 
overwhelmingly and primarily personal but it has a social dimension as well. This makes it a 
multi-level process. Moreover, it can lead to change in the mode of behaviour over time. 
Although weighing up is on-going, it does not always lead to a change in the mode of behaviour. 
The content of the weighing-up activity is different, depending on the extant mode of behaviour. 
A particular managerial approach or technique could lead to a change in response from a 
participant or it could lead to no change at all. If it leads to a change, then some stages or modes 
of behaviour could be skipped. Thus, the same participant can take different positions on the 
same issue without necessarily feeling uncomfortable. Weighing up is a two-phase process: 
making sense of the change and doing something about it. 
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4.3.2.1 Making sense of the change 
Doctors come to work with a strong sense of who they are, what they have come to do and how 
they should go about doing it. They generally believe that they should be at the heart of 
whatever happens in a hospital. Patients come to hospitals because they are concerned about 
their health and clinicians are the people who can address their concerns. Doctors, as 
individuals and as a group, see themselves as intellectually and creatively above everyone else 
in the hospital. As far as their dealings with patients are concerned, they feel that they should be 
free to exercise their clinical judgement in the best interest of each patient.  
Doctors come from different personal and social backgrounds and have commitment structures, 
which make it very difficult to take collective action. They have a shared need to provide a solid 
middle-class standard of living for their families. Moreover, given their stage in career and life, 
they may have children at school at a later stage than many other people. So participants look at 
the changes in the environment and compare them to their own personal and professional 
needs, norms and interests. These constitute the filters through which changes in the 
environment are processed.  
The changes have been in the making for more than two decades. Thus, managerialism is a long-
term challenge for these doctors. Very few aspects of hospital life are unaffected. In terms of 
their world, managerialist intrusions are chronic and pervasive.  
“A & E is managed by dashboards and targets. Managers and the Trust Board watch the clock 
whilst clinicians deal with patients and their concerns.” (A & E consultant) 
“New technologies mean that patients who ten years ago had no options are now being treated. 
Patients also have rising expectations of the type and timing of their care. So doctors are facing 
increasing and relentless pressure to keep up with the rising demand and unending targets whilst 
trying to deliver the quality of care that we believe patients deserve.” (Consultant paediatrician) 
“The NHS is still like the old utilities that are funded by the taxpayer. The aim is to turn them into 
competing privately owned franchises that are driven by profits. That requires the turning of fixed 
costs associated with consultants into variable performance-related costs. We are threatened with 
long-term job insecurity.” (Consultant surgeon) 
In trying to interpret what is happening, doctors take account primarily of their own needs, 
priorities, past experiences and commitment structures. However, their primary reference 
group is often made up of people from their speciality. Hence, their immediate colleagues also 
shape their views. They do not respond to the managerialist technique, or approach, itself but in 
terms of what it means to them; i.e. is it benign, a threat, a passing fad or something serious? 
That meaning is projected into the future as a possible outcome that could be positive, negative, 
neutral or unclear. This shapes their initial mode of behaviour. The interpretations of significant 
others and actual outcomes are among the feedback loops that can influence perception at a 
later stage. 
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The sense-making process is not a linear process where all the facts are gathered, comparisons 
made, positives, negatives considered, then options clarified, and choices made. On the contrary, 
it is a more intuitive process. Meanings are discovered as the doctors go along. 
4.3.2.2 Doing something about it 
“There are no right or wrong responses to the changes in the hospital. There is only your own 
response given your own situation. If you are a relatively younger consultant, then you might have 
greater flexibility. If you are a bit older, then your commitments do not allow for as much change. 
So you do what you can to get by.” (Consultant oncologist) 
Perception of the managerialist intervention shapes their response not the intervention itself. 
“Doctors are not inclined to take ill-considered decisions. As individuals, we have too much invested 
in the system, especially our pensions. So, we just try to make the best under the circumstances. You 
roll with the punches and keep a knuckle-duster in case you need a knockout punch.” (Consultant 
surgeon nearing retirement) 
Just the way that they go about doing their work, primarily as individuals, makes it difficult for 
doctors to do things in concert with other doctors. Moreover, professionally, they would be 
largely unwilling to take actions that could undermine a core element of their profession; i.e. the 
trust that patients have in them. They have very little room to challenge the status quo without 
harming themselves. It hardly matters how upset they may be about what is happening; they 
will not readily do things that could be considered ill judged by others. They are, after all, 
doctors. Hence, they will do the best that they can under the circumstances; i.e. rolling with the 
punches. They will look for the small ways, embedded in their daily professional roles, in which 
they can express their dissatisfaction. Their pragmatism means that the taking of certain types 
of actions, those that might be openly confrontational or could arguably put patients at risk, 
would be out of bounds. They will take actions that are largely consistent with their ideas of 
clinical autonomy and medical professionalism. Managers do not diagnose and treat patients. 
The doctors know that they have significant latitude when the patient is in front of them. 
In hospitals, nothing is as calm as it seems. Managers and doctors do not fight openly in the 
corridors, theatres or wards. Uninformed people may not even be aware of the daily struggles 
that take place. There is intense jostling for power and influence between protagonists. 
Managers can constantly complain but doctors do not refuse to see their patients. Doctors, in 
turn, do not openly rebel, so management does not have much evidence to go by. Doctors meet 
their commitment to the patient in the room and beyond that they resist. 
Whatever they decide to do, there must always be an exit plan. 
In summary, the weighing-up process is central to Rolling with the Punches. It is the means used 
by participants to take what is happening and align that with their own needs, values and 
priorities. This frames the meaning of the issues for them. That meaning is primarily individual 
but also has a social dimension. That meaning is projected as a potential consequence that also 
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is measured up against actual consequences later. Thus, meaning can change as a result of social 
interaction and time.  
Then they decide what to do about it. However, this is hardly a revolution and the banging of 
bedpans in the corridors. Doing something about it involves a number of discreet attempts to 
hold on to how things ought to be for the time that the participant is working in the hospital. 
The weighing-up process is multi-level (i.e. individual and social) and dynamic (i.e. it involves 
change over time). This process informs the behaviour of the participants.  
4.3.3 Stabilising Temporarily 
This is the behaviour pattern of newly qualified consultants in their first or second appointment 
in a hospital. Generally, consultants stay in one place or two places over the length of their 
consultant careers.  
Stabilising Temporarily refers to their “keeping head above water” (newly appointed 
radiologist). The transition from being a registrar (who could call on a consultant when needed) 
to the consultant on-duty and on-call is substantial. It means being the most senior clinician in 
the area with responsibility for diagnosis and treatment of patients. They can call on their peers 
and seniors but as a consultant, they need to be, or become, clinically competent and get 
through the work. These pressures mean that despite their awareness of issues in the 
environment, they are unlikely to get involved. The key goal during stabilising temporarily is to 
become clinically credible and develop a good reputation at work. They will not help themselves 
or anyone else if they are eloquent on the broader medical-political issues but they are unable 
to finish their allocated work or their work is of dubious clinical quality. Hence, they just keep 
their heads down and work the extra hours, days and weekends to get through.  
Their personal pressures such as having a young family despite being not so young themselves, 
due to the years of training that it takes to become a consultant, mean that they have to pay a 
mortgage and pay bills for a car or two, private school fees, and a holiday or two per year. They 
often try to provide these things while having insufficient time to spend with their families as 
they try to keep their heads above water. Stabilising temporarily is about getting through, 
fighting exhaustion, developing clinical credibility and looking forward to having a private life at 
some point.  
“Long days and nights build up sleep debt and fatigue that do not benefit the doctor or the 
patient.” (Consultant) 
Clinical competence is also a gateway to the private work network that could relieve some of the 
consultants’ financial pressures. It is also a phase in their career when some newly qualified 
consultants develop relationships with senior clinicians, who can become mentors and 
sounding boards. Clinical experience and ways to interpret and respond to managerialism are 
communicated from the older generation to the newly qualified consultant. While keeping their 
heads down during this phase, they are also tweaking the weighing-up process.  
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4.3.4 Resisting 
“In our hospital, Trust finances and targets come first. Patient safety and quality of care are 
afterthoughts to the management. That is unacceptable.” (Consultant radiologist) 
Acute hospitals deal with people who often are at the boundaries of life and death. As sedate as 
these may seem, there are frequent interruptions of emergencies, loss, grief and fear. Hospitals 
are complex places where things are finely balanced. Whatever happens in one place can have 
consequences elsewhere. A hospital, therefore, is hardly a place where dropping tools because 
one has an issue with a particular management mechanism will be welcomed. Participants 
cannot readily take positions because they could potentially put patients at risk with radical and 
apparently ill-considered actions. Hence, professionally and socially, doctors are constrained 
from taking radical or ill-considered action. They place a high premium on the trust that the 
public has in them. Doctors could not engage in outright sabotage because it would go against 
the “does no harm” oath to which they swear professional allegiance. 
In the resisting mode, doctors seek either to subvert or to slow down the managerialist 
intervention. Resisting is a pattern of behaviour that has two associated strategies: subverting 
and quibbling. The difference between the two is a degree of overtness and subtlety. The next 
subsection clarifies the concepts “subverting” and “deflecting”. 
4.3.4.1 Subverting 
Subverting in this study means working to undo, undermine and undercut the managerialist 
threat to autonomy. This includes autonomy over the organisation of work, relative status, 
distribution of power, ability to deliver the best care, and the social norms of the profession or 
the participant as a person. Subversives are often well prepared. They study the relevant issues 
and present a formidable case, which managers and some of their peers can find scary. The 
subversive is one who takes a tool such as clinical governance and uses it to emphasise peer-to-
peer accountability rather than clinician-to-non-clinician accountability. The dissenter is one 
who argues that the environment should be safe not only for patients but for doctors as well. 
For the dissenter, therefore, doctors should not give in to ever-increasing intensification of 
demands from managers. This person would remind doctors that, when things go wrong, they 
are held to account and that having been under pressure is not a valid excuse when a doctor is 
subject to a fitness-to-practice inquiry.  
“I have complained about the lack of bedside or mobile suction in our wards for some time. Only 
ITU, HDU and 1 other ward have 100% bedside suction. On numerous occasions I had graded it as 
bad and it likely went into an audit. But when I graded it as extreme, things happened. The 
management went ape sh*t. But one must be careful not to overdo it.” (Consultant physician) 
The increasing use of guidelines and protocols reminds doctors that they have decreasing room 
to exercise independent judgement. The dissenter would argue that the European Working 
Time Directive (EWTD) applies to all doctors and not just junior doctors. Dissent takes place 
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within the moral constraints of daily work in a hospital. When attempts are made to reduce, for 
example, SPAs, the subversive doctor will reject these attempts by arguing that the SPAs are 
needed to support reflective clinical practice to improve services to patients. The same 
subversive will also back up the claims to provide material support for their positions.  
There are further constraints to subversive options. Doctors, as a group, are not known to act in 
ways that put them at risk. They are a cautious group of people and tend to avoid “extremes” in 
dealing with social problems. They would expect that their colleagues would not easily join in 
action that might be considered ill advised, imprudent, crackbrained or foolhardy, particularly 
involving taking a stand in unison. So there are limits to the support that a subversive doctor 
could expect.  
“What pisses me off most is the lack of balls and togetherness amongst doctors. We undermine 
each other, backbite, bitch, whine and moan about things in corridors and offices but do nothing 
about anything. We openly express our unhappiness about those who shit on us but no one does 
anything to stop this.”  
Another version of this is the argument: 
“Why bother? Resistance is futile.” 
Generally, it is very hard to be an underground dissenter; i.e. a subversive. Doctors are often 
afraid of being caught. They have a lot invested in the system. Falling foul of the NHS can be 
professionally and personally disruptive and costly. The system has its ways of getting back at 
those who dare to step out of line. The NHS is largely a monopoly provider of healthcare 
services. Some hospital consultants do provide private healthcare services but they remain a 
small part of the overall healthcare delivery system.   
Even if things become very bad and one decides to become a whistle-blower, professional and 
private consequences could be at least very unsettling, if not devastating.  
“A whistle-blower will be hit hard by the management team, ostracised, put on indefinite leave, 
suffer reputational damage and reported to the General Medical Council. It is for the very brave.” 
(Consultant) 
Subverting is a very lonely path to follow. 
“I have seen some people who were brave enough to take a stand against staff shortages, gaps in 
the rota, poor cooperation between departments and poor staff morale. People who take a stand 
and take on the management are demoted, silenced, disciplined and gagged. Doctors even frame 
these issues in terms of patient safety.” (Consultant) 
4.3.4.2 Quibbling 
Quibbling means raising hair-splitting criticisms, moaning and groaning, and finding faults that 
others might overlook, with the aim of slowing down and impeding inapposite managerialist 
measures.  
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“I might not be able to stop this but I can whinge, yell, bleat but I am a prolific incident form filler. 
The ward management and clinical governance people do not always like me but I am concerned 
about patient safety and the quality of the service…” (Consultant oncologist) 
The person adopting this behavioural strategy spends an inordinate amount of time on 
questioning issues of authority and legitimacy. Matters are seldom settled in meetings. On the 
contrary, this person is adept at agreeing and smiling in meetings and then in offices and 
corridors seeking to build coalitions that will revisit and possibly slow down if not overturn 
decisions. 
Given the institutional memory of prior change initiatives and strategies that might have 
worked, quibblers wait for a change initiative to be sufficiently slowed down that it grinds to a 
halt, for the next change initiative to start or for the change to blow up. The belief is that 
managers and changes come and go while consultants have jobs for life. This strategy seems to 
be a more nuanced way of resisting passively. 
“Managers come and go but being a consultant is a job for life.” (Consultant) 
“We have to find innovative ways to say NO.” (Consultant microbiologist) 
Consultants have become consummately skilled in putting spokes in the wheels of managers. 
Once a manager fails to move an initiative (or the invariably unending, sometimes contradictory 
set of initiatives) along, despite their lack of control over clinicians, these managers move on. 
These initiatives then die a quiet death before another ingenious management scheme is 
brought to life. 
Those doctors for whom resisting is a viable mode weigh up whether things are as they had 
hoped or feared and whether the outcomes are as they had projected. They take account of the 
behaviours of the advocates of the managerial initiative and the positions adopted by their 
peers. They then review their own perceptions and may make adjustments to how they see 
things and what they do next. 
Doctors who resist may find that there are “quiet whispers in the ear that there are no prizes for 
doing the right thing. You will only be labelled as a troublemaker and be ignored.” (Consultant 
nearing retirement) 
4.3.5 Limiting 
In the limiting mode, greater acceptance of the inevitability of the changes is present than in the 
resisting mode. What matters is a degree of acceptance of and resignation to the changes but 
with the intention of finding ways around these changes. With the resisting mode there is 
opposition, with the aim of either subverting the managerial intervention or slowing it down. 
With limiting, the opposition is still there but it is moderated by a degree of acceptance and the 
attempt to create a detour around, avoid and stay away as far as possible for as long as possible. 
Some participants may choose first to resist passively but find that this does not work for them. 
Others may choose the limiting mode after stabilising temporarily because of their own distinct 
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personal inclinations, experiences, priorities and values. Limiting means looking for ways 
around problems. It involves lying low and faking (“facading”). The one-to-one engagement 
between the doctor and the patient could be said to facilitate this mode and its strategies. 
“We can bleat and yell as much as we like but we will get only what the NHS will give us.” 
(Consultant) 
“The medical establishment has to sell the changes and in return they keep their clinical excellence 
awards and final salary pension schemes.” (Consultant) 
4.3.5.1 Lying low 
Lying low is a pattern of behaviour aimed at limiting the impact of the change. This involves 
strategies such as taking cover, staying out of sight, not being noticed, going to ground, keeping 
quiet and walking in the shadows. This is a pattern of behaviour that seeks to buy time as one 
plays one’s cards close to one’s chest. A participant may be inclined to abide by the change, or 
even not abide but still have the freedom to exercise a limited choice. The key is not to be 
noticed by the advocates of change or by those from one’s peers who may oppose the 
managerial initiative or those who are still sitting on the fence.  
Medical practice allows sufficient room for this type of behaviour. Doctors see patients largely 
on an individual basis. Doctors often deal with patients behind closed doors with no one else 
around. What happens in theatres, some wards such as intensive care units (ICUs) and multi-
disciplinary teams (MDTs) are more team based. But low-flying doctors have sufficient room in 
their daily practice to buy time either to comply or not comply without drawing attention to 
this. 
4.3.5.2 Faking it 
Masquerading is a strategy that involves making a show, giving the appearance of, going 
through whatever motions may be needed, or pretending to be complying. It is a paying lip-
service strategy. People who adopt this strategy appear to say and do what is expected of them. 
They go to the right meetings, say the appropriate things enough to be noticed and agree as 
required. This is, however, all play-acting and pretending. They comply sufficiently not to be 
labelled as a troublemaker but not enough to be labelled an early sell-out by some of their peers. 
Doctors are aware of the constraints that people may face but they expect a bit of a fight even if 
they fake it for a little while at least. 
This is a positioning strategy. Whereas flying low is about buying time to make up one’s mind, 
faking it is about situating oneself so as to take advantage when the direction that the wind 
blows becomes clearer. Faking it means doing one thing in public and, sometimes, making one’s 
feelings known in private. 
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The unending stream of meetings between managers and doctors where things are easily 
agreed on yet seldom executed thereafter allow for many occasions and circumstances for 
faking it. 
As they go about their different roles as hospital consultants, doctors weigh up what is 
happening regarding managerial interventions and how this affects them. Limiting the impact 
weighing up is about how well the participant is doing at lying low, with the aim of buying time 
to decide which way to go, or faking it as a positioning strategy to take advantage of whichever 
way the wind is blowing. In the latter case the participant is more inclined to believe that 
management is likely to get its way so it does not help to store up trouble for oneself. If limiting 
the impact does not work as a strategy then there is an even greater acceptance of the 
inevitability of the managerial direction in which the hospital administration is going.  
4.3.6 Adjusting to/living with Change 
This is a mode of behaviour at the compliance end of the continuum. It is a defensive posture. It 
involves a re-examination, re-evaluation and reassessment of one’s own subjectivities; i.e. 
priorities, values and beliefs. The main reason for adopting this mode of behaviour is that 
managerialism has been an on-going issue in hospitals for so long and the person who adopts 
this mode of behaviour believes that there is nothing one can do to stop or limit the impact of 
the change. Given that one cannot easily change jobs, this person believes that making the best 
of things is the way to go. Adjusting to, or living with, managerialism may require surrendering 
or changing one’s perspective of the situation or even one’s self-definition. But it means finding 
a new reason for going to work. 
“It is a case of we are where we are. I have to move forward.” (Consultant) 
Adjusting to the change involves the strategies of going with the flow, complying substantially, 
complying fully and waiting it out. This pattern of behaviour is about following the path of least 
resistance. It seeks out open doors rather than banging on closed doors.  
The individuals that adopt this mode of behaviour develop a keen sense of which way the wind 
is blowing and they prepare their sails accordingly. They make the very best of what is available. 
Many who take up lower-level clinical management jobs adopt this mode of behaviour. They 
take these jobs to know what is coming so that they can position themselves and protect their 
clinical sub-area. Those who do substantial amounts of private work may also take up this 
position. For them, it is important to know where things are going, be in the right place at the 
right time and be ready to take advantage of any opportunity that arises. They also cannot 
afford to be seen as being on the wrong side of management because private work often 
encroaches on NHS time. Even if the individual may have some residual reservations about the 
changes, their overriding interest is to maximise opportunities. 
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On the other hand, some people who adopt this behavioural mode may be just too tired and 
stressed to confront management changes. They have been ground down and the fun and joy in 
their work have long evaporated. They focus on doing the best that they can for their patients 
and on being available for their colleagues. 
“Increased workloads and managerial interference and just being ignored over the years have left 
me exhausted. Sometimes it is like treading water and struggling to keep afloat. Coming to work is 
not always great.” 
4.3.6.1 Complying substantially 
In this reconciling pattern of behaviour, the participant decides to comply with, surrender to 
and abdicate in favour of increasing and chronic managerialism. Complying substantially 
involves yielding to and falling in line with the proposed changes. However, compliance may not 
be 100%. The participant may not necessarily believe in the managerial project or in the 
competence of non-clinical managers but complies as is required. The participant could be 
someone who for all intents and purposes is compliant but is seething on the inside or has a 
heavy heart. However, some participants who adopt this strategy often shut out the anxiety that 
they experience. 
“I cannot afford to rock the boat. I am the breadwinner as my husband earns substantially less 
than me. We have a mortgage and young children.” (A & E Consultant) 
“I choose to be a blade of grass in the wind and not an oak tree. How I feel is unimportant. When 
you work for the NHS you sign over your life.” (Consultant physician) 
“Banging your head against the wall achieves sweet f*!k all. After a while you just give up on 
informing the CEO, MD and CD. You just do what you have to or move on in the hope that the grass 
is greener elsewhere. It is unlikely though.” (Consultant surgeon) 
4.3.6.2 Complying fully 
“I hope that this interview is anonymous.” (Consultant paediatrician) 
For some participants the fear of retaliation was visible in eyes overflowing with emotion. These 
participants may choose to do exactly as is required. Sometimes participants follow the rules 
completely either because they believe in them or because they are “dotting their I’s” and 
“crossing their “t’s”. In the first instance, it is clear that they are fine with the change. Some 
people can work in any environment as long as they can deal with their patients, which is what 
validates them. They go to work for the sake of their patients. Whatever else happens they 
choose to tolerate it. For others who comply fully there may be a degree of resistance but for 
some reason they follow the changes to the letter.  
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The rise in litigation often means that participants adopt this posture as a means to defend 
themselves proactively. They fully comply with, for example, guidelines and protocols, despite 
some of their colleagues resisting “cookbook medicine”. Fully complying, despite diminishing 
clinical autonomy, and affirming the managerial turn in hospital administration keeps one in the 
clear. It can result in less-than-optimal care or even more expensive care for patients. However, 
the overriding concern is surviving day by day and rolling with the punches. Others may follow 
the letter but not the spirit. One therefore could have an underground resistance operating in 
the citadels of compliance. 
“Working to rule, spending the necessary time with all the documents to slow down the system 
whilst technically promoting patient safety. However, time is money and money makes the hospital 
take notice.” (Consultant) 
This mode of behaviour is different from the quibbling strategy in the resisting mode. Quibbling 
takes a more direct position. The two modes are positioned at different ends of the resistance-
compliance continuum. 
4.3.6.3 Waiting it out 
“You can take being knocked back only so many times. After that you stop complaining about 
issues. Being accused of not being corporate sticks.” (Consultant physician) 
“My life at work can be described as working without enthusiasm. They have sucked the life out of 
me. I am no longer always the doctor that I had aspired to be.” (Consultant surgeon) 
“If you are working in an under-resourced area, after banging your head against the wall for so 
long then if you focus only on your work then you are accused of being indifferent. Yet no matter 
how hard you work you cannot do your job properly. There are problems with avoidable arrivals, 
some internal inefficiencies, and delayed discharges. Arrivals and discharge are the biggest 
problems.” (A & E Consultant) 
Waiting it out is a compliance strategy that is adopted by more experienced consultants, who 
often suffer from change fatigue and have become cynical or just plain tired of trying. They have 
given up on resistance, having banged their heads against the rising managerial wall for years 
on end, without much to show for it. They decide to do their best for their patients and be 
available for their colleagues, who may need their assistance. Beyond that they do not care. 
They have had enough. They are counting the days until they can proverbially hang up their 
white coats and stethoscopes. Even though they may have almost two decades to go, they are 
waiting for the day when they can draw their pensions. As for the regular meetings called by 
managers, they often arrive late. Their apologies are understandable because patients are the 
hospital’s priority and there are always difficult cases to handle. Those who are aware know 
that it is waiting-it-out resistance but the management cannot do much about it because it is 
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framed in terms of professional norms and values. The adoption of this strategy also means that 
participants will hardly say anything in meetings. They have said enough over the years and 
have found that managers disregard their ideas and do whatever they want to do. Their silence 
is taken as consent but they have sufficient professional wiggle room to mask their private 
dissent. 
“The vast majority of older consultants, including myself, are busy working out an exit strategy to 
retirement. We cannot wait to go.” (Consultant nearing retirement) 
“I have been an A & E consultant for more than 20 years. During nights and weekends on-call I can 
spend a long time on my feet. As I am getting older it can take a week or more for me to feel 
normal again. The future, the next 20 years before I will be allowed to retire, does not look too 
bright, does it? We are getting older and more tired and we are told to be more like a major 
supermarket chain, open 24/7. Guess what, hospitals are open 24/7.” (A & E Consultant) 
Table 4.1, in Section 4.4 below, summarises the GT that emerged from the data. In the left 
column is the weighing-up process, with the observed patters (modes) of behaviour in the right 
column. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
Table 4.1: Summary of the grounded theory: Rolling with the Punches 
 OBSERVED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOURS 
 STABILISING TEMPORARILY 
 RESISTING 
  Subverting 
WEIGHING UP  Quibbling 
 Making sense LIMITING THE IMPACT 
 Deciding what to do  Lying low 
 Mode-shifting triggers  Faking it 
 ADJUSTING TO CHANGE 
  Going with the flow 
  Complying substantially 
  Complying fully 
  Waiting it out 
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Managerialism; i.e. performance management, financial management, standardisation of clinical 
practice, transparent accountability and competition between providers, emerged as the main 
concern of consultants in publicly owned acute NHS hospitals. Doctors are finding that the 
environment in which they practise is changing, they are increasingly losing control over 
diagnosis and treatment decisions and they are losing control over their profession. These 
changes pose challenges to the ways in which they see themselves and their roles in the hospital 
and the broader healthcare debate. The participants are dealing with this managerial turn in 
publicly owned acute healthcare hospitals by adopting a behaviour pattern that can be 
described as Rolling with the Punches. This pattern of behaviour is composed of four different 
modes of behaviour: Stabilising Temporarily, Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Living 
with/Adjusting to the change. The mode that the participants adopt is contingent on triggers 
that are dynamic over time. These triggers stimulate the key weighing up process. Weighing up 
involves two activities: interpreting the significance of what is happening and deciding what to 
do about it. Significance is a function of the personal filters of doctors because these determine 
meaning for them and shape what they can do. Doing something can involve more of the same 
strategy within a mode of behaviour or it can result in mode and strategy shift.  
In the Stabilising Temporarily mode, the doctors just want to get through their work and 
develop the clinical leadership skills that are required of the duty consultant. In Resisting mode 
doctors try to subvert or slow down the increasing managerialism. In Limiting the Impact, they 
actively seek to constrain the impact of managerialism on themselves. Doctors adopt limiting 
the impact behaviours when resisting is not an option or is no longer feasible. Adjusting to 
(Living with) managerialism is the fourth mode of behaviour and is one in which they largely 
give up the fight and choose various compliance strategies. The mode of behaviour chosen 
depends on the on-going process of weighing up, which is the connecting link between the 
various modes. One mode of behaviour is not necessarily better or worse than any other. GT 
does not make value judgements about what people do. It only identifies patterns of behaviour.  
The weighing-up process goes on all the time as doctors go about their daily work. They are 
constantly evaluating the changing situation at work against their own personal needs, values, 
priorities and prior experiences and they project potential outcomes of what is happening. The 
evaluation process determines their mode of behaviour and the tactics within that mode. This 
weighing up can lead to their staying in the same mode or changing strategies or modes. In each 
mode, the weighing up is different. The triggers for mode shifting may be the actual outcomes, 
the behaviours and choices of close colleagues and managers or even changes in personal 
circumstances. Mode shifts can lead to problems at work with either colleagues or managers but 
doctors avoid doing things that put their continued employment in the NHS at risk. They are 
always Rolling with the Punches.  
This GT does not claim to represent all of the ways in which doctors are behaving. It is a 
theoretical account of the multiple ways in which doctors are dealing with their main concern. It 
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is a theoretical account that explains a preponderance of the behaviour of doctors. As a theory it 
fits, it works, is relevant and modifiable (Glaser, 1998). However, since a GT transcends time, 
place and person (Glaser, 2003), further research is needed to establish whether the theory fits 
other substantive contexts; whether its principal concepts continue to fit, work and remain 
relevant; and how the theory could be modified to optimise the emergent fit. 
The next chapter presents the literature review.  
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CHAPTER 5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
It should be noted that one could skip this chapter and proceed to Chapter 6 after having read 
Chapter 4. That would avoid the idea of obvious repetition between Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
However, the two Chapters serve different purposes. Chapter 5 reviews the literature that had 
been delimited by the grounded theory in Chapter 4, on a standalone basis. Chapter 6 integrates 
the grounded theory (Chapter 4) and the literature review (Chapter 5).  
 
This literature review develops a relational view of what it means to be a hospital consultant in 
a wicked, complex institutional environment. It argues that the contradictions, tensions, 
ambiguities and paradoxes in the acute hospital are constructed and not given. From the 
literature, our understanding of the theoretical implications for the individual actor at the 
intersection of the aforementioned issues requires a close examination and appreciation of 
structure, agency and observed behaviours as contingent, fluid and historicised. It opens new 
practice-oriented ways of theorising and researching about structure, agency, institutional 
logics and institutional work. From the literature review emerges a conceptual model of 
structure, agency and routine practices that shows how unstable and complex structures shape, 
constrain and stimulate various interacting dimensions of agency. These dimensions underpin 
observed practices with a loop backwards again, with modes of practice instantiating agency, 
which, in turn, iteratively creates structures. 
This literature review does the following: 
 It provides a short overview of the classic GT perspective of the doing of a literature 
review.  
 It examines the social organisation of healthcare as a wicked problem because of 
fundamental and inalienable difficulties in organising healthcare delivery. The acute 
hospital, which is the workplace of the hospital consultants, is framed as a complex 
adaptive system. Wickedness and complexity theory are important because of the linear, 
rational and reductionist management approaches that have been used to organise 
healthcare delivery over the past three decades. Wickedness and complexity are then 
situated within the context of the institutional complexities of the managerial 
transformation of the acute hospital. These two issues pose fundamental challenges to 
the performance-management system within the managerial acute NHS hospital. 
 It reviews literature on professionalism and the sociology of professions and examines 
an institutional approach to professionalism to show how medical professionalism is to 
be understood contrapuntally in light of other competing logics in the institutional field. 
It shows how there is not really a pure unadulterated medical professionalism but 
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rather a medical professionalism within an organisational context that is fundamentally 
different from that of a sole practitioner running a corner shop. 
 It takes some conceptual tools from the Foucauldian toolbox to see how structures 
shape and frame agency. The focus is on changes in the technologies of control over 
time. These technologies of control are not necessarily hegemonic in that as much as 
they shape and constrain agency they do stimulate and leave room for resistance. So 
from Foucault the literature examines power and resistance. Resistance is forensically 
studied at the points where technologies of control are translated into policies and 
procedures. 
 It examines literature on routine resistance to see how people respond to technologies 
of control when the elites do indeed have the power of retaliation. Thus, it studies 
everyday agency within a context of power.  
 It takes a close look at institutional theory because this theory has become a significant 
lens through which to study organisations. 
o  An archetypal approach to institutional theory provides a useful conceptual tool 
for framing the relative extents and ways in which structures, decision-making 
systems and interpretive schemes have changed or not. This is an important 
section because it provides a sense of the flux, contingency and historicity of 
structures, power and agency. However, one will not really get a clear picture of 
the difficulties with changing interpretive schemes until one takes account of 
some of the ideas from wickedness, complex adaptive systems, Foucault’s power 
and resistance, routine resistance and the next section on institutional 
complexity.  
o The section on institutional complexity shows how an institutionally complex 
field with a constellation of logics creates structures that are fluid and 
potentially contradictory, thus shaping, constraining and stimulating the agency 
of actors in complex and non-linear ways. Relations between institutional logics 
are not considered as given but are constructed as congruent or contradictory.  
o A more multi-dimensional, interactional, and therefore nuanced, understanding 
of agency follows since it underpins the modes of practice and observed 
behaviours. This literature review is that of a GT study. It started from the 
patterns of observed behaviours and these weave their way back as 
instantiations of a multi-dimensional and dynamic conceptualisation of agency, 
which iteratively feeds back as the micro-iteration of the institutionally complex 
structures that are found in the institutional field. It, thus, explicates the nature 
of intentionality by taking a closer look at institutional work; i.e. creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions within the context of the earlier parts of 
the literature review.  
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5.2 A CLASSIC GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH TO THE LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
This literature review was an opportunity to reconnect the study of organisations, the sociology 
of professions and institutional theory. In contrast to non-classic GT studies, I did not begin the 
study with a review of these bodies of literature at all and embedding research questions within 
existing bodies of knowledge. As was described in Chapter 3, the place and role of a literature 
view are different in GT studies. The main literature review was conducted after principal 
elements of the theory had emerged. It may be useful to recall the classic GTM view of literature. 
“Grounded theory’s very strong dicta are 
a) Do not do a literature review in the substantive area and related areas where the research is 
being done, and  
b) When the grounded theory is nearly completed during sorting and writing up, then the 
literature search in the substantive area can be accomplished and woven into the theory as 
more data for constant comparison.” p.360 (Glaser, 1998; Holton, 2008). 
Thus, I did not study the literature until the GT had emerged and I was writing it up. This 
ensured that the main concern and its continual resolution remained the focus of the research 
and not my preconceptions as the researcher or the preconceptions of other experts in the field. 
The GT, Rolling with the Punches, delimited the literature review. It ensured that time was not 
wasted on literature that was potentially irrelevant. It also promoted possibilities for consulting 
literature from a wide range of substantive areas – as is evidenced in the introduction to this 
chapter – thus enhancing the possibilities for novel insights from the literature (Holton, 2009). 
Literature was considered as data to be compared to the emerging theory (Glaser, 1998). The 
literature was reviewed after conceptual memos had been sorted and the core category – 
Rolling with the Punches – had emerged.  
During the literature review, I consulted a number of databases via the Wits University gateway 
to electronic resources. Given the complexity of the theory, I identified a number of substantive 
areas of study that could be relevant to the GT. These included organisational theory, 
institutional theory, sociology of professions, organisational change, role ambiguity, paradox, 
resilience, stress and coping, routine workplace resistance, NPM, professional boundaries, 
medical dominance, medical regulation, medical autonomy, professional self-regulation, 
institutional logics, wicked problems, routine resistance, critical organisational theory and 
discourse theory. They were not all identified from the start but emerged as the literature 
review proceeded. Most of the literature was from refereed journals. Some government 
documents and reports for quasi-government agencies and think-tank reports for government 
and its agencies were also consulted. 
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I examined areas where the literature supported the emerging GT and other areas where there 
were tensions and which therefore required adjustment of the GT through the addition of new 
concepts and/or reframing of theoretical codes (Glaser, 1998). A GT is not a statement of truth 
but a probability statement of relationships between concepts. Thus, it should be modifiable in 
the constant comparative process with new data. The openness of classic GT means that I could 
look for literature in multiple substantive areas that might be relevant to the emerging GT. 
5.3 WICKED PROBLEMS, COMPLEXITY AND SYSTEMS THEORY 
This section of the literature review examines wicked problems and complex adaptive systems. 
Problems can be seen as being on a continuum from tame to messes to wicked problems 
(Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007; King, 1993). Tame problems are problems where 
the definition of, and solution to, the problem can be readily agreed on even if it is very difficult 
to get to that agreement. Reductionist linear approaches can be used in which data is gathered, 
the problem is framed, options are identified and a solution is chosen and implemented; e.g. 
working out the chemical components of air pollution (Conklin, 2006b; King, 1993). Messes are 
problems that require a systems approach to solve them because one needs to understand how 
these problems fit in with other parts of the system. An example of this type of problem would 
be vehicle congestion on highways (King, 1993). There are no easy answers to messy problems, 
so calls for “taking the tough decisions” may have more rhetorical than practical value. Wicked 
problems (Conklin, 2006a; Rittel & Webber, 1973) are messy problems with significant social 
and political complexity (King, 1993). Linear, reductionist, mono-disciplinary, expert-driven 
approaches are inappropriate ways to “solve” wicked problems. In the discussion below better 
ways of dealing with wicked problems are discussed. 
In order to understand the behaviours of hospital consultants, it is useful to examine:  
 The wickedness (Conklin, 2006b; Rittel & Webber, 1973) of the social organisation of 
healthcare (Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 2005);   
 Healthcare as a complex field (Macfarlane, Barton-Sweeney, Woodard, & Greenhalgh, 
2013) with intricate links with non-medical issues such as socio-economic status, 
stressful life events, social relationships and isolation (Wallace & Wallace, 1997). It 
helps to see problems as being on a continuum from tame to messes to wicked problems 
(Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007);  
1. The hospital as a complex organisation (Godfrey, Nelson, Wasson, Mohr, & Batalden, 
2003; Karasek, 1979; Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2002; Shiell, Hawe, & Gold, 2008).  
5.3.1 The Organisation of Healthcare Delivery as a Wicked Problem 
The social organisation of healthcare delivery could be considered to be a simple problem to 
which rational, linear – or tame – solutions could be applied (Austrailian Publis Service 
Commission, 2007; Rittel & Webber, 1973). This is what the NPM managerial approach (Clarke 
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& Newman, 2006; Hood, 1991) healthcare delivery in the NHS suggests. One’s approach would 
be to employ experts from the private sector, develop good models of demand, take account of 
available resources, set priorities and then manage the numbers (Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 
2005). Better (i.e. private sector) management presumably leads to a better healthcare delivery 
system. This has, of course, been the approach in the NHS since the 1980s (Griffiths, 1983). 
Despite more than three decades of private sector management since the Griffith management 
revolution (Greener, 2002; Veronesi, Kirkpatrick, & Vallascas, 2013a), the NHS is still saddled 
with huge problems of how to organise the delivery of high quality, efficient and effective 
healthcare (Appleby, Thompson, & Jabbal, 2015). An alternative to the linear, tame, reductionist 
approach to healthcare organisation is that of wickedness (Conklin, 2006b; Rittel & Webber, 
1973). “Wickedness” in this context does not refer to a moral deficiency but rather to the 
cognitive ambiguity, uncertainty and social complexity of the problem “definition”, potential 
“solutions” and the implications for hospital consultants on a day-to-day basis as they go about 
their work of treating patients.  
Cost pressures, demographic and technological (IT), led to NPM public sector management 
reforms (Dent, 2003; Ferlie et al., 1996b; Hood, 1991). Hospitals are targets of such reforms 
because of their central role in healthcare delivery, the high proportion of the healthcare budget 
that they absorb and the difficulties in coordinating the administrative, caring and curing roles 
that they embody (Glouberman & Mintzberg, 2001). Low socio-economic status (Phelan, Link, & 
Tehranifar, 2010), stressful life events – including chronic strain and trauma – (Thoits, 2010), 
social relationships (Umberson & Montez, 2010) and social construction of illness (Conrad & 
Barker, 2010) are some of the non-health factors that influence health (Wallace & Wallace, 
1997). This makes it unclear how better management of the acute hospital will be sufficient to 
improve the way the institution functions and provide appropriate outcomes for patients. 
Health status is affected by housing, transport, education, social welfare and poverty-relief 
policies (Paton, 1995). How do better management techniques of the broader healthcare system 
and in the hospital address the problems posed by patients who are obese, are socially isolated, 
live in toxic neighbourhoods, have substance abuse issues and perhaps suffer domestic 
violence? Management reforms are not only rational planning exercises that could be designed 
and implemented by groups of experts (Roberts, 2000) as the independence, interdependence, 
non-linearity and emergence make management reforms difficult (Barach & Johnson, 2006; 
Holland, 1992).  
As noted earlier, tame or simple problems are those where the problem definition, the solution 
and the implementation processes are clear and unambiguous. Simple problems are also called 
“Type 1 problems” (Roberts, 2000). These are the types of problems that can be disaggregated, 
solved in parts and left to a few experts (King, 1993). Even building a most modern passenger 
aircraft can be seen as a tame problem. It is, indeed, technically complex but the project – as a 
whole – can be broken down into a number of constituent tame problems. As each individual 
problem is solved then the problem as a whole is solved. Messes require that one takes 
cognisance of the inter-linkages between parts to get an idea of how the whole functions (King, 
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1993). For messes, it may take time to understand how things fit together but agreement is 
possible. For as long as it is possible to develop consensus on what the problem is and what a 
solution might look like, then in the end linear, rational, albeit holistic, approaches can still be 
used (King, 1993). When problems are such that the definition and proposed solutions depend 
on one’s perspective then no optimal solution is possible. Consensus on problem definitions and 
solutions that involve multiple stakeholders from different constituencies is unlikely. Wicked 
problems have a single irreducible feature of radical dissensus (Raisio, 2009, 2010) and 
consensus is not possible (King, 1993). It is found in other situations as well. For example, how 
does one tackle issues such as crime, child poverty, terrorism and global warming? Conklin 
summarises Rittel and Webber’s criteria (1973) into six features while retaining the essence of 
their characterisation (Raisio, 2010), as detailed below.  
1. You don’t understand the problem until you have developed a solution. 
A wicked problem is one where the cause of the problem, and therefore its solution, depends on 
one’s perspective (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Wicked problems do not have a set of off-the-shelf 
solutions for them. Every solution that one attempts helps to clarify the problem at hand. Hence, 
an understanding of the problem and possible solutions are mutually implicated (Conklin, 
2006a). Thus, what are the causes of ill health?  
2. Wicked problems have a “no stopping” rule. 
Wicked problems do not have an end-point where the problem is solved. One usually stops 
when resources run out (Conklin, 2006b). In healthcare, reforms have usually followed one 
after the other (Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 2005). In the NHS, there is a history of managerial 
interventions in the healthcare system that has resulted in a policy hybrid due to the multiple,  
often contradictory attempts by experts to address the issue of the social organisation of 
healthcare delivery (Allen, 2002; Checkland, Snow, McDermott, Harrison, & Coleman, 2011; 
Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Exworthy, Powell, & Mohan, 1999; Ferlie & McGivern, 2013; 
Kirkpatrick, 1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002a). And an optimal solution has not been found. In 
fact, it might never be found. 
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong. 
Solutions to wicked problems are never right or wrong. Some solutions are just better or worse 
than others. No objective way to determine the quality of a solution exists because there are 
multiple stakeholders – with their own objectives, criteria and priorities – with equally valid 
perspectives (Conklin, 2006b). Patient choice (Pollock et al., 2011). Provider competition 
(Bartlett, Propper, Wilson, & Le Grand, 1994b; Le Grand, 2009a; Propper et al., 1998) militates 
against the need for cooperation in dealing with wicked problems. One-size-fits-all, universally 
applied performance management systems do not deal with the complexity and embeddedness 
(Greener, 2003; Pollitt, Harrison, Dowswell, Jerak-Zuiderent, & Bal, 2010) associated with 
wicked problems in healthcare organisation.  
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4. Every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel. 
Social complexity makes superficially similar problems actually unique. Small details can be 
significant. Given the multiple perspectives – each of which contains a grain of the truth 
(Roberts, 2000) – at play, small may be relative when it comes to wicked problems. 
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”. 
Despite the difficulties in defining the problem, one has to try to solve the problem in terms of 
what one believes the solution to be. The planner has no right to be wrong (Rittel & Webber, 
1973). Every intervention has consequences that may be difficult to undo and changes the 
nature of the problem and the solutions that follow.  
 
6. Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions. 
Given the difficulties in defining what the wicked problem might be, it becomes hard to see what 
possible solutions could be tried. The problem and the solution are mutually constituted. 
Interventions in wicked problems cannot be tested before they are implemented. Feedback 
loops and sub-problem interactions often lead to waves of unintended consequences (Conklin, 
2006b; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Widening a highway to ease traffic congestion might do 
exactly that but it could also result in even more traffic congestion. Similarly, building a hospital 
is based on certain assumptions and once that hospital has been built one has to deliver 
healthcare within given physical constraints. Hence, one needs to have the broadest input from 
relevant stakeholders (Checkland, 1999; Raisio, 2009, 2010). Wicked problems demand a 
preparedness to deal with uncertainty, ambiguity and discovery (Klein, 1999, 2011). 
5.3.2 Summary of Literature on Wicked Problems 
The wickedness of problems does not mean that one should despair (Raisio, 2010). On the 
contrary, it requires that one acknowledge the nature of the problem at hand and learn to 
structure interventions accordingly (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007; Shiell et al., 
2008).  
Wicked problems defy rational and linear approaches and require an ability to deal with 
ambiguity and uncertainty. These problems cannot be tamed (Conklin, 2006b; Roberts, 2000) 
let alone solved by experts. A process that starts with defining the problem, gathering data, 
determining options, deciding on a solution and implementing the solution, and ends with 
evaluating the solution is inappropriate in dealing with wicked problems (Conklin, 2006b). Yet, 
that has been the case with the provider competition, patient choice and money following the 
patient, bureaucratisation, standardisation, targets, sanctions, performance management, 
transparent accountability and the use of audit technologies in the management of the acute 
hospital. Wicked problems are social problems because appropriate ideas about the problem 
and the solution are likely to emerge in an approach that is open, collaborative, consultative and 
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emergent because there are no final problem definitions or solutions. The management of 
wicked problems requires the application of an open collective mind (Weick & Roberts, 1993), 
collective intelligence (Zara, 2005), a shared understanding (Conklin, 2006b) and public 
deliberation (Raisio, 2010).  
The process of dealing with wicked problems suggests managing by discovery rather than 
managing by objectives (Klein, 1999, 2011). Wicked problems are best addressed by involving 
all relevant stakeholders. They require a process that allows all who have material interests in 
the matter to be involved in framing and considering the relevant policy options and to consider 
the merits of each option patiently and unhurriedly in the light of multiple and often conflicting 
values, beliefs, assumptions and priorities (Raisio, 2010). With wicked problems, every 
perspective can be considered to contain a grain of truth (Roberts, 2000) and the best solution 
is merely an on-going accomplishment of dialogue and deliberation. At this point one should 
stop and take account of my philosophical and epistemological perspectives that I had outlined 
in Chapter 3. The deliberate involvement of all stakeholders allows one to better manage the 
inherent fragmentation that is associated with wicked problems (Conklin, 2006b). Experts can 
play a role in that they could help to frame and work with the inputs of the different 
stakeholders, who are likely to come from different sectors and organisations (Austrailian 
Publis Service Commission, 2007). But experts cannot lock themselves up in a room when they 
set out to reach solutions after which smoke emerges from the chimneystack. Since the 1980s 
significant stakeholders have been excluded from the healthcare policy-making process 
(Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b; Klein, 2013). Between 2000 and 2014 healthcare reform in the 
NHS experienced a revolving door between healthcare policy-making structures and 
management consulting firms (Leys & Player, 2011; Oliver, 2014). Wicked problems involve 
changes in behaviours of people (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007). The 
deliberative involvement of all stakeholders in the processes of farming the problems and the 
solution (Raisio, 2010) is indispensable to making progress with wicked problems. 
5.3.3 Complexity Theory 
Concepts from systems analysis could be used to analyse complex organisations (Checkland, 
1981; Perrow, 1986). These include subsystems which act independently and in parallel, while 
constantly reacting to what is happening in other subsystems and in so doing shaping the 
behaviour of the whole system (Holland, 1992; McKelvey, 1999). Decisions are made 
independently within each self-organising subsystem so that the overall behaviour of the 
system is the result of the decisions made and reactions to what is happening within 
subsystems (Waldrop, 1994). A water molecule is made of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen 
atoms. When millions of water molecules are put together in the same container, they acquire a 
collective property (i.e. liquidity) which a single water molecule on its own, does not have. 
Liquidity is an emergent property (Waldrop, 1994). Emergence means that the whole structure 
is more than the sum of its parts (Checkland, 1981). Independent subsystems interact with one 
another and have linkages with, and feedback loops to, other similarly independent subsystems. 
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Hence, a non-linear relationship exists between inputs and outputs so that small inputs can 
have significant outputs. Also, large inputs could have negligible outputs. Cause and effect 
relationships are not readily identified in a complex adaptive system. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
dynamics of a complex adaptive system. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: A simple representation of the components of a complex adaptive system 
(Fryer, 2001) 
 
Healthcare systems operate as complex adaptive systems. The community, primary, secondary 
and tertiary healthcare subsystems function independently and interdependently. Feedback 
loops between subsystems ensure that whatever happens in any one subsystem affects every 
other subsystem. Non-linearity between inputs and outputs and emergence characterise the 
behaviour of the system as a whole (Anderson, 1999; Edgren, 2008; Gatrell, 2005). A process of 
dynamic exchange of information and mutual adaptation (Waldrop, 1994) takes place between 
the healthcare and the broader system of government within which it is embedded. Many of the 
things happening in social welfare, transport, education and housing affect the healthcare 
system. This was discussed in Section 5.3.1 on wickedness. Complex adaptive systems operate 
with very few simple rules. They are self-organising systems; hence, command and control 
strategies do not easily work in this type of environment. The implications of a complex 
adaptive systems approach make it difficult to see how rational, linear, reductionist NPM 
techniques might solve some of the intractable issues of resource utilisation and coordination in 
healthcare (Glouberman & Mintzberg, 2001; Mintzberg & Glouberman, 1997). 
An acute hospital, similarly, is an interdependent network of hierarchically embedded, 
autonomous, self-organising subsystems or clinical and non-clinical micro-systems (Godfrey et 
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al., 2003; Kauffman, 1993; Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2002). Self-organisation, non-
linearity and emergence are fundamental features of its spatio-temporal rhythm (Carley, 1998; 
McKee & Healy, 2002; Shiell et al., 2008). In order to act on a complex system, one must first 
recognise the fact and the nature of that complexity (Checkland, 1999). Self-organisation, 
interaction, feedback loops and non-linearity have implications for how one conceives the 
imposition of structure and order (Dooley, 1997). This makes the history of the complex system 
irreversible and the future unpredictable (Holland, 1999). Studying the past to determine causal 
relationships may not be particularly helpful for complex systems. 
A key text about professional bureaucracy argues that significant power is vested in the hands 
of professional experts and managers play only a supportive role (Mintzberg, 1978). The 
overriding assumption in this text is that professional and administrative values were 
incompatible and that professional values were dominant. A hospital is a professional 
bureaucracy with a multitude of professional groups that take frontline roles in organising and 
delivering services to clients while being loyal to their subgroups rather than the organisation 
as a whole (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Dickinson, Ham, Snelling, & Spurgeon, 2013b; Martin, 
Currie, & Finn, 2009). The managerial hospital turns the power relations of a professional 
bureaucracy upside down. 
Wickedness and complexity raise issues for our understanding of healthcare reform. As 
theoretical lenses, they challenge fundamental assumptions about the ways in which healthcare 
delivery should be organised. It brings into sharp relief the roles of hospital doctors in that 
process. Ambiguity, paradox, non-linearity, emergence and living with uncertainty abound 
within wicked problems and complex adaptive systems. How appropriate is the business-like 
culture of performance management (C. & Bouckaert, 2011; Exworthy, 2010a; Smith, 2002b)? 
How does one reconcile wickedness and complexity on the one hand with performance 
indicators, targets, benchmarks and league tables (Carter, Klein, & Day, 1992; Healthcare 
Commission, 2004) on the other hand?. Over time the one-size-fits-all performance 
management culture has been criticised (Sheaff et al., 2003; Talbot, 2009) but to no avail. The 
English NHS performance system has remained centrally controlled and it does not take into 
account the wickedness, complexity and embeddedness of the organisations and actors. The 
result is that the system is “gamed” at local levels or if actors do comply with the centrally 
imposed demands then local priorities are distorted (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Exworthy et al., 
2010b; Greener, 2003).  
Over time, in a complex organisation like an acute hospital multiple logics have settled one on 
top of the other within the acute hospital (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Reay & Hinings, 2009; 
Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002b). This is that one creates an unstable, ambiguous and sometimes 
absurd business environment (Eisenhardt, 2000). The resultant paradoxes imply that the efforts 
to control the clinical frontline with vertical accountability measures, lateral standardisation of 
clinical practice and an increased commercial orientation may not be as complete as the 
policymakers and managers may have intended. The wickedness (Austrailian Publis Service 
Commission, 2007; Conklin, 2006b; King, 1993; Raisio, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Vartiainen, 
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2005) and systemic adaptive complexity (Holland, 1999; Waldrop, 1994) of the organisation of 
healthcare delivery systems have perhaps not been adequately recognised in the managerial 
hospital. Rationalisation, standardisation and commodification (Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a; 
Kuhlmann, 2006; Timmermans & Berg, 2010) appear to clash fundamentally with wickedness 
and complex adaptive system features. These are some of the inputs into the framing of both the 
main concern and its routine resolution.  
The next section of the literature review examines some of the literature on professionalism. 
5.4 PROFESSIONALISM 
This part of the literature review focuses on medical professionalism. It examines 
professionalism not in terms of abstract debates (Levenson, Atkinson, & Shepherd, 2010; RCP, 
2005) but as it is enacted and instantiated in the real world by doctors themselves. Rolling with 
the Punches is a GT of medical professionalism in the managerial hospital. It therefore delimits 
the examination of the literature for this study. The routine enactment of medical 
professionalism is viewed as an instantiation of the resolution of the main concern of the 
participants of this study. 
5.4.1 Medical Professionalism as a Logic  
Professionalism can be seen as a logic; i.e. “socially constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012). It provides legitimated rules of the game and criteria for appropriate, goals, 
the means to achieve them and suitable behaviours. Hence, professionalism should be studied 
as a form of institutionalisation (Muzio et al., 2013; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). It has normative 
value over and above its technical value (Muzio et al., 2013; Selznick & Rosen, 2011). This 
review of medical professionalism examines critical issues from the sociology of professions 
within an institutionally complex organisational context (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood 
et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010) with its constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). 
From a macro-institutional perspective one could map how these logics are embodied as 
structures that shape and frame the agency of hospital consultants, which in turn underpins 
their everyday behaviours (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 
2013; Pache & Santos, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013b; Smets et al., 2012). This study examines 
medical professionalism as it is routinely enacted on the clinical frontline in the acute hospital 
from the perspective of the everyday behaviours of the professionals themselves because this is 
what the GT revealed. How do their modes of behaviour (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a) as 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013) represent 
and instantiate medical professional agency (Delmestri, 2006; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; 
Powell & Colyvas, 2013; Powell, 2008)? Furthermore, the study explores how their multi-
dimensional and dynamic agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) iteratively creates the content 
and contours of medical professionalism as a structure and logic (Suddaby & Viale, 2011) within 
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a complex environment. How does medical professionalism contrapuntally (Said, 1993) find its 
character within a context of wickedness, complex adaptive systems, institutional complexity 
and a constellation of logics?  
Rolling with the Punches is an embedded account of medical professionalism. It concurs with the 
need to conduct studies at the coalface of institutionalism (Barley, 2008) and for the close 
analysis of the behaviours of the inhabitants of institutions, who are the heartbeat of 
institutionalism (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). Thus, the focus has been on these inhabitants’ ways 
of talking and behaving in the face of managerial rationalisation, performance management, and 
financialisation of the service, standardisation of clinical practice and commodification and 
commercialisation of hospitals.  
Professionals and the organisations in which they work play an important role in contemporary 
knowledge-based societies (Brock et al., 2014; Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Scott, 2008c). Liberal 
professions – in western societies – are historically based on professional autonomy; 
collegiality; self-regulation of the definition, organisation and evaluation of their work; and 
occupational control (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Reihlen & Mone, 2012; Suddaby, Greenwood, & 
Wilderom, 2008). Professionalism is an identity that is acquired through rigorous training to 
master a body of knowledge, further in-service training and socialisation (Exworthy & Halford, 
1999). Autonomy has been justified on the basis of an indeterminate expertise that requires 
professional knowledge to understand it (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1994). However, sociologists 
have failed to agree on a definition of what are the criteria of a profession except to agree that 
they constitute a way of working and control that is different from that found in hierarchical 
and industrial work settings (Evetts, 2003, 2012).  
Professionalism that is enacted within an organisational context (Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2008; 
Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009; Suddaby & Viale, 2011; Waring & 
Currie, 2009) is constrained by goals such as organisational efficiency (Flynn, 1999). How is 
professionalism instantiated on an everyday, routine basis so that its meanings emerge from 
social interaction (Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971) as the material enactment (Thornton et al., 
2012) of a professional logic amongst a constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011)? The 
meanings of medical professionalism are not given but are crafted in social interaction (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971) on a routine basis from the interdependencies 
and contradictions (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Friedland & Alford, 1991b; Pache & Santos, 
2010) in an institutionally complex workplace (Greenwood et al., 2011). Medical 
professionalism would be but one of the logics that are carried by the participants (Delmestri, 
2006; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002) and it would have traces of wickedness, complex adaptive 
systems and institutional complexity (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Thus, medical professionalism will emerge as fluid, non-foundational, 
contingent, relative and historicised (Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf, 2011; Thomas & 
Hewitt, 2011; Waring & Currie, 2009). This is why there may not be one way, or a best way, to 
be a medical professional within the managerial acute hospital. 
  
 
 
77 
5.4.2 Sociology of Professions 
The sociological study of professions covers three major eras as detailed below.  
The functionalist perspective dominated the first era from the 1950s (Etzioni, 1969; Goode, 
1957; Parsons, 1954; Turner & Durkheim, 1957). Functionalists, especially Parsons, hold the 
view that professions play an important role in bringing order and structure to parts of complex 
and modern societies. Since it can be argued that professions are more than just technical 
approaches to problems (Selznik, 1957), therefore they have roles as institutional logics 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2013). As institutional logics, professions are “socially constructed 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space and 
provide meaning to their social reality” p.804 (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). In the 1970s, the 
functionalist perspective was criticised for having adopted an uncritical view of the roles of 
professions in society (Turner & Samson, 1995). Functionalists have also been censured for 
uncritically adopting the views of the professions and for ignoring the importance of power and 
the protection of professional interests and privilege.  
The second era – from the 1960s onwards – was suspicious of the functionalist perspective. 
Instead, it critically examined the functionalist perspective with accounts such as professional 
domination (Freidson, 1970, 1985, 1994), the professional project (Larson, 1979a), the 
jurisdictional disputes that involve professions (Abbott, 1988) and the idea of a congruence of 
interests between knowledge and power. Concerning the latter, it focused on how a knowledge-
power nexus (Foucault, 1977) operates to shape and control the subjectivities and choices of 
autonomous individuals (McHoul & Grace, 2002; Miller & Rose, 2008) through procedures that 
rationalise, standardise, commercialise and commodify delivery procedures. Professional norms 
shape the choices and behaviours of those within its jurisdiction (Fournier, 1999; Reed, 2002). 
Professional projects could be integral to the enterprises of the state and, similarly, knowledge 
elites often serve the interests of power (Johnson, 1972). This was arguably the case with the 
establishment of the NHS as a key part of the welfare state after World War II (Clarke & 
Newman, 2006). The managerial transformation of the hospital continued the project of the 
creation of the congruence between power and professional interests. The NHS as a 
professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1978) was an example of an organisation in which 
professionals played a dominant role in delivering services and organisation control and were 
deemed essential to the stability of the state (Ackroyd, Hughes, & Soothill, 1989). Thus, it 
represented a congruence of the interests of the state and the medical profession (Klein, 2013). 
The sociology of professions in this era sketches a canvass that goes from an instrumental view 
of professions to a critical perspective of a group of very skilled people who seek to find ways of 
meeting their own private interests while claiming to serve a public interest agenda. The 
dominance perspective, within the critical accounts of professionalism, however, does not 
account for the challenges of professionals working within organisations (Brock et al., 2014; 
Suddaby & Viale, 2011).  
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The third era – from the 1980s onwards – is concerned with the enactment of professionalism 
within organisations. Organisations have become primary spaces for the enactment of 
professional agency (Brock et al., 2014; Cooper & Robson, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009). 
How do the issues raised in the critical sociology of professions (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1970, 
1985; Johnson, 1972; Larson, 1979b) play out as organisational issues around contestation for 
resources, spaces, routines and practices that frame routine work practices (Faulconbridge & 
Muzio, 2008; Muzio et al., 2013)? Moreover, how does the managerial professional workplace – 
increasing formalisation, standardisation, transparent accountability and commercialism 
(Clarke & Newman, 2006; Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996; Hood, 1991) – reshape 
professional concerns such as autonomy, occupational control and collegiality? How does 
collegial, self-regulating medical professionalism find its content and boundaries within a 
corporate and managerial hospital (Ashburner, Ferlie, & Fitzgerald, 1996; Dent, Howorth, 
Mueller, & Preuschoft, 2004; Kitchener, 1998; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, 
& Caronna, 2000)? Does it necessarily lead to deprofessionalisation (McKinlay & Stoeckle, 
1988), proletarianisation (Haug, 1973, 1988) or restratification (Freidson, 1985)? What about 
the possibilities of coexistence, mutual reconstitution, sedimentation and hybridisation (Cooper 
et al., 1996; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009)?  
The persistence of professional forms of organisation among workers with expert knowledge is 
found in the literature (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 
2013b; Kipping & Kirkpatrick, 2013). The question is not whether the constellation of logics 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011) is compatible in the abstract (Besharov & Smith, 2013) but how the 
relationships between logics, including professionalism, are constructed at the coalface of 
institutionalism (Barley, 2008) by the inhabitants of institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). 
How do the carriers of the logics (Delmestri, 2006; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002) understand 
their professionalism within a constellation of other logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011)? How are 
the meanings of professional autonomy, control and collegiality negotiated in the routine, 
everyday lives of medical professionals? That is the focus of this section of the literature review: 
how professionalism is routinely institutionalised (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 
2012; Thornton et al., 2012) in this institutionally complex environment (Greenwood et al., 
2011). Professional autonomy is a paradoxical phenomenon (Clifford, 1981; Thomas & Davies, 
2005). It invites surveillance because it works in opposite directions from the vertical 
accountability and standardisation of professional practice (Cooper et al., 1996) of the 
managerial hospital. Yet, it is also a site of resistance for an organisation that depends on expert 
frontline staff; i.e. street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010), to deliver services to patients. 
Since the organisation is a primary site for professional agency (Ackroyd & Muzio, 2007c; 
Cooper & Robson, 2006), and also for the contest between multiple logics (Greenwood et al., 
2011; Pache & Santos, 2010), it becomes necessary to consider more closely what happens 
when the public interest, professional self-interest and the corporate purpose (Christmas & 
Millward, 2011; Evetts, 2003; Saks, 2014) within a constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011) and institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) collide. What happens when NPM 
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managerialism (Ashburner et al., 1996; Flynn, 1999; Hood, 1991) – with its focus on efficiency, 
transparency and accountability – encounters professional autonomy and discretion (Clarke & 
Newman, 2006; Kitchener, 1999a) at the coalface (Barley, 2008), and the beating heart (Hallett 
& Ventresca, 2006) of institutionalisation? In a Foucauldian manner, one could examine how 
medical professionalism functions on an everyday basis (Rabinow, 1984) rather than on what 
the features of medical professionalism or the new medical professionalism might be (Levenson 
et al., 2010; RCP, 2005). That invites one to examine closely medical professionalism as an 
interactional phenomenon (Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets 
et al., 2012). 
Professionalism has been described as a “third logic”, which differs from that of the public 
sector hierarchical bureaucracy and consumerist market structures (Freidson, 2001). Yet, the 
NHS has also been described as an amalgamation of different organisational forms (Exworthy et 
al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002a). How does medical professionalism – as 
a logic (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013) – find its voice contrapuntally (Said, 1993) within 
institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2013) and the constellation of 
logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). From a macro-institutionalist perspective, logics shape, 
constrain and stimulate agency (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Emirbayer & Mische, 
1998). That agency is reflected in the enactment of medical professionalism as routine practices 
(Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012). A number of calls have been made for a more 
nuanced account of the agency (Delmestri, 2006; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Powell & Colyvas, 
2013; Thomas & Davies, 2005; Yu, 2013); i.e. how do actors locate themselves within their 
social contexts?  
In seeking to explain the patterns of behaviour of the participants, this section of the review of 
the literature looks back from observable practices to examine medical professionalism as the 
material enactment of multiple logics, which may be interdependent or contradictory (Besharov 
& Smith, 2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991a). Routine practices involve everyday improvisations 
that dynamically cast and recast relationships between logics (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; 
Smets et al., 2012). This is the real world of the people who animate institutions. Their modes of 
practice represent their agency that, through their iterative practices, creates a medical 
professionalism. This section of the literature review is delimited by the GT to a coalface 
medical professionalism as a phenomenon that routinely expresses the everyday working lives 
of the actors and how behaviours reflect their agency and the structures in the field. Thus, 
methodological congruence occurs between GT and the stance taken with respect to the 
literature review. It is a view that is grounded in practice (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets 
et al., 2012) as an instantiation of agency (Delmestri, 2006; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Powell & 
Colyvas, 2013), which, in turn, by addressing tensions and contradictions in the workplace, 
frames answers to questions and iteratively creates structures (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; 
Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971; Strauss et al., 1963).  
Somehow, the new medical professionalism (Christmas & Millward, 2011; Levenson et al., 2010; 
Rosen & Dewar, 2004) does not appear to deal well enough with the messiness associated with 
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institutionalism, wickedness and complex adaptive systems. Another concern is the inadequacy 
of the conceptualisation of the sociological impact of the reorganisation of medicine 
(Timmermans & Oh, 2010) as deprofessionalisation (Haug, 1973, 1988), proletarianisation 
(McKinlay & Arches, 1985; McKinlay & Stoeckle, 1988) and McDonaldisation (Ritzer, 1996; 
Ritzer & Walcak, 1988), on the one hand, and professional restratification (Freidson, 1988) and 
the adoption of clinical-managerial hybrid roles (Currie, Finn, & Martin, 2009; Muzio & 
Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf, 2007b) on the other hand. The aforementioned accounts do not 
seem to come to grips with the situational improvisations and compromises (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998; Smets et al., 2012) that characterise medical professionalism as a day-to-day 
practice. Clarity is lacking about medical professionalism as institutional work (Lawrence, Leca, 
& Zilber, 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) that is carried out in a context where institutional 
complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) is not resolved and is not a temporary phase (Reay & 
Hinings, 2005, 2009). Medical professionalism is therefore routinely accomplished as a going 
concern (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Hughes, 1971) where historicised, contingent social 
conventions link social structures and social interactions.  
This GT started with the people who enact their professionalism on a routine everyday basis. A 
practice perspective (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, & Van de Ven, 2009a; Jarzabkowski, Smets, 
Bednarek, Burke, & Spee, 2013b) of medical professionalism places it within an organisational 
context. Congruence exists between the GT perspective and a practice perspective on medical 
professionalism being enacted as a logic within a constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) 
on an everyday basis in ways that address participants’ the main concern; i.e. managerialism (C. 
& Bouckaert, 2011; Exworthy & Halford, 1999). Institutional complexity (Besharov & Smith, 
2013; Greenwood et al., 2011), the wickedness of the healthcare organisation (Raisio, 2009; 
Vartiainen, 2005) and the workplace that is a complex adaptive system (Holland, 1999; 
Waldrop, 1994) contribute to the fluid, contingent and historicised content and boundaries of 
medical professionalism. 
Taking a closer look at the routine enactment of a medical professionalism embedded in the 
context outlined above suggests that the binary conceptual account (Gleeson & Knights, 2006; 
Numerato, Salvatore, & Fattore, 2012) of this professionalism may be inadequate. The hospital 
consultants are not in a privileged position outside the messiness that is described above. They 
are part of the context and have to juggle the tensions, paradoxes and agreements between 
competing demands on a daily basis. Closer inspection of routine instantiation of medical 
professionalism shows that to some extent three things have reshaped medical professionalism. 
The first is the rationalisation of managerial control in quality-control procedures, service 
design and resource allocation decision-making within a metrics-based performance 
management system (C. & Bouckaert, 2011; Clarke & Newman, 2006; Farrell & Morris, 2003; 
Harrison & Ahmad, 2000b; Hood, 1991; Power, 1999). The second is the standardisation of 
clinical practice through clinical guidelines, clinical pathways, protocols and national service 
protocols (Mooney, 2009; Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Timmermans & Kolker, 2004; 
Timmermans & Oh, 2010). And the third is the continued reliance on market-based competition 
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between providers. Perhaps it is less a case of deprofessionalisation than of 
reprofessionalisation (Evetts, 2003). In the latter case medical professionals combine 
organisational and professional logics (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Reay & Hinings, 2009) to 
greater or lesser degrees.  
It should be remembered that the meanings of professionalism are not given but are crafted in 
social interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971; Strauss et al., 1963). 
Some hospital consultants internalise the managerial framework (Doolin, 2002; Levay & Waks, 
2009) of the hyper-rationalised hospital (Germov, 2005). They adopt the transparency agenda 
and audit culture of the managerial hospital (Harrison & Ahmad, 2000b; Power, 1999). These 
doctors manifest the self-monitoring conduct expected by management (Miller & Rose, 2008). 
Deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation and McDonaldisation suggest an almost complete 
surrender of agency. This does not appear to be the case with hospital doctors (Kirkpatrick & 
Ackroyd, 2003b; Levay & Waks, 2009; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004; Nancarrow & Borthwick, 2005). 
The managerial hospital has reshaped – rather than completely eliminated – their autonomy 
into a bounded or soft autonomy (Levay & Waks, 2009). For some, their professional power and 
authority have weakened (Deem, Hillyard, & Reed, 2007; Farrell & Morris, 2003). Other hospital 
consultants remain resistant to the managerial hospital (Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, & Walker, 2007b; 
Dent, 2003; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Between these two 
positions lies a range of behaviours that hospital doctors exhibit. Some choose to blur the 
“boundaries” between their professional identity and the organisational imperatives of the 
managerial hospital (Kurunmäki, 2004; Noordegraaf, 2007a, 2011; Noordegraaf & Steijn, 
2014b). They create an organisational professionalism (Correia, 2013a; Faulconbridge & Muzio, 
2008; Kitchener, 2000; Kuhlmann et al., 2013; Muzio, Hodgson, Faulconbridge, Beaverstock, & 
Hall, 2011). Restratification also emerges (Freidson, 1985) in the healthcare sector in general. 
Some doctors are with those who develop technologies of control (Deem et al., 2007; Miller & 
Rose, 2008; Reed, 1999). Other doctors assume hybrid clinical-managerial roles within the 
hospitals. Thus, interests overlap between an administrative/policy elite and a knowledge elite 
on the outside of the hospital and the clinical rank and file. This is a state of affairs with its own 
problems (Davies & Harrison, 2003; Dickinson et al., 2013b; Iedema, Degeling, Braithwaite, & 
White, 2004). 
One gets a sense of medical professionalism in the managerial hospital as a range of behaviours 
that instantiate what this type of professionalism may mean but no real clearer sense of how 
and why professionals do what they are doing (Correia, 2013a). This issue is explored in the 
next sections of the literature review.  
5.5 FOUCAULT 
This section of the literature review deals with the exercise of power and resistance and arose 
after I had metaphorically rummaged through Foucault’s conceptual toolbox and taken a few 
tools for use in this study (O'Farrel, 2005). This was potentially a precarious move because the 
resulting conceptual bricolage could be dismissed as not-Foucauldian. A Foucauldian 
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perspective is a rather treacherous thing. It might even be non-existent. However, I crossed the 
Rubicon and scoured a Foucauldian toolbox, took a few concepts and went ahead to see where it 
could lead.  
The managerial hospital could be seen as an exercise of systemic power (Lawrence, 2008). Its 
rationalising, performance managing, standardising, commodifying and commercialising 
technologies aim to structurally shape, control and frame the collegial and self-regulatory 
behaviours of autonomous professionals. The intention of these technologies is to deliver a cost-
effective and consistently high quality healthcare service (Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a; Waring & 
Bishop, 2013). However, where there is power there is resistance (Foucault, 1977). Thus, to 
understand the behaviours of hospital consultants, an examination of how power operates, 
functions and flows within the healthcare sector, in general, and the acute hospital, in particular, 
should be conducted. In Section 5.4, the discussion on professionalism I sketch a picture of a 
fluid, complex and ambiguous collegiality and self-regulation. Social structures intend to frame 
agency and behaviours without succeeding in being hegemonic (or perhaps even intending to be 
hegemonic).  There is thus leave room for interpretation, agency and resistance. In those small 
spaces, the crafting of medical professionalism takes place. 
For Foucault, power is not a thing or an object that is located in a centre but is a diffuse, 
ubiquitous feature of human activities (Foucault, 1979). The fact that power is everywhere does 
not mean that it is hegemonic but rather that it is embedded in social relations (Foucault, 1988). 
Power, as relational and interactional, functions to legitimise and delegitimise. This perspective 
suggests that individuals are not subjects to which power is applied, or over whom power is 
exercised, but rather they are carriers of power within social networks (Clegg, 1989; Townley, 
1993). Routine, everyday interactions produce and reproduce social relations of power. An 
appreciation of power as relational requires a close examination of how it functions within 
social contexts. It is fluid, contingent and dynamic. Power may advantage some groups and 
disadvantage others (Clegg, 1989; Foucault, 1977) at certain times and in particular contexts, 
and it can then shift. Power as a social interactional phenomenon is a controversial issue in the 
literature (Dennis & Martin, 2005). The ubiquity of power and its embeddedness in relations 
and mundane practices may result in its not being readily recognised (Townley, 1993). So 
power may be everywhere and yet appear nowhere. 
Foucault links power and discipline (Foucault, 1979, 1988). Discipline involves the power that is 
inherent in the techniques, practices and procedures’ control found in ordinary relations within 
a given context. Power is not only negative (i.e. it does not only repress or constrain). It is also 
productive and is aimed at the shaping of the identity of a target (Clegg, 1989; Knights & 
Willmott, 1989). Disciplinary power involves the internalising of external rules by autonomous 
subjects. The Benthamite Panopticon – the guard tower that makes it possible for guards to 
observe inmates on a “continuous” basis in the architecture of a prison – forms the basis on 
which an inmate conforms to expected norms. The mere possibility of being seen, without 
knowing whether one is actually being observed, changes the way the individual sees himself or 
herself (Foucault, 1977). That awareness alone may render the actual use of physical force and 
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material constraints superfluous. Permanent visibility and scrutiny may be sufficient to ensure 
compliance with expectations (Foucault, 1979, 1988). The rationalised, standardised, 
commodified, managerially controlled, market-oriented and performance-managed hospital, 
with its focus on efficiency, budgeting, accounting and financial management (Power, 1999) and 
performance management systems (Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a; Hood, 1991; Power, 1999), can 
be considered to be an instance of the operation of an electronic Panopticon (Zuboff, 1988). The 
political and administrative centre is keeping a close watch on day-to-day clinical frontline 
work. The activities of professionals are made visible and therefore they can be subjected to 
norms as in evidence-based medicine (Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Timmermans & Kolker, 
2004; Timmermans & Oh, 2010). The managerial gaze aims to reshape clinical autonomy. 
Another Foucauldian tool is a knowledge-power nexus that blurs the boundary between 
knowledge and power. Since the late 1990s, congruence between the interests of the state and 
its senior civil servants on the one side and the medical elite from the teaching hospitals on the 
other has re-emerged (Pollock, 2005). The relationship between a segment of the professional 
elite, the academic clinicians, and the policy elite is based on a shared interest in monitoring and 
controlling the periphery. Knowledge elites, instead of being an alternative centre of power to 
the state, find a congruence of interests with the state in seeking to control the periphery 
(Johnson, 1972; Miller & Rose, 2008). A proliferation of technologies of control is designed by 
these knowledge elites; e.g. the introduction of budgeting accounting and auditing procedures 
that make clinical practice and the financial consequences of clinical decisions visible. The 
formulation of clinical guidelines and protocols standardise clinical practice and audits. Clinical 
governance procedures reframe professional indeterminacy. There is perhaps the instantiation 
of a restratification (Freidson, 1985) of the medical profession where, inside the acute hospital, 
the adoption of hybrid clinical-managerial roles reflects the knowledge-power nexus in the 
broader healthcare system (Waring, 2014). The boundaries between power and expertise are 
blurred (Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2008; Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf, 2007a; Waring, 
2014; Waring & Currie, 2009). These are willing hybrids (McGivern, Currie, Ferlie, Fitzgerald, & 
Waring, 2015) who use their positions to challenge “out-dated” professionalism. 
A question could be asked whether the Weberian iron cage has changed to a Foucauldian gaze 
(Foucault, 1977; Reed, 1999)? The change from the directly managed hospital to a quasi-market 
trust (Kitchener, 1998) or the public administration hospital to an NPM hospital (Fitzgerald & 
Ferlie, 2000a; Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000b). Later it changes to managed care networks (Goodwin, 
Perri, Peck, Freeman, & Posaner, 2004; Guthrie et al., 2010). The changes continue, even later, to 
foundation trusts (Allen et al., 2010; Directorate, 2005; Foucault, 1977; Reed, 1999). The 
political centre would be increasingly steering the periphery indirectly (Miller & Rose, 2008). 
Thus, a congruence of the interests of a professional elite and the power of senior civil servants 
and politicians – a knowledge-power nexus (Burchill, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Miller & Rose, 
2008) – has resulted in the development of sophisticated technologies to monitor, control and 
discipline the clinical rank and file, whose routine practices spend the healthcare budget of the 
NHS. The reorganisation of healthcare delivery – which is a major concern of countries 
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belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Hood, 1991; 
Waring & Currie, 2009) – is aimed at the delivery of an efficient healthcare system. This requires 
tackling the paradox of clinical autonomy and the ways in which clinicians deliver healthcare 
(Doolin, 2002; Thomas & Hewitt, 2011). 
Before the 1980s, the government lacked the tools to monitor and control the periphery (Klein, 
2013). The command and control structures of the public sector professional bureaucracy were 
aimed at enabling ministers to account to Parliament about how public money was being spent. 
Crude performance indicators were derived from the Financial Management Initiative, in which 
every government-spending project had to have clear objectives and performance indicators to 
determine whether those objectives were being met. Furthermore, ministers in the Health 
Ministry had annual performance review meetings with chairpersons of the Regional Health 
Authorities to determine whether the priorities of government were being followed and 
whether value for tax funds was being delivered. The Hospital Advisory Service and the Health 
Service Commissioner were further attempts to influence clinical practice. The service-mix was 
always controlled by regulation from the centre. The key issue is that before the development of 
IT in the 1980s, the tools to pierce the veil of clinical autonomy were not available. The majority 
of hospital consultants were dismissive of general management (Griffiths, 1983, 1992). There 
were always tensions between the social aspirations and the affordability of the NHS (Klein, 
2013). Oversight in the NHS did not start with NPM (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Hood, 1991; 
Power, 1999). The history of the NHS is a dichotomy of a political centre seeking transparent 
accountability on the spending of taxpayer funds and a medical profession finding ways to 
retain its clinical autonomy (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Klein, 2013). It is a service that is funded 
primarily from tax revenues and delivered mainly through public sector organisations. Private 
sector organisations delivered a small percentage – less than 2% in 2008 – of local elective 
health procedures (Audit Commission, 2008). 
The impact of the NPM in the 1980s and 1990s (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Ferlie, Ashburner, 
Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 1996a; Hood, 1991) coincided with the general management proposals 
of Griffiths (Griffiths, 1983, 1992). The Department of Health was broken up and operationally 
independent NHS provider organisations were created. A quasi-market (Le Grand, 2009a; 
Mulligan, 1998) was initiated to imitate the operations of competitive markets (Department of 
Health, 1989). The relationship between the hospital and the hospital consultants changed from 
one based on trust to one based on employment contracts (Ferlie et al., 1996a; Hood, 1991). IT 
in addition to a performance-managed general management infrastructure in the hospitals 
allowed performance indicators to become more sophisticated as health economists played a 
bigger role in testing the effectiveness and efficiency of clinical decision making (Klein, 2013). 
These ideas began to shape an emerging audit-based performance-management system 
(Exworthy, 2010a; Power, 1999). For managers, contract management, budget management, 
efficiency and targets became the order of the day.  Beds, wards and theatres were closed. 
Qualified nursing staff numbers were cut and cheaper healthcare assistants trained to replace 
them. Unused and under-utilised assets were sold off due to an efficiency charge. Costs were cut 
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to meet the statutory requirement to balance the budget of the hospital (Pollock, 2005). The 
ensemble of institutions and processes of control were being refined. The periphery was coming 
into clearer focus.  
By the late 1990s the stubbornness of waiting lists; geographic variations in the availability of, 
amongst others, specialist cancer, chronic heart disease, in vitro fertilisation (IVF), hip 
replacement and cataract treatments; scandals; and a rise in clinical negligence litigation 
resulted in a focus on tighter performance management (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Propper et al., 
2008). The wickedness (Conklin, 2006b; Rittel & Webber, 1973) of the social organisation of 
healthcare delivery (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007; Raisio, 2009) was not readily 
acknowledged. Variations in the quality of treatments resulted in a quality agenda that included 
clinical governance as a responsibility of the Board of Directors rather than the clinicians. Elite 
professionals drafted national service frameworks and clinical guidelines (Timmermans & 
Kolker, 2004; Timmermans & Oh, 2010). Professional practice was being made visible by the 
knowledge–power nexus. Professional behaviour was being normalised and deviations deemed 
punishable. Moreover, because of concerns over quality (Abbasi, 1998; Dixon-Woods, Yeung, & 
Bosk, 2011; Kennedy, 2001; Smith, 1998), inspectorate machinery that is more sophisticated 
than the Hospital Advisory Service Inspectorate and the Health Service Commissioner was put 
in place. The aim was to determine the extent to which the clinical periphery was complying 
with the quality agenda and machinery (Care Quality Commission, 2009; Healthcare 
Commission, 2004; Patterson & Lilburne, 2003) It also reflects the fragmentation of the 
technologies of control (Miller & Rose, 2008). The delivery of healthcare by an integrated 
vertical bureaucracy has fractured into purchasers, providers, regulators, inspectorates and 
special health authorities such as the NICE (C. & Bouckaert, 2011; Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield, & 
Smullen, 2005). The language of healthcare had changed. Health authorities became purchasers. 
Patients became consumers. Providers became competitors. Budgets, contracts and cost control 
replaced a concern for social justice, universality and comprehensiveness.  
Control was no longer being exercised through command and control hierarchies as in the 
directly managed hospital (Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000b; Kitchener, 1998) or the public 
administration hospital (Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000b) or networks, (Addicott, McGivern, & Ferlie, 
2006). Command and control was replaced by a combination of techniques, processes and 
procedures that aim to shape the choices and behaviours of targeted organisations and 
individuals (Foucault, 1979; Miller & Rose, 2008). The centre therefore exercises control over 
the periphery from a distance in ways that hopefully make the exercise of physical control 
superfluous (Miller & Rose, 2008). The targeted individuals, ideally, would internalise the aims 
of the control processes and therefore make the “right” choices (McKinlay & Starkey, 2000). The 
political elite and its executive agencies enforce regulations with respect to financial 
management, performance management and transparent accountability while the professional 
elite drafts the clinical guidelines, national service frameworks and protocols. Clinical behaviour 
on the periphery is thus standardised. Financial services accountability systems enable the 
recording, monitoring and evaluation of professional behaviours, which allow for evaluations to 
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be made and disciplinary action to be taken where needed. The behaviours of the subject are 
made known. However, the aim is that the mere awareness of evidence-based standards of 
clinical practice and the state of being under “constant surveillance” would encourage the 
clinical rank-and-file to adopt compliant and docile behaviours. Corrective interventions should 
therefore not be needed.  
An electronic Panopticon (Zuboff, 1988) replaces the physical Weberian 
bureaucratic/Benthamite Panopticon. The managerial hospital is a hyper-rational institution 
(Germov, 2005) of observation, measurement and performance appraisal. But have the hospital 
doctors been transformed into compliant, self-surveying, self-controlling subjects of a 
managerial agenda? Have hospital consultants internalised the imperatives of the disciplinary 
power? Have the transformation and intensification in the technologies of control (observation, 
measurement, performance appraisal, audit and clinical governance) managed to produce 
hospital consultants who do as the policymakers intend? Have hospital consultants adopted the 
clinical guidelines and protocols that normalise practice? Have doctors prioritised efficiency to 
the extent that the managerial hospital wishes? How do the technologies of power take account 
of the wickedness of the problem that they seek to address, the dynamic complexity of the social 
system in which the electronic Panopticon and the knowledge-power nexus operates? Does the 
microphysics of power tame the negotiated order by which the participants live? Does the target 
of the pervasive, silently operating managerial disciplinary power become more visible and 
more docile?  
Auditing techniques from the financial sector (Power, 1999; Timmermans & Kolker, 2004) have 
been imported by a knowledge elite, in concert with political and economic power, into 
performance-management systems and evidence-based clinical practice (Timmermans & 
Kolker, 2004; Timmermans & Oh, 2010). Self-surveillance procedures such as medical audits 
and clinical governance (Donaldson, 2001; GMC, 2013; Officer, 2006) have become statutory 
responsibilities of the local governing agents. Have these resulted in a more confessional and 
reflective self-governing hospital consultant? Do technologies of control settle the struggles 
over meanings, language, symbols and legitimacy within the hospital? Do hospital consultants 
uncritically comply with scientific bureaucratised practice (McDonald & Harrison, 2004; 
Timmermans & Berg, 2003)? If not, how do they play out sociologically? Have more than three 
decades of managerial control, metric-based performance management, market-based 
competition, standardisation, bureaucratisation, audits and surveillance led to internalisation of 
managerial norms, values and priorities? Does it appear that hospital consultants are in 
agreement on these matters? What does the continuous steering of professional practice 
through protocols; guidelines and audits do to the content and boundaries of professionalism?  
After all, norms and standards are not new to the medical profession. Are proletarianisation, 
deprofessionalisation or restratification sufficiently nuanced and comprehensive 
conceptualisations of their ways of dealing with prescriptions, audits and accountability? Does 
the range of practices instantiate the normalised behaviour of a docile subject who has been 
“proletarianised” or “deprofessionalised”? Or have some creative responses come into play with 
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restratification? Where are the multiple shades of restratification and hybridisation? In the 
previous section, I argued that the binary conceptualisation does not really capture the 
complexity of behaviours and intentions. 
As mentioned above, where there is power there is resistance (Foucault, 1977). Power creates 
and provokes the resistance that alerts one to the existence of power and attempts at the 
reconfiguration of power relations. From the literature on professionalism, it is known that 
professionals have historically resisted managerial interference in the organisation of their 
work (Flynn, 1999; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Disciplinary power, when 
expressed as rules, has to be interpreted by subjects. This implies agency and discretion (Clegg, 
1998), which, in turn, means varying hybrid responses to managerial control, market-based 
competition and metrics-based performance-management systems (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; 
Ferlie, McGivern, & FitzGerald, 2012; Fitzgerald & Dufour, 1998; McGivern et al., 2015; 
Noordegraaf, 2013). 
The next section casts the consequences of some Foucauldian conceptual tools (Knights & 
Willmott, 1989) in a more nuanced light. It examines the multiple roles that participants in a 
work situation might adopt in relation to disciplinary power (McCabe, 2011; McKinlay & 
Starkey, 2000). It is important to remember that this GT study examines the exercise of power – 
as an instance of the participants’ main concern – and resistance – as the way of resolving that 
concern – within a context that is institutionally complex (Greenwood et al., 2011). The GT is 
concerned with a constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) that includes professionalism, 
hierarchy, and networks (Exworthy et al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999) and markets, management 
and metrics (Farrell & Morris, 2003). No single logic dominates (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 
2010; Kraatz & Block, 2013) but power circulates as a number of sedimented and often 
contradictory logics (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood et al., 2011; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 
2003b). Within these contradictions and contestations, the managerial gaze is likely to be less 
than hegemonic and the absence of professional subservience may mean that there is resistance 
of a professional kind. This is discussed in the section that follows. 
5.6 ROUTINE RESISTANCE 
Another theoretical angle that clarifies the sociological impact of the reorganisation of 
healthcare delivery (Timmermans & Oh, 2010) is that of everyday or routine resistance (Prasad 
& Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985). This study began with a GT of behaviours of hospital consultants 
in the managerial acute NHS hospital. Their routine, everyday behaviours are situated 
improvisations (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b) and rather non-dramatic (March, 1981) 
instantiations of their interpretations of rules of the game (Clegg, 1998; McCabe, 2011). Their 
understandings and behaviours are aimed at shifting the microphysics of power (Foucault, 
1979). The examination of literature on routine resistance begins with the tracing of a line of 
sight from modes of behaviour as instantiations or representations of agency – and how the 
latter seeks to reconfigure the power relations within the given context – and institutional logics 
and complexity. The GT imposes that limitation on the literature review.  
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Scott (1985) examined the power relations between rich landowners and poor peasants in a 
Malay village. Two Foucauldian ideas related to power are central to his argument. These are 
the relational view and ubiquity of power. Power is embedded in the complex web of routine 
social relations and its ubiquity does not necessarily imply its hegemony. It is everywhere but 
where it becomes a technique or a procedure there will be gaps that can be exploited for 
resistance or collaboration. Power as relational and ubiquitous is pertinent in an institutionally 
complex environment (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Scott (1985) examines what peasants do in the timeframes between instances of open conflict 
to defend their interests. He studies behaviours such as foot-dragging, false compliance, feigned 
ignorance and gossip. A casual observer might pass over critical meanings associated with these 
actions (Jermier, Knights, & Nord, 1994; Prasad & Prasad, 1998, 2000). He reframes what could 
be interpreted as bad or uncooperative behaviour as “weapons of the weak”. Distinguishing 
features of these actions are that they are individual, unorganised and spontaneous. The 
ambiguity that is inherent in the weapons of the weak means that those who employ them have 
sufficient wiggle room so that they are not clearly defined as being in open rebellion. From 
Foucault, Scott takes the idea that power is embedded in social relations and is pervasive. 
Resistance aims to reconfigure power relations. The absence of drama (March, 1981) in 
resistance does not imply the absence of resistance. The effect of the actions of an individual 
might not substantially change the relations of power in the short-term but in the longer-term 
the cumulative impact – of the myriad of routine resistance activities by many individuals – 
should check the material realisation of the ambitions of the powerful. For the individual, 
however, everyday resistance makes a situation just a bit more bearable. Scott directs attention 
away from what appears obvious in the public encounters between the powerful and the weak 
with his ideas of a “public transcript” and a “hidden transcript” (Scott, 1990). The underlying 
idea is that there is more to the encounter than meets the eye. The public transcript is an 
account of the interactions between the powerful and the weak that conform to the dictates of 
power. Fear of retaliation rather than false consciousness informs the public behaviours. 
Impression management is a survival skill in the encounters between the powerful and the 
weak (Scott, 2008b). The public encounter or transcript is inherently inauthentic as it reveals 
only those elements – of the relationship between the dominant and the subordinate groups – 
that are safe to unveil. Despite hidden anger and boiling fury, a peasant may smile at the 
landlord as if all is well. 
The hidden transcript is an account of the feelings and thoughts of the weak when they are 
beyond the gaze and reach of the powerful. Thus, there is more to the relationship than meets 
the eye. The tensions between the public and private transcripts reflect the internal politics of 
the weak. It is possible to argue that the hidden transcript is nothing more than private grief, 
but that could be a mistake as it is encoded and requires organic knowledge to decipher (Scott, 
1990). The dominant may see consensual relations between themselves and the weak, but 
subterfuge and impression management present the absence of obvious dissent, as compliance 
while resistance is evident to those in the know. The collective hidden transcript provides a 
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logic of action (Bacharach & Mundell, 1993) that allows marginal groups to resist domination. 
The hidden transcript contains the seeds of resistance because in a protected environment it 
reframes the inauthenticity of the public transcript when overt, organised dissent is not a viable 
option. Even though the hidden transcript does not offer possibilities for radical 
transformations in the economic relations between the groups, it allows the weaker groups to 
fight within the available constraints so that the worst elements of their situation are alleviated. 
Scott (1985) argues that the peasants challenge the ordinary manifestations of their exploited 
status with routine resistance that may not be spectacular at all. Open rebellion is merely a 
failure of routine resistance and it occurs when things become completely unbearable. Everyday 
resistance precedes and sustains collective and organised resistance. Scott’s theory of routine 
resistance is a close look at the ordinary actions taken by weaker parties, on a day-to-day basis. 
These activities could otherwise be ignored because theoretical lenses may be biased towards 
organised, public and overt dissent. However, routine resistance has been criticised as being 
“decaf resistance” (Contu, 2008) as it serves as a safety valve for the relations of domination. 
Routine resistance allows “resistors” to feel that they are at least doing something whilst in 
reality nothing changes at all (Fleming & Spicer, 2008). 
Despite the aforementioned criticisms, Scott’s theory of routine resistance allows for a more 
nuanced understanding of relationships and encounters between dominant and marginal 
groups. It can be seen as a continuum from compliance to open rebellion resistance and with 
public and private dimensions. Meanings are not always clear. Ambiguity and complexity are to 
be decoded in private structures to which the powerful have limited access. The theory suggests 
that one should just pause and look a bit closer for there might be signals that an observant eye 
and an attentive ear could pick up. A struggle might just be taking place. 
This particular turn towards routine resistance has also been reflected in debates around 
resistance in other workplaces. The neglect by academics of employee resistance in the modern 
workplace and the assumption of the efficacy of managerial control have been criticised because 
the structural conflict between capital and labour remains intact (Ackroyd, 2007a; Ackroyd & 
Thompson, 2003b; Thompson & Ackroyd, 1995) These scholars call for the return of the 
insubordinate, headstrong and obdurate worker who had theoretically almost disappeared 
under the influence of managerial surveillance and control. Dissent and resistance are enacted 
whether management scholars recognise them or not. Workers going slowly, absenteeism and 
wasting time, subversive humour as discourse (Taylor & Bain, 2003), stealing by workers in 
hotels, catering and in the docks (Mars, 1982) and sabotage (Brown, 1977) are taking place 
despite the lack of attention by management scholars. Workers are doing things that they are 
not supposed to do and are finding ways to break the rules and undermine managerial control. 
Dissenting behaviours affirm the agency of workers. These close examinations of awkward 
behaviours shift attention from organised and overt industrial action to the unorganised, 
spontaneous subterranean struggles that individuals undertake. Organisational studies 
scholars, through writing, have largely privileged the managerial perspective and interests over 
those of the workers (Ackroyd & Thompson, 2003a, 2003b; Jermier et al., 1994). 
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Labour process theorists, despite giving a rich account of employee behaviour, have been 
criticised for being too deterministic and for failing to account for the everyday, routine ways in 
which employees make sense of the complexities of the workplace (Thomas & Davies, 2005; 
Weick, 1995). The everyday, informal and spontaneous ways (Jermier et al., 1994; Knights & 
McCabe, 2000) in which workplace contradictions are being addressed have apparently escaped 
labour process theorists. A “Foucauldian” turn on power expands our understanding of 
workplace resistance by taking a closer examination of the agency and motivations of 
individuals. It shines a light on how they routinely negotiate and seek to transform meanings 
and contradictions embedded in power relations in the workplace (Doolin, 2002; Kuhlmann et 
al., 2013; Smets et al., 2012; Thomas & Davies, 2005; Waring & Currie, 2009). The emphasis 
shifts from a structural, deterministic account of power and resistance – labour process theory- 
to a closer examination of the micro-politics of resistance as individuals reflexively engage in 
on-going processes of confronting, adapting to, and compromising with existing power 
relations, thus subverting dominant discourses, meanings and understandings.  
The adoption of a routine resistance lens allows one to address calls for the reconnection of the 
sociology of professions with organisation studies (Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf, 
2011; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). The adoption of this lens links the sociology of professions, 
organisation studies and institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
A routine resistance perspective could facilitate a closer inspection of how professionals 
respond to managerial controls within organisations because organisations have become 
primary arenas for professional agency (Ackroyd & Muzio, 2007c; Cooper & Robson, 2006; 
Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2008). Given that organisations are also principal arenas for the 
enactment of multiple logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 
2010), a routine resistance perspective allows one to begin to see how embedded actors 
routinely engage those multiple logics (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a). Routine resistance examines the institutionalisation processes from the bottom-up 
(Barley, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2013). The routine resistance perspective allows a miner’s 
perspective to emerge about institutionalisation from the coalface (Barley, 2008). Routine 
resistance lenses allows for the hearing of the voices of those who make up the heartbeat of 
institutionalism (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). The mutual implication of power and resistance 
(Foucault, 1979; Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985) directs attention to the mutual 
constitution of structure and agency (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Giddens, 1984; 
Hughes, 1971). It studies the institutionalisation process from the perspective of its material 
enactment (Thornton et al., 2012). A routine resistance perspective opens a way to 
understanding how organisational hybridity (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Besharov & Smith, 
2013; Pache & Santos, 2010) is resolved in the real lives of people as they go about their daily 
business at work (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). People integrate 
the wickedness (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007; Rittel & Webber, 1973) of the 
social organisation of healthcare delivery, the hospital as a complex adaptive system (Barach & 
Johnson, 2006; McKelvey, 1999; Rickles, Hawe, & Shiell, 2007) and the multiple logics within the 
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hospital in a routine, everyday, non-dramatic manner (March, 1981; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a). What are the implications of these insights for the conceptualisation of the impact of the 
social reorganisation of the delivery of healthcare (Timmermans & Oh, 2010; Waring & Bishop, 
2013)? Is the binary account (Gleeson & Knights, 2006; Numerato et al., 2012) a sufficiently 
nuanced account of medical professional responses in the managerial hospital (Kirkpatrick & 
Ackroyd, 2003a; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004; Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Suddaby & Viale, 2011)? 
A routine resistance perspective invites one to look beyond what one sees. So it suggests that 
the range of behaviours that were conceptualised as deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation 
and restratification (Section 5.4.2), might not yet be the whole story. There is perhaps a 
narrative that unfolds away from the glare of the managerial gaze. A more detailed examination 
of other parts of neo-institutional theory literature (Section 5.7) helps to clarify some of the 
issues raised earlier. The GT described in Chapter 4 is likely enriched by ideas of routine 
resistance and public and hidden transcripts. 
5.7 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
This section of the literature reviews neo-institutional literature that has a bearing on the 
behaviour of hospital consultants in the acute hospital sector of the English NHS. 
“Institutions … control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel 
it in one direction as against the many other directions that would be theoretically possible.” p.57 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967)  
Institutions shape, constrain, control and stimulate human conduct. Institutional theory has 
become the main theoretical perspective for conceptualising organisations (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Suddaby, & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008; Munir, 2015; Walsh, Meyer, & Schoonhoven, 2006). 
Institutions are symbolic systems of meaning by which people structure space and time in 
meaningful ways (Friedland & Alford, 1991b). This theoretical lens examines how human 
behaviour is shaped, constrained, directed and transformed by social structures. However, the 
institutional world is not given and fixed but has a socially constructed objectivity (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Hughes, 1971). Human behaviour is institutionally embedded within 
historicised, contingent and fluid structures. How do the behaviours of actors affect the 
contingency of institutions? 
Institutional theory started with a focus on organisations having meaning and purposes beyond 
meeting their technical tasks (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Selznick, 1957). This is especially important in this study 
because of the nature of the acute hospital as a workplace. The doors are always open for the 
whole day on every day of the year. Then the neo-institutionalist phase looked at the impact of 
the broader environment on organisations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1983). In mature sectors of society, legitimised ways of doing things 
emerge over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) with usually one dominant template for 
conducting affairs prevailing (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Scott et al., 2000). Three 
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mechanisms promote homogeneity in institutional sectors or fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): 
coercive (e.g. state regulation), normative (expectations of what are proper and reasonable 
ways to behave) and mimetic (e.g. copying good practice). When states regulate changes in the 
ways in which sectors are structured, the modifications take place quickly (Barley & Tolbert, 
1997). The power of isomorphic pressures is such that alternative ways of doing things or 
behaving are not even considered (Zucker, 1977). An alternative view is that the role of the 
state – as an institutional actor – is not necessarily efficient in achieving fundamental change 
(Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). With respect to this study, the impact 
of the broader environment on the hospital is important because the macro-environment plays 
a significant role in shaping some of the fundamental dilemmas faced by the hospital 
consultants. That broader environment is wicked and complex (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Cooper et al., 1996; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Exworthy et al., 1999; Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Pache & Santos, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012). 
This section is relatively longer than the other sections of the literature review because it serves 
as a theoretical canvass for the rest of the literature review. The stability of institutions could be 
illusionary when history is considered (Bjerregaard & Jonasson, 2014; Kaghan & Lounsbury, 
2011; Suddaby, 2015). Hence, the processes of institutionalisation can be recognised as 
historicised, contingent and in flux (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Hughes, 1971). Institutions do 
shape and constrain the choices of actors, be they organisations, groups or individuals. 
Contingency, flux and historicity create space for the return of people into the institutionalised 
processes as they interpret, modify and coordinate their activities with other inhabitants of 
institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002). In this way, people 
create the institutions by social interaction (Blumer, 1971) as they set out to address 
immediate, practical problems (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). This 
study started with the behaviours of people as they set out to resolve their main concern. Thus, 
an account of how the macro-institutionalisation process created the micro-institutional 
problems that the participants seek to resolve on an everyday basis is appropriate. This mainly 
structural archetype theory account of institutional change in the NHS reflects the initial taken-
for-grantedness of institutions and the agents responding to them (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; 
Jepperson, 1991). The second section (Section 5.7.2) introduces a more detailed and nuanced 
examination of structure, agency and manifest behaviours within the context of wickedness, 
complexity, circulation of power, routine resistance and institutional complexity. It explores 
structure, agency and manifest behaviours as on-going accomplishments (Emirbayer & Mische, 
1998; Friedland & Alford, 1991b; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a).   
5.7.1 An Archetype Approach to Institutional Theory 
5.7.1.1 Introduction 
Institutional theory has become a significant theoretical lens for the study of organisations 
(Suddaby et al., 2008). This is especially true in studying change in complex organisational fields 
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like healthcare (Macfarlane et al., 2013; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009). The NHS healthcare 
environment can be said to be institutionally complex (Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets et al., 
2012) because of the constellation of logics (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Exworthy et al., 1999; 
Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 1999; Noordegraaf, 2013). Institutional logics prescribe 
what is considered legitimate behaviour and provide taken-for-granted templates of 
appropriate goals and means to attain them (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2013; 
Thornton et al., 2012). In complex environments, organisations are likely to face multiple, often 
contradictory, demands arising from institutional complexity (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Friedland & Alford, 1991b; Kraatz & Block, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2012; Reay & Hinings, 2009) 
Effecting organisational change is difficult in environments such as healthcare. The wickedness 
of healthcare organisation (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007; Conklin, 2006b; 
Raisio, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Vartiainen, 2005) makes it difficult as was discussed 
earlier. Another muddling feature is the hospital as a complex adaptive system (Checkland, 
1981; Dooley, 1997; Ferlie & Dopson, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et 
al., 2002; Shiell et al., 2008).  
 
One early neo-institutionalist approach to explaining the dynamics of radical change in 
healthcare systems has been that of archetypes (Chreim, Williams, & Coller, 2012; Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1993; Kitchener, 1998; Kitchener, 1999b; Kitchener & Mertz, 2012). A key issue to note 
in this literature is the significant investment in structural and decision-making systems’ 
change. At the same time one should notice how the underlying professional logic has proved 
difficult to dislodge (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Dickinson et al., 2013b; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 
2003b; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). This draws attention to the role of people in the 
institutionalisation process (Barley, 2008; Friedland & Alford, 1991a; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; 
Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012; Thornton et al., 2012; Zilber, 2008). In fact, 
much of the earlier institutional theory had focused on structural responses to institutional 
complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a) but had failed to account for 
a level of institutional behaviour at levels below the organisation (Kraatz, 2009; Kraatz & Block, 
2013; Lok, 2010; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). This draws attention to how embedded actors 
interpret, contest and symbolically interact with and create social structures. 
5.7.1.2 Elements of the archetype 
A number of scholars have taken an archetype approach to explaining organisational change 
(Brock, 2006; Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Greenwood & Hinings, 2006; 
Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990; Malhotra, Hinings, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2005). This 
approach has also been used as a theoretical lens in the study of radical change in public 
services (Ferlie et al., 1996b; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b). Change in healthcare delivery 
systems have also been examined from an archetype approach to institutional change (Chreim 
et al., 2012; Dent et al., 2004; Ferlie, 1999; Kitchener, 1998; Scott et al., 2000). 
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This approach to institutional theory sees the organisation as an integrated set of structures and 
decision-making systems that are reflective of a single underlying interpretive scheme 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Scott & Meyer, 1994). The interpretive scheme is the combination 
of ideals, values and beliefs that infuse the structures and systems with meaning (Bartunek, 
1984; Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980b). Within a sector there would usually be a 
dominant archetype (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; Hinings et al., 2003). Given the idea of 
multiple institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991b; Kraatz & Block, 2013; Oliver, 1991), one 
might question the notions of institutional field stability and coherence and the dominance of an 
archetype that has dominated earlier accounts of archetype change (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1993; Scott et al., 2000). Those early isomorphic accounts of neo-institutionalism arguably have 
under-accounted for institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). Thus the earlier 
accounts of archetype change within healthcare can be critically re-examined (Crilly & Le Grand, 
2004; Exworthy et al., 1999; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 1999; Reay & Hinings, 2005; 
Scott et al., 2000). Sometimes institutional complexity is a temporary phenomenon (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2012). In other instances, it might be more 
enduring (Greenwood et al., 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Zilber, 2011).  
The challenges for organisations and people can be contingent on the type of institutional 
pluralism that exists in their organisation (Besharov & Smith, 2013). This complicates the key 
issues of conformity or isomorphism with dominant archetypes and the tensions around 
legitimacy, efficiency and decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). 
Institutional pluralism makes change processes is just a bit messier (Lawrence, 2008; Oliver, 
1991). Archetype accounts of institutional theory argue that over the medium- to longer terms 
congruence occurs between the structures, systems and the interpretive scheme (Brock, Powell, 
& Hinings; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993). Archetype incoherence is 
a temporary phenomenon as, in a mature institutional field, there is a tendency towards a 
dominant coherent archetype (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Scott et al., 2000). As was briefly 
mentioned earlier and is discussed in more detail later, these assumptions in earlier archetype 
studies have proved to be difficult to sustain. However, this approach is still a useful way to 
analyse changes in professional services organisations (Brock, 2006; Brock, Powell, & Hinings, 
1999, 2007). 
5.7.1.3 Dynamics of archetype change 
Archetype change can arise from within the broader institutional field or within the specific 
sector (Battilana, 2006; Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Hinings, 
Greenwood, & Cooper, 1999). Institutional field pressures may have made certain modes of 
organisation of professional services inefficient and hard to justify; e.g. in law firms (Brown, 
Cooper, Greenwood, & Hinings, 1996; Malhotra & Morris, 2009; Pinnington & Morris, 2003), 
accounting firms (Brock & Powell, 2005; Malhotra, Morris, & Hinings, 2006) and architecture 
firms (Pinnington & Morris, 2002). Increasingly, corporate and managerial modes of operation 
have replaced professional norms (Cooper & Robson, 2006). The idea of a professional 
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bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1979) and professional forms of organisation that rely on expert 
knowledge workers (Adler, Kwon, & Heckscher, 2008; Zardkoohi, Bierman, Panina, & 
Chakrabarty, 2011) had become hard to justify in the period under review from the 1980s 
onwards (Ackroyd et al., 2007b; Clarke & Newman, 2006; Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1998). The 
professional organisation suffered a legitimacy crisis in being characterised as self-interested, 
inefficient and unaccountable (Ackroyd et al., 2007b; Brock et al., 1999). 
The critical appraisals of professionalism noted earlier (see Section 5.4) were applied to 
professional bureaucracies in the public sector. The professionals stood accused of contributing 
to the problems of bloated public service organisations (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Ferlie & 
Fitzgerald, 2002; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011). The UK government was looking for ways to cut the 
costs of the delivery of healthcare and reduce the influence of the medical profession in policy 
making (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b; Klein, 2013). Developments in IT, a better educated 
public and changes in expectations of the public from the delivery of public services and a 
financial crisis contributed to a changed relationship between the state and the medical 
profession. Until the 1980s the tools to control the medical profession were non-existent (Klein, 
2013). The question of whether the state has managed to change the ways in which hospital 
consultants think and behave has been the subject of numerous studies (Crilly & Le Grand, 
2004; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 2013b). This is an important issue in 
archetype change. The question is: what does a change in archetype involve? 
5.7.1.4 Successful archetype change 
Successful archetype change requires a radical, parallel and simultaneous change in all three 
components of the archetype, with a particular focus on the interpretive scheme (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1993; Hinings & Malhotra, 2008). It is a complicated and complex process that involves 
a combination of precipitating and enabling dynamics (Hinings & Malhotra, 2008). The 
precipitating factors include institutional pressures, the patterns of value commitments and 
interests. The enabling dynamics include supportive power dependencies and a capacity for 
action. The institutional pressures are already noted above as the factors that delegitimised the 
professionalised bureaucracy. The interests reflect whether major stakeholders hold the view 
that their concerns are served by the status quo or not. If the status quo were not functional 
then that would be a driver for change. Value commitments can be reformative, indifferent or 
competitive. Those with reformative value commitments would be interested in changing the 
ways in which things are done. With indifferent value/commitment patterns the relevant 
parties do not particularly care whether change happens or not. With competitive value 
commitment structures some participants would likely be for the status quo and others for 
change. The supportive power dependencies take account of the power differentials within 
sectors and organisations. Different stakeholders have differing capacities to persuade the 
organisation to follow their preferred course of action (Greenwood, Walsh, Hinings, & Ranson, 
1980a). The capacity for action includes having a clear view of what the alternative archetype 
might be, being able to manage the transition to a new archetype and having the skills to 
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operate in that new archetype. Successful archetype change requires several issues to come 
together. 
The two major players in the English NHS are the government and the medical profession 
(Klein, 2013). The government, in the 1980s, because of its fiscal crisis and the possibilities that 
IT afforded, was inclined to change the professional bureaucracy (Exworthy et al., 1999; 
Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003a; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011). The interests of the government 
would be better served by an archetype that would prioritise the control of costs, efficient 
delivery of services and transparent accountability. The medical profession did not share their 
enthusiasm for the new priorities (Klein, 2013; Pollock, 2005). This meant that the value 
commitments were competitive (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  
Hospital doctors have for many years shown a lack of interest in assuming managerial roles in 
the English NHS hospitals (Griffiths, 1983, 1992). Before the 1980s, geographical area-based 
health authorities determined health needs of populations, allocated the funds and determined 
whether government priorities were met. All along the way, they relied on medical 
professionals, who made significant input into the process. Doctors had a right of veto in the 
policy-making process (Klein, 2013). The Treasury always had concerns about the affordability 
of the NHS. So the managerial hospital did not emerge only in the 1980s as might be inferred 
from the NPM literature (C. & Bouckaert, 2011; Hood, 1991). For a long time skirmishes took 
place between the government and the medical establishment over the organisation and 
delivery of the health service.  
A Hospital Inspection Service – reporting to the Secretary of State on shortcomings in the 
delivery of healthcare – did not have authority over doctors. The Health Service Commissioner, 
established in 1964 to investigate patient complaints, could not deal with issues that involved 
clinical judgement. Attempts to get doctors to consider the resource implications of their clinical 
decision making, such as the Cogwheel Report and the Hospital Activity Analysis, did not have 
significant impact on the clinical practice of hospital doctors (Gray et al., 1991; Klein, 2013). The 
Treasury implemented a Financial Management Initiative, in which every government 
spending-programme had to have clearly stated objectives and performance indicators. 
Ministers would hold annual performance reviews with regional health authorities to determine 
whether the government agenda was being implemented and whether tax funds were being 
spent efficiently. The difficulty was that the tools were not yet available to obtain the data and 
hence the medical profession had to be relied on for their impressions of these issues. 
Rudimentary data had been collected since 1956 but sophisticated analysis was not possible. 
Thus, before the 1980s, the focus was on controlling inputs into the NHS; e.g. the numbers of 
doctors, nurses and beds. How resources were being spent was a black hole to the government, 
which paid the bills. 
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5.7.1.5 The Griffiths general managers 
The 1983 Griffiths managerial revolution was a step taken by the government to realise its 
ambition of a more managed and efficient healthcare system. Administrators, who generally 
acted as diplomats between clinicians competing for scarce resources, became general 
managers who would be appointed on performance-related employment contracts (Klein, 2013; 
Pollock, 2005). Managers assumed responsibility for running hospitals efficiently. Griffiths tried 
to encourage doctors to become general managers. Doctors believed that Griffiths, a 
supermarket managerial executive, could not tell them how to run a hospital (Griffiths, 1983, 
1992). The Griffiths Report did not have input from the medical profession. The government 
ignored the medical profession in crafting healthcare policy for the first time (Ackroyd et al., 
2007b; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b). This was strange given the wickedness of healthcare 
service organisation and the complexity of the hospital as a primary delivery vehicle for 
healthcare services (Roberts et al., 2012). The number of senior managers in the NHS increased 
from 1 000 (1986) to 26 000 (1995) and the cost of administration increased from 5% to 12% 
of the NHS budget over the same period (Pollock, 2005). No agreement has been reached on the 
implications of the Griffiths Report. Some researchers argue that the Griffiths general managers 
increased the control by the Department of Health on the clinical frontline and increased 
efficiency (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000b; Klein, 2001b). The government 
also required hospitals to focus on their core business of healthcare delivery and forced them to 
put out for competitive tendering the delivery of cleaning, catering, laundry services and 
charges for car parks (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Pollock, 2005; Pollock & Whitty, 1990). The 
medical profession was opposed to these changes but they felt that they still had the upper hand 
(Dickinson et al., 2013b; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b). Their interests remained with the 
professionalised bureaucracy (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006).  
Other researchers take a different view on the efficacy of government actions. The government 
was, and remains, constrained because it does not necessarily have the power to change the 
archetype fundamentally. It can force through changes in the structures and decision-making 
systems but it cannot force a change in the beliefs and the value system (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 
2003b; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Moreover, at the time, it lacked the capacity for action (Hinings 
& Malhotra, 2008). The government did not have a clear view of the new archetype that it 
wanted to impose. Also it did not have the skills to operate that new archetype. Added to the 
aforementioned deficiencies, it did not have the capacity to manage the migration from the 
professionalised bureaucracy to what was later called the quasi-market archetype (Kitchener, 
1998; Kitchener, 1999a) or the NPM archetype hospital (Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000a). The 
Conservative government decided to place much of the public-service delivery in the hands of 
executive agencies (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Greer, 1992). Activity was to be decentralised but 
control and accountability would be centralised (Carter et al., 1992; Klein, 2013). With 
developments in IT, the government believed that it could control the periphery and transform 
itself from a provider of services to a regulator of these services (Day, 1987). Government 
lacked clarity about whether to centralise or decentralise control (Exworthy et al., 2010b). 
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5.7.1.6 Tracks of change 
It is necessary at this point to introduce another idea on archetype change; i.e. tracks of change. 
Organisations do not always follow the same change trajectory (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings, 1995) but can have one of the following 
different trajectories: 
 A successful reorientation, which is a quick simultaneous and parallel change in all three 
components of the archetype;  
 An unresolved excursion, which is a decoupling from an archetype without a complete 
recoupling to a different archetype;  
 An aborted discursion, which is a decoupling from an archetype with movement 
towards another archetype and then a return to the original archetype; and  
 Inertia, which is an instance of no change.  
A professional archetype is more inclined towards stability than change (Mintzberg, 1978, 
1983). In healthcare radical change in the delivery model is complicated by a number of factors 
(Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; Lee, Weiner, Harrison, & Belden, 2013) including the 
wickedness of healthcare issues (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007; Conklin, 2006b; 
Raisio, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Vartiainen, 2005), the hospital as a complex adaptive 
system (Anderson, 1999; Barach & Johnson, 2006; Ferlie & Dopson, 2005; Kickert, Klijn, & 
Koppenjan, 1997; McKelvey, 1999; Shiell et al., 2008) and the distributed professional skills and 
leaderships in healthcare organisations (Godfrey et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 
2002). In healthcare organisations an imperative exists to build consensus at different levels 
rather than relying on charismatic leaders (Buchanan, Addicott, Fitzgerald, Ferlie, & Baeza, 
2007; Dickinson et al., 2013b). Successful reorientation is more the exception rather than the 
rule (Ferlie, 2002; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Kitchener, 1998). Change driven from the top, in 
healthcare environments, is difficult (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004; Waring & Currie, 2009) because 
professional values are difficult to change (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 
2003a). The Cabinet committee process that excluded doctors from making an input into the 
formulation and assessments resulted from a failure to acknowledge wickedness, complexity, 
multiplicity of logics and expectations so that despite the upheavals over three decades of 
managerial healthcare policy the professional bureaucracy is still operative (Crilly & Le Grand, 
2004; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 2013b).  
5.7.1.7 A change in archetype: from a district general hospital to a market-oriented 
hospital 
This section reflects on the processes that led to the change from the traditional publicly owned 
and operated district general hospital to the quasi-market trust (Kitchener, 1998), the NPM 
hospital (Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000a) or perhaps the post-bureaucratic hospital (Hoggett, 1996). 
It is important to keep in mind the focus of this study, which is the explication of the main 
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concern and its continual resolution by the participants of the study. Hence, the attention of this 
study is directed at institutional complexity (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011), 
the agency of the participants (Delmestri, 2006; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Friedland & Alford, 
1991a; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Powell & Colyvas, 2013) and the observed practices and 
behaviours (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2011) of the 
inhabitants (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Hughes, 1971) at the coalface of institutionalism (Barley, 
2008) as the carriers of the logics (DiMaggio, 1988; Friedland & Alford, 1991a; Jepperson, 1991; 
Zilber, 2002). 
The Conservative government introduced a White Paper, Working for Patients (Department of 
Health, 1989) that was enacted in 1990. As with the Griffiths Report (Griffiths, 1983, 1992), the 
medical profession did not participate in drafting the document. A cabinet committee, rather 
than a royal commission of all stakeholders, prepared the document. This is strange, given the 
wickedness of the social organisation of healthcare (Raisio, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973; 
Vartiainen, 2005) and the complexity of the hospital as an organisation (Holland, 1999; Strauss 
et al., 1963; Waldrop, 1994). The first thing to note was the introduction of a quasi-market in 
the NHS. The government legislated the separation of the delivery of healthcare services from 
the purchasing of services (Le Grand, 2009a; Propper et al., 1998; Walsh, 1995; Weber & 
Khademian, 2008). Healthcare authorities would focus on a purchasing function on behalf of 
geographic populations while providers would engage in competition to win contracts from 
purchasers. The White Paper, Working for Patients could be considered a tame solution to a 
wicked problem (Vartiainen, 2005; Weber & Khademian, 2008; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Wicked 
problems require the adoption of patiently constructed collaborative processes where 
ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty are accepted as part of the processes of trying to define 
the problems and crafting solutions. Moreover, the complexity of the spatio-temporal rhythm of 
the hospital means that the NPM management model was hardly appropriate.  
Structure 
Planning by health authorities based on the needs of geographic populations was replaced by 
resource allocations as determined by a quasi-market, financial incentives and competition 
(Farrell & Morris, 2003; Le Grand, 2009a; Pollock, 1992, 2005). Fragmentation replaced 
integration, albeit bureaucratic. In considering the move to quasi-market competition, 
management-based control systems and metrics-based performance-management systems 
(Exworthy, 2010a; Farrell & Morris, 2003; Greener, 2003), wickedness and complex adaptive 
system features were arguably ignored. Years later attempts would be made again to fix the 
fragmentation as patients, especially elderly, frail patients with multiple medical ailments, fell 
through the cracks (Ham, Imison, Goodwin, Dixon, & South, 2011c; Ham, Smith, & Eastmure, 
2011d; Lewis, Rosen, Goodwin, & Dixon, 2010).  
NHS hospitals became independent NHS hospital trusts with Boards of Directors that would 
assume responsibility for the operational management of the hospital. The regional and district 
health authorities – as representatives of the Secretary of State with a legal duty to provide a 
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comprehensive and free NHS – would no longer retain operational responsibility for the 
delivery of healthcare. The managed hospital was a departure from the professional 
bureaucracy (Ashburner et al., 1996; Exworthy et al., 2010b; Kitchener, 1998; Kitchener & 
Whipp, 1998; Mintzberg, 1979). Professional power and autonomy (Ackroyd et al., 2007b; 
Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a; Waring & Currie, 2009) receded. The first assumption was that 
competition would lead to increased efficiency (Propper et al., 1998; Söderlund, Csaba, Gray, 
Milne, & Raferty, 1997). Secondly, GPs would hold funds for purchasing some services from 
providers on behalf of their patients (Crisp, 2005; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Working for Patients 
introduced financial incentives into the NHS (Kay, 2002; Pollock, 2005). The medical profession 
exploded in anger that the founding political consensus of the NHS was at risk (Mulligan, 1998; 
Pollock, 2005). Others argued that not much had changed (Klein, 2013; Mulligan, 1998). Some 
said that new business model had changed the dynamics of the NHS (Mays, Mulligan, & 
Goodwin, 2000; Pollock, 2005).  
Working for Patients also changed the relationship between hospital consultants and the 
hospitals. Previously the Regional Health Authority employed doctors. Now they became 
employees of the hospital, with employment contracts that were managed by the management 
of the hospital. Private practice was to be limited by the management; i.e. doctors would have to 
commit themselves to work for the hospital in a more structured manner. Moreover, hospital 
management could employ all hospital staff on locally agreed terms and conditions. National 
bargaining agreements between the state and representative medical professional 
organisations could be adjusted at a local level. Clinical excellence awards (extra income for 
going the extra mile in developing clinical services) would have management input for the first 
time. Lastly, doctors had to take part in medical audits in which their clinical practices would be 
reviewed (Klein, 2013; Mooney, 2009). Medical audits linked the clinical decisions with the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their resource implications. The hospital had to deliver value for 
money (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006; Hood, 1991; Pallot, 1998). That meant 
that, for the first time in the history of the NHS, managers had managerial oversight over 
consultant outputs (McKee & Healy, 2002). Doctors have always been of the most expensive 
members of staff. 
Decision-making systems 
The NHS hospital Trust has a statutory duty to balance its books. At the same time to create 
pressure to use assets productively a 6% capital charge was introduced on the value of 
buildings, land and equipment and a 3% efficiency savings target was introduced (Pollock & 
Gaffney, 1998). These were new charges on the “revenues” of the hospitals. The NHS hospital 
moved from input controls and cost containment (Dunleavy et al., 2006; Hood, 1991; Pallot, 
1998), such as numbers of beds and nurses, to output controls, such as numbers of patients 
treated and operations performed. Hospitals were to operate like private businesses. The focus 
on efficiency, contracts and competition meant that decision-making systems had to be put in 
place. So investments were made in IT systems. Management staff was hired so that the hospital 
could be efficient and competitive. Key numbers were to be tracked. The management of 
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budgets and costs assumed greater significance. The relationship between the hospital and the 
health authorities had changed from being based on trust to being based on contracts between 
providers and purchasers (Pollock, 2005). The aim of the contracts was to introduce 
transparency into the agreements between purchasers and providers regarding the 
specifications of services to be delivered. The administration of the contracts resulted in 
increased administration costs (Paton, 1995; Söderlund et al., 1997). Moreover, hospitals were 
disaggregated into clinical directorates that were managerially inspired collections of clinical 
services under the leadership of a senior consultant who was assisted by a general manager and 
often a senior nurse. The medical profession was against the introduction of competition but 
was less hostile on the matter of clinical directorates (Klein, 2013). Hospital doctors had to 
participate in clinical audits (Hitchen, 2008; Mooney, 2009). Clinical audits strengthened the 
control of managers and linked clinical activities and financial management imperatives 
(Pollock, 2005).  
The structure changed significantly. Decision-making systems were improved. However, the 
Boards were not in a position to make significant strategic decisions because the service mix 
and “prices” for services were centrally controlled although theoretically the market should 
determine the service mix (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Exworthy & Greener, 2008). Providers had 
to deliver services according to NHS standards. Should a hospital fail to meet its financial and 
service obligations, the Secretary of State could intervene in its operational affairs. The Board of 
Directors could be replaced. Doctors were not clamouring to become clinical directors. These 
were positions that were of a part-time nature and the primary source of identity for doctors 
had always been clinical (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; McGivern et al., 2015; Spyridonidis, Hendy, 
& Barlow, 2014).  
Control in the hospital was, however, not through managerial hierarchies. Its functioning as a 
complex adaptive system (Holland, 1999; Waldrop, 1994) and therefore its self-organisation, 
non-linearity and emergence suggest that strong management might not be particularly 
effective. Some scholars proposed that the hospital remained a professional bureaucracy 
(Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 2013b; Ferlie, 1999). Professional leadership still 
played a substantial role in leading clinical services and remained dispersed across a number of 
individuals in the hospital (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Godfrey et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2003; 
Nelson et al., 2002). The administrator, who became a general manager and later a CEO of the 
independent NHS Trust, still had to deal with a clinical frontline that retained control over their 
work. The managerial NHS Trust reduced its costs and increased its throughputs (Mulligan, 
1998; Söderlund et al., 1997). Its wards became busier and noisier (McKee & Healy, 2002). The 
spatio-temporal rhythm of the district general hospital had been replaced by the frenzy of the 
quasi-market trust. Professional bureaucratic decision-making systems had changed to a 
sedimented hybrid decision-making system that was a mixture of centralisation and 
decentralisation, professionalism, bureaucracy, markets and later networks (Cooper et al., 1996; 
Exworthy et al., 2010b; Exworthy et al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999). 
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Interpretive scheme 
A change in the interpretive scheme is fundamental to an archetype approach to radical 
institutional change. The question is: given the significant structural changes and the less 
fundamental changes in the decision-making systems, has there indeed been a change in the 
interpretive scheme? Already, it should be clear that a radical change may not have taken place 
because this would involve simultaneous and parallel change in the structures, decision-making 
systems and the interpretive scheme. It would be amiss to argue that the interpretive scheme 
did not change, given that the structure and the decision-making systems radically changed. 
Doctors were less hostile to clinical directorates than they were to the Griffiths general 
managers. The evidence on this matter is mixed. Communication between primary care GPs and 
hospital consultants improved because of GP fundholding (Glennester, Matsaganis, Owens, & 
Hancock, 1994; Smith et al., 2005). Competition, instead of improving patient outcomes, 
resulted in poorer outcomes (Cooper & Le Grand, 2007; Pollock, 2005; Propper et al., 1998). 
Professional reservations were reinforced. The lack of fundamental change was said to be due to 
the market-oriented incentives being too weak and the constraints too strong (Ham, 1999; Le 
Grand, Mays, & Mulligan, 1998a). Waiting lists of fundholding GPs came down at a faster rate 
than those of the health authorities (Dusheiko, Gravelle, & Jacobs, 2004), which suggested that 
commissioning was potentially useful. However, non-market relationships were hard to change 
(Allen, 2002; Checkland et al., 2011). Healthcare services are not readily bought and sold as 
commodities; hence, competition and contracts are difficult to frame and administer, which 
complicates changes in the interpretive scheme (Ferlie et al., 1996b; Shaw, Smith, Porter, Rosen, 
& Mays, 2013). Despite talk of decentralisation away from the Department of Health, central 
bureaucratic control remained very strong (Braithwaite, Westbrook, & Iedema, 2005; Exworthy 
et al., 2010b; Exworthy et al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999). The hostility towards general 
management was not repeated with the introduction of clinical directors (Braithwaite et al., 
2005; Fitzgerald & Dufour, 1998; Klein, 2013).  
The unevenness in the scope and rates of change in structures, systems and interpretive 
schemes raises questions about a key hypothesis of archetype coherence in the longer term 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993). The longevity of a hybrid archetype 
and an unresolved excursion with the quasi-market hospital trust (Kitchener, 1998; Kitchener & 
Whipp, 1998) or the NPM archetype hospital (Ferlie, 1999) call into question the soundness of 
the “tracks of change” argument as well. In the context of institutional complexity (Greenwood 
et al., 2011) and a practice-based approach to institutional complexity (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a) – discussed later in this section – the ambiguities, paradoxes and contradictions in large-
scale change become clearer as enduring and socially constructed. 
Since no quick, parallel and simultaneous change took place in the structure, systems and 
interpretive scheme in the change from a district general hospital to a quasi-market or NPM 
hospital trust, it is questionable whether radical archetype change had indeed taken place. Over 
time, the patterns of value commitments and interests of the two major players in healthcare 
remained fundamentally at odds despite the external pressures in the field that precipitated the 
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crisis. The government had the monopoly of power as funder and rule-maker but it lacked 
capacity for action and its agents (i.e. managers) did not have the power to move the healthcare 
organisations irretrievably in a managerial direction. The structures changed significantly, the 
decision-making systems were more constrained and the interpretive scheme hardly moved. 
From a wicked problem perspective, it is unclear whether the fragmentation between 
purchasers and providers and the competition between providers necessarily was a good move. 
Moreover, the reinforcement of the vertical walls silos between providers and agencies involved 
with healthcare, transport, education and social welfare can hardly be said to have helped. It is 
also not obvious how strong CEOs could impose their executive will on the distributed, 
collective clinical leadership in an acute hospital. 
The introduction of quasi-markets was an incomplete shift from the public sector bureaucracy 
(Exworthy et al., 2010b). What were the role of institutional complexity (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011; Greenwood et al., 2011) and the agency of the participants (Delmestri, 2006; Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998; Friedland & Alford, 1991a; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Powell & Colyvas, 2013) in 
this shift? How do the observed practices and behaviours (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets 
et al., 2011) of the inhabitants (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Hughes, 1971) clarify the dynamics of 
this change? What has been happening at the coalface of institutionalism (Barley, 2008), who 
are the carriers of the sedimented logics (Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; 
Zilber, 2002). The messiness, complexities and paradoxes are further clarified in Section 5.10, 
where the literature is integrated into the GT established in Chapter 4. 
5.7.1.8 Networks 
After the Conservative government left office in 1997, the New Labour government took office 
with a “third way” of organising healthcare delivery; i.e. neither hierarchy nor markets. The 
internal market was dismissed as wasteful but a key element of this market was retained; i.e. 
the purchaser-provider split. Healthcare providers had to collaborate. Complex, non-elective 
conditions require integrated service delivery. These healthcare services include as treatments 
for frail, old people with multiple chronic conditions; stroke services; and paediatric heart 
surgery. Clinical networks of providers from the social, primary, secondary and tertiary care 
services were expected to coordinate care for these groups of patients (Edwards, 2002; 
Goodwin, Curry, Naylor, Ross, & Duldig, 2010; Goodwin et al., 2004; Ham, Dixon, & Chantler, 
2011b; Ham et al., 2011c; Ham et al., 2011d). Networks put the patient at the centre of the 
service design, improve access to care, transcend professional boundaries and share best 
practice. Collaboration would promote efficiency, effectiveness and quality of care (Edwards, 
2002; Hamilton et al., 2005). Managed care networks took account of the cross-cutting nature 
(Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002b) of healthcare. However, the ambivalence in policy appears to have 
escaped government, which insisted on retaining a purchaser-provider split, competition 
between providers, and performance management of individual providers while at the same 
time expecting them to collaborate. 
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Between 1999 and 2009, the new government strengthened the regulatory framework as 
another means to improve quality. Initially, until 2000, there was a subtle shift away from 
competition as a route towards efficiency and quality to collaboration and tighter regulation to 
achieve the same ends. The government established the Commission for Health Improvement 
(CHI), later replaced by the Healthcare Commission and more recently the Care Quality 
Commission. Scandals in medical practice created a moment for government to remove the 
implied responsibility for quality assurance from the clinical professionals and to meet pre-
existing political objectives of controlling the clinical frontline (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011; 
Kennedy, 2001; Smith, 1998). The NICE (renamed the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence in 2005) was set up to formulate clinical guidelines and protocols of best practice 
based on the available evidence (Ferlie & McGivern, 2013; Timmermans & Berg, 2003; 
Timmermans & Kolker, 2004). Quality assurance was being codified. National service 
frameworks were drafted to promote consistency of service delivery across organisational 
boundaries. These were evidence-based professional consensus guidelines of what was 
considered good clinical practice for particular conditions or groups of patients. These central 
institutions aimed to promote consistently high clinical quality, irrespective of geographical 
location.  
Decentralisation was proclaimed loudly. It was probably more the continuation of centralised 
decentralisation (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Klein, 2001a). Once again the state lacked the capacity 
for action (Hinings, 2008) as it lacked a clear vision of what a network archetype would look 
like, how it would fit within the residual quasi-bureaucracy, quasi-market archetypes (Allen, 
2002; Exworthy et al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999). There was also not a clear plan to manage the 
migration from an already deeply sedimented archetype (Brown et al., 1996). Managed care 
networks have been described as sedimented archetypes (Addicott & Ferlie, 2006). Once again 
the contradictions have implications for institutional complexity (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; 
Greenwood et al., 2011). How does agency of the participants (Delmestri, 2006; Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998; Friedland & Alford, 1991a; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Powell & Colyvas, 2013) 
unfold? What do the observed practices and behaviours (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets 
et al., 2011) of the inhabitants (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Hughes, 1971) suggest about the 
compromises and choices being made? What pictures do we see at the coalface of 
institutionalism (Barley, 2008)? What is happening with the hospital doctors, amongst other 
staffs, who are also carriers of the logics (DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002)?  
The meanings and purpose of the managed care networks have not been clear; i.e. were they to 
manage the linkages between organisations or were they responsible for service delivery 
(Addicott & Ferlie, 2006; Addicott et al., 2006; Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Wistow & Dickinson, 
2012)? The managed care networks did not have budgetary responsibility as that still resided 
with the commissioners of services. Provider organisations had individual service delivery and 
quality targets to meet. Clinicians – without any operational authority – managed the care 
network board which in turn managed the networks while the organisations that employed 
them had to deliver the services and meet targets (Addicott, 2008). The networks had to 
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structure services according to national service framework and NICE guidelines so they had 
very little room for discretion. The managed care networks had unclear responsibilities with 
limited or no authority (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Fitzgerald, Mark, McKee, Addicott, & Ferlie, 
2007; Wistow, Dickinson, Cunningham, Morris, & Braithwaite, 2012). The autonomy of 
individual frontline clinicians was constrained while an administrative and knowledge elite 
protected the collective autonomy of the profession (Domagalski, 2007; Freidson, 1988) or 
themselves. It could also be seen as indirect steering from the centre (Ferlie & McGivern, 2013; 
Miller & Rose, 2008). The networks had limited strategic decision-making capacity with a 
healthcare policy-focus on structural configuration and performance management (Addicott, 
2008; Exworthy et al., 2010b). This often meant that expertise had to be centralised in 
secondary and tertiary centres with smaller district general hospitals doing routine treatments 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2007). Amidst all the change so much appears to remain the same. 
What happened to the interpretive scheme?  Was the new value system more collegial, 
horizontal and professional than a system that underpinning command and control in a 
hierarchy or competition by markets? The managed care networks assumed operational 
responsibility for managing the linkages between organisations that remained accountable for 
meeting targets and delivering services according to national service frameworks, clinical 
guidelines and protocols. In a system where efficiency, effectiveness and outcomes are set in a 
strong and centrally controlled metric-based performance-management system (Exworthy, 
2010a; Farrell & Morris, 1999; Power, 1999) of targets to reduce waiting times (Bevan & Hood, 
2006; Propper et al., 2008), it is hard to see the operational effect of the official rhetoric of 
collaboration and care networks while the guiding principle for resource allocation remained 
quasi-bureaucratic and quasi-market (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Fergusson, 2000).  
The collaboration-competition paradox appeared to be unproblematic to the policymakers. Yet, 
the operational reality at the coalface it could hardly be more different. An elite emerged that 
captured some of the managerial jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988) of the managed care networks. The 
medical once again, restratified (Freidson, 1988). The academic clinicians at teaching hospitals 
recaptured central roles in the managed care networks and their power reverted to what it had 
been at the time of the establishment of the NHS (Pollock, 2005). Traditional bureaucratic 
norms still applied to a networked NHS hospital (Addicott & Ferlie, 2006; Addicott et al., 2006; 
Exworthy et al., 2010b). The NHS continued to function as a professional bureaucracy (Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 2013b).  
The interpretive scheme of managed care networks was an amalgamation of managerial, 
professional and bureaucratic beliefs, values and material practices. However, one does not 
appear to get a tangible sense of how hospital consultants adapt to, avoid, manipulate and 
compromise (Lawrence, 2008; Oliver, 1991) with the new managerialist structuring of service 
delivery. How did they find their ways within the complex balance between strategic direction 
and operational control (Currie et al., 2009; Farrell & Morris, 2003; Freidson, 1985; Waring & 
Currie, 2009)?  
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The next, and last, archetype is that of foundation trusts, which are discussed in the next section. 
5.7.1.9 Foundation trusts 
After a few years of joined-up government (Bogdanor, 2005; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002a) and 
managed care networks (Guthrie et al., 2010; Le Grand, 2003), in 1999, the Labour government 
announced another changed policy direction. The new policy was a return to market-based 
competition, management-based control systems and metrics-based performance-management 
systems (Farrell & Morris, 2003; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000b). It would eventually be based on 
patient choice, money following the patient (payment by results) and a diversity of healthcare 
providers. The Health and Social Care Act (2003) was the instrument that created a new 
hospital structure: the Foundation Trust. This was set up as a public benefit corporation in 
2004. The policy has been dismissed as privatisation below board level (Pollock, 2005; Unit, 
2003). High-performing NHS trusts could gain greater autonomy as foundation trusts (Allen et 
al., 2010; Day & Klein, 2005) that could be used to drive further improvements (Exworthy, 
2010a). 
Structure 
The NHS Foundation Trust is not accountable to the Secretary of State or the NHS bureaucracy 
(Francis, 2013; Unit, 2003). An independent regulator, Monitor, reports to Parliament on behalf 
of foundation trusts. All high-performing NHS Trust hospitals are eligible for the right to a 
licence to operate as foundation trusts. Monitor primarily assumes responsibility for the 
financial integrity of the Foundation Trust. The government intended that all NHS trusts should 
become foundation trusts by 2008 (House of Commons Health Committee, 2008). That target 
was extended to 2013/14 (Department of Health, 2010) and the policy objective still seems 
unattainable as many foundation trusts and NHS hospital trusts have severe financial and 
quality of care issues (Francis, 2013; O’Dowd, 2013; Pollock & Price, 2013b). Even foundation 
trusts have been running into all sorts of financial and operational problems. 
Decision-making systems 
Since the Foundation Trust remains within the NHS, it has to operate according to NHS 
standards and is subject to the NHS quality-of-care inspectorate bodies. Foundation trusts are 
not required to balance their books and can borrow funds up to prudential limits set by 
Monitor. A Board of Directors is answerable to Monitor and assumes operational responsibility 
for the Foundation Trust. A Board of Governors represents all the stakeholders, including the 
staff, and the local community is a means to promote local accountability and citizen 
involvement in the running of the hospital (Allen et al., 2011b; Klein, 2013). The relationships 
between the two structures are not always clear (Audit Commission, 2008; Day & Klein, 2005). 
However, matters appear to be improving (Allen et al., 2011b; Exworthy et al., 2010b). Like NHS 
hospital trusts, foundation trusts have contractual relationships with commissioners and other 
service providers. A standard fee-for-service delivered, Payment-by-Results, was introduced. 
The money would follow the patient. It would be aimed at promoting entrepreneurialism and 
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efficiency among providers. The private sector could also compete with, or deliver services on 
contract to, the Foundation Trust. This has been criticised as a way to contain costs through 
cherry-picking uncomplicated patients and medical procedures. Thus, potentially undermining 
the principles of equity, access, comprehensiveness and universality (Pollock, 2005). A system 
of contracts, pricing and competition opens the door to privatisation (Unit, 2003).  
Foundation trusts’ greater financial and operating freedoms are supposed to make them more 
responsive and innovative (Audit Commission, 2008). Foundation trusts added new wards and 
theatres (Allen et al., 2011b) but they could have done more, as indicated by the large retained 
surpluses in their bank accounts and their unwillingness to depart from nationally agreed 
conditions of employment for their staff, including clinicians (Audit Commission, 2008). Despite 
their freedom from operational management by the Department of Health, they are still subject 
to the NHS outcomes framework and national targets (Allen et al., 2011b; Exworthy et al., 
2010b). The Foundation Trust can go into joint venture agreements with other providers – 
including the private sector – to provide or buy-in services. This would expand capacity and be 
an avenue for innovation. However, it could also be seen as a backdoor to privatisation (Pollock, 
2005; Unit, 2003). A critical reading of the purchasing authorities is that they have not been 
effective in their role of moving services away from high-cost acute hospitals to cheaper 
alternatives in the community (Audit Commission, 2008; Robinson et al., 2011; Smith, Curry, 
Mays , & Dixon, 2010). Since the Foundation Trust has remained part of the NHS, changes in the 
service mix have to be agreed with Monitor and the commissioning authorities. So decision-
making is an overlapping maze among the Department of Health, the Care Quality Commission, 
the Board of Directors, the Board of Governors and Monitor.  
In terms of the interpretive scheme, the targets and performance-management terror regime 
(Bevan & Hood, 2006; Exworthy et al., 2010b; Greener, 2003; Propper et al., 2008) had proved 
to be insufficient to reduce the waiting lists and concerns with quality. Supplier competition was 
reinstated as a key operating principle to meet the expectations of the state, the public and the 
patients (Hawkins, 2011; Stevens, 2004). The senior management had become more rational 
(Mannion et al., 2009) while the hospital remained a professional organisation (Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 2013b; Kitchener, 1999a; MacDonald, 2006). The reticence 
to take full advantage of the freedoms to borrow money to develop services and employ staff in 
terms of locally agreed terms and conditions (House of Commons Health Committee, 2008) 
shows that it is difficult to change professional values (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004). The 
embeddedness of the hospital within a local healthcare economy constrains the impact of 
attempts at organisational change (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Smith et al., 2010). Non-market 
relations between commissioners and providers were still robust despite the structural and 
decision-making systems changes (Porter, Mays, Shaw, Rosen, & Smith, 2013). 
5.7.1.10 Summary of the archetype approach to institutional theory in NHS change 
This review of an archetype approach to institutional theory shows how difficult it has been to 
implement market-based reform within a professional context (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; 
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Dickinson, Shaw, Glasby, & Smith, 2013c). Moreover, it allowed one to see how institutional 
complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) and the constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) are 
socially constructed and dynamic. The underlying wickedness and complexity bedevilled the 
attainment of healthcare policy objectives (Allen, 2013; Dickinson, Glasby, Nicholds, & Sullivan, 
2013a). It is important to take explicit account of history to appreciate the contingency, 
situatedness and flux of the hospital as an organisation (Bjerregaard & Jonasson, 2014).  
However, much of the literature on organisational change in the NHS has dealt with structural 
changes (Addicott & Ferlie, 2006; Addicott et al., 2006; Ashburner et al., 1996; Exworthy et al., 
2010b; Kitchener, 1998) at organisational level and not much is really known about how 
individuals deal with these changes on a mundane, routine, everyday basis (Barley, 2008; Pache 
& Santos, 2013a; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012). The rest of the literature 
review examines the hospital as a professional organisation that houses multiple logics under 
its roof (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010), including 
hierarchy, markets, networks, bureaucratisation, commercialism, professionalism and public 
service (Dickinson et al., 2013c; Exworthy et al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999). These can lead to 
contradictory demands being made on the hospital (Pache & Santos, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999, 2013; Zilber, 2002). These logics and demands are not incompatible by definition 
(Besharov & Smith, 2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991b; Reay & Hinings, 2009) but their relative 
incompatibility is a function of the actual practice context (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009b; Smets 
& Jarzabkowski, 2013a). This part of the literature review visits the practice context; i.e. the 
coalface of institutionalism (Barley, 2008), where the inhabitants of institutions (Hallett & 
Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002) enact behaviours, and material practices and symbolic 
systems of meaning are manifestations and instantiations of institutional logics (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999, 2013; Zilber, 2008). This section of the literature review draws a theoretical line 
from micro-institutional processes to macro-institutional processes. 
5.8 INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY 
Institutional logics have been described as “socially constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values and rules” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) that shape the beliefs and 
behaviours of actors. Institutional logics are thus the rules of the game and frame the 
worldviews and behaviours of actors within given contexts. The acute hospital, like many other 
organisations, has come to embed multiple conflicting logics under one roof (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2013b). These comprise a hierarchical 
bureaucracy, a quasi-market and a quasi-network (Cooper et al., 1996; Exworthy et al., 2010b; 
Exworthy & Greener, 2008; Exworthy et al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999). Each of structural 
configurations has different implications for the ways in which the hospital goes about 
organising the delivery of service and criteria for success or failure.  
One could also say that a hospital combines multiple logics in novel ways (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Thornton et al., 2012). Alternatively, it can be considered as a place that manages to blend 
different logics that are relatively compatible (Haveman & Rao, 1997). Much of the work in 
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institutional theory on responses to institutional complexity has been largely structural and at 
an organisational level (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a). An organisation has to engage in a type of institutional bricolage where it adopts either 
parts of different logics to construct a new overarching hybrid logic or complete sub-units of 
given logics and constructs a new logic. Organisations can engage in strategic decoupling –
manipulating templates from competing logics (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2014; Pache 
& Santos, 2013b). Other practices include the importance of an overarching, integrated 
organisational identity in dealing with multiple, competing logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Kraatz & Block, 2013). For example a study of four French business 
schools (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014) examined how they had to cope with the increasing 
internationalisation of business education while retaining their distinctive traditional French 
orientation. In another study, a natural food organisation manages the competing logics 
associated with idealism and social welfare on the one hand and pragmatism and 
commercialism on the other (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014).  
Multiple institutional logics also raise questions about an underlying assumption of a singular 
organisational identity in organisation studies (MacLean & Webber, 2014). However, as 
mentioned above, organisations are sites that often embed multiple logics (Friedland & Alford, 
1991b; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Kraatz & Block, 2013; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, one 
could say that organisations are arenas for the contestation of multiple logics (Greenwood et al., 
2011; Pache & Santos, 2013a; Thornton et al., 2012; Zilber, 2002). Much of the attention given to 
organisation studies has assumed that one logic will prevail, especially in the short term (Pache 
& Santos, 2010), and that the organisation could make strategic and tactical adaptations (Kraatz 
& Block, 2013; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2013b). However, how do organisations, and the 
people within those organisations, respond in contexts where multiple logics are permanently 
part of the operations (Besharov & Smith, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009; 
Zilber, 2011)? 
This GT study does not address how the organisation responds but rather how individuals 
respond to these competing logics on a routine, everyday basis. In doing this, it fills a gap in the 
literature on institutional theory (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013a; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012). Earlier in the literature review, it was shown how the 
government policies, as macro-institutional logics, frame the hospital as an organisation that 
houses multiple, sedimented logics under one roof (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 
2011). The next question is: how do these logics – in turn – shape, constrain and stimulate the 
agency of the participants (Foucault, 1977; Hughes, 1971; Knights & Willmott, 1989)? What is 
the nature of the mutual implication of the hospital as a structure and the agency of the hospital 
consultants (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971)? From the 
perspective of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 
2004) and institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), what is the 
nature of the individual agency (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Hwang 
& Colyvas, 2011; Powell & Colyvas, 2013)  that is employed as the participants engage with 
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institutional complexity on an everyday, routine basis? Does “purposive” in institutional work 
that is aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions (Lawrence et al., 2013; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) mean having a clear vision that one single-mindedly pursues. Or, is 
agency more situated, dynamic, improvised and emergent (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets 
et al., 2012)? How does the structure shape and stimulate agency (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Yu, 
2013) with the day-to-day agency iteratively creating and shaping structure (Hwang & Colyvas, 
2014; Powell & Colyvas, 2013)?  
On the one hand, a closed loop exists between structure and agency. On the other hand, agency 
underpins the practical, routine, everyday actions of the participants (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a) as carriers of institutional logics (Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; 
Zilber, 2002). These routine, observed behaviours are, in turn, instantiations of agency. So a 
second closed loop is formed between agency and observed practice. What are the micro-
foundations of institutionalism? How does institutionalisation take place in the absence of the 
drama (March, 1981) associated with institutional entrepreneurship and institutional work 
(Suddaby, Lawrence, & Leca, 2009) but is grounded in everyday practice (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012). 
As was mentioned earlier, healthcare organisation is a wicked issue and a hospital, as a place 
where healthcare is delivered, is a complex place. Performance management has become a 
central feature of the managerial public service (Exworthy, 2010a; Farrell & Morris, 2003; 
Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011). Yet wickedness and complex adaptive systems appear not to 
moderate the certainties of the centrally controlled performance-management system (Bevan & 
Hood, 2006; Smith, 2002b; Talbot, 2009). Many of the services, such as mental health, elderly 
patients with multiple chronic comorbidities and children with complex chronic conditions, 
diabetes care, cancer services, stroke services and paediatric heart surgery, are not readily 
transformed into products that can be competitively bought and sold as commodities (Allen, 
2013; Ashburner et al., 1996; Porter et al., 2013; Walsh, 1995). There are areas where the 
nature of the service is in conflict with a competitive ethos and service improvement is more 
important than the choice of provider (Lewis et al., 2010). Also the need for service integration 
(Curry & Ham, 2010; Dixon, Mays, & Jones, 2012; Hawkins, 2011) conflicts with the ways in 
which providers are reimbursed for costs and performance is measured. Examples of these 
tensions are found in the provision of stroke services, paediatric heart surgery, knee surgery, 
hip replacements and treatment of cataracts. For some services, a robust regulatory framework 
of standards, periodic inspections, performance data and patient choice are important drivers. 
For other services, target standards, procurement rules, training staff for quality outcomes and 
increased funding are more important (Dixon et al., 2012).  
Wickedness (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007; Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 2005), 
institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) and the constellation of logics (Goodrick & 
Reay, 2011) have different impacts on the different subsystems in the hospital (Godfrey et al., 
2003; Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2002). These structural features differentially affect the 
different types of services that they deliver (Dixon et al., 2012; Hawkins, 2011; Lewis et al., 
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2010) and the people inside the organisation who carry logics (DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 
1991; Zilber, 2002). The complexities, tensions and congruence between the processes of 
macro-institutionalisation and micro-institutionalisation (Gray, Purdy, & Ansari, 2015; Smets et 
al., 2012) are resolved by the inhabitants of the institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Hughes, 
1971; Scully & Segal, 2002) as they go about their everyday, routine workplace activities at the 
coalface (S. R. Barley, 2008). The clinical frontline is where the logics are translated into 
techniques, technologies and procedures and people deal with these, not logics in the abstract. 
An absence of drama (March, 1981) conceals the difficulties that the frontline staff members 
have to juggle as they deliver healthcare services to patients. 
So, what does it mean to be a hospital consultant in a managerial hospital; i.e. an inhabitant of a 
hybrid institution who operates at the clinical coalface? Numerous calls have been made for 
accounts of how professionals get by on a day-to-day basis in managerial organisational 
contexts (Correia, 2013; Noordegraaf, 2011; Numerato et al., 2012; Thomas & Davies, 2005; 
Tonkens, Broer, van Sambeek, & van Hassel, 2013). There has been a shortage of studies that 
look at actors as carriers of logics (Jarzabkowski, 2009; Smets et al., 2012; Zilber, 2002) within 
an institutionally complex environment (Greenwood et al., 2011) made up of a constellation of 
logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). 
The plural institutional demands (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Fligstein, 1997; Friedland & Alford, 
1991a; Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010; Zilber, 2002) are not mutually exclusive and 
contradictory. These logics can be both complementary and contradictory (Besharov & Smith, 
2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991a). People, on the clinical frontline, work out the relationships 
between logics in their day-to-day practices (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b; Thornton & Ocasio, 
2013; Thornton et al., 2012). Institutional logics provide criteria for what are considered 
appropriate and the means to achieve them. Logics shape, constrain and stimulate the 
possibilities for agency by organisations and individuals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Foucault, 
1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1983; Reed & Anthony, 2005). This idea concurs with interactional 
sociology (Hughes, 1971), phenomenology (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1984) and the negotiated order (Strauss et al., 1963).  
People inhabit institutions, logics and structures (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Strauss, 1996) and 
through their routine, everyday work discover problems, pose questions and develop answers 
inter-subjectively, thus creating structures and logics. Are the inhabitants of institutions 
“cultural dopes” (Garfunkel, 1984; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997a) who robotically and 
unthinkingly act out their over-socialised roles, or are they hyper-muscular agents who are able 
to act more rationally than all the other embedded agents around them (Powell & Colyvas, 
2013; Suddaby et al., 2009)? The question is: how do people understand and experience the 
contradictions, overlaps and tensions in their institutional environment (Greenwood et al., 
2011)? It has been conceptualised (Carvalho, 2012; Numerato et al., 2012; Waring & Bishop, 
2013) as binary social formations (Gleeson & Knights, 2006). Managerial hegemony prevails as 
proletarianisation (McKinlay & Arches, 1985; McKinlay & Stoeckle, 1988), McDonaldisation 
(Ritzer, 1996; Ritzer & Walcak, 1988) and deprofessionalisation (Haug, 1973, 1988), on the one 
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hand, and as restratification, where hospital doctors exercise some forms of agency (Freidson, 
1988), on the other hand. How that agency is exercised is a question that requires a nuanced 
understanding (Delmestri, 2006; Powell & Colyvas, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Some 
researchers have argued that professionals reject the managerial project and remain committed 
to their own professional identities and priorities (Ackroyd et al., 2007b; Clarke & Newman, 
2006; Dent, 2003; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003a; Kitchener, 1998; MacDonald, 2006). Some 
studies on professionalism have emphasised that since organisations are primary sites for 
professional activity (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2008) the lines between 
managerialism and professionalism have been blurred (Correia, 2013a; Noordegraaf, 2007a, 
2011; Noordegraaf & Steijn, 2014a). The managerial hospital has indeed resulted in the 
weakening of the power, authority and status of hospital consultants (Deem et al., 2007; Dent, 
2003; Farrell & Morris, 2003) but not all the professionals are equally committed to the 
managerial norms (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 
2013b; Farrell & Morris, 2003; Porter et al., 2013). Therefore, it is important to ask: how do the 
people who inhabit the institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) and who carry the logics in their 
heads and hearts (Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002) enact their 
agency at a local level on an everyday, routine basis? This is a black box in institutional theory 
(Jarzabkowski, 2009; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 
2012; Zilber, 2002).  
5.9 CONCEPTUAL MODEL: STRUCTURE, AGENCY AND PRACTICE/OBSERVED 
BEHAVIOURS 
Exploration of the dimensions of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) is a useful way to 
approach the relationship between agency and observed everyday behaviours (Battilana & 
D'Aunno, 2009a; Battilana & D’aunno, 2009; Delmestri, 2006; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011, 2014; 
Powell & Colyvas, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a).  
Before examining the relationship between agency and observed practices, it may be useful to 
step back to recall the relationship between structure and agency. This is because the 
conceptual model that is being proposed is a loop where social structures shape agency and the 
latter iteratively creates the former (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Giddens, 1984; 
Hughes, 1971; Strauss et al., 1963). Thus, the mutual implication of structure and agency brings 
to the fore the situatedness, historicity, contingency and flux of both structures and agency. 
The next section develops a deeper understanding of agency and then sketches a conceptual 
closed loop from agency to modes of observed practice (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). One can 
visualise a conceptual model that is made up of three circles: structure on the left, agency in the 
middle and observed practice on the right. There are two closed loops: one between structure 
and agency to the left and another between agency and practice to the right (Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a). 
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5.9.1.1 Dimensions of agency 
Institutions, social structures and logics shape, constrain and stimulate action, whereas iterative 
actions create social structures (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Emirbayer & Mische, 
1998; Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971). Institutional complexity (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010) could manifest as competing demands from 
external stakeholders (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). It could 
also be revealed in competing priorities or identities within organisations (Kraatz & Block, 
2013; Zilber, 2002). Competing priorities might be triggers for sense-making (Weber & Glynn, 
2006) or agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Friedland & Alford, 1991a) by which the 
incoherent is framed into meaningful patterns (Ancona, 2012; Weick, 1995) that are enacted as 
situated practices (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Meaning is not 
only an individual accomplishment but is also negotiated in social interaction (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Weber & Glynn, 2006). Understandings of, and responses to, 
constellations of logics are clarified, framed, negotiated, affirmed, legitimised and delegitimised 
inter-subjectively. 
A three-dimensional view of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) consists of projective agency, 
iterative agency and practical-evaluative agency. It places human agency within a temporal-
relational framework.  Human agency is conceptualised as a process of social engagement that is 
informed by the past, oriented towards the future and engaged in the present as a bridge 
between the demands of the moment as informed by the past and the future. In this view, 
agency is a dynamic response to the demands of a given situation at a given time. It is possible 
for an agent to have multiple concurrent temporal agentic orientations, although one 
orientation may be dominant.  
Projective agency involves the changing of existing institutional arrangements. This refers to the 
actors’ reflecting on the status quo and potential new institutional arrangements, given existing 
and emerging interests, needs and priorities. It takes effort to overcome existing institutional 
constraints and to contemplate alternative institutional arrangements. The latter are not always 
clear goals that actors pursue rationally. On the contrary, they are choices made from emergent, 
shifting and fluid possibilities, given dynamic human motivations, interests, priorities and social 
commitments. Projective agency is socially interactive (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). It is rooted 
in conflicts, negotiations and agreements as actors frame dilemmas as they ask questions and 
seek answers at the junctures between the adequacy of maintaining existing institutional 
arrangements, just getting by with the day-to-day demands, or reflecting on whether alternative 
institutional arrangements may be required. This is an area of study that has received 
significant attention, especially under the guise of institutional entrepreneurship and the 
paradox of embedded agency (DiMaggio, 1988, 1991; Fligstein, 1997; Leca, Battilana, & 
Boxenbaum, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004). 
Iterative agency involves maintaining existing institutional arrangements that are taken-for-
granted (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Jepperson, 1991; Zucker, 1977). With routine actions, 
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dilemmas are discovered, framed and resolved iteratively and institutions are maintained. 
Hence, despite the apparent objectivity and givenness of social structures, iterative agency 
opens a view to the contingency, flux and historicity of social structures (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967; Blumer, 1971; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971). The 
phenomenological, ethnomethodological, social interactionist and social constructionist 
underpinnings of shared beliefs and expectations inform understandings of the dynamics of the 
neo-institutional perspective (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1983; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983). However, this does not necessarily mean that iterative agency is the mindless act 
of a “cultural dope” (Garfunkel, 1984; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997b). It requires an active 
comparison of the existing institutional arrangements with the other institutional options that 
are routinely reconciled at the coalface (Barley, 2008; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et 
al., 2012). This is particularly so when actors are viewed as carriers of logics (Delmestri, 2006; 
DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002). 
Practical-evaluative agency involves assessments and actions that are involved in getting 
through the immediate day-to-day work. The present is not always an untroubled space as it 
can be filled with uncertainties, ambiguities and paradoxes (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Logics 
do not just apply themselves but have to be interpreted and applied (Friedland & Alford, 
1991a). Hence, the gap between the prescriptions for action and their enactment is filled by 
understanding, sense-making, situation-based judgement or practical evaluative agency. Often 
contexts where the rules for conduct are not always clear call for situated improvisations 
(Smets et al., 2012). Practical-evaluative agency is relatively neglected in institutional studies 
(Besharov & Smith, 2013; Lawrence, 2008). Yet, it is an area that could illuminate our 
understandings of how people get by in complex and unambiguous situations. It includes 
temporal improvisations in which people can advance their own interests by avoiding, resisting, 
subverting and contending the logics of the prevailing order (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; 
Lawrence, 2008; Scott, 1985, 1990). 
A dynamic, fluid and complex understanding of agency facilitates an appreciation of how agents 
are able to negotiate their roles within the wickedness of the social organisation of healthcare 
delivery. Agents are able to negotiate their places within the hospital as a complex adaptive 
system, find spaces between and within the constellation of logics and develop a routine 
resistance profile within a non-hegemonic exercise of managerial attempts to reshape their 
clinical autonomy and self-governance. 
The reciprocal implication of structure and agency (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; 
Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971; Strauss et al., 1963) is enhanced by the contingency, fluidity and 
historicity of relational-temporal structures that are supportive of particular agentic 
orientations (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). The relationship between structure and agency is 
therefore not one of either stable opposition or mutual constitution but rather of flux and 
unpredictability with situational improvisation (Bjerregaard & Jonasson, 2014; Smets et al., 
2012) between the agentic orientations to maximise the opportunities for choice and impact 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).  
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5.10 INSTITUTIONAL WORK 
This multi-dimensional understanding of agency opens the way for examining institutional 
work (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009). The latter, is a 
significant institutionalist approach to the study of organisations (Lawrence et al., 2013; Zilber, 
2013). “Institutional work” refers to the determined, deliberate and intentional daily activities 
of actors that are aimed at maintaining, disrupting and creating new institutions. Actors are 
considered competent and reflexive individuals, who, despite their institutional embeddedness, 
are able to affect the institutionalisation process. This understanding affirms the ideas noted 
earlier about the mutual implication and constitution of structure and agency, with the added 
adjustment of the fluidity of structure and the multi-dimensionality of agency thrown into the 
conceptual mix. The dynamics and contingency of context, time and audience (Zilber, 2008) 
complicate the determination of the intentions of purposive actors as accounted for in 
institutional work. One can legitimately infer intentions from actions (Blakemore & Decety, 
2001; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Press, Heyes, & Kilner, 2011). The coping behaviours (i.e. 
problem-focused and emotion-focused) are manifestations of an appraisal process that frames 
the intentions of an actor (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 1987). One could also argue that 
dimensions of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) underpin modes of practice and that the 
modes of practice are therefore an instantiation of dimensions of agency (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). This is the right-hand loop of the conceptual model 
proposed earlier in this study. A practice perspective draws attention to happenings at the 
coalface of institutionalism (Barley, 2008), to the inhabitants of institutions (Hallett & 
Ventresca, 2006); i.e. the people and what they do on a routine basis, and to the shared 
understandings that underpin their interactions because meaning is created, shaped, negotiated 
and modified in social interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971). 
Those negotiations (i.e. social interactions) do not take place in a vacuum. They take place in 
structural contexts that shape, constrain and stimulate them. Hence, we are back to the two 
closed loops in the conceptual model (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Social interaction crafts 
meanings but also iteratively creates, affirms and modifies structures. A given practice by itself 
may not be significant but patterns of practices reveal shared meanings and interpretations 
(Gray et al., 2015; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Institutional logics provide frames of reference 
as well as social identities and vocabularies of motive for actors in a field (Meyer, Egger-Peitler, 
Höllerer, & Hammerschmid, 2014; Thornton et al., 2012).   
This literature review confirms a link between institutional logics, frames of reference, 
understanding, social identity, and dimensions of agency, intentionality and action in the field. 
Everyday action instantiates or represents agency (Sillince, Jarzabkowski, & Shaw, 2012; Smets 
& Jarzabkowski, 2013a), which, in turn, iteratively creates structure. Institutional complexity 
(Greenwood et al., 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011) and the constellation of logics (Goodrick & 
Reay, 2011) make demands on organisational and individual actors and shape their 
understandings and behaviours. These demands are not – by definition – contradictory or 
complementary (Friedland & Alford, 1991a; Greenwood et al., 2011) but people interactively 
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negotiate and recast the meanings of these logics and in this way they reframe institutional 
complexity (Suddaby, Elsbach, Greenwood, Meyer, & Zilber, 2010; Yu, 2013).  
In constructing a link between institutional logics, structure, agency and practice, one is able to 
work backwards from the coalface of institutionalism (Barley, 2008). One looks to the 
inhabitants of institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011) as they carry 
logics (Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Zilber, 2002). One closely examines how they engage 
in routine everyday practice (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Their 
observed everyday actions instantiate their reflexive, multi-dimensional and dynamic agency 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Friedland & Alford, 1991a; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Zilber, 
2002). This creates a link between routine, everyday material enactments and constellations of 
institutional logics (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Thornton et al., 2012). Institutional 
complexity is framed as a problem (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b) not 
to be resolved but one that remains a permanent feature of the institutional field (Goodrick & 
Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011; Zilber, 2011). Thus, institutional complexity is managed 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010) routinely (Greenwood 
et al., 2011; March, 1981). It is possible for competing demands to be both central and 
incompatible (Besharov & Smith, 2013) yet equally inalienable (Greenwood et al., 2011; Reay & 
Hinings, 2009). The actors at the coalface do not have the option of choosing the logics that are 
in play. They have to deal with all of them at the same time. Also, they are themselves implicated 
because they do not occupy a privileged space outside the paradoxes. 
This understanding opens the way for a dynamic, everyday appreciation of the relationships 
between institutional logics, complexity, wickedness, professionalism, routine resistance, the 
acute NHS hospital and the hospital consultants. A practice perspective suggests that hospital 
consultants construct and reframe the relationships between a plurality of institutional logics 
within their day-to-day work (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets 
et al., 2012). To understand what it means to be a hospital consultant in a managerial acute NHS 
hospital, it helps to recall how a national healthcare policy ignores the wickedness of healthcare 
organisation (Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 2005) and seeks to transform a complex adaptive system 
(Holland, 1999; Waldrop, 1994). National healthcare policy attempted to transform the public 
sector district general hospital, which was part of a bureaucracy, into a quasi-market hospital 
trust (Ferlie et al., 1996b; Hood, 1991) and later into a quasi-network of trusts (Bevir & Rhodes, 
2010; Newman, 2001; Newman & Clarke, 2009; Rhodes, 1997). This resulted in a policy 
environment with residual traditional bureaucratic, quasi-market and quasi-network features 
(Addicott, 2008; Exworthy & Halford, 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999). Multiple prescriptions for 
actions added up to a constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). Between these logics are 
varying degrees of incompatibility and interdependence (Friedland & Alford, 1991b; Kraatz & 
Block, 2013), thus leading to institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). This may sound 
like a mouthful but in the real world, it is likely to be worse.  
The institutionally complex policy and professional environment aims to control the behaviours 
of the clinical frontline through enhanced vertical accountability and performance-management 
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systems (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a).  Clinical practice is standardised 
with evidence-based clinical guidelines and protocols (Greenhalgh et al., 2014; McDonald & 
Harrison, 2004; Mickan, Burls, & Glasziou, 2011; Miller & Rose, 2008; Spyridonidis & Calnan, 
2011; Timmermans & Berg, 2010). Collaboration is reshaped by an increased commercial 
orientation (Dickinson et al., 2013c; Dixon et al., 2012; Timmermans & Oh, 2010; Waring & 
Bishop, 2013). Inside the hospital a spatio-temporally complex adaptive system is in place 
Clinical professionals act as street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010), enacting the meanings of 
policy as they provide healthcare services to patients. The complex constellation of policies has 
created technologies of control that sometimes work in contradictory ways. One policy 
instrument could stimulate agency in one direction whilst another constrains agency in an 
opposite direction. Structures are therefore not given, which leaves room for multi-dimensional 
agentic orientations to be activated, depending on the priorities, interests and motivations of 
embedded actors. The latter might choose to maintain existing institutions, create new ones or 
merely just get by with the day-to-day demands. Within a given situation it is possible for an 
actor to have multiple agentic orientations, although one orientation may dominate. Agency 
underpins the behaviours of actors. From routine resistance we have seen that there is more to 
behaviours than meets the eye. A closer examination of motivations of actors explicates their 
behaviours that instantiate their agency, which, in turn, iteratively creates institutions. 
Deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation, McDonaldisation and restratification may just not 
adequately account for the nuances and subtleties of professional agency within the context of 
institutional complexity, wickedness, complex adaptive systems and routine resistance. As the 
structures have been chopped, changed and sedimented so the agency of hospital consultants 
has modified, hence the concept of a danse macabre (Degeling et al., 2003). 
5.11 SUMMARY 
The literature review has compared the concepts in the GT with their use in other bodies of 
literature. The literature was used, as data for constant comparison with the GT, Rolling with the 
Punches, make up an integrated set of propositions of what it means to be a doctor in a 
managerial hospital. 
The main concern for the actors in this GT is managerialism in the hospital. Key features of the 
managerial hospital are market-based competition, management-based control systems and 
metrics-based performance-management systems (Farrell & Morris, 2003; Harrison & Ahmad, 
2000a), and standardisation of clinical practice (Timmermans & Berg, 2003, 2010). However, 
the hospital is a complex place, institutionally (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011), 
systemically (Nelson et al., 2002; Shiell et al., 2008; Waldrop, 1994) and spatio-temporally 
(Allen, 2000; Zerubavel, 1979). It is difficult to see how strong management (Hammer & 
Champy, 2001) could impose its will on the organisation. The management of the hospital itself 
is but the evolution of a number of tame solutions (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 
2007; Conklin, 2006a; King, 1993; Roberts, 2000) to the wicked problems associated with 
healthcare delivery organisation (Phelan et al., 2010; Raisio, 2009; Thoits, 2010; Umberson & 
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Montez, 2010; Vartiainen, 2005). Why do people come to the hospital? Why are the doors 
always open? Why are the lights always on? Why is someone always there to receive 
whomsoever walks through the door? Why does the NHS hospital treat that person irrespective 
of an ability to pay?  What are the health, social and moral imperatives that are operating in this 
scenario?  
Rolling with the Punches emerged as a pattern of behaviour through which the hospital 
consultants deal with their main concern. It frames their ways of being doctors in an acute 
managerial hospital. It conceptually frames their ways of being medical professionals within a 
hybrid organisational (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Besharov & Smith, 2013; Pache & Santos, 
2010) context (Brock et al., 2014; Muzio et al., 2011; Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf, 
2007a, 2013).  
Rolling with the Punches involves four modes of observed behaviours: Stabilising Temporarily, 
Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Living with/Adjusting to. The actual mode of observed 
behaviours depends on a Weighing-up process (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984) that is used to make sense (Ancona, 2012; Frankl, 1984; Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005) 
of the dilemmas and puzzles posed in, and by, the managerial hospital. The constellation of 
logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) does not impose itself but has to be interpreted (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991b) before it is enacted. The actual mode of behaviour is dynamic and complex as it 
is a function of the needs, priorities and personal narratives of the actors. Rolling with the 
Punches does not represent a complete account of what actors do within the context but is an 
important pattern of behaviour in which they engage. It accounts for a significant amount of 
variation in their behaviours. A classic GT transcends time, place and people (Glaser, 1978, 
1998) and it could be a pattern of behaviour in which people resolve similar main concerns in 
routine, everyday, non-dramatic ways (March, 1981; Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985; Smets 
& Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012). Thus, further research could test whether the theory 
fits other substantive areas, such as professionals in universities, social care, education, utilities 
and city management. These studies would indicate whether the theory stands its ground or 
whether new concepts could emerge to modify the GT in this study to ensure that it continues to 
meet the criteria for a GT; i.e. fit, work, relevance and modifiability (Glaser, 1998). It also does 
not take a stand on what constitutes good or bad behaviours as it is but provides a conceptual 
account of how people resolve their main concern. 
The next chapter integrates the GT described in Chapter 4 into the literature reviewed in this 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 INTEGRATING THE GROUNDED THEORY INTO THE 
LITERATURE  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the literature review, it is clear that the managerial hospital did not emerge in the 1980s 
for the first time. The aim of governments to hold the clinical frontline accountable for the 
resource implications of its clinical decisions is as old as the NHS itself (Klein, 2013). Ministers 
had to account to Parliament for the way tax funds were spent on the NHS and the Treasury 
always wanted to know whether money was well spent. So for a long time input controls were 
implemented. The Financial Management Initiative, the regional health authorities, the Hospital 
Advisory Service and the Health Service Commissioner, The Cogwheel Report and Hospital 
Activity Analysis were attempts to link the tax-funded NHS budget with value for money (Gray 
et al., 1991; Klein, 2013) but things have changed in the last three decades. The balance of 
power has shifted away from the doctors. 
The 1980s was different from the earlier decades of the NHS because of the congruence of a 
number of factors. These included a need for transparent accountability, a more critical view of 
expertise and the data-management possibilities that emerged with the IT revolution. The 
1980s was the beginning of a process of the transformation of a Weberian public sector 
bureaucratic iron cage into a Foucauldian gaze (Deem et al., 2007; Ferlie & McGivern, 2013). A 
key operational change in the NHS started with the Griffiths general managers, who replaced 
the administrators (Griffiths, 1983, 1992). General managers were placed on performance-
related contracts (Klein, 2013; Pollock, 2005). The health service was fragmented as long-term 
care, dentistry and optical services were spun off from the NHS service. Similarly, hospitals 
were required to focus on their core “business”; thus, catering, cleaning, parking and shops were 
outsourced (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Pollock, 2005; Pollock & Whitty, 1990). Management 
control shifted from a focus on inputs to a greater emphasis on outputs. Managerialism took on 
a more robust content and posture with the NPM (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 
1993). Providers were required to compete for contracts. Performance was managed according 
to clearly defined metrics. Control was systematised with general managers in charge (Farrell & 
Morris, 2003; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000b; Le Grand, Roberts, & Bartlett, 1998b). Professional 
and organisational accountability was made more transparent (Donaldson, 2001; Power, 1999). 
Clinical practice became standardised through evidence-based clinical practice (McDonald & 
Harrison, 2004; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). Medical professionals lost control over their work. 
These were not abstract concepts because the NPM. At a practical level it meant that books had 
to balance at year-end. Contracts and budgets had to be managed. It often meant that on the 
clinical frontline nursing posts were frozen, wards and theatres closed and demands on the 
remaining resources intensified in pursuit of efficiency. 
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In the 1990s the performance-management system was refined with targets (Bevan & Hood, 
2006; Propper et al., 2008), a quality agenda that included national service frameworks, clinical 
guidelines and protocols (Ferlie & McGivern, 2013; Timmermans & Berg, 2003), and regulatory 
bodies such as the Audit Commission, the Care Quality Commission and Monitor (Audit 
Commission, 2008; Francis, 2013; House of Commons Health Committee, 2014; Roderick & 
Pollock, 2014). So rather than bureaucratic command and control, the welfare state was 
fragmented. The state steered from a distance with sophisticated technologies of control (Ferlie 
& McGivern, 2013; Miller & Rose, 2008). 
The rationalising, standardising, commodifying, observing, verifying, inspecting and performing 
managerial hospital challenged the core of the professionalism of the hospital consultants. The 
sociological impact of the managerial hospital on the consultants’ professionalism has been 
conceptualised as a binary of either managerial hegemony with deprofessionalisation (Haug, 
1973, 1988), the McDonaldisation (Ritzer, 1996; Ritzer & Walcak, 1988) and the 
proletarianisation of doctors (McKinlay & Arches, 1985)- on the one hand- or restratification 
(Freidson, 1985, 2001) – on the other hand. Haug suggested that IT developments would result 
in the disappearance of professionalism whereas Freidson was not persuaded that the 
profession was losing its status because of something that was being done to it. On the contrary, 
he challenged the idea of a homogenous medical profession. He argued that doctors would 
routinely resist encroachment (Scott, 1965) and they would respond to changes with a 
knowledge and administrative elite that sought to exercise control of the rank-and-file in a 
process of restratification. The key would be how that resistance to encroachment would 
manifest itself. 
The literature on professionalism provides little empirical evidence that the imposition of a 
managerial order in hospitals has necessarily resulted in either deprofessionalisation or 
proletarianisation (Numerato et al., 2012; Thomas & Hewitt, 2011; Waring & Bishop, 2013). 
Crude accounts of embedded agents either as cultural dopes or heroic agents have been 
subjected to criticism (Delmestri, 2006; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Powell & Colyvas, 2013; Yu, 
2013). Empirical studies have provided evidence of increasing stratification in the medical 
profession (Cheraghi-Sohi & Calnan, 2013; McDonald, Checkland, Harrison, & Coleman, 2009; 
Waring, 2014) but even this may be a simplification. Professions have adopted more varied 
positions from which they resist (Doolin, 2002; Levay & Waks, 2009) or strategically adopt 
managerial technologies (Courpasson, 2000; Levay & Waks, 2009). They view managerialism 
either as technically and professionally neutral (Kurunmäki, 2004) or they seek to protect 
themselves with a decoupling strategy (Levay & Waks, 2009; Waring & Currie, 2009). Calls have 
been made to explicate the relationship between institutions and micro-level identities because 
the relationship between the two is considered to be intimate (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Thornton et al., 2012). 
Rolling with the Punches integrates the multiple and diverse bodies of literature on the 
wickedness of the social organisation of healthcare delivery, the difficulties of imposing private 
sector management practices on the hospital as a complex adaptive system, the sociology of 
  
 
 
121 
medical professionalism, Foucauldian power and resistance, and the routine accomplishment of 
reframing of institutional complexity. Moreover, Rolling with the Punches provides a mechanism 
of that shows how participants routinely recast relations between logics. Their everyday 
behaviours instantiate of their agency and, in turn, iteratively create the institutions (Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a). It responds to the need for empirical studies that explain how relations 
between logics are resolved on a routine basis and how meaning is constructed (Zilber, 2013). 
Rolling with the Punches is a pattern of behaviour that shows what it means to be a doctor in a 
managerial acute hospital. In so doing, it shows how participants address their main concern, 
which is managerialism. Managerialism comprises market-based competitive relationships 
between providers, patient choice, money following the patient, management-controlled 
organisational structures and decision-making systems. It also involves metrics-based 
performance-management systems with transparent and auditable quality control systems, and 
standardisation of clinical practice. The managerial hospital is aimed at ensuring that resources 
are efficiently allocated, effectively used and the quality of services is systematically assured. 
Rolling with the Punches emerged as a pattern of behaviour through which participants 
endeavoured to resolve their main concern.  
The managerial hospital is a crucible for a constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). It is 
institutionally complex (Greenwood et al., 2011). “Institutional logics” refers to the belief 
systems and associated practices that predominate in an organisational field (Scott et al., 2000). 
Logics provide the rationale for appropriate organisational practices within given institutional 
settings, at given moments in history (Greenwood et al., 2010). Institutional logics have also 
been described as the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values and beliefs by which people organise their time and space (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012). Institutional logics introduce a vocabulary for discussing 
the symbolic and practical, i.e. cultural dimensions of institutions. Bureaucratic hierarchy, 
markets, networks, professionalism, measurement, transparency value-for-money, professional 
autonomy and clinical-performance management are not neutral, technical instruments. On the 
contrary, they reflect particular beliefs, values and interests, as they are prescriptions for, and 
criteria for the evaluation of, action.  
The professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1978, 1983) has remained largely intact (Dickinson 
et al., 2013b).  However, it coexists with various reincarnations of a managerial logic (Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Denis, Davies, Ferlie, Fitzgerald, & McManus, 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009; 
Scott et al., 2000; Van den Broek, Boselie, & Paauwe, 2013). Multiple logics can coexist in 
organisations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010). In a 
review of empirical studies (Greenwood et al., 2011), an operating assumption was that of 
incompatibility between logics. Yet, it need not necessarily be the case (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Besharov & Smith, 2013; Goodrick & Reay, 2011). 
The literature review showed that organisations are significant sites for institutional complexity 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013b). Much of what is known about responses to 
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institutional complexity is structural (Greenwood et al., 2011). These include, the importance of 
an integrated organisational identity (Kraatz & Block, 2013), the juggling between the 
conflicting prescriptions for appropriate behaviour that flow from the exploitation and 
exploration logics (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), tensions between social and financial goals 
(Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Haigh & Hoffman, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010) and in case of  the 
internationalisation of management education the retention of a distinctive national identity in 
business schools (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014).  
But gaps exist in our understanding of a level below structural responses by organisations. 
Institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Battilana & D’aunno, 2009; 
DiMaggio, 1988; Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007; Maguire et al., 2004) has been an attempt to 
give an account of the role of actors (Thornton et al., 2012). However, it has been hampered by 
criticism about its handling of the paradox of embedded agency (Leca et al., 2006; Seo & Creed, 
2002). Scholarship within institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012) 
and institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009) 
have seen significant attempts to explain purposive effort at an individual level (Zilber, 2013) in 
managing organisational hybridity (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). 
Little attention has been given to what individuals actually do to resolve institutional 
complexity on a routine, everyday basis (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Lok, 2010; McPherson & 
Sauder, 2013; Zilber, 2013). Not enough is known about the role of local, embedded social 
actors and their engagement with, and reactions to, institutional pressures at the frontline 
(Barley, 2008; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Lok, 2010).  
Norms are cognitively intransparent and even more so when they are plural. Interpretation and 
agency are needed when prescriptions and norms are in conflict. Meanings have to be 
determined as logics do not impose themselves (Friedland & Alford, 1991a). Actors have to 
determine the story, make sense, unravel the dilemmas, structure the unknown or decide what 
is to be done (Weick, 1995; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Sense-making enables actors to act when 
the world that they know has changed in significant ways (Weick et al., 2005). People often 
make sense by acting in the situation despite the absence of a clear roadmap (Klein, 1999), 
especially in dealing with wicked problems in complex adaptive systems. Objectives are 
modified as one goes along and learns more about what is at stake. This has been called 
adaptive sense-making (Weick et al., 2005) or adaptive decision-making (Klein, 2011). It 
suggests a preparedness to act despite not knowing completely while trying to understand the 
impact of one’s action on the system at a local level and at the same time trying to achieve one’s 
goals. One works at the lack of clarity and makes adjustments along the way. The sense-making 
process is also reflected in the appraisal processes of the Transactional Model of Stress and 
Coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 1987). People make judgements on the basis of their own 
sense of self, interests, priorities as well as the beliefs and interpretations of significant others. 
Meaning making and sense making are social interactional processes (Blumer, 1971; Hallett & 
Ventresca, 2006; Hughes, 1971; Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005), in which institutional 
understandings are emergent, in flux and historicised as they are negotiated and legitimated.  
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Institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009; Garud et al., 2007) assumes a projective 
agentic orientation (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). One gets a sense, in institutional 
entrepreneurship literature, that visions of alternative institutional alignments are apparently 
fully formed (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a) and embedded agents consciously and strategically 
set out to reshape social institutions accordingly (Suddaby et al., 2009). On the other hand, 
institutional work takes a more modest perspective of the role of the actor within the 
institutional process. It focuses on the effort that the actor exerts while either coping – getting 
by - within an existing set of institutional arrangements, working at maintaining or changing 
these institutional settings. With its focus on effort, there is space to consider incomplete, 
emergent visions and also failed attempts and unintended consequences (Lounsbury, 2008; 
Suddaby et al., 2009). This closer scrutiny, of where and how the social actor is embedded in the 
institutional process, has resulted in calls for an understanding of agency that is more nuanced 
than what could be called the “cultural dope” or “hyper-muscular” (Battilana et al., 2009; 
Garfunkel, 1984; Suddaby et al., 2009).  
This study responds to the view (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Delmestri, 2006; Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011; Powell & Colyvas, 2013) that intentionality is multi-
dimensional, empirically grounded, dynamic, emergent and complex whilst underpinning 
varying modes of practice. This research also shows that at the coalface of institutionalisation 
(Barley, 2008), the inhabitants of institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) reframe relations 
within the constellation of institutional logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). The process unfolds in 
non-dramatic (March, 1981) everyday, routine yet complex ways (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a; Smets et al., 2012). There is very little, if any, conjectured grand accounts of institutional 
complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). The orientation of this study takes the argument away 
from the abstractions of deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation and restratification. As a 
literature review that is delimited by a classic grounded theory it starts with what the 
participants are doing and then finds conceptual accounts for what is happening. This is the 
magic of GT and it concurs with practice theory accounts of the world.  
Having metaphorically rummaged through Foucault’s toolbox, I found a note that reads exercise 
of power is weakest where it becomes technologies, procedures and capillaries (Foucault, 1977, 
1988). For instance, when managerial structures are created to exercise an indirect steering 
role (Miller & Rose, 2008; Rhodes, 1997), commissioners do not always have the capabilities to 
exercise their restructuring and controlling roles (Exworthy et al., 2010b; House of Commons 
Health Committee, 2008). A space for engagement emerges for the clinical frontline. 
Competition between providers has not always improved outcomes for patients despite the 
rhetoric (Propper et al., 1998; Propper et al., 2008). A discursive space comes into view. The 
Patient Choice agenda (Rosen, Florin, & Hutt, 2007) comes into conflict with the gatekeeping 
role of GPs and the mediating role of the latter has ensured that non-market relationships with 
hospital consultants have remained strong (Allen, 2002). Those who are alert, to the 
contradictions, can transform a fissure into a canyon.  It has been argued that the incentives for 
change have been too weak and the constraints too strong (Le Grand et al., 1998a). The turf 
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battles between independent agencies have led to role confusion and sometimes catastrophic 
oversight failures at supposedly high-performing hospitals (Francis, 2013; House of Commons 
Health Committee, 2008). Even when hospitals are given greater operational freedoms with 
respect to borrowing money for capital investment, developing new services and determining 
the terms and conditions for the employment of all staff, those freedoms are not fully exercised 
(Audit Commission, 2008; Exworthy & Greener, 2008; House of Commons Health Committee, 
2008). Despite the investment by the neo-liberal state in structural and decision-making 
systems changes, gaps exist for the hospital doctors to be recalcitrant and hold – sometimes 
tenuously – the line for medical autonomy and collegiality. 
It is important to repeat that people, as carriers of logics (Delmestri, 2006; Jepperson, 1991; 
Zilber, 2002), interpret and make sense (Friedland & Alford, 1991a; Weick et al., 2005) of the 
institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) and enact their interactional recasting of the 
multiple logics and wickedness (Jarzabkowski, 2009; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). The 
inhabitants of institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002) engage in a dynamic 
process of sense making and meaning-making (Ancona, 2012; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Weick, 
1995; Weick et al., 2005). A similar picture emerges from literature on stress and coping 
behaviours, which states that the behaviours are consequent on an appraisal process. This 
literature is important because coping with institutional complexity can be stressful. If actors 
hold the view that they are able to change a situation, they are likely to engage in problem-
solving behaviours where they address causes of stress by, for example, seeking information 
and weighing up the pros and cons of some action. If they feel that they do not really have any 
control then they may adopt emotion-focused behaviours, which involve managing their 
reactions to the issues that cause them to be stressed; e.g. keeping busy, talking to others to get 
things off their chest, avoidance, detachment and preparing for things to get worse (Endler & 
Parker, 1994; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 1987; Moos & Holahan, 2003; Roger, Jarvis, & Najarian, 
1993). This reflects a multi-dimensional agency (Battilana & D’aunno, 2009; Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998; Friedland & Alford, 1991a). The dimensions of agency are empirically intertwined 
but are conceptually disaggregated to understand how complexity (institutional and systemic) 
and wickedness interact to frame relationships between logics practically. That understanding 
underpins behaviours that might show conformity with or acting in ways that avoid, 
compromise with, defy and manipulate (Oliver, 1991) in routine ways (Fleming & Spicer, 2008; 
Knights & McCabe, 2000; Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985, 1990).  
The consultants’ iterative, routine agency frames and reconstructs the relationships between 
logics (Besharov & Smith, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012) that underpin 
their routine practices. In everyday behaviours institutional complexity is resolved and 
managed. The behaviours and practices reflect understandings of what is at stake and the 
possibilities of acting within the institutional context. The sense making, understanding, agency, 
patterns and observed behaviours constitute being a doctor in the acute NHS hospital. Rolling 
with the Punches is an integrated set of hypotheses that accounts for much of the variation in the 
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ways in which their main concern is resolved. The different components of Rolling with the 
Punches follow below. 
6.2 ROLLING WITH THE PUNCHES 
Below is a repeat in the table that appears at the end of Chapter 4. At the end of Chapter 6 some 
of the concepts and ideas from the literature review will be included to develop the components 
of the grounded theory that are summarised in Table 6.1.    
 
Table 6.1: The components of the grounded theory: Rolling with the Punches 
THE GROUNDED THEORY: ROLLING WITH THE PUNCHES 
 OBSERVED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOURS 
 
 STABILISING TEMPORARILY 
  
 RESISTING 
  Quibbling 
  Subverting 
WEIGHING UP  
 Making sense LIMITING THE IMPACT 
 Deciding what to do  Lying low 
 Mode-shifting triggers  Faking it 
  
 LIVING WITH/ADJUSTING TO CHANGE 
  Going with the flow 
  Complying substantially 
  Complying fully 
  Waiting it out 
 
6.2.1 Weighing up 
This is the core process that individual, embedded actors use as they routinely go about making 
sense of, and resolving, institutional complexity. Weighing up is need when the world becomes 
unintelligible to us in some ways (Ancona, 2012) and requires adaptive responses since the 
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usual repertoire of responses has become inadequate (Heifetz, Linsky, & Grashow, 2009). 
Individual, embedded actors in the acute NHS hospital environment seek to solve this dilemma 
by constructing conceptual maps of the conflicting institutional prescriptions that are found in 
the managerial hospital. These hypothetical depictions structure and order the tensions and 
points of congruence (Besharov & Smith, 2013) allowing for the emergence of plausible 
understandings that may enable them to act (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005) within the 
constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). They have to balance their assessment of the 
demands of the managerial hospital for bureaucratisation, standardisation and 
commercialisation (Waring & Bishop, 2013) and their salient identity as doctors (Ashforth & 
Johnson, 2001). Even the latter is but a plurality of selves identity (Burke & Tully, 1977; Doolin, 
2001; Spyridonidis et al., 2014). Weighing up is a means of coming up with reasonable 
understandings. These are tested inter-subjectively and are refined in real-world situations. 
Adjustments are made as one goes along. It is a process of muddling along, finding answers to 
questions and managing by discovery (Klein, 1999). Weighing up takes explicit account of the 
actors’ personal and professional needs, beliefs and values and the demands posed by the 
managerial hospital. Actors are able to act despite uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. 
Weighing up is a two-stage process of assessment. In the first phase, the hospital consultants 
consider how their professional identity and clinical autonomy are challenged by vertical 
accountability procedures, transparent accountability measures and work intensification driven 
by demands for efficiency, documentation to underpin contracts, commodification, recording 
and auditing. The second phase involves doing something about the assessment, in phase one. 
Medical professionalism as a process of institutionalisation aims to bring order, structure and 
meaning to an important area of healthcare delivery. It is indeed a set of structures and 
practices that are based on rationalised myths and symbols that express the expectations of the 
wider society (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The transformation in the social organisation of the 
hospital has introduced new myths and symbols that do not necessarily eliminate a previous 
set. Thus, one has a process of sedimentation of myths and symbols (Brock, 2006; Cooper et al., 
1996). There emerges the rub. Medical professionalism is being reframed. Market-based 
competition, management-based control systems and metrics-based performance-management 
systems (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Farrell & Morris, 2003; Flynn, 1999; Greener, 2003) leave their 
marks on clinicians. Weighing up is a complex process of juggling the demands from multiple 
frames of reference, including professionalism within organisations. The assessment process 
underpins the mode of professional practice and observed behaviours. 
The question is whether – for the hospital consultants – the meanings of the myths and symbols 
have radically changed and how those interpretations are framed. Medical professionalism is 
not only about treating a patient but also about the meanings associated with that process that 
early accounts of neo-institutionalism had apparently assumed could be taken-for-granted 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). In the managerial hospital, to the 
management the patient has become a customer.  The hospital has to compete with other 
hospitals - public, private and NGO - for customers. Customers have rights. How do doctors see 
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the change in the language and meanings associated with their engagement with the patient? 
Doctors have duties to patients. In fact, this meaning-making process is more agentic 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005) than taken-
for-granted. It places greater emphasis on the cognitive work needed to overcome the causal 
influence of structures than previously assumed by neo-institutionalists (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). This is because it requires the constant comparison of multiple 
logics and the crafting of an option from a constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) and 
justifying that choice to oneself and to significant others (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). It is 
also an interactional process, which means that actors have to take account of the views, goals, 
needs and interests of relevant referent audiences (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; 
Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971).  
The weighing-up process can be viewed as a reflection of the appraisal processes in the 
Transactional Model of Coping and Stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 1987), in which actors do 
not respond to a stressor itself. They interpret what it means to them in terms of their beliefs, 
values, interests and priorities. With the secondary appraisal, they determine what they could 
do to address the cause of the stress. The meaning-making process is a gateway to a response to 
three calls. Firstly, it responds to the need for a more nuanced understanding of agency 
(Delmestri, 2006; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011, 2014; Powell & Colyvas, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a). Secondly, it offers a reply to appeals for better understandings of how doctors take 
decisions (Correia, 2013a), given that the GT (as described in Chapter 4) indicated that doctors 
are disinclined to make ill-judged or rash decisions. Thirdly, it provides an insight into key 
elements of how the paradox of professional autonomy (Thomas & Davies, 2005) is juggled on a 
routine basis.   
Meaning-making is emergent and serendipitous (Smets et al., 2012) yet intentional (Dorado, 
2005; Klein, 1999, 2011). This incongruous process consequently provides a more subtle 
understanding of intentionality and purpose than suggested in institutional work (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009). It illuminates meaning-making developments at the 
coalface (Barley, 2008) of institutionalism. Understandings are inter-subjectively generated by 
inhabitants of institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002) as they seek 
practical ways to resolve the wickedness of the social organisation of healthcare (Raisio, 2009; 
Vartiainen, 2005). The process of meaning-making is bedevilled by the complex adaptive system 
of the hospital and its institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). Meaning-making as a 
social process draws on phenomenology (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), interpretive sociology 
(Hughes, 1971), symbolic interactionist sociology (Blumer, 1971) and structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1984). That said meaning making is embedded in power relations that privilege some 
actors and exclude or neglect others (Album & Westin, 2008; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010; Rosoff & 
Leone, 1991). Power has not been adequately addressed in institutional theory (Lawrence, 
2008; Munir, 2015). Similarly, in the hospital, the clinical prestige hierarchy privileges some 
meanings over others. 
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Doctors try to accomplish two things on an on-going basis: getting through the workload and 
sustaining a sense of meaning in their work (Gleeson & Knights, 2006). From the previous 
paragraphs, it is clear that meaning is negotiated in social interaction. Hence, the meanings of 
the multiple logics and the inter-relationships between logics are not given but are constructed 
as contradictory, complementary, comparable and strange within the routine, everyday 
practices of embedded actors (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012). Hospital 
doctors are – amongst other major players – intra-organisational carriers of mental models of 
the competing logics in the field (Thornton et al., 2012). The managerial hospital is a hybrid 
organisation because it houses multiple logics under its roof (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). A national health policy hybrid (Ferlie & 
McGivern, 2013) created a sedimented quasi-hierarchy, quasi-market and a quasi-network 
(Exworthy et al., 1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002a) so that one has the worst of both worlds; i.e. 
public services with neither markets nor bureaucracy (Kirkpatrick, 1999). Doctors interpret 
organisational issues through the lenses of the multiple logics that they carry and enact 
(Besharov & Smith, 2013; Delmestri, 2006; Jepperson, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012; Zilber, 2002; 
Zilber, 2011). Meaning-making, although it is interactional, is always a personal response to the 
questions posed by life (Frankl, 1984, 1997). The doctors ask what these logics mean for their 
own sense of self (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Burke & Tully, 1977; Spyridonidis & Calnan, 2011; 
Spyridonidis et al., 2014), what they are supposed to do for the patient, how they should go 
about it, the implications for the relative distribution of power in the hospital and their 
economic well-being. Sense making and weighing up are processes that are central to the micro-
foundations of the institutionalisation processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Lok, 2010; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012). 
“Performance management means sweating the assets. Doctors are the more expensive assets. 
That means more should be done with less. So our sessions are over-booked and there is always 
pressure to add another patient or two to our lists.” (Surgeon) 
“Managers watch targets and dashboards. Doctors treat patients.” (A & E consultant)  
“Doctors are not inclined to take ill-considered decisions. As individuals, we have too much invested 
in the system, especially our pensions. Therefore, we try to make the best under the circumstances. 
You roll with the punches and keep a knuckle-duster in case you need a knockout punch.” (Surgeon 
nearing retirement) 
Doctors are constantly weighing up and appraising. They have workload figures that they have 
to meet in order for the hospital to meet mandatory targets. Moreover, they have to judge how 
to meet their professional commitments to patients, as they no longer exclusively control the 
resources of the hospital. Then there are a number of other basic issues to consider. These 
include the inalienable wickedness (Conklin, 2006a; Raisio, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973; 
Vartiainen, 2005) of the social organisation of healthcare delivery (Timmermans & Oh, 2010). 
Technology has resulted in changes in clinical practice. Patients have greater expectations. 
Technology has changed the doctor-patient relationship. Scandals had undermined the prestige 
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of the medical profession. Fiscal pressures have resulted in demands for greater effectiveness 
and efficiency. More people are coming through the front door of the hospital because 
community and primary healthcare services are failing. In addition, they have to contend with 
issues such as patients blocking beds because they are not ill enough to be in an acute hospital 
but cannot be discharged because home-care arrangements are not in place. What is the 
meaning of doing the best for the patient in the room, while having to follow standard 
guidelines and protocols? This is an on-going process. 
So one might look at a hospital and not find doctors on a picket line having dropped their 
stethoscopes and banging bedpans on the sidewalk. However, institutional complexity is 
unravelled on the clinical frontline. The process of institutionalisation of the meanings of the 
acute hospital, the framing of the patient and illness, and the role of the doctor are deeply 
contested processes that are constantly being destabilised by the social transformation of the 
delivery model for healthcare. Every situation has the potential to be meaningful. One finds 
meaning by doing something that matters, experiencing something important or bearing 
difficulties with courage. The absence of meaning leads to alienation (Frankl, 1984). This study 
is about how embedded individuals find themselves within multiple, and sometimes, 
contradictory logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011). The physician identity 
may be more salient in that the actor will primarily remain a doctor – despite incidental and 
strategic hybridity (McGivern et al., 2015). Other identities are likely to be nested (Ashforth & 
Johnson, 2001; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Spyridonidis et al., 2014). Their identity work is an on-
going project within the process of weighing up, so they go about framing their personal stakes 
in maintaining and reproducing fluid and plural selves (Carroll & Levy, 2010). Institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009; DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004), institutional 
logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2013) and institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009) have been different accounts of the role of actors in 
institutionalism. However, as discussed above, there have been calls for more nuanced accounts 
of agency (Delmestri, 2006; Hwang & Colyvas, 2011, 2014; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; 
Suddaby et al., 2009; Yu, 2013). Weighing up is a multi-dimensional and dynamic part of the 
response to those calls. 
The multi-dimensional view of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) is a starting point from 
which to begin a process of understanding how a situated and dynamic agency functions as an 
element in the weighing-up process. The causal implications of logics and structures do not just 
happen, nor are they simply imposed. The mutual implication of structure and agency (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971) is adjusted with a greater view of the on-going 
contingency of structure (Bjerregaard & Jonasson, 2014). This leaves room for cognitive roles 
for actors to determine, negotiate, clarify, frame and change meanings associated with 
particular structures or combinations of these structures (Ancona, 2012; Weick, 1995; Weick et 
al., 2005). The isomorphic turn of neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) focused on the taken-for-grantedness of institutional 
logics from the institutional field to the extent that the actor may be a cultural dope (Garfunkel, 
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1984). The range of behaviours of hospital doctors suggests that they are more agentic than 
mindless followers of cultural scripts (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Levay & Waks, 2009; Morrow, 
Burford, Redfern, Briel, & Illing, 2012; Numerato et al., 2012; Waring, 2014).  
Meaning making, sense making and weighing up take a closer look at the cognitive processes 
that inform behaviours. Even the reproduction of existing institutional arrangements within an 
institutionally complex environment (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache 
& Santos, 2010) requires active agency. The embedded actor has to take account of the shaping, 
constraining and stimulating provided by multiple logics and make bounded choices even if that 
means choosing what is already in place (Besharov & Smith, 2013). Hence iterative agency 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) is not equivalent to passivity. Active agency responds to questions 
posed (Frankl, 1997) within the workplace. Projective agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) 
involves an assessment of existing institutional arrangements against possible alternatives and 
the choice of supporting new and emerging institutional arrangements. This has been the focus 
of institutional entrepreneurship scholarship (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009b; DiMaggio, 
1988; Dorado, 2005; Garud et al., 2007; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Jennings, Greenwood, 
Lounsbury, & Suddaby, 2013; Leca, Battilana, & Boxenbaum, 2008). Practical evaluative agency 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), the assessments and actions associated with getting by and doing 
routine work, has been relatively neglected in institutional theory scholarship (Besharov & 
Smith, 2013; Lawrence, 2008). Individuals are carriers of logics within organisations (DiMaggio, 
1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002; Zilber, 2011) and their contested, shared, contingent, fluid 
and historicised understandings and subjective interpretations become objectified or 
institutionalised (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The routine interpretations and actions of 
embedded actors manifest the systems of logic within institutional fields (Thornton et al., 2012). 
This study is about these micro-foundations of institutionalisation (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a; Smets et al., 2012; Thornton et al., 2012).  
Routine resistance and public and private transcripts (Ackroyd et al., 2007b; Prasad & Prasad, 
1998, 2000; Scott, 1985, 1990) invite one to look beyond public encounters to clarify what 
situations might mean. They also call for a critical look at the privilege afforded to managerial 
control and hegemony (Jermier et al., 1994) and the rediscovery of the recalcitrant worker 
(Ackroyd & Thompson, 2003b). The Transactional Model of Coping and Stress (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984, 1987) presents suggestions for how the process unfolds. It proposes that people 
seek to match the demands of a situation with the resources at their disposal with two linked 
appraisal processes. In the primary appraisal stage, they try to determine what a particular 
change may mean for them with respect to their values, beliefs, goals and interests. A particular 
event may be considered potentially harmful if it is associated with earlier loss. It can be 
considered a challenge if the possibility exists that the demands can be met with available 
resources. It can be considered a threat if demands potentially exceed resources. The secondary 
appraisal process determines what can be done and is influenced by the primary appraisal 
process (Cox & Ferguson, 1991). Depending on available resources, there are feedback loops to 
the primary appraisal process. The coping behaviours are either problem-focused coping or 
  
 
 
131 
emotion-focused coping. The former behaviours are attempts to solve the issue at hand. These 
could include seeking more information, developing new skills and seeking social support. 
Problem-focused coping behaviours have better stress outcomes than emotion-focused coping 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Moos & Holahan, 2003). Emotion-focused coping behaviours are 
adopted when the situation is beyond the control of the participants.  
To a large degree, the managerial hospital is a creation of the government of the day because it 
pays the bills. The responses and behaviours of the social, creative and intellectual capital of the 
hospital; i.e. the frontline clinicians, especially the doctors (Walshe & Smith, 2011), place limits 
on the emergence and evolution of the managerial hospital. 
A complex institutional field (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011) makes 
contradictory demands on the managerial hospital (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 
2010; Zilber, 2002). Such an institutional environment does not offer complete and specific 
solutions that the participants can follow strategically (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Their 
agency and behaviours are experimental solutions as they seek to reframe relations between 
institutional logics. The modes of agency that they employ (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) 
underpin the observable behaviours of the participants and the observable behaviours are 
instantiations of the modes of agency. The modes of agency are analytically separated but 
empirically entangled in any concrete situation of action (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a). The observable behaviours have institutional work consequences 
(Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009); i.e. maintaining, 
creating and disrupting institutions. 
The weighing-up process is the connective link between the constellation of logics (Goodrick & 
Reay, 2011) and institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) - that arise in the 
institutional field (Gray et al., 2015; Hinings & Malhotra, 2008), the associated competing 
external demands (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Fligstein, 1997; Pache & Santos, 2010; Zilber, 
2002) - and institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) practices of embedded actors. The 
work practices are enacted as the four modes of observed behaviours in Rolling with the 
Punches: Stabilising Temporarily, Resisting, Limiting the Impact and Living with. Weighing up is a 
meaning-making process (Weick et al., 2005) in which embedded actors evaluate the paradoxes 
of the managerial hospital against their own sense of self, their values, priorities and beliefs. 
They can try stabilising temporarily, resisting, limiting the impact or living with the 
contradictions and tensions. This perhaps explains why the acute hospital has largely remained 
a professional bureaucracy (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 2013b; Sullivan & 
Skelcher, 2002a) since professional values do not change easily (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; 
Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003a; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Weighing up goes on all the time 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 1987). 
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6.2.2 Stabilising Temporarily 
Newly qualified consultants adopt this pattern of behaviour for a period of more than 12 
months – if not a few years – to become established in their new positions (Brown, Shaw, & 
Graham, 2013; Morrow et al., 2012; Morrow et al., 2009) as they strive to become clinically 
independent within their new roles. It has become increasingly difficult for specialist registrars 
who have completed their training to secure permanent posts (Gordon & Newbery, 2013), so 
getting the first job is crucial. Hospitals are under pressure to deliver a service around the clock 
but financial pressures lead them to offer locum/contract posts rather than 
substantive/permanent posts.  
Working as a newly qualified duty consultant in a hospital where one has not trained or worked 
before can be stressful. The protocols and location of equipment and the quality of the junior 
doctor teams are just a few of the variables that could spell disaster even before the new 
consultant has seen a patient. Induction and mentoring programmes that are specifically geared 
for consultants are needed, yet rare (Dean, 2003; MacLeod, 2007; Roberts, Moore, & Coles, 
2002) or may be inappropriately conceived (Harrison et al., 2014). 
The transition from specialist registrar to consultant is big, given the added management 
responsibilities for which registrars are not well trained (Beckett, Hulbert, & Brown, 2006; 
McKinstry, Macnicol, Elliot, & Macpherson, 2005; Morrow et al., 2009). Studies in which newly 
qualified consultants were interviewed showed that they had a higher opinion of their clinical 
training compared to the lowest rating given to their preparedness to manage resources and the 
delivery system (Higgins, Gallen, & Whiteman, 2005; Morrow et al., 2012). Consultants felt 
clinically well trained for their roles but significantly less so with respect to management, 
service delivery organisation, patient complaints, job planning, chairing meetings and 
supporting colleagues (Brown et al., 2013; Shaw, Stenson, Fenton, Morrow, & Brown, 2012). 
A new consultant faces acute pressures in a market-based competitive hospital, under 
management-based control systems with metrics-based performance systems (Farrell & Morris, 
2003). A study by Brown et al. (2013) found that while workload figures cannot suffer and one 
must be seen to be clinically competent by one’s peers, the new consultant struggles to 
prioritise, delegate and deal with conflicts. The same study found that new consultants have 
difficulties with controlling those who act in the name of “my consultant”. Having trained in a 
hospital helps with knowing protocols and procedures but it poses identity problems. How 
should new consultants deal with senior consultants with whom they had trained, the junior 
medical team, the ward team, the directorate management team, job planning, appraisal and 
service development (Stanaway et al., 2011). 
Two of the competing forces in the managerial hospital: managerialism and professionalism pull 
this consultant in different directions. The newly qualified consultant has to find the extra hours 
to get through the work lists in a clinical session. The acute hospital is in market-based 
competition with other providers, the clinical autonomy of the consultant is constrained by 
management-based control systems and value added is measured in a metrics-based 
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performance-management system (Carter et al., 1992; Farrell & Morris, 2003; Greener, 2003). 
This may mean working extra hours in a day and over weekends. This doctor is caught in the 
vortex of the wickedness of healthcare organisation (Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 2005) and the 
relative insularity of working in a subsystem of a complex adaptive system (Godfrey et al., 2003; 
Holland, 1999; Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2002; Waldrop, 1994). At the same time the 
complex adaptive system itself is a hybrid organisation (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Noordegraaf, 
2013; Pache & Santos, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Scott et al., 2000) for which performance 
has been raised to a supreme value (Gabriel, 2008). Medical professionalism is being expanded 
beyond the delivery of quality care to the individual patient to being efficient with the use of 
scarce resources. Medical professionalism has been undergoing change (Christmas & Millward, 
2011; Evetts, 2003; Rosen & Dewar, 2004). The efficiency logic places this doctor under severe 
time pressures and causes anguish (Iversen, Rushforth, & Forrest, 2009) as the doctor has to 
learn resource management on the job, while at the same time being the scarce expert resource 
to be managed. The purpose of the performance-management system is self-management. 
Newly qualified hospital consultants struggle with the management roles associated with being 
the duty consultant(Higgins et al., 2005). 
New doctors tend to prioritise a better work-life balance more than their predecessors did 
(Dacre, 2008; Mayor, 2009; McKinstry, 2008; Thomas, 2014). They often choose to work flexibly 
and to live in areas where they are close to family and friends. This is especially true especially if 
they are in dual-income relationships. An increasing number of women are choosing to work 
part-time or flexibly, even taking time out to start families. Hospitals are moving towards 
extended seven-day weeks while the new doctors are moving towards a better work-life 
balance. The managerial hospital and the new consultant appear to travel in opposite directions. 
However, these consultants know only the managerial hospital. They themselves do not have a 
memory of a hospital where consultants were in charge. 
The observed practices show that newly qualified consultants tend to try to get through the 
work, develop their ability to work under pressure, become clinically competent and create a 
support network for themselves. Their efforts and intentionality are not aimed at changing 
institutional arrangements so projective agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009b; DiMaggio, 1988) and institutional work that is geared 
towards creating new institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009) do not 
feature at all in this phase of the career of the consultants.  
The consultant primarily employs practical-evaluative agency to get through the day-to-day 
work and to develop a good professional reputation. Their primary mode of agency tends to 
reproduce the existing institutional arrangements; thus, iterative agency is also evident. 
However, the practical-evaluative and iterative dimensions of agency that the newly qualified 
consultant employs are not just passively taken-for-granted. On the contrary, their modes of 
agency require constant effort to compare viable alternative assumptions, beliefs and material 
practices (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012) and make choices. It is certainly not 
the case of being a cultural dope (Garfunkel, 1984). Practical-evaluative agency – with iterative 
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agency consequences – underpins observable behaviours that, in turn, have the institutional 
work implications of maintaining institutions. However, the aim of this newly appointed 
consultant is not necessarily a purposeful maintaining of existing institutional arrangements. 
Just wanting to get by, which is the intention, has unintended institutional work consequences. 
This subtlety appears to be lacking in institutional work theory (Lawrence et al., 2013; Suddaby 
et al., 2009). The participants legitimate what they are doing and discursively dismiss (Mumby, 
2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) almost everything else as relatively unimportant (Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Sometimes they may actively dismiss 
alternative practices or, at other times, they are just too tired to bother.  
Living up to the expectations of the primary, salient identity as a hospital consultant (Ashforth & 
Johnson, 2001; Burke & Tully, 1977) is the main objective of the newly qualified consultant. 
That accomplishment comes with its own interpretive scheme (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 
Ranson et al., 1980b), template (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) and institutional logics (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999, 2013). The relative independence of the clinical departments provides new 
consultants with sufficient room to focus on the tasks at hand. They are able to seek local 
solutions to the day-to-day complexities that they face. However, the interdependence with 
other clinical and service departments has the potential to, and often does, disrupt their 
attempts at splendid isolation (Godfrey et al., 2003; Holland, 1999; Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et 
al., 2002; Waldrop, 1994). Their idea of medical professionalism is to get through the work, do 
the best for their patients and earn the trust and respect of their colleagues. They often have 
public transcripts that do not openly challenge the managerial hospital but they are likely to 
have very deep hidden transcripts (Prasad & Prasad, 1998, 2000; Scott, 1985, 1990). 
Thus, stabilising temporarily is a way of being in which the mode of agency (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998) is primarily practical-evaluative as the focus of the newly appointed consultant is 
mainly to get through their work. This mode of agency has iterative agency consequences 
because institutional maintenance is an unintended outcome. The observed practices are 
primarily those that practical-evaluative agency underpins. One can therefore take a look from 
the coalface of institutionalism (Barley, 2008) at how this group of inhabitants of the 
institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002) casts and reframes a Byzantine 
institutional environment in its routine, everyday practice. Practical-evaluative agency 
dominates whilst iterative agency consequences may be unplanned. Both modes of agency 
require effort because the participant has to compare individual and primary referent group 
priorities constantly within a fluid, contingent and intricate institutional environment. The 
observed practices are instantiations of the dominant practical-evaluative agency and 
unintended iterative agency. The modes of agency loop backwards to the institutional field, 
which results in a coalface iterative micro reframing of relationships between field-level 
structures, logics and demands. Structures are therefore contingent and unstable (Bjerregaard 
& Jonasson, 2014; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) with non-hegemonic power to shape behaviour 
(Anderson, 2008; Foucault, 1979; Mumby, 2005; Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985, 1990).  
  
 
 
135 
Since structures do not impose themselves (Friedland & Alford, 1991a) but have to be 
interpreted, room is left for sense-making and meaning-making (Ancona, 2012; Frankl, 1997; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005). Meaning-making is expressed as a 
multi-dimensional agency (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) whose 
different modes interact dynamically in two directions. Firstly, the modes of agency underpin 
observed behaviours, which manifest specific instances of institutional work (Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a). These behaviours represent intended and accidental framings of 
relations between structures or logics, thus in effect resulting in maintaining, disrupting or 
creating new institutions. Stabilising temporarily is characterised by mainly practical-evaluative 
agency, with iterative agency consequences, thus resulting principally in both effortful and 
unintended institutional maintenance. So the observed institution-maintaining behaviours 
instantiate the dynamic interaction between a dominant practical-evaluative agency and a 
subordinate iterative agency. Secondly, dynamic interaction between the modes of agency 
iteratively frames – for this group of consultants – the relations between the institutional logics 
as practically incompatible and feeds back the coalface instantiations of those relations.  
This is perhaps one of the reasons for the acute hospital remaining primarily a professional 
bureaucracy (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 2013b) despite the significant 
investments in structural and decision-making systems changes. However, since the carriers of 
the logics inside the hospital (Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002) 
have salient and nested identities (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Burke & Tully, 1977; Spyridonidis 
& Calnan, 2011; Spyridonidis et al., 2014) that vary, the modes of agency, their interactions and 
the observed practices are unlikely to be uniform, although the preponderance will be as 
outlined in this section on stabilising temporarily. It should be noted that a generational element 
might be involved, because this group of consultants has trained - and is practising - in the 
managerial healthcare system. It could be that in future, the institutional arrangements that are 
maintained are not the professional bureaucracy. 
6.2.3 Resisting 
This is a coalface institutionalisation (Barley, 2008), in which the inhabitants of institutions 
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002) try to keep managerialism and professionalism 
apart.  
In the resisting mode, hospital consultants seek discursively to dismiss (Anderson, 2008; 
Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) the managerial logic. They prioritise a professional 
logic and identity (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Burke & Tully, 1977; Spyridonidis & Calnan, 2011; 
Spyridonidis et al., 2014). Moreover, they exercise primarily practical-evaluative and iterative 
dimensions of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). In this way they are getting through the day-
to-day work. These are the underpinnings of their observed behaviours which are aimed at 
maintaining existing institutional arrangements (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 
2009). Professional values are difficult to dislodge (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006) so they prioritise their duty to the patient, clinical autonomy, collegiality 
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and traditional medical professionalism. Resisting reflects the accusations of “professional 
recalcitrance” in the face of a managerial reconfiguration of service delivery (Ackroyd et al., 
2007b; Dent, 2003; Farrell & Morris, 2003). However, resisting is a contingent and dynamic 
process. The Resisting mode of behaviour is made up of two strategies: subverting and quibbling. 
The differences are significant but they are a matter of degree. Few doctors actually operate in 
this space, which probably constitutes about 5% of the consultant body. 
The systemic power (Lawrence, 2008) exerted by the market-based competitive hospital, with 
its managerial-based control systems and metrics-based performance-management system 
(Farrell & Morris, 2003; Flynn, 1999), is pervasive. Power is not necessarily hegemonic, and 
generates its own resistance (Foucault, 1979, 1988). The managerial hospital – as a hybrid, 
contested space of multiple logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010; Zilber, 
2002) – leaves room for resistance. Resistance behaviours exist within those spaces between 
the capillaries of technologies of control (Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Miller & 
Rose, 2008) associated with the competing logics.  
These actors perform their daily work in established ways that keep the professional and 
managerial logics separate. It is an active, not a mindless or effortless, process (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Resisters deliberately engage the managerial logic 
and discursively justify their own behaviours.   
The doctors who adopt a resistance pattern of behaviour find themselves on the resistance end 
of the resistance-compliance continuum. They access the professional logic to engage reflexively 
in self-creation and resistance (Spicer & Böhm, 2007). What drives them is their sense of self, 
their salient physician identity (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Burke & Tully, 1977; Spyridonidis et 
al., 2014). They deeply reflect on how best to serve their patients and be of service to their 
colleagues. Moreover, they are disturbed by the extent to which the managerial project is trying 
to transform them into docile subjects (Ferlie et al., 2012; Kondo, 1990). 
6.2.3.1 Subverting 
Subversion involves taking a particular practice or symbol and reframing it, in this way 
undermining the original intention of its use. In the novel The Wrapped Woman by Boolell, 
Supaya, the protagonist, rejects the sari as a symbol of the oppression of women and transforms 
it into a tool for the creative construction of her strength, dignity and identity (Barrios, 1996). In 
political thought, subversion is often advised when conditions do not favour a direct assault 
(Gramsci & Forgacs, 2000).  
In the subversive mode of behaviour, agency is mainly practical-evaluative (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998) because, whilst an actor may have issues with the social organisation of the 
delivery of healthcare, they still have a primary on-going duty to patients and getting through 
the day-to-day work. Doctors arrive at the hospital to help patients and assist their colleagues. 
Iterative agency also features prominently since the aim of the participant is to keep 
managerialism and professionalism apart. Being subversive deals with how they go about doing 
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their work. The resistance practices are often discursive and depend on the meanings, which are 
highly dependent on the context in which actions take place (Anderson, 2008; Mumby, 2005; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Thus, the primary dimension of agency is practical-evaluative 
with almost an equal iterative agency. Projective agency does not feature in this pattern of 
behaviour.   
Subversives take a managerial technology and decouple it (Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009; Levay & 
Waks, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991) from the intentions to extend the managerial 
gaze and control. They either formally comply without changes in clinical practice or use the 
technology to entrench clinical autonomy further. Taking the clinical audit as an example, the 
clinical audit evolved from being voluntary (during and after the 1960s) to mandatory (after 
1989) and then became part of the bigger clinical governance (after 1999) project (Klein, 2013; 
Scally & Donaldson, 1998). Clinical audit aims at making clinical practice transparent and at 
improving the quality of care (Mooney, 2009). It also links clinical practice and resource 
utilisation (Pollock, 2005). This provides an opening for discursive de-legitimisation. Given the 
lack of funding, an absence of a national strategy and the multiple groups involved in clinical 
audits, there is sufficient room for decoupling (Hitchen, 2008). However, to the subversive 
consultant, the audit as a component of the risk-governance system in addition to making 
clinical practice transparent has the added effect of mediating and shaping the doctor-patient 
encounter (Hillman et al., 2013). The patient is fragmented into an agglomeration of risks. The 
patient, as a person, is lost in the process. 
As was argued in archetype theory (see Section 5.7.1), structures are meaningful (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1993; Ranson et al., 1980b) and are not neutral processes. Clinical governance frames 
the encounter with the patient as a bundle of risks that have to be mitigated, recorded, verified 
and tracked. The subversive consultant takes a dissenting view and argues that the audit should 
be a means of peer review – to improve clinical practice – rather than an extension of the 
Panoptic gaze of management (Ferlie et al., 2012; Miller & Rose, 2008). One can see the point 
that the managerial logic works despite the activities of the subversive consultant. It might be 
dismissed as decaf resistance (Contu, 2008) because it leaves power relations unchanged (Dey 
& Teasdale, 2015). That, however, would be a misreading of what was found in this literature 
review about power relations and routine resistance. The subversive consultant would take 
clinical governance as a discourse aimed at creating an environment where safe, consistently 
high quality care is delivered to patients and would argue that a safe environment for patients 
starts with the safety of, and respect for, the staff who deliver care. One cannot expect staffs that 
are driven to the edges of exhaustion to deliver safe, high-quality care. The subversive is always 
on the lookout for gaps to exploit. The performance-management systems result in work 
intensification that can undermine the ability of staff to deliver good quality care. The 
subversive highlights the dark sides of the performance- and risk-management systems (Brown 
& Calnan, 2010; Hillman et al., 2013). Subversives are not averse to using the system against 
itself and putting a clinical spoke in the managerial wheel. They bring to the fore the safety of 
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patients when managers apply pressure to cut costs (Pollock, 2005). So the subversive uses the 
spaces created by the competing logics. 
“I have complained about the lack of bedside or mobile suction units in our wards for some time. 
Only some wards e.g. the intensive treatment unit, the high dependency unit and another ward 
have these mobile suction units. I had recorded them as audits on numerous occasions and it 
probably went into a filing cabinet. However, I am personally and professionally responsible for the 
patient, not the manager. So when I got fed up with a lack of response I used the clinical 
governance system against the bean counters. I graded the matter as a one. That meant that it had 
to be escalated and management went ape sh*t. They could not ignore it any longer and there is a 
record that will feed into other records. It was bad for the manager but this is a problem 
everywhere in the hospital. The managers control the budget and we are responsible for patient 
care. One must not overdo it and be sure to cover your back.” (Consultant) 
In the managerial hospital, almost everything that does not directly deal with patients is seen as 
a cost to be reduced or cut and is subject to forensic scrutiny. Doctors hold DCC sessions that 
involve contact with patients and other SPA sessions. The latter include things like teaching, 
research, continuing professional development and service development. The efficiency 
imperative requires that SPAs be reduced and more time spent on DCC. The subversive argues 
these activities are part of their requirements for appraisals and professional revalidation 
(periodic relicensing). They also argue that the quality of care delivered by doctors requires that 
they have time to reflect and discuss with colleagues. 
Not many doctors choose to be subversives. Many consultants choose to have deep public and 
hidden transcripts (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985, 1990) because the NHS is a monopoly 
employer and the fear of retaliation is tangible (Dyer, 2013, 2014; Francis, 2015). From a labour 
process theory perspective, organised, formal and collective resistance by hospital consultants 
is almost unthinkable (Spicer & Böhm, 2007; Thomas & Davies, 2005). Hospital doctors who use 
whistleblowing as a subversive tactic can have tremendous difficulties, which include being 
marginalised, investigated on spurious charges, placed on indefinite leave and even reported for 
professional misconduct (Dyer, 2015; Francis, 2015). In a time when performance is publicised 
the delivery of service is a spectacle, with image and reputation becoming ever more important 
(Gabriel, 2008). The subversives therefore have to find alternative ways of leaking information 
into the public domain. Often websites like www.doctors.net become fora for bringing matters 
to the attention of a wider audience. This is the type of activity that can be carried out from the 
shadows yet can be devastating to the managerial project. 
In an environment with an aggressive policy of performance management, targets and severe 
sanctions or the infliction of terror (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Propper et al., 1998), the subversive 
engages in discursive resistance (Anderson, 2008; Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
They will mock the management focus on the achievement of mandatory targets while missing 
the point of healthcare; i.e. health outcomes for patients. The participants juggle the 
requirements to complete their work lists, meeting the needs of the patient in the room and 
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consulting their own professional values to find ways of doing the right thing. Even resistance 
behaviour is about finding the right balance between the multiple variables that include the 
workload, the needs of the patient and the professional values. The right decision is taken on 
balance. Subversive practices therefore are effortful accomplishments (Giddens, 1984; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a). The physician identity is salient in that the actor will primarily be a 
doctor. In incidental and strategic hybridity (McGivern et al., 2015), nested identities (Ashforth 
& Johnson, 2001; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Spyridonidis et al., 2014) – do not feature frequently. 
Their identity work is not complicated by on-going projects of maintaining and reproducing 
fluid and plural selves (Carroll & Levy, 2010). 
When clinical guidelines – as technologies of systemic power – become too burdensome, 
subversives dismiss these as “cookbook medicine” (Timmermans & Berg, 2003, 2010) or as 
assembly-line medicine (Brownlie & Howson, 2006) or the McDonaldisation of medicine 
(Ritzer, 1996). These are rhetorical barbs quietly traded in the struggle about the meanings of 
the patient, treatment, outcomes and identity. It must be remembered that this is a small – but 
astute – segment of the body of consultants.  
Subversives rarely show their hand in public; i.e. the hidden transcript does not readily go 
public. The June 2012 strike over pensions by NHS hospital doctors reflects the second time in 
four decades that doctors took industrial action, which shows the infrequency of open conflict 
between the powerful and the weak (Scott, 2008a). The main weapon of subversive doctors is to 
operate in the shadows. There is always ambiguity and sufficient room to retreat, hide away, 
live and fight another day. Subversives more often than not do indeed have an exit strategy.  
6.2.3.2 Quibbling 
In an article on bioethics that discusses the use of surrogacy, where the body of a woman is used 
to carry the baby for another family, several questions are asked. Is this practice exploitative 
because one is renting space or could it become less exploitative in the event of informed 
consent? What if the person who wishes to employ a surrogate is wealthy and the surrogate 
mother is from a poor family? What are the ethical issues associated with exploitation when 
transnational surrogacy is involved? On the other hand, does the relationship between the 
surrogate “mother” and the genetic “material” matter? The arguments about exploitation and 
informed consent can be said to narrow semantic quibbling rather than dealing with the bigger 
and more fundamental issue of human relationships between the surrogate person and the 
embryo (Rothman, 2014). The negative, hair-splitting gamesmanship associated with quibbling 
has also been featured in an article on disputes that involve the use of a trademark between a 
trademark proprietor and a collective with a geographical indicator (Gangjee, 2007). Who has 
the right to use the signifier in a given jurisdiction? This has been a semantic squabble for 
decades. 
As shown in the two examples above, quibbling involves behaviours that include raising hair-
splitting criticisms and using a magnifying glass to identify issues that others might routinely 
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overlook. In the managerial hospital, quibbling involves a conscious and tortuous comparison of 
an existing practice with a proposed change that is to be resisted. The goal is to slow down the 
managerial bureaucratic and competitive pressures at the extremities or capillaries (Foucault, 
1979). The extremity is where power is at its weakest (Ezzamel & Willmott, 1998; Kondo, 
1990). This is not narcissistic self-indulgence but has a normative component; i.e. it is a pattern 
of behaviour rooted in a professional bureaucracy. An individual act of quibbling by a solitary 
hospital consultant may not be the single grain of sand in the wheel bearing that causes the 
system to grind to a halt. However, the cumulative effects are sufficient to slow things down. A 
grand plan is not always visible.  
“I might not be able to stop these procedures, protocols and form-filling. But I can – and do – take 
the time to follow the procedures that will make things happen or not happen. As long as I frame 
the issues in terms of patient safety and the quality of the service then the managers cannot easily 
take action against me.” (Consultant) 
Wickedness associated with the social organisation of healthcare delivery (Raisio, 2009; 
Vartiainen, 2005) gives rise to institutional complexity (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et 
al., 2011). Byzantine demands are made on a hybrid organisation (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Kraatz & Block, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010). These demands are not necessarily incompatible 
(Besharov & Smith, 2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991b). They can coexist (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Zilber, 2002). But this requires sense making (Ancona, 2012; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1987; Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005) and agency (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967; Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971; Strauss et al., 1963). The professional identity component of 
the sense-making process (Frankl, 1984, 1997) involves a salient physician identity. The actor 
will primarily remain a doctor. The salient identity is substantially uncomplicated by incidental 
and strategic hybridity (McGivern et al., 2015) or The maintenance and reproduction of fluid 
and plural selves (Carroll & Levy, 2010) are not key concerns. The main professional project is 
holding the line of the salient traditional hospital consultant identity.  
The agency is a combination of practical-evaluative and iterative dimensions (Battilana & 
D'Aunno, 2009a; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). The observable practices (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a; Smets et al., 2012) are the same as the subversive in being opposed to market-based 
competition, management-based control systems and metrics-based performance-management 
systems (Farrell & Morris, 2003; Greener, 2003; Noordegraaf & Abma, 2003). Both aim 
maintaining existing practices. The difference is that, whereas the subversive seeks to strike 
decisive blows, the quibbler seeks to kill with a thousand cuts. The quibbler does not readily 
decisively agree or disagree. On the contrary, this is a person who works within the realms of 
that which is possible and does that which cannot be unambiguously identified as open dissent. 
The public transcript (Scott, 1985, 1990) still operates according to the expectations of the 
management. However, the hidden transcript is activated in the corridors, canteens and outside 
during smoke-breaks. These are sites that are beyond the immediate gaze of management. This 
is where the quibbler builds support at least to slow down or review decisions that have been 
sufficiently discredited in meetings.  
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The features of wickedness and complex adaptive systems mean that final decisions require 
patience and building consensus horizontally (Godfrey et al., 2003; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004; 
Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2002). Quibblers create and discursively exploit the gaps that 
such consensus building requires. Quibblers are often good at for building alliances to influence 
organisational processes (Demil & Bensédrine, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). So it should 
be clear that not much of the institutional template is taken-for-granted or given (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993). Institutional arrangements are effortful and on-
going accomplishments (Giddens, 1984; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Weighing up, sense 
making and meaning making, the appraisal processes, are on-going. They require continual 
assessing and determining what managerial procedures, techniques and technologies might 
mean. At the same time one has to be exploring for ways of engaging in routine resistance that 
operates within the tolerance limits of managerial power. As long as dissent is not public and 
unambiguous, it can indeed be accommodated by the patterns of domination (Prasad & Prasad, 
1998, 2000; Scott, 1985, 1990). The quibbler aims to slow down the managerial project to a 
snail’s pace because managers are under pressure to deliver tangible outcomes within limited 
time frames (Klein, 2013; Pollock, 2005).  
“A consultant has a job for life, whilst managers come and go.” (Consultant) 
Doctors are aware that resistance is a lonely affair that often ends badly for the doctor who 
breaches the tolerance limits. Resistance requires a keen awareness of the managerial red lines 
and staying within the boundaries. Quibblers use the pressures of the multiple – often 
conflicting, unending and ever-changing – national priorities of managers to put spokes in the 
wheels. Managers are under pressure to meet all sorts of targets, some contradictory, and 
delays can derail or stall their careers. Quibblers build alliances with people who share their 
dissatisfaction with the managerial hospital and seek to influence the organisational processes 
in a plethora of small ways (Demil & Bensédrine, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). They use 
the contradictions and spaces in the multiple logics to engage in legitimacy politics (Kraatz & 
Block, 2013), justify their behaviour and solidify their support networks (Courpasson, Dany, & 
Clegg, 2012; Pina e Cunha, Clegg, Rego, & Story, 2013; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).  
Resisting behaviours involve mainly practical-evaluative agency because all doctors have work 
lists that have to be completed. This already is indicative of a reconfiguration of their 
professional autonomy. Managers and their staff compile the work lists. It also illustrates the 
real-world constraints that doctors face. Clinical guidelines and protocols further frame how 
they do their work. Managerial logics, as systemic power (Lawrence, 2008), shape and constrain 
their agency (Evetts, 2003; Noordegraaf, 2007a). Power generates resistance (Foucault, 1988), 
albeit of a routine kind (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Their iterative 
agency combines with practical evaluative agency aiming to keep the managerial and 
professional logics separate. Public and hidden transcripts (Scott, 1985, 1990) suggest that the 
observed behaviours, although very similar, may be underpinned by different dynamically 
interacting, empirically intertwined but analytically separate modes of agency (Battilana & 
D'Aunno, 2009a; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Resisters get 
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through the day-to-day work whilst intentionally and unintentionally working at maintaining 
existing institutional arrangements and disrupting the emergence of new ones (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006).  
Neither the subversive nor the quibbler have grand visions for the social organisation of 
healthcare delivery (Waring & Bishop, 2013) to be strategically pursued. Their observed 
behaviours are similar but the subversive acts decisively while the quibbler aims to drain the 
life out of management. It is worth noting that creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions 
are not actions taken by separate actors. The same actors can at one time be creating whilst, at 
another time they could be maintaining or disrupting institutions (Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a) Thus, one develops a sense of the subtlety, reflexivity and skills of 
embedded actors and the contingency of institutions during coalface framings of relations 
between institutional logics. The differences in the modes of practice are subtle but they serve 
the same purpose; i.e. resisting. The gerund “resisting” allows for the emergence of a sense of an 
on-going activity, some of which is successful while some fail the aim of maintaining existing 
institutional arrangements. 
6.2.4 Limiting the Impact 
Limiting the impact as a strategy has been used in literature. Two examples illustrate limiting 
the impact concisely. In the first example, light pollution contributes to environmental 
degradation when compared to natural starlight and moonlight. Unnecessary upward light 
emission and residual light distribution have significant effects on wildlife, human health and 
stellar visibility. Effective practices have been identified that limit the impact of direct upward 
light distribution and over-lighting (Falchi, Cinzano, Elvidge, Keith, & Haim, 2011). The second 
example concerns resistance to antibiotics, which is a nightmare, especially in facilities where 
people are ill or frail. Steps can be taken to limit the impact of antibiotic resistance in nursing 
homes (Drinka, 2010). So limiting the impact suggests that one accepts the fact of a 
phenomenon and does whatever one can to minimise the effect it could have. 
“We can make positive suggestions and complain as much as we want but the managers still do 
what they want. But we will still suggest and complain.” (Consultant) 
This is an instance of the hospital consultants using their social position (DiMaggio, 1988; Garud 
et al., 2007) within the hospital to reduce the influence of market-based competition, 
management-based control, and decision-making systems and metrics-based performance-
management systems (Farrell & Morris, 2003; Sheaff et al., 2003; Talbot, 2009) on their medical 
professionalism. Resisting behaviours attempt to subvert or delay managerial initiatives. 
Limiting the impact behaviour is adopted when resisting is not an option or, when it has failed to 
achieve its objectives.  
Limiting the impact behaviours are legitimacy actions (Kraatz & Block, 2013) to hinder shifts in 
the balance of power and adverse impacts on personal commitment structures (Binder, 2007; 
Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). The imposition of managerial logics (Ackroyd et al., 2007b; Oldham, 
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2013; Smith, Walshe, & Hunter, 2001b) has not eliminated medical professional logics 
(Numerato et al., 2012; Waring & Currie, 2009). Healthcare services are not easily transformed 
into commodities (Ferlie et al., 1996b; Walsh, 1995). Managerial, bureaucratic and professional 
logics still coexist within the NHS hospital (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004; Exworthy et al., 1999; 
Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002a) as a result of multiple attempts to deal with the wickedness of the 
social organisation of healthcare delivery (Ferlie & Dopson, 2005; Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 
2005). Institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) and the constellation of logics 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011) are inalienable features of the healthcare system. They cannot be 
wished away by any of the stakeholders.  
Some people do not choose resistance as an option at all. They might choose limiting the impact 
behaviours. There is sufficient room for manoeuvring and limiting the impact behaviours in the 
wickedness of healthcare delivery organisation, the acute hospital as a complex adaptive system 
and the way that doctor-patient contact is structured. Professionals within organisations are 
able to adapt to organisational life (Deem et al., 2007; Evetts, 2003; Noordegraaf, 2007a; Reed, 
1996; Suddaby et al., 2009). They are elite workers rather than cultural dopes (Garfunkel, 1984; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Thomas & Davies, 2005). Limiting the impact behaviours is an 
account from the real world of a group of professionals within a managerially transformed 
organisation. It is a narrative that engages the call (Lawrence, 2008) for more empirical studies 
that show how actors enact the compromising, avoiding and acquiescing contingent and 
strategic responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). Seeking ways to insulate 
themselves are but some of the complex, pragmatic and routine resistance ways (Knights & 
McCabe, 2000; Prasad & Prasad, 1998, 2000; Thomas & Davies, 2005) in which hospital doctors 
intentionally and unintentionally maintain and disrupt institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Suddaby et al., 2009). Their efforts are directed at getting by with their increasingly over-
committed work lists despite the lack of drama or noise (March, 1981; Smets et al., 2012). The 
capital charges imposed on hospitals, as well as the statutory duty to balance their books, mean 
that managers are under pressure to reduce costs and deliver more services with diminishing 
resources (Dunnigan & Pollock, 1998; Pollock, Shaoul, & Vickers, 2002). Clinical guidelines and 
protocols reduce discretion on the clinical frontline (McDonald & Harrison, 2004; Timmermans 
& Berg, 2003).  
The meanings of professionalism and duty to the patient are crafted in the midst of these 
dilemmas (Ancona, 2012; Frankl, 1997; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Weick et al., 2005). The 
intentionality that follows from the sense-making process is reflected in the modes of agency 
(Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). The dimensions of agency that underpin the limiting the impact 
observed behaviours combine the practical-evaluative and iterative dimensions (Battilana & 
D'Aunno, 2009a; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), with the iterative dimension dominating. This 
means that limiting the impact behaviours are situated at the resistance end of the resistance- 
compliance spectrum. In enacting both their practical-evaluative and iterative dimensions of 
agency, they do not have a fully formed vision of the institutional arrangements that they 
strategically pursue. On the contrary, their observed behaviours are experimental, contingent, 
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fluid and situated improvisations (Smets et al., 2012) that allow them to accomplish their daily 
work while resisting managerial transformations of their work. The mundane, yet purposeful 
actions of professionals are consistent with the institutional work theory of deliberately 
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions. These actions also reflect routine resistance 
behaviours (Scott, 1985, 1990). Limiting the impact behaviours is one of the many complex 
ways in which professional people exercise mundane, episodic power in the workplace (R. 
Thomas & Davies, 2005; Lawrence, 2008). It shows that even people for whom power may have 
slipped a little are likely to find routine ways to protect their interests (Knights & McCabe, 2000; 
Prasad & Prasad, 1998).  
Limiting the impact behaviours involves two strategies: lying low and faking it. 
6.2.4.1 Lying low 
GT allows one to take concepts from outside the boundaries of specialist bodies of literature 
(Glaser, 1978), with  the grounded theorist likely to have something new to say about these 
concepts. Lying low is a concept that is used in foreign policy and cell biology. Adopting lying low 
behaviours does not mean not doing anything. China, for example, adopts a lying low position in 
its foreign policy orientation (Chen & Wang, 2011). China may stay below the radar but it does 
pursue its national interests quite robustly. In an example from cell biology, muscle satellite 
cells, which play an important role in skeletal muscle regeneration when after injury they 
become activated (Montarras, L'Honoré, & Buckingham, 2013), lie low until needed. 
As mentioned above, Limiting the impact, as a pattern of behaviours, has two dimensions or 
strategies: lying low and faking it. The first is a buying time strategy and the second is a more 
opportunistic strategy. Lying low behaviours are contingent on the non-hegemony of systemic 
power (Gramsci & Forgacs, 2000; Lawrence, 2008). Lying low involves behaviours that include 
playing one’s cards close to one’s chest, lurking in the shadows, staying below the radar and 
doing just enough not to be noticed as being either for, or against anything. A person who 
adopts this strategy may adopt some of the managerial discourse and practices to keep the 
management happy enough and then make sure that they meet as little of the management 
requirements as possible, to remain credible with their colleagues. This is an example of inverse 
decoupling (Levay & Waks, 2009; Power, 1999). The actors reconstruct the institutional order in 
which they are embedded by a practical-evaluative agency that underpins observed behaviours 
aimed at largely completing their work lists so that the hospital reaches its performance targets. 
However, their iterative agency underpins observed behaviours that manifest intentions 
formally to comply with the managerial hospital while actual work is informed by a professional 
value system (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004).  
Lying low behaviours can be seen as instantiations of a “negotiated order” (Strauss et al., 1963) 
as jurisdictions and roles are contested at micro-levels and continually resolved with 
contingent, fluid and local coalface (Barley, 2008) solutions by the inhabitants of the institutions 
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002). Thus, their intentionality reflects in a dynamic 
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combination of practical-evaluative and iterative agency that is aimed at both getting by on a 
day-to-day basis and, at the same time, constraining the advance of managerialism by 
decoupling behaviours. This reflects the dynamic multi-dimensionality of agency (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998) and the subtlety – and sometimes contradictions– in the nature of effort and 
purpose involved in institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009). It 
shows the low-key ways in which relations between institutional logics are negotiated on the 
clinical frontline, thus altering the ways in which actors experience institutional complexity 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Lying low can be a buying time tactic while not losing ground, as the actor may be unsure of 
which way to go. Limiting the impact behaviour can be instantiated by hybrid clinical-
management roles (Waring & Currie, 2009). In this study limiting the impact was found to be 
more of an avoidance behaviour (Endler & Parker, 1994; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) but it can 
be a case of collaborating with or accommodating power because the boundaries between 
compliance and resistance are not obvious (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994; Scott, 1985). Lying 
low, as a pattern of behaviours, aims at maintaining credibility with colleagues, patients and 
managers. It takes hard work to keep all the balls in the air. However, in order to not draw 
attention from management, this participant will dabble in a bit of projective agency (Emirbayer 
& Mische, 1998) while not doing too much since this would risk credibility with colleagues. One 
could consider this as projective agency that is aimed at defending professional logics. 
Projective agency therefore may not involve the pursuit of fully formed visions as suggested in 
institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Lying low 
could therefore be considered an instance of tempered radicalism (Myerson, 2001) as actors try 
to find a space between resistance and conformity, already having decided that resistance is not 
really an option but not yet having decided to adopt conformity as a way forward. It can 
sometimes be ham in the sandwich behaviour.  
Lying low involves a salient physician identity, in that the actor remains primarily a doctor while 
dipping their toes into the ponds of incidental and strategic hybridity (McGivern et al., 2015). 
These identities are deeply nested (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; 
Spyridonidis et al., 2014) because the participant still operates in the zone of resistance. Their 
identity work is an on-going accomplishment of maintaining and reproducing fluid and plural 
selves (Carroll & Levy, 2010) so that the balance between salience and nestedness is 
maintained. 
With limiting the impact behaviour, the projective agency is primarily defensive.  The associated 
modes of practices that this underpins begin to recast incompatible logics as relatively 
compatible (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Scott et al., 2000; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Hybrid 
practices are incubating in the shadows. 
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6.2.4.2 Faking it 
Faking it is the second dimension of limiting the impact behaviours. It can be seen as an 
opportunistic positioning strategy because, rather than buying time to decide which way to go, 
those who are faking it are just waiting for the right moment to play their hand. Meaning-
making, although it is interactional (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Hughes, 1971), 
means that the individual still assumes responsibility for the process (Frankl, 1997; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). The individual is the one who is faking it.  
Lest some take a moral stance against faking it behaviours of hospital consultants, it may 
perhaps help to recall that faking it could be an essential social lubricant that makes the world 
an easier place in which to live (Miller, 2012). Faking it, according to Miller, is about routine 
impression management; i.e. the conning, scamming, praising, bluffing and manoeuvring in 
which actors engage rather routinely. Impression management goes on all the time, from the 
faking of orgasms to artists miming at live shows or at presidential inaugurations, expressions 
of joy at the arrival of much disliked guests and sorrow at their departure, happiness in a 
colleague’s getting a promotion that one desired for oneself, people wearing fake brands (Gino, 
Norton, & Ariely, 2010) and applicants doctoring their CVs (Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 
2013). Faking it behaviours allow actors to respond to immediate demands while working at 
positioning themselves for emerging situations. These behaviours deal with the secret agendas 
that actors have and the games that they play with multiple selves (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; 
Burke & Tully, 1977) that are constructed within contingent, fluid and historicised contexts. A 
similar influential argument was advanced earlier about life as nothing more than a 
performance (Goffman, 1990). Faking it behaviours can be both exhausting and exhilarating. 
There is always the possibility of being unmasked. Yet, in being found out, one might even feel 
better, Miller could add. 
Faking it behaviours are underpinned by a complex combination of intentionalities that 
dynamically interact and are instantiated by a mode of agency that combines practical-
evaluative, iterative and projective dimensions. Practical-evaluative appraisals are always 
present because doctors have to get through their day-to-day work with and for patients. Much 
of this is likely to be genuine, without faking it behaviours. There is, however, a degree of faking 
about how much work some doctors actually do. The workload figures – within and between 
departments – appear to bear that out. Much of the faking it behaviour reflects the varying 
combinations of iterative and projective agency that individuals choose to adopt, given their 
own appraisal processes (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). However, these combinations of iterative 
and projective agency are not necessarily associated with the strategic pursuit of given 
institutional visions. On the contrary, they situationally improvise (Smets et al., 2012) and 
pursue opportunities in the gaps between the capillaries of power (Foucault, 1988). Living up to 
the expectations of relevant stakeholders, while framing – and recasting – relations between 
institutional logics and paradoxes can be hard work and extremely tiring. It involves the delicate 
balancing of intentions, actions and identities (Miller, 2012). 
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Faking it is a decoupling strategy since formal managerial requests are agreed to but 
professional practices remain largely sealed off (McGivern & Ferlie, 2007; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Power, 1999). In the same way that managerial control is not hegemonic, the insulation of 
professional priorities and practices is not complete but rather a matter of degree. Even those 
who are resisting make a few compromises here and there because the NHS is a monopoly 
employer. Material and symbolic constraints temper radicalism (Meyerson & Scully, 1995; 
Myerson, 2001) on either side of the resistance-compliance continuum. The hospital consultant 
who is faking it engages in incidental hybridity (McGivern et al., 2015) to gain legitimacy with 
important stakeholders but clinical practice remains substantially professionally informed. 
These participants believe that the professional frame of reference tis technically more efficient 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008a).  
The physician identity is the more salient one in that the actor will primarily remain a doctor – 
with some incidental hybridity and hardly any strategic hybridity (McGivern et al., 2015). 
Incidental hybridity is nested within the salient physician identity (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; 
Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Spyridonidis et al., 2014). Their identity work is an on-going project of 
maintaining and reproducing fluid and plural selves (Carroll & Levy, 2010). A study by Levay 
and Waks (2009) found that Swedish clinicians saw merit in quality enhancement programmes 
but assumed control of the content and the process (Levay & Waks, 2009). In their 2007 study 
of NHS hospital consultants, McGivern and Ferlie found that although they accepted the 
implementation of job planning and clinical audits – thus changing their clinical autonomy – 
NHS hospital consultants did not allow non-clinical managers to assume control of the process 
(McGivern & Ferlie, 2007). Faking it does not involve the active dismissal or subversion of 
managerial technologies. The same logics – that actors would construct resisting behaviours as 
contradictory or would seek to avoid lying low behaviours because of an interpreted degree of 
incompatibility – are reconstructed as at least marginally compatible. This concurs with the 
findings that logics are not necessarily incompatible by definition but that those relationships 
are framed within the dilemmas and puzzles that actors discover within their practice contexts, 
the questions that they frame and the answers that they develop (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; 
Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a).  
The intention is to get through the day-to-day tasks at hand; hence, the mode of agency is also 
mainly practical-evaluative with iterative dimensions (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). The latter 
reinforces existing institutional arrangements. The intentionality differs from that of lying low 
because the actor is waiting to take advantage of emerging opportunities. Faking it is not 
avoidance but priming for opportunity and it requires a constant surveying of the landscape. 
Thus, it is an effortful accomplishment (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). The portfolio of observable 
practices that faking it instantiates is wider than lying low, despite being within the limiting the 
impact pattern of behaviour. This perhaps contributes to the explanation of why successful 
archetype change has not taken place.  
Resisting and limiting the impact differ in their intentionality – as reflected in the mode of 
agency (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a) – regarding emerging institutional arrangements and 
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the observed modes of practice which they instantiate. Weighing up is on-going at every stage of 
Rolling with the Punches. With limiting the impact behaviours, the participants seek either, to 
buy time by lying low or to position themselves by faking it. Thus taking advantage of the way 
that the wind is blowing. If these behaviours have failed, or if the person is more inclined to be 
compliant, then adjusting to, or living with, managerialism is an option. For those who choose to 
adjust to a market-based, management-controlled and metrics-based performance-managed 
hospital, compliance behaviours would instantiate their modes of agency. These, in turn, would 
routinely and iteratively create and recreate relations between institutional logics, wickedness 
of healthcare organisation and the complex adaptive system called the hospital. 
6.2.5 Adjusting to/Living with 
Living with as a pattern of behaviour has been used in literature to refer to having to structure 
responses around a phenomenon that endures.  Living with, or adjusting to behaviours forms a 
complex pattern of behaviours that indicate varying degrees of adjustment to a given 
phenomenon. For example living with HIV (Cridland, Jones, Caputi, & Magee, 2014; Kalichman, 
Heckman, Kochman, Sikkema, & Bergholte, 2000), living with grief as part of hospice care (Otis-
Green, 2014), chronic illness (Vassilev et al., 2014) and heart disease (Pryor, Page, Patsamanis, & 
Jolly, 2014). Even where people are living with particular medical conditions, they differ in their 
adherence to treatment regimes (Thieda, Beard, Richter, & Kane, 2003; Torrey & Zdanowicz, 
2001). Compliance is also uneven in the case of states that have to live with international law 
(Carvalho, 2015) (Tallberg & McCall Smith, 2014).  
This pattern of behaviour is situated at the compliance end of the resistance-compliance 
spectrum. Adjusting to, or living with, managerialism is a complex pattern of modes of agency 
and observed practices. It involves four analytically distinct but empirically entangled emotion-
focused coping patterns (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984); i.e. going with the 
flow, complying substantially, complying fully and waiting it out. The living with pattern of 
behaviours is chosen by actors who do not choose resisting or limiting the impact behaviours or 
for whom these options have not proved to be effective. Some accept the managerial hospital as 
a fact of life and try to make the best of the situation in which they find themselves. Instead of 
banging on closed doors, some will look for those doors that are ajar or wide open. Some 
participants view the managerial hospital not as a bottomless pit but rather as a ladder. Others 
do not really care about what is happening around them as they just come to work, deal with 
their patients and go home. The four different ways of coping involve significant differences in 
effort, intentionality and constructions of inter-logic relationships. Each way of carrying out the 
living with pattern is a different agentic response to the dilemmas of being a doctor within the 
context. The mode of agency chosen – each of which is dynamic and composite – underpins a 
group of observable practices that in turn instantiate and affirm a co-determination between 
observable practice and agency. The different agentic modes reflect different framings of the 
puzzles and paradoxes in the hybrid context.  
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6.2.5.1 Going with the flow 
Going with the flow conveys a sense of trimming one’s sails according to the direction of the 
wind. The strategy suggests being immersed in any activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Going with 
the flow has a presence in literature. A 2014 study by Altabbaa, Beran and Kaba shows that 
sometimes physicians adopt this strategy in dealing with dilemmas in medical practice 
(Altabbaa, Beran, & Kaba, 2014). Another study shows that children choose going with the flow 
when majority and minority views are equally plausible (Schillaci & Kelemen, 2013).  
For the participants who adopt going with the flow behaviours, the boundaries between 
managerialism and medical professionalism are blurred (Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; 
Noordegraaf, 2007a; Noordegraaf & Steijn, 2014b; Waring & Currie, 2009). About 10%-20% of 
hospital consultants and 4%-5% of the NHS hospital CEOs choose to become clinical managers 
(Dickinson et al., 2013b; Spurgeon, Clark, & Ham, 2011) and adopt going with the flow 
behaviours. Rather than a danse macabre (Davies et al., 2003; Degeling et al., 2003), it is more a 
case of: “Shall we dance?” (Chelsom, 2004). 
Going with the flow requires substantial effort (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1984; Smets 
& Jarzabkowski, 2013a). The actor has to reflect deliberately and continually on the existing and 
emerging managerial institutional arrangements and make the conscious choice to adopt the 
managerial perspective, work out how to do this and to what extent this should happen. This 
choice itself is on a minor complex continuum rather than being a simple binary. Moreover, it 
has to be discursively justified and legitimised to the self and to other relevant stakeholders 
(Anderson, 2008; Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). In the medical profession, 
credibility in the local sub-system (Morgan & Ogbonna, 2008; Nelson et al., 2002) is important. 
The selection of assumptions, values, beliefs and material practices (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 
2013) that are more aligned with market-based competition, management-based control 
systems and metrics-based performance-management systems (Farrell & Morris, 2003) than 
those who adopt resisting or limiting the impact behaviours reflects a shift in intentionality and 
agency when compared to the latter modes of behaviour. The modes of agency are varying 
combinations of practical-evaluative, iterative and projective dimensions that are the actors’ 
interpretations of solutions that may be needed within a complex, fluid and hybrid managerial 
hospital (Cooper et al., 1996; Exworthy et al., 2010b; Exworthy et al., 1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 
2002a).  
The managerial hospital itself is in a state of becoming (Bjerregaard & Jonasson, 2014). It 
therefore is not a fully formed vision in which the inhabitants have to occupy predetermined 
spaces (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002). On the contrary, it is a contested space 
where actors respond to immediate demands while discovering emerging dilemmas, framing 
answers and testing these. Going with the flow may involve greater commitment to the 
reframing of relationships between logics in the direction of compatibility and 
complementarity. However, these are almost always situated improvisations rather than radical 
transformations (Smets et al., 2012). That is another reason why the NHS has largely remained a 
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professional bureaucracy (Dickinson et al., 2013b; Mintzberg, 1979). The primary mode of 
agency of the inhabitants remains practical-evaluative as they have to get through their daily 
clinical work and the fact that they develop an emerging vision locally in situated improvised 
practices has iterative consequences as well. The degree of iterative and projective agency 
commitment is where these actors differ from those who adopt resisting and limiting the impact 
behaviours. The practical-evaluative agency, plus the marginal adjustments that hybridisation 
involves, edges the hospital in the direction of managerialism in order to retain clinical 
credibility.  
By adopting boundary-spanning roles as clinical leads for particular services, or clinical 
directors of managerially aggregated groups of services or medical directors as clinical voices at 
senior-management level, clinical-management hybrids see themselves as two-way windows 
(Llewellyn, 2001). They mediate the impact of the managerial project in the hospital on their 
colleagues. Soft bureaucracy (Courpasson, 2000) replaces the hard economic and financial 
edges of direct non-clinical management. Boundary-blurring roles are located on a continuum 
from incidental to strategic, willing clinical-managerial hybrids (McGivern et al., 2015). These 
are particular material framings of relationships between institutional logics (Jarzabkowski, 
2009; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a) in the direction of agreement and congruence. Clinical-
managerial hybrids assume responsibility for some of the implementation of the processes of 
vertical accountability, lateral standardisation of clinical practice and commercialisation of the 
values of the hospital. Many of those who choose going with the flow behaviours do so on a 
temporary or part-time basis and return to full-time clinical positions later. This usually 
tempers their enthusiasm for radical (Meyerson & Scully, 1995) projective agency. Bridges and 
boats are often needed at later times, so not burning them is a prudent way to go. This type of 
framing of intentionality, subtlety of agency and the construction of relations between logics to 
meet immediate demands in independent and inter-dependent local settings answers some of 
the questions about how actors at the intersection of multiple institutional fields with distinct 
sets of expectations make decisions (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Correia, 2013a; Lok, 2010; 
McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Nancarrow & Borthwick, 2005; Numerato et al., 2012). Thus, the 
sociological impact of the managerial hospital (Timmermans & Oh, 2010) is more than the 
simple binary (Gleeson & Knights, 2006; Numerato et al., 2012; Waring & Bishop, 2013) of 
deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation and McDonaldisation, on the one hand, and 
restratification, on the other hand.  
Wickedness and systemic and institutional complexity have resulted in a hybrid, fluid and 
ambiguous service delivery context. Embedded actors have to make sense of, and enact, the 
meanings for themselves, thus micro-framing the macro-dilemmas. The managerial hospital is a 
hybrid structure (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010) that manifests the multiple 
logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011). These logics have varying degrees of 
compatibility (Besharov & Smith, 2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991b). Such a fluid, plural 
institution does not hold itself together by itself (Kraatz & Block, 2013). It requires that people 
who make sense of the institutional context and enact their understandings. Their practices are 
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either completely or loosely coupled (Townley, 1997) and reframe the relations between logics 
in their day-to-day organisational activities.  
Going with the flow, as clinical-management hybridity, may be an instance not of 
deprofessionalisation but rather of reprofessionalisation (Waring & Currie, 2009) at the 
coalface (Barley, 2008). It could be seen as a routine (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985) and 
non-dramatic (March, 1981) contest for the expansion of professional jurisdiction (Abbott, 
1988; Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin, & Waring, 2012b; Reay, Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006) or 
enhancing of a professional identity (Spyridonidis & Calnan, 2011; Spyridonidis et al., 2014). 
This is a local, routine translation of logics by actors who have interests, beliefs and preferences 
and who strategically respond to attempts at institutional control; i.e. by acquiescing, 
compromising, avoiding, defying and manipulating (Oliver, 1991).  
How embedded actors routinely engage with systemic power is largely still an empirical black 
box (Lawrence, 2008; Lok, 2010; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Munir, 2015; Zilber, 2013). The 
various combinations of agency, intentionality, effort and modes of observed behaviours in 
Rolling with the Punches contribute to decoding the black box. Transcending the boundaries, by 
engaging in hybridity, is a way of engaging institutional control. The difference that this account 
adds is the roles of sense-making in opening the black box and framing intentionality and effort 
that are instantiated in complex combinations of modes of agency that underpin observed 
practices, thus micro-dynamically framing relations between macro-logics. Clinical hybrids as 
carriers of multiple logics (Jepperson, 1991; Smets et al., 2012; Zilber, 2002) show how 
individuals can pursue otherwise divergent expectations.  
In pursuing their expectations, hybrid clinical managers reframe relations between logics on the 
clinical frontline. They work through the dilemmas and paradoxes that emerge within 
wickedness, systems and institutional complexity as they engage in professional identity 
bricolage (Gotsi, Andriopoulos, Lewis, & Ingram, 2010; MacLean & Webber, 2015; Wyatt, 2010). 
This is their crafting of their personal stakes in the managerial hospital. The physician identity is 
the more salient in that the actor primarily remains a doctor – despite incidental and strategic 
hybridity (McGivern et al., 2015) – whilst other identities are nested (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; 
Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Spyridonidis et al., 2014). Their identity work is an on-going project of 
maintaining and reproducing fluid and plural selves (Carroll & Levy, 2010). The process reflects 
the situated improvisations (Smets et al., 2012) and discursive legitimisations (Anderson, 2008; 
Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) as they try to accomplish practical work within the 
ambiguities, complexities and paradoxes at hand (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a).  
Hybrid clinical managers engage in the management of professionals and other non-
professional staff (Denis et al., 2001; Doolin, 2002; Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000b). However, this is 
often without adequate training or support, thus these managers end up as enthusiastic 
amateurs (Ham, Clark, Spurgeon, Dickinson, & Armit, 2011a; Spehar, Frich, & Kjekshus, 2012). It 
can be a disconcerting role to occupy. Their clinical colleagues suspect them of having gone 
beyond the dark side to the centre stage (Spurgeon et al., 2011). The non-transparency of their 
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appointments exacerbates clinical suspicions (Unit, 2012). Non-clinical managers treat them 
with suspicion. Clinical hybrids often end up being stranded in no man’s land between the 
managerial and clinical domains (Degeling et al., 2003; Marnoch, McKee, & Dinnie, 2000). So 
some clinical managers have little operational control over their colleagues and assume 
responsibility for budgets that they do not control (Greener, Harrington, Hunter, Mannion, & 
Powell, 2011; Mumford, 2010; Unit, 2012). Hybrid clinical-management positions appear 
unenviable posts to occupy but despite their problems there seems to be a link between clinical 
leadership and improved service delivery (Dickinson et al., 2013b; Goodall, 2011; Veronesi, 
Kirkpatrick, & Vallascas, 2013b). 
Weighing up is an on-going process and takes place in each stage of Rolling with the Punches. 
Actors do not have big plans to promote the managerial hospital and expand the boundaries and 
content professionalism. Rather, they seek to cope and exploit opportunities within their work 
situation. Their agency and observed practices (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a) are neither 
strategic nor unintentional but are instances of situated improvisations (Smets et al., 2012). 
They respond to immediate demands. As puzzles are identified, solutions are tested as they go 
along. This is not management by objectives but rather management by discovery (Klein, 1999, 
2011). The managerial hospital, as a work in progress (Bjerregaard & Jonasson, 2014; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a), frames shifts in intentionality, effort, agency and observed practices of 
actors who adopt going with the flow behaviours. In this way, their institutional work (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009) and recasting of relationships between institutional 
logics emerge as issues and challenges that are encountered rather than the pursuit of grand 
institutional projects. Instead of being enthusiastic and skilled institutional entrepreneurs 
(Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; DiMaggio, 1988; Garud et al., 2007), they are tempered radicals 
(Myerson, 2001) who routinely resist (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985, 1990) both their 
clinical colleagues and non-clinical managers (McGivern et al., 2015). Their observed 
behaviours are constructions of relationships between institutional logics and systemic and 
institutional complexity through hybrid practices. Those practices instantiate the dynamism, 
complexity, contingency and fluidity of their mode of agency, which is mainly practical-
evaluative but has varying combinations of iterative and projective dimensions and 
consequences. Their agency feeds back to co-determine the institutional structures. The 
wickedness of the social organisation of healthcare and the complex adaptive systems features 
of the hospital allow them the spaces to engage in hybrid efforts, intentionalities, modes of 
agency and observed practices. 
6.2.5.2 Complying substantially 
The observed behaviours of hospital consultants should not be taken at face value if one 
considers routine resistance and public and private transcripts (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 
1985, 1990). Professionals are able to adapt to organisational life (Muzio et al., 2013; 
Noordegraaf, 2011, 2013). Even compliance may not imply surrendering (Oliver, 1991) or being 
a cultural dope (Garfunkel, 1984). Decoupling is always a possible response strategy 
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(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008b; Levay & Waks, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). A smile can mask 
a heavy heart (Scott, 1985) as life can get in the way of taking a more principled stand.  
“After a while you just give up on dealing with managers. You come to work, do what you have to 
do and go home. The NHS is the same everywhere the problems are the same.” (Consultant) 
Those participants who adopt complying substantially behaviours have not necessarily adopted 
self-surveillance practices (Ferlie & McGivern, 2013; Miller & Rose, 2008). They do their best for 
their patients, are available for their colleagues and beyond that they drag their feet using the 
weapons of the weak (Scott, 1985, 1990). They do not have a false consciousness and are aware 
of the contradictions in the managerial hospital. However, they feel that they are not in a 
position to do much about it. It is a case of “we are where we are” (Consultant). Their way of 
being is that of “blades of grass in the wind instead of oak trees” (Consultant). Stoicism and 
courage (Frankl, 1984) are key elements in their sense-making processes (Frankl, 1997). Often 
the people who adopt this pattern of behaviour have deep private transcripts (Scott, 1990). 
They only reveal those parts of their private transcripts that are safe for them to do so. The 
wickedness of healthcare delivery organisation (Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 2005), the acute 
hospital as a complex adaptive system (Waldrop, 1994), their own professional training and the 
expectations of patients leave them sufficient room to manoeuvre into complying substantially. 
The observed practices in this mode of behaviour reflect primarily a practical-evaluative agency 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). This is not a mindless or effortless case of getting the work done. 
The day-to-day work itself is being framed within a market-based competitive, managerial-
based control and metrics-based performance-managed system (Farrell & Morris, 2003; 
Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a) and scientifically bureaucratised standardised clinical practice 
(Knaapen, 2014; McDonald & Harrison, 2004; Timmermans & Berg, 2010). Even complying 
substantially is an effortful accomplishment (Giddens, 1984; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Participants have to choose how they are going to perform their tasks 
within an increasingly complex institutional environment (Greenwood et al., 2011). In a hybrid 
institution (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010), those who adopt complying 
substantively behaviours have to monitor their own practice reflexively while discursively 
legitimising their choices (Harmon, Green, & Goodnight, 2015; Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012; Mumby, 
2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). However, they may not be engaging in purposely 
disrupting (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) the emergence of new institutional arrangements. They 
also do not necessarily have an explicit commitment to maintaining existing institutional 
visions. But their practical-evaluative agency does have iterative consequences (Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Their observed behaviours construct, for them, the relations between the 
institutional co-existing logics of bureaucracy, markets, networks and professionalism. Their 
less-than-enthusiastic interest in projective agency contributes to the NHS largely remaining a 
professional bureaucracy (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson et al., 2013b) although it 
might be better described as a sedimented structure of multiple organisational forms (Sullivan 
& Skelcher, 2002a). 
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The physician identity is salient in that the actor is primarily a doctor with hardly any incidental 
or strategic hybridity (McGivern et al., 2015) as nested identities (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; 
Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Spyridonidis et al., 2014). Their identity work is not an on-going project 
of maintaining and reproducing fluid and plural selves (Carroll & Levy, 2010) but of just keeping 
the salient physician identity intact, despite operating at the compliance end of the resistance-
compliance continuum. 
Complying substantially and being a blade of grass in the wind can have dark consequences – an 
instance of professionally keeping one’s head down – as has been pointed out in the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary Inquiry (Kennedy, 2001), The Shipman Inquiry (Smith, 2002a) and the Mid-
Staffordshire Inquiry (Francis, 2013). Complying substantially behaviours are about responding 
to immediate demands, justifying them and going home. The rest “is not my problem” 
(Consultant). 
6.2.5.3 Complying fully 
Complying substantially involves acquiescence sometimes even with a heavy heart. Complying 
fully involves not having resistance to the managerial hospital. This group would have adopted 
the hyper-rational (Germov, 2005) managerial mode of reasoning (Pollitt, 1993, 1998) and 
internalised the managerial discourse (Levay & Waks, 2009). These participants believe that 
efficiency and transparent accountability (Power, 1999) should be part of the new medical 
professionalism (Christmas & Millward, 2011; Moffatt, Martin, & Timmons, 2014; Spyridonidis 
& Calnan, 2011). Governmentality, self-management and self-surveillance in the neo-liberal 
state (Flynn, 2002; Miller & Rose, 2008) are integral to their identity and practice. For those 
who adopt going with the flow behaviours, being a physician is their salient identity (Ashforth & 
Johnson, 2001; Burke & Tully, 1977; Spyridonidis et al., 2014). They sometimes protect and at 
other times challenge traditional medical professionalism. Their hybridity is incidental 
(McGivern et al., 2015). However, for those who adopt complying fully behaviours, hybridity is 
the salient part of their identity (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Burke & Tully, 1977; Spyridonidis et 
al., 2014). They resolve institutional complexity by being the change (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 
2010b). They argue that standardisation (Timmermans & Berg, 2010), despite the reservations 
(Knaapen, 2013, 2014), accountability (Lapsley & Lonsdale, 2010; Power, 1999) and clinical 
audits (Mooney, 2009) are important for the integrity of wider professionalism (McGivern et al., 
2015). However, this can lead to severe issues of clinical credibility and the need for discursive 
legitimisation (Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and identity reconciliation work 
(Creed et al., 2010b).  
The mode of agency that is adopted by this group of participants is practical-evaluative and 
projective (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), with the latter mode dominating as they challenge 
traditional out-dated medical professionalism (McGivern et al., 2015). Once again, given the 
wickedness (Raisio, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Vartiainen, 2005) of healthcare organisation, 
projective agency with tame solutions to wicked problems (King, 1993; Roberts, 2000) is of 
limited value. The hospital works within a broader healthcare system with primary and 
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community care. As noted in the section on wicked problems (Section 5.3), the social and 
economic causes of ill health should temper decontextualised projective agency. The hospital as 
a complex adaptive system (Godfrey et al., 2003; McKelvey, 1999; Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson et 
al., 2002; Shiell et al., 2008; Waldrop, 1994) complicates attempts at unbridled projective 
agency. The situatedness tempers the radicalism (Meyerson & Scully, 1995) of those who adopt 
complying fully behaviours. The new institutional order has to emerge from solutions to 
immediate demands at local subsystem levels.  
Projective agency is exercised within the possibilities that emerge within commitments to 
practical-evaluative agency and having to get through routine work. So projective agency is not 
working with a blank canvass but emerges within the crevices of seeing patients on the lists 
today and those that have been booked on lists for six or more weeks ahead. Projective agency 
is constrained. It is not driven by a fully formed vision of alternatives as suggested by 
institutional entrepreneurship literature (Battilana et al., 2009b) nor by the unqualified 
purposive action as suggested in institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 
2009). Projective agency is forward-looking to the extent that it seeks to address day-to-day 
work in new ways; i.e. standardised, evidence-based clinical practice with transparent 
accountability (Ferlie & McGivern, 2013; Timmermans & Berg, 2010). Those who adopt 
complying fully behaviours therefore do not necessarily have completed visions of the new 
institutional order that they are strategically pursuing. On the contrary, they routinely (Prasad 
& Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985) engage in repeated future-oriented situated improvisations (Smets 
& Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012), which gradually congeal over time. Thus, the 
relations between the constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) are reframed in hybrid 
practices that reflect particular modes of agency. 
Those actors that engage in complying fully behaviours exert significant effort in choosing new 
non-traditional ways to practise as professionals. They have to monitor their own practice 
reflexively and discursively legitimise their choices to relevant stakeholders, especially in their 
subsystems (Anderson, 2008; Morgan & Ogbonna, 2008; Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005). Hybridity is the salient part of their identity (McGivern et al., 2015). Their agency is a 
combination of practical-evaluative and projective dimensions, with the latter dominating yet 
significantly constrained by the wickedness and systemic and institutional complexity. The new 
institutional arrangements that they pursue are non-linear and emergent. They deliberately 
cobble together existing practices with parts of newer material practices, values and 
assumptions associated with different logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2013). In this way they 
frame relations between logics in ways that differ from those who adopt resisting, limiting the 
impact and going with the flow behaviours.  
Their intentionalities, efforts, combinations of dimensions of agency and framings of relations 
between logics differ. This shows that rather than the assumed incompatibility between 
institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2011) the managerial hospital is a context where relations 
between logics are constructed at the coalface (Barley, 2008) by inhabitants of institutions 
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002) who are carriers of logics to varying degrees 
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(Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002). The existing institutional 
arrangements that make up the acute NHS hospital are actively being framed and reconstructed 
by these embedded actors as they respond to immediate demands in ways that range from 
traditional professional to hybrid, with the radicalism of the latter being tempered by the 
context. 
6.2.5.4 Waiting it out 
Waiting it out is a concept that is widely used in the scholarly literature. A study of the 
geographic distribution of racial and ethnic diversity in higher education reflects on what has 
happened to diversity; it questions whether it has been silenced, diversified or waited out 
(Price, 2014). Waiting it out is viewed as an opposite of being fully engaged (Auger-Voyer, 
Montero-Sieburth, & Cabrera Perez, 2014). It can be associated with negative feelings of being 
frustrated (Ayan, 2015). Waiting it out has been associated with people who do not really want 
to change their situation or are just holding on until retirement (Mallon, 2014). Waiting it out 
can also be a strategy for making sense of a situation and deciding how to handle it (Tiedtke, 
Donceel, de Rijk, & Dierckx de Casterlé, 2014). 
Those hospital consultants who adopt this mode of behaviour constitute about 30% to 40% of 
the consultant body, with 5% consisting of more experienced consultants. Some of the last-
mentioned consultants take up clinical management positions to defend themselves at this late 
stage of their careers. They are incidental hybrids (McGivern et al., 2015) who can take hybrid 
positions on a temporary basis to act as buffers in defence of traditional professionalism. Their 
defence of traditional professionalism requires them to exert effort in reflecting on their own 
practices and their outcomes against the emergent practices of the managerial order. Hence, 
their continuation of their traditional professionalism is an effortful accomplishment 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1984). They are required to legitimise discursively 
(Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) their choices of practices as situated and 
emergent alternatives are available. Their experience allows them to find ways to decouple 
(Levay & Waks, 2009; Power, 1999) word and deed. Their agency is mainly practical-evaluative 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) as they respond to immediate demands. Their practices have 
iterative consequences and projective agency seems to be absent. They use their positions to 
defend professional resistance to the risk of blame (Hood, 2011) in managerial technologies 
such as performance appraisals (McGivern & Ferlie, 2007; Townley, 1997). Their roles concur 
with those incidental hybrids that are going with the flow. The difference is that the latter may 
be mid-career physicians while those waiting it out are often very experienced and close to 
retirement. This horizon shapes the efforts, intentionalities and the relative balance of the 
dimensions that make up their modes of agency.  
This group constructs the relations between the co-existing logics as contradictory. Thus, the 
group members shape their efforts, intentionality, agency and observed practices in defence of 
traditional, historic medical professional ways of delivering healthcare services.  
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The physician identity is the more salient in that the actor is primarily a doctor. Some of those 
who are waiting it out may become incidental hybrids and very few become strategic hybrids 
(McGivern et al., 2015). Thus, their identity is not a complicated case of multiple nested 
identities (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Spyridonidis et al., 2014). Their 
identity work is not really an on-going project of maintaining and reproducing fluid and plural 
selves (Carroll & Levy, 2010). The salient physician identity dominates and thus they defend 
traditional physician ways of doing things. 
Others adopt a resigned and detached state of mind. They do not oppose the management focus 
on meeting the targets and the disregard for the concerns raised by frontline staff. The raising of 
concerns is seen as a recipe for professional marginalisation and exclusion (BMA, 2013; Francis, 
2013, 2015). After a while, raising issues and being knocked down add up to that state of not 
caring about others and the system. Some of those who adopt waiting it out behaviours concern 
themselves with responding to immediate demands that face them, responding in ways that 
allow them to get the job done as best as they can, discursively justifying (Anderson, 2008; 
Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) this to themselves and going home. For these 
actors, there is hardly any projective agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Their agency is 
primarily practical-evaluative, with iterative effects as well. Waiting it out is an example of 
avoidance coping behaviours (Endler & Parker, 1994). This is another instance of the 
professional detachment and resignation that have been blamed for some of the worst scandals 
in the NHS by the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (Kennedy, 2001), The Shipman Inquiry (Smith, 
2002a) and the Mid-Staffordshire Inquiry (Francis, 2013). Waiting it out behaviours are not 
mindless or effortless (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). It requires constant effort to ignore what 
is happening around one, the impact of the focus on financial and other operational targets, and 
poor care of patients. It takes equal effort to close one’s eyes, ears and heart while maintaining 
an existing practice and discursively dismissing broader professional engagement (Mumby, 
2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
It is perhaps not what the individual clinical staff member does that is the cause of the scandals 
that let patients down so badly; perhaps, it is the managerial model itself (Iles, 2011; Pollock & 
Price, 2013a). The ways in which wickedness, complex adaptive systems and institutional 
complexity are framed, thus shaping the efforts and intentionality, or lack thereof, of those who 
are waiting it out, can be exhausting and deadly in their consequences. The amount of effort 
required to maintain a reflexive practice and to legitimise it discursively in the midst of systemic 
failure of patients and the staffs that serve them can be exhausting. The practical-evaluative 
agency, with its iterative dimensions and consequences, is not aimed at maintaining grand 
institutions because sometimes the managerial hospital can indeed be a disaster. The nature of 
the institutional work is perhaps not purposive action aimed at creating, maintaining and 
disrupting institutions. It may just be about maintaining an integrated sense of self; i.e. it may be 
aimed at just personally staying whole. Table 6.2 overleaf integrates some of the key ideas from 
Chapters 5 and 6 with Table 4.1, which was reproduced as Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.2: Rolling with the Punches: behaviour patterns, agency, relations between 
managerialism and professionalism, and institutional work impact 
ROLLING WITH THE PUNCHES THEORY 
 
 OBSERVED 
PATTERNS OF 
BEHAVIOUR 
AGENCY RELATIONS BETWEEN 
MANAGERIALISM AND 
PROFESSIONALISM 
INSTITUTIONAL WORK 
IMPACT 
 STABILISING TEMPORARILY 
Practical-evaluative 
(intentional, 
dominant) 
Iterative (accidental, 
subservient) 
 Maintaining existing 
institutional arrangements 
 RESISTING  Keeping apart Maintaining 
  Subverting Practical-evaluative (intentional) 
Iterative (intentional) 
 
Keeping apart Maintaining existing 
Disrupting emerging 
  Quibbling Iterative (intentional) 
Practical-evaluative 
(intentional) 
Keeping apart Maintaining existing 
Disrupting emerging 
WEIGHING UP     
 Making sense LIMITING THE 
IMPACT 
   
 Deciding what to 
do 
 Lying low Practical-evaluative 
(mainly) 
Iterative consequences 
Microscopic projective 
Keeping apart 
Acknowledging 
congruence 
Maintaining existing 
On the margins  
 Mode-shifting 
triggers 
 Faking it Practical-evaluative 
(mainly) 
Iterative consequences 
Microscopic ++ 
projective (much more 
than lying low) 
Keeping apart 
Dabbling in 
complementarity 
Maintaining existing 
 ADJUSTING TO CHANGE 
   
  Going with the flow 
Practical-evaluative 
(mainly) 
Iterative consequences 
Defensive projective 
Keeping apart Maintaining existing 
Disrupting emerging 
  Complying substantially 
Practical-evaluative 
(mainly) 
Iterative consequences 
Limited projective 
Keeping apart Maintaining existing 
  Complying fully Practical-evaluative (mainly) 
Significant projective 
(“being the change”) 
Reconciling Disrupting existing 
Creating new 
  Waiting it out Practical-evaluative (mainly) 
Iterative consequences 
Defensive projective 
Keeping apart Maintaining existing 
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6.3 SUMMARY 
From this chapter, on integrating the literature into the GT, it is clear that the concepts used 
weighing up, stabilising temporarily, resisting with its dimensions subverting and quibbling, 
limiting the impact with its dimensions lying low and faking it and living with/adjusting to 
with its dimensions going with the flow, complying substantially, complying fully and waiting it 
out are not new concepts but have been used to describe behaviours in multiple contexts.  
Taking a long view of the evolution of the managerial hospital, the inalienable wickedness in the 
social organisation of healthcare and the hospital as a complex adaptive system, the managerial 
hospital, in fact the NHS, is not a stable social structure (Bjerregaard & Jonasson, 2014). It does 
not reflect fixed, taken-for-granted meanings (Battilana et al., 2009b; Jepperson, 1991) that 
shape, constrain and frame the motivations, understandings and discourse of actors at a micro-
level (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott & Meyer, 1994; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2013) in uncomplicated ways. On the contrary, the hospital is part of an NHS that is a 
hybrid archetype (Cooper et al., 1996; Ferlie, 1999; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003a, 2003b; 
Kitchener, 1998). The NHS manifests multiple structural forms (Exworthy et al., 2010b; 
Exworthy et al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002a) and the multitude of 
institutional logics in the organisational field (Doolin, 2001; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009; Scott 
et al., 2000). Some of these policy prescriptions are contradictory (Ham et al., 2011d) and 
messy. 
The acute hospital attracts the policy attention that it does because of its centrality in the 
delivery of healthcare and the resources that it absorbs (Appleby et al., 2014; Glouberman & 
Mintzberg, 2001; Klein, 2013; Mintzberg & Glouberman, 1997). The aim of the managerial 
hospital is to control the clinical frontline that spends the budget by its clinical activities (Klein, 
2013). Given the underlying wickedness of the social organisation of healthcare delivery, the 
hybridity of healthcare policy, the hospital as a complex adaptive system and the attempts to 
shape the clinical frontline, the influence on the agency of hospital consultants is not likely to be 
hegemonic (Foucault, 1979, 1988; Gramsci & Forgacs, 2000). Rolling with the Punches is a 
conceptual account of the ways in which the actors craft their sense of self within the 
constraints and opportunities represented by the managerial hospital. Rather than having to 
deal with the problems associated with structure-agency duality and the paradox of embedded 
agency (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Garud et al., 2007), this study adopts the perspectives 
based on the mutual constitution of structure and agency (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 
1971; Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971). The responses to the constraints and opportunities in the 
multiple logics of the managerial hospital manifest the limits on the agency of the actors. They 
also indicate the ways in which their day-to-day lived experiences, of which Rolling with the 
Punches is but one conceptual account, iteratively in social interaction produce and reproduce 
relations between the logics in the hospital.  
Numerous calls have been made for more nuanced accounts of agency (Delmestri, 2006; Lok, 
2010; Powell & Colyvas, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Much of what we know about 
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how institutional complexity is addressed deals with structural and organisation-level 
responses (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Besharov & Smith, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & 
Santos, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013a). Very little is known about how individual actors navigate, 
negotiate and frame institutional complexity (Creed et al., 2010b; Greenwood et al., 2011; 
McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). Filling this gap is important in 
understanding the micro-foundations of hybrid organisations (Pache & Santos, 2013a; Powell & 
Colyvas, 2013).  
Institutional entrepreneurship has attempted to account for embedded agency but has been 
hampered by criticism of the paradox of embedded agency (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; 
Suddaby et al., 2009). Institutional logics and institutional work have become major lenses for 
framing the debates in institutional theory (Zilber, 2013). Institutional logics (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991b; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2013) have tried to account for the relationship 
between agency and structure, the historicity, contingency and fluidity of institutions and the 
complementarity of the material and symbolic elements of institutional phenomena. However, 
institutional logics too have been mainly studied at organisation level (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2013; Thornton et al., 2012; Zilber, 2013). We have only rudimentary understandings of the 
messiness, contingency and fluidity that occur as individuals juggle between, negotiate, filter, 
interpret, and frame meanings, understandings, identities and material practices as they enact 
relationships between logics (Creed et al., 2010b; Lok, 2010; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets 
& Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012).  
Institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009) refocuses attention from 
macro-institutionalism to the micro-foundations of institutionalism, with its accounts of the 
intentional activities of actors in creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions. Institutional 
work draws our attention to actions not outcomes and that allows for the situated 
improvisations (Smets et al., 2011), doings and undoings, successes and failures as people 
routinely go about their day-to-day activities in maintaining, creating and disrupting 
institutions. Although institutional work refocuses attention on the actions of actors within 
institutions, problems exist with the nature of intentionality and efforts as stated in the 
founding formulations of institutional work and the lack of clarity regarding the dimensions of 
agency (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). An implication of “purposive 
action” suggests that actors have fully formed visions of the grand institutional arrangements 
that their actions are creating, maintaining or disrupting. That need not be the case 
(Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009b; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). 
The GT, as a conceptual account of the ways of being for the hospital consultants as they resolve 
their main concern, allows one to examine institutional theory at the coalface (Barley, 2008). 
The hospital doctors, as embedded actors (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a), inhabit the abstract 
institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002) and carry the multiple logics in 
their field (Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002). They do not stand 
apart from the logics with their associated symbolic and material elements. Rolling with the 
Punches describes and explains the routine ways in which the participants resolve the 
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contradictions, dilemmas and paradoxes associated with managerialism, commercialism, 
professionalism, standardisation, formalisation of practice, transparent accountability, 
hierarchy, bureaucracy, networks, wickedness and complex adaptive systems. Their collegiality, 
independence and association with external professional organisations are shaped by their 
everyday working lives.  
This GT gives a theoretical narrative of how Weighing up frames meaning for the actors and how 
that shapes their intentionality and efforts. These intentionalities and efforts are their decisions 
about how the dilemmas, paradoxes, contradictions, tensions and congruencies are to be 
negotiated, worked and reworked. It should be noted that those intentions are directed at the 
accomplishment of immediate everyday work and not at the realisation of grand institutional 
visions. Intentionality and effort therefore relate to how day-to-day work is to be performed 
(Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012). The hospital consultants do not have the 
power of veto over the acute hospital as a crucible for the multiple logics (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011; Greenwood et al., 2011) and organisational forms (Exworthy et al., 2010b; Exworthy et 
al., 1999; Kirkpatrick, 1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002a). However, they are able to engage the 
microphysics of power and craft their professionalism within the capillarity (Foucault, 1979; 
Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985, 1990) of these institutional contradictions and overlaps 
(Besharov & Smith, 2013; Friedland & Alford, 1991b).  
Their ways of resolving their main concern serve only to ameliorate the effects of 
managerialism. Each of the observed modes of behaviour: Stabilising Temporarily, Resisting, 
Limiting the Impact and Living with/Adjusting to, with their dimensions, represents different 
effortful accomplishments (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1984), intentionalities, 
orientations, and their associated discursive justifications (Mumby, 2005; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). Each mode of behaviour requires the actor to monitor her own practice 
reflexively against competing claims to preferred practices and to justify those choices on an on-
going basis. Thus, this account of intentionality and effort is subtler than those normally given in 
institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009). The absence of a fully 
formed vision of an alternative institutional order does not necessarily imply unintentionality 
or lack of effort. 
Weighing up frames the intentionality that, in turn, is manifested in the mode of agency 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009). The mode of 
agency is a combination of different dimensions: projective agency that is aimed at creating new 
institutions, iterative agency that is geared towards maintaining existing institutional 
arrangements and practical-evaluative agency that addresses immediate demands. Although 
these dimensions are analytically disaggregated, they are empirically hard to separate. Each of 
the observed modes of behaviour; i.e. Stabilising Temporarily, Resisting, Limiting the Impact and 
Living with/Adjusting to represents a different and dynamic combination of the three 
dimensions of agency. Practical-evaluative agency was common to all of the modes of observed 
behaviours because doctors have to meet immediate demands. The different modes of observed 
behaviours are the results of the different degrees to which the iterative and projective 
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dimensions combined with practical-evaluative agency. Their practical-evaluative agency has 
significant iterative consequences because they do not completely know in advance what 
institutional visions they are pursuing. It is a case of management by discovery rather than 
management by objectives (Klein, 1999, 2011). Iterative agency does not suggest that the 
agency is that of a cultural dope (Garfunkel, 1984; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997b; Powell & 
Colyvas, 2013). Very few hospital clinical-manager consultants; i.e. incidental and strategic 
hybrids (McGivern et al., 2015), deliberately adopt unbridled projective agency. Those actors 
who are Complying Substantially would do so but also drag their feet (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; 
Scott, 1985, 1990). The accounts of structure, agency and observed behaviours explain why very 
little appears to change (Crilly & Le Grand, 2004) in the institutional arrangements of the NHS 
and why it largely remains a professional bureaucracy (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Dickinson 
et al., 2013b). 
The portfolios of observed practices (Creed et al., 2010b; Jarzabkowski, 2009; Jarzabkowski, 
Smets, Bednarek, Burke, & Spee, 2013; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a) associated with each of the modes of behaviour represent the material framing of 
wickedness, social adaptive systems and institutional complexity by embedded actors as they 
respond to immediate demands, thus reflecting their intentionality, efforts and agency. These 
demands can be addressed in established or emerging ways. The overwhelming impact of their 
material and symbolic responses to managerialism is the maintenance of the professional 
bureaucracy and disruption of the evolution of the hyper-rational, standardised and 
commodified managerial hospital.  
The responses of the hospital consultants are definitely more complex than the binary account 
(Gleeson & Knights, 2006; Numerato et al., 2012; Waring & Bishop, 2013) of, on the one hand, 
proletarianisation (McKinlay & Arches, 1985), deprofessionalisation (Haug, 1973, 1988) and 
McDonaldisation (Ritzer, 1996; Ritzer & Walcak, 1988) and, on the other hand, restratification 
(Freidson, 1985). Hospital doctors do show that they have the skills and reflexivity to protect 
their interests as professionals within an organisational context (Brock et al., 2014; Correia, 
2013a; Currie et al., 2012b; Gleeson & Knights, 2006; Moffatt et al., 2014; Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 
2011; Noordegraaf, 2007a, 2013; Numerato et al., 2012; Spyridonidis & Calnan, 2011; Suddaby 
& Viale, 2011). Participants have shown that they are substantially able to delay the evolution of 
the managerial hospital at the points where it is at its weakest; i.e. where it is translated into 
policies, procedures and techniques.  
The absence of drama (March, 1981) does not mean that there is not a struggle is taking place. 
Patients come into the hospital because the doors are always open, the lights are always on and 
there is almost always someone there to treat them. Behind that picture is a battle about the 
meaning of healthcare delivery, the meaning of and duty to the patient, the role of the hospital 
and the clinical professionals in that process. Hospital consultants with Rolling with the Punches 
define their ways of being a doctor in very situated, contingent and fluid ways. Their 
professionalism is framed in practical, routine and everyday activities that work and rework the 
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relations between the logics that make up the hospital. In carrying out these routine activities, 
they instantiate their agency that, in turn, iteratively creates the hospital. 
Rolling with the Punches is a complex integrated set of propositions of how hospital consultants 
address their main concern; i.e. the managerial hospital with its market-based competition, 
management-based control systems, metrics-based performance-management systems, 
transparent accountability and standardisation of clinical practice, while retaining elements of 
bureaucracy, hierarchy, networks and professionalism. Their behaviours show that the 
managerial hospital is not a settled issue. It also shows that medical professionalism is also not 
given and fixed. 
The next chapter discusses the implications, contributions, limitations and suggested future 
directions of the study. 
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CHAPTER 7 IMPLICATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter presents the integration of the literature into the GT that emerged, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. In this last chapter, key issues are synthesised and the implications and 
limitations of the study and directions for future research are suggested.  
The aim of this classic GT study was to identify the main concern of the participants of the study 
and how they resolved that concern on a routine basis. In Chapter 2 the background to the 
study was provided. Chapter 3 presented an account of the classic GT and the methods used in 
the study. Rolling with the Punches– discussed in Chapter 4 – emerged as the GT that explained 
much of the variation in the behaviours of the hospital consultants in the managerial hospital. 
This study concurs with those calls to open the black box occupied by embedded actors at the 
on-going constructions of complexity (Lok, 2010; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Zilber, 2013). 
Chapter 5 covered a wide body of literature that was delimited by the criterion of relevance to 
the theoretical framework that had emerged in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 provided examples in a 
broad range of literature of the concepts that had emerged in Chapter 4 and the integration of 
the literature in Chapter 5 into the grounded theory from Chapter 4. 
The following concepts proved to be relevant in explicating the theoretical framework Rolling 
with the Punches: 
 The wickedness of healthcare organisation (Raisio, 2009; Vartiainen, 2005);  
 The hospital as a complex adaptive system (Checkland, 1999; Edgren, 2008; Nelson et 
al., 2002);  
 Professionalism (Brock et al., 2014; Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf, 2007a; 
Suddaby & Viale, 2011);  
 Discipline and control (Foucault, 1977, 1988);  
 Routine resistance (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 1985, 1990);  
 Institutional theory (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Scott & Meyer, 1994);  
 Archetype approaches to institutional theory (Brock, 2006; Chreim et al., 2012; Cooper 
et al., 1996; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b; Kitchener & Whipp, 1998);  
 Sense-making (Ancona, 2012; Frankl, 1997; Weick, 1995);  
 Agency (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998);  
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 Structure and agency;  
 Institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012);  
 Institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009; Zilber, 2013); and  
 Institutional complexity (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Greenwood et al., 2011; Jarzabkowski 
et al., 2013b; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Vermeulen, 
Zietsma, Greenwood, & Langley, 2014).  
The grounded theory is an integrated set of propositions that account for much of the variation 
in the routine behaviours of the participants as they go about resolving their main concern. It 
facilitates understandings of the kinds of choices hospital consultants are making to frame 
coalface (Barley, 2008) relationships between constellations of contradictory demands 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Besharov & Smith, 2013; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 
2011) in their everyday work (Creed et al., 2010b; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009a; McPherson & 
Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). The ordinary, routine, everyday observed 
behaviours of the hospital consultants often belie extraordinary calculations. 
7.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
The implications of a study serve two purposes. They bring to the existing study to a point of 
theoretical closure and they open up new theoretical pathways for the future (Geletkanycz & 
Tepper, 2012). This section of the study addresses closure and the opening of policy, practice 
and theory pathways that had been highlighted by this study. 
7.2.1 Implications for Policy 
The acknowledgement of the delivery of a high quality healthcare service that meets the 
founding vision of the NHS (i.e. universal, comprehensive and free at the point of delivery) as a 
wicked problem means that no perfect solutions exist (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 
2007; Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002; King, 1993; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Roberts, 2000). 
This means that radical uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity in the social organisation of 
healthcare delivery should be recognised and attempts at taming should be resisted. 
Furthermore, the unending stream of healthcare policy reforms (Exworthy et al., 2010b; 
Greener, Harrington, Hunter, Mannion, & Powell, 2014; Smith, Walshe, & Hunter, 2001a) that 
are implemented without prior policies being allowed to be fully embedded and evaluated 
(Vartiainen, 2005) should be discouraged as they destabilise the healthcare system. Every new 
set of health policy initiatives takes a few years to embed. What is required is a recognition of 
the wickedness of the problem of the social organisation of healthcare delivery and the need for 
the meaningful and deliberate participation (Raisio, 2010)of all the stakeholders, especially the 
users. Wicked problems (Clarke & Newman, 2006) or cross-cutting themes (Sullivan & Skelcher, 
2002a) are not addressed by organisations that operate within a market-based competitive, 
manager-based controlled and metrics-based performance-managed environment (Farrell & 
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Morris, 2003; Greener, 2003; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000a). Wicked problems can include tame 
problems; e.g. treatments for chronic conditions of geriatric patients, and can include minor 
surgical procedures. Wickedness requires collaborative approaches (Ham et al., 2011b; Ham et 
al., 2011d) and that awareness goes against almost three decades of market-friendly 
approaches of quasi-competition between providers, patient choice and money following the 
patient, and the purchaser-provider split. In an environment of scarce resources, the public has 
to define its values and priorities and the role of the healthcare system in that worldview. The 
revolving door between management consultants and healthcare bureaucrats (Leys & Player, 
2011; Pollock, 2005) is unlikely to open a passageway to the allocation and prioritisation of 
social values (Raisio, 2010). 
Moreover, the acute hospital as a complex adaptive system (Barach & Johnson, 2006; Ferlie & 
Dopson, 2005; Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002; Shiell et al., 2008; Waldrop, 1994) means that 
the hospital should be seen as a sum of microsystems (Nelson et al., 2002) and as a flotilla 
rather than an aircraft carrier (Dickinson et al., 2013b). This has implications for the aims of 
performance-management policies. It is difficult in such a system to control costs and the 
clinical frontline at an aggregate or whole hospital level. Self-organisation at subsystem level, 
interdependence, non-linearity and emergence imply that performance measurement and 
management in a complex adaptive system can never be complete (Sheaff et al., 2003; Stewart & 
Walsh, 1994; Talbot, 2009). Thus, a plethora of agencies, quantitative metrics, indicators, 
targets, rankings and league tables (Carter et al., 1992; Farrell & Morris, 2003; Hartley, 
Donaldson, Skelcher, & Wallace, 2008; Noordegraaf & Abma, 2003) do not really make non-
linearity and emergence disappear. What happens is that the performance-management system 
is “gamed” (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Wilson, Croxson, & Atkinson, 2006) and some targets are met 
but the purposes of healthcare delivery may be missed. The Mid-Staffordshire scandal is a case 
in point (Francis, 2013). The lenses that are adopted to “manage” should take account of the 
ambiguity of public service design, delivery and performance, and the challenges posed by 
attempting to “control” frontline professionals. 
7.2.2 Implications for Practitioners 
A good theory has great practical value (Van de Ven, 1989). Scholars are encouraged to reflect 
deeply on the implications of their research for management practice (Colquitt & Ireland, 2009). 
Do managers learn something new from the study (Bergh, 2003)? 
Wickedness requires the acknowledgement that there is no ultimate solution that experts and 
technocrats could devise. Within acute hospitals, MDTs are already attempting to overcome 
some of the consequences of internal fragmentation. However, on-going assessments of the 
effectiveness of the MDT processes are needed. The hospital should also look at better 
collaboration with providing an integrated service for the core group of patients. This is a group 
of patients whose needs transcend the organisational boundaries and competencies of the social 
care, primary and acute hospital service providers. They pose a need inside the hospital for 
integrated teams of clinicians – and outside professionals- to work together and apply their 
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collective mind (Weick & Roberts, 1993) as a deliberative democracy (Raisio, 2010). All 
stakeholders should be involved in designing the healthcare delivery system for a local health 
economy despite the fragmentation and competitive ethos between service providers that 
follow from the national policy bias. Inside acute hospitals, patients with multiple acute and 
chronic conditions require integrated solutions. 
Within the organisation, it is important to take account of the roles of professionals in 
facilitating or impeding change (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). 
Opportunities should be created to involve the creative and intellectual capital of the NHS 
(Walshe & Smith, 2011) in the change process. Rolling with the Punches shows how 
professionals are able to respond to change, especially when their interests are ignored.  
7.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION 
In a Special Form on Research Methodology, a content analysis of 76 papers, the editorial panel 
concluded that a methodological contribution involves three issues: importance and 
significance, adequate conceptual grounding, and adherence to methodologically sound and 
accurate strategies (Bartunek, Bobko, & Venkatraman, 1993). The same article proposes that 
“significance” refers to the value added by the use of a given methodology in explicating a 
substantive area in ways that other methodologies have not been able to do. The use of classic 
GT enabled me to identify a main concern of the hospital consultants and to provide a 
theoretical account that explains how they routinely resolve that concern. The relationship 
between doctors, managers and the managerial hospital has been the subject of extensive 
scholarly discourse in the literature. The use of classic GT has added to the scholarly discourse 
by facilitating an understanding of what is happening, why it is happening and what might 
happen. Classic GT has solid conceptual foundations that have stood the test of time over almost 
six decades. Moreover, the study has once again shown that a novice researcher with rigorous 
adherence to the strategies of classic GT would be able to pierce the veils of misunderstanding 
around an area that has been described as a problem without a solution.  This study has also 
shown that classic grounded theory, as a general research methodology, can retain its integrity 
whilst still being in conversation with other “versions” of grounded theory. The same can be 
said about its dialogue with qualitative research methodologies. In many instances, I touched on 
some of the debates raised amongst scholars. I did that not because of methodological confusion 
or slurring. On the contrary I showed how classic grounded theory stands its ground.  
7.4 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
It is important to have a good grasp of organisation phenomena (Smith & Hitt, 2005). A good 
theory is the conceptual rendition of a messy and complex empirical reality in the phenomenal 
world (Suddaby, 2015). A theoretical contribution specifies the factors that explain a particular 
phenomenon, how those factors are related and why they have the relationships that are 
suggested (Whetten, 1989). In this study the GT, Rolling with the Punches, is a conceptual 
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account of the latent patterns of behaviour in which hospital consultants are engaged as they 
resolve their main concern; i.e. the managerial transformation of the hospital. It is therefore a 
theoretical account of a phenomenon within an organisation with a significant footprint in a 
local health economy. The wickedness of healthcare organisation (Raisio, 2009; Rittel & 
Webber, 1973; Vartiainen, 2005) and the hospital as a complex adaptive system (McKee & 
Healy, 2002; McKelvey, 1999; Nelson et al., 2002) and hybrid organisation (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Besharov & Smith, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010) that is institutionally complex 
(Greenwood et al., 2011) with a constellation of logics (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) under its roof 
make it conceptually a very complex and untidy place. A hospital is professionally and spatio-
temporally complex (Allen, 2000; Zerubavel, 1979). This GT proposes that managerialism is a 
significant issue for hospital consultants and it conceptualises the latent pattern of behaviour in 
which they are engaged as they resolve for themselves their main concern (Glaser, 1978, 1998). 
The theoretical contribution did not emerge from a gap in a literature review that had been 
undertaken before the fieldwork began. However, the theoretical contribution emerged as a 
conceptual account of what is already going on in the field (Glaser, 2003). The theory emerged 
from a commitment to the full package of GT steps (Artinian et al., 2009; Glaser, 1998) without 
preconception. With constant comparison of fractured data, theoretical sampling, memoing and 
trusting in the emergence of concepts, categories and theoretical relationships the GT emerged 
incrementally (Smith & Hitt, 2005). The GT process is open to all types of data (Glaser, 1998); 
hence, interview data, document analysis and observational notes from the field were used as 
data sources. Given the life-and-death dramas that inevitably occur in an acute hospital and the 
difficulties associated with gaining ethical approval and access, it was useful to have an insider 
who helped to secure the availability of participants. That insider was also an important 
sounding board for the evolution of the theory. The logic of the theory is discovered through the 
process of memoing, which starts from the time the study begins. Memos are written down to 
slow down the analytical process because preconception is always an open door. Memoing 
enables the researcher to record thoughts, ideas and hunches, which form the basic building 
blocks of the conceptual links of the theoretical framework. Theoretical ideas are written, 
stored, revisited and refined. All the time, the memos are shifted around as the fit between the 
core category and related categories emerges. Thus, the GT - that emerges - fits, works, is 
relevant and is modifiable (Artinian et al., 2009; Glaser, 1998). Novice researchers (Glaser, 
2009b) should feel confident that if they faithfully follow the steps of GT then they should 
generate a novel theory that is likely to make a theoretical contribution (Smith & Hitt, 2005). 
This study makes a theoretical contribution to the micro-foundations of an institutional theory 
approach to organisation studies. Embedded actors (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Battilana et 
al., 2009b) inhabitant of institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002). They do 
not stand aside from the institutional complexity but are bearers of this complexity (Delmestri, 
2006; Jepperson, 1991). These actors creatively and routinely (Prasad & Prasad, 1998; Scott, 
1985, 1990), without drama (March, 1981; Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Smets et al., 2012), 
manage wickedness (Austrailian Publis Service Commission, 2007; Conklin, 2006a; King, 1993; 
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Rittel & Webber, 1973; Roberts, 2000) in the social organisation of healthcare delivery (Raisio, 
2009; Vartiainen, 2005). They do this by innovatively using the space provided within the 
hospital as a complex adaptive system (Ferlie & Dopson, 2005; Nelson et al., 2002; Shiell et al., 
2008; Waldrop, 1994) to structure relationships between institutional logics. Their activities, at 
the coalface, creatively (Barley, 2008) respond to immediate demands (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2009a; Jarzabkowski et al., 2013b; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). 
The study challenges the assumed macro-institutional incompatibility (Greenwood et al., 2011) 
between managerialism and medical professionalism. Responses to immediate demands have 
institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Suddaby et al., 
2009) implications; i.e. they maintain, disrupt and create institutional arrangements. 
As noted above, Rolling with the Punches challenges the assumed incompatibility between 
managerialism and professionalism within organisation studies (Postma et al., 2015). Medical 
professionalism has always involved key features of managerialism; i.e. organisation, 
coordination and integration (Noordegraaf, 2007a). Rolling with the Punches is a theoretical 
account of professionalism within an organisational context (Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2008; 
Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 2011). The different components of the GT manifest varying degrees of 
coexistence between managerialism and medical professionalism at the coalface where 
managerialism and medical professionalism are translated into procedures through which 
healthcare services are delivered. The discussion of medical professionalism might be different 
if Rolling with the Punches were taken as a point of departure because it would provide an 
account of how the real world already integrates the multiple demands raised in earlier 
paragraphs. 
Rolling with the Punches emphasises the importance of sense making as a process of 
determining the meanings (Ancona, 2012; Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015; Weick, 1995; Weick et 
al., 2005) of multiple demands (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Friedland & Alford, 1991b; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; Raaijmakers, Vermeulen, Meeus, & Zietsma, 
2015) and what could be done about these demands. This understanding is determined on an 
individual (Cox & Ferguson, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 1987) and a social interactional 
basis (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Blumer, 1971; Giddens, 1984; Hughes, 1971; Strauss et al., 
1963). Weighing up, appraisal and sense-making shape the effort, intentionality and agency 
(Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Given the prestige hierarchy in 
medicine (Album & Westin, 2008; Creed, Searle, & Rogers, 2010a; Norredam & Album, 2007), 
not all consultants have the same leverage to influence the sense-making processes (Pettigrew, 
1985; Ranson et al., 1980b; Walsh, Hinings, Greenwood, & Ranson, 1981). This suggests that 
weighing up is also an issue of power, which should be taken more seriously in institutional 
theory and management studies scholarship (Lawrence, 2008; Munir, 2015; Suddaby, 2015; 
Willmott, 2015).  
Sense-making highlights the point that institutional demands do not necessarily impose 
themselves on participants (Friedland & Alford, 1991b). The diversity in the latent pattern of 
behaviours points to a nuanced account of agency (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009a). The 
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intentionality of the participants is directed mainly at completing the jobs at hand. The agency 
that underpins this is practical-evaluative agency. They can choose to accomplish the tasks in 
traditional ways or in new managerially inspired ways. The first manner of doing work is 
underpinned by iterative agency and the second way by projective agency. The dimensions of 
agency reflect a framing of relations between institutional logics and have institutional work 
consequences. The participants are not grand entrepreneurs who are motivated by completed 
visions of maintaining, disrupting or creating institutions. The dimensions of agency provide a 
more subtle account of intentionality than is implied in institutional work (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2009). The participants are primarily interested in doing the 
immediate work at hand and in so doing i.e. just doing their daily work; their actions may have 
iterative or projective consequences. The focus on immediate tasks at hand points to the 
limitations of radical change (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003b; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Iterative 
agency does not mean being an unthinking cultural dope (Garfunkel, 1984), merely following 
cultural scripts or lacking intentionality (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). The combination of 
practical-evaluative and iterative agency can reflect an intention to keep managerialism and 
professionalism, which results in maintaining existing institutional arrangements. This is 
significantly different from the isomorphic accounts of early neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Scott et al., 2000). Maintaining existing institutional 
arrangements is a reflexive, intentional and effortful accomplishment (Emirbayer & Mische, 
1998; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a).   
Regarding the point made about the mutual entanglements between managerialism and 
professionalism, the same can be said about the relationships between the multiple demands 
that make up institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) and the constellation of logics 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011), which are not incompatible by definition (Besharov & Smith, 2013; 
Friedland & Alford, 1991b; Thornton et al., 2012). The range of latent behaviours that emerge in 
the GT shows that the adoption or dismissal of particular practices associated with given logics 
is the enactment of a constructed relationality between logics (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). 
Inhabitants of institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002), who themselves are 
carriers of the contradictions (Delmestri, 2006; DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991; Zilber, 2002), 
frame and recast relations between conflicting logics as they work through dilemmas in the 
process of accomplishing real day-to-day work.  
The use of GT allowed me to get beyond the organisational-level structural responses to 
institutionalism (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010) and open the black box of 
institutionalism (Zucker, 1991) below the organisational level to examine closely what might be 
happening at the coalface (Barley, 2008). Hence, the study managed to clarify some of the 
micro-foundations of institutionalisation (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a; Smets et al., 2012; 
Thornton et al., 2012) to show how embedded actors routinely respond to institutional control 
by acquiescing, compromising, avoiding, defying and manipulating (Oliver, 1991) the resources 
at their disposal. Acquiescing concurs with the idea of managerial hegemony, proletarianisation, 
deprofessionalisation and McDonaldisation (Waring & Bishop, 2013), which are discussed in 
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Chapter 5. This study fills a gap in the literature in that it shows how embedded actors push 
back against, deflect, make concessions to, and steer clear of institutional controls (Lawrence, 
2008). It also adds to the few studies that show professionals resist routinely (Thomas & Hewitt, 
2011) and how doctors make decisions about the organisation (Correia, 2013a). 
Rolling with the Punches connects agency, institutional logics, institutional work, medical 
sociology and organisation studies.  
7.5 EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION 
An “empirical contribution” refers to whether a study contributes to existing knowledge in a 
particular research domain. Studies that explain high degrees of variance are likely to make an 
empirical contribution to a research domain (Colquitt & Ireland, 2009).  
This study presents a conceptual account of a latent pattern of real-life behaviour. In a scoping 
report for the Health Foundation of the United Kingdom, it is claimed that medical professionals 
are exhausted by having to cope with constant changes in the demand for healthcare, the social 
organisation of healthcare delivery and the state of medicine itself (Christmas & Millward, 
2011). In fact, the scoping report suggests that unless the sense that doctors have of being under 
siege is reversed, patients and staff could be at risk. Furthermore, the report expresses the fear 
that even the idea of an NHS could be in danger. The need to discuss what a new medical 
professionalism might look like is acknowledged, given the changes in society, the nature of the 
state, medical technology, the patterns of illness from acute to chronic, and the relationships 
between the state and the medical profession and what they mean for medical professionalism.  
In a report for the King’s Fund, medical professionalism is described as the link between values, 
the environment within which care is delivered and the formulation of healthcare policy 
(Levenson et al., 2010). The report is a summary of 11 consultation events that were conducted 
between 2009 and 2010 and builds on a number of similar series of events in 2007 (Levenson, 
Dewar, & Shepherd, 2008). Once again, one can see the links between conceptions of medical 
professionalism and institutional theory, especially institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012) and institutional work.  
A report for the Royal College of Physicians (RCP, 2005) also discusses values, attitudes and 
behaviours that are relevant and fit for the times so that medical professionalism remains a 
positive influence that shapes society and serves patients. The same comments as made about 
the report to the King’s Fund apply to this report. 
Rolling with the Punches is an inductively generated, conceptual account of how hospitals are 
already resolving these concerns by addressing immediate concerns on the frontline 
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013a). It is a theory of what is already 
going on (Glaser, 2001a) and takes into account discussions of medical professionalism from 
descriptions and wish lists to latent patterns that are already operating in the real world. It is 
not the only – or a complete – account of medical professionalism in the NHS but it is one that 
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accounts for much of the variation in the behaviours of the participants and meets the criteria 
for a classic GT; i.e. it fits, it works, it is relevant and it is modifiable (Glaser, 1998). 
 
The above-mentioned sections draw to a close the study. The next section illuminates the 
scholarly ways ahead.  
7.6 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
This study resulted in a GT that fits, works and is relevant within the substantive context. It 
therefore constitutes a completed body of work. However, a GT is not a final statement on a 
substantive area but remains open to modification in the light of new data for constant 
comparison. The concepts in the theory Rolling with the Punches would provide the anchors for 
theoretical sampling. It might be possible to extend the study to hospital consultants in other 
acute NHS hospitals to confirm the theoretical framework. It might then be possible to gain a 
more thorough understanding of the different concepts and theoretical relationships that 
constitute the theory. 
Then it might be useful to see how other groups of professionals – with less power – in the 
hospital deal with managerialism. In so doing, one could begin to compare and contrast the 
areas where the patterns of behaviour are at odds and where they overlap. These insights might 
help one to have a broader, yet fine-grained, understanding of the ebb and flow of power in the 
social organisation of public healthcare.  
Research on Rolling with the Punches should not be limited to how hospital doctors deal with 
the managerial hospital. It should be readily extended to other substantive areas. Given that this 
study was conducted under the auspices of a South African university, it is possible to see that 
this study has implications for understanding how professionals manage the wickedness, 
complex adaptive systems and institutional complexity in universities, social care, healthcare, 
education utilities, city management and even the national airline. It has the potential to be 
developed into a formal theory (Glaser, 1998, 2002a, 2006; Glaser & Holton, 2004). The 
grounded theory can potentially be applied in other areas where attempts are made to shape, 
constrain and modify the behaviours and choices of people for whom exit is not a realistic 
possibility. 
Rolling with the Punches could be a way of being and somehow getting by, of trying to make 
things better in the absence of a grand vision. It could also be a way of just keeping hold of 
oneself when much else seems to be slipping. While on the surface very little might appear to be 
happening, behaviours routinely and non-dramatically (March, 1981; Prasad & Prasad, 1998; 
Scott, 1985, 1990; Smets et al., 2012) might be balancing a plethora of contradictions, thus 
resolving dilemmas as people address immediate practical concerns (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013a). Rolling with the Punches could be a process that is happening all around us. 
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7.7 LIMITATIONS  
This study aimed to identify the main concern of participants in a substantive area and how they 
routinely go about resolving that concern. Chapter 4 is an account of the GT that emerged from 
the data and Chapter 5 is an account of the literature review and its integration into the GT. The 
first limitation in this study is the fact that as the researcher I did not have any experience in 
using GT before embarking on this PhD study. This surely affected the ways in which I used the 
classic GTM. I think that I also passed the readiness-to-write moment (Glaser, 2012b) due to 
inexperience. The core category and the subcategories were ready to be written up in the 
literature review, but I got carried away with wanting to go beyond conceptual completeness. 
Despite my vigilance throughout the process, I stumbled at the end at the door of descriptive 
coverage. It is an inviting door that cost me almost nine months. The use of an insider to collect 
some of the data may also have had an impact on the data-collection process but I trust that 
adherence to classic GT procedures countered limitations in this regard. 
  
 
 
174 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I hope that this GT does justice to the participants who were so generous in making themselves 
available and vulnerable. This study generated an integrated set of hypotheses that explains 
much of their behaviour as they routinely resolve their main concern. It is not a complete 
account of their latent behaviours, nor is it the only one. It is also not a full account of medical 
professionalism within the managerial hospital. Some may be horrified by what this account of 
their behaviours says about medical professionals. However, a GT does not take a moral stance 
on the behaviours of participants. Whatever one might feel about this account, the clinicians, 
especially the doctors, still remain the social, creative and intellectual capital of the healthcare 
system (Walshe & Smith, 2011). As much as they struggle with huge issues that lie at the heart 
of the managerial transformation of healthcare, it should be remembered that clinicians, 
especially doctors, are at the core of the NHS, which sees 1 million patients every 36 hours. 
Thus, this study concludes as a tribute to those doctors who so courageously shared their 
innermost fears and pains. The researcher hopes that justice has been done to them. To the 
doctors…  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGISTS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
 
Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth Ethical Guidelines for Good 
Practice (ASA 1999) 
Relations With and Responsibilities Towards Research Participants  
The close and often lengthy association of anthropologists with the people among whom they 
carry out research entails personal and moral relationships, trust and reciprocity between the 
researcher and research participants; it also entails recognition of power differentials between 
them.  
(1) Protecting research participants and honouring trust: Anthropologists should 
endeavour to protect the physical, social and psychological well-being of those whom they study 
and to respect their rights, interests, sensitivities and privacy:  
(a) Most anthropologists would maintain that their paramount obligation is to their research 
participants and that when there is conflict, the interests and rights of those studied should 
come first;  
(b) Under some research conditions, particularly that involving contract research, it may not be 
possible to fully guarantee research participants' interests. In such cases anthropologists would 
be well-advised to consider in advance whether they should pursue that particular piece of 
research.  
(2) Anticipating harms: Anthropologists should be sensitive to the possible consequences of 
their work and should endeavour to guard against predictably harmful effects. Consent from 
subjects does not absolve anthropologists from their obligation to protect research participants 
as far as possible against the potentially harmful effects of research:  
(a) The researcher should try to minimise disturbances both to subjects themselves and to the 
subjects' relationships with their environment. Even though research participants may be 
immediately protected by the device of anonymity, the researcher should try to anticipate the 
long-term effects on individuals or groups as a result of the research;  
(b) Anthropologists may sometimes be better placed than (at the least, some of) their 
informants to anticipate the possible repercussions of their research both for the immediate 
participants and for other members of the research population or the wider society. In certain 
political contexts, some groups, for example, religious or ethnic minorities may be particularly 
vulnerable and it may be necessary to withhold data from publication or even to refrain from 
studying them at all.  
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(3) Avoiding undue intrusion: Anthropologists should be aware of the intrusive potential of 
some of their enquiries and methods:  
(a) Like other social researchers, they have no special entitlement to study all phenomena; and 
the advancement of knowledge and the pursuit of information are not in themselves sufficient 
justifications for overriding the values and ignoring the interests of those studied;  
(b) They should be aware that for research participants becoming the subject of anthropological 
description and interpretations can be a welcome experience, but it can also be a disturbing one. 
In many of the social scientific enquiries that have caused controversy this has not arisen 
because participants have suffered directly or indirectly any actual harm. Rather, the concern 
has resulted from participants' feelings of having suffered an intrusion into private and personal 
domains, or of having been wronged, (for example, by having been caused to acquire self-
knowledge which they did not seek or want).  
(4) Negotiating informed consent: Following the precedent set by the Nuremberg Trials and 
the constitutional laws of many countries, inquiries involving human subjects should be based 
on the freely given informed consent of subjects. The principle of informed consent expresses 
the belief in the need for truthful and respectful exchanges between social researchers and the 
people whom they study.  
(a) Negotiating consent entails communicating information likely to be material to a person's 
willingness to participate, such as: - the purpose(s) of the study, and the anticipated 
consequences of the research; the identity of funders and sponsors; the anticipated uses of the 
data; possible benefits of the study and possible harm or discomfort that might affect 
participants; issues relating to data storage and security; and the degree of anonymity and 
confidentiality which may be afforded to informants and subjects.  
(b) Conditions that constitute an absence of consent: consent made after the research is 
completed is not meaningful consent at all. Further, the persons studied must have the legal 
capacity to give consent. Where subjects are legally compelled (e.g., by their employer or 
government) to participate in a piece of research, consent cannot be said to have been 
meaningfully given by subjects, and anthropologists are advised not to pursue that piece of 
work.  
(c) Consent in research is a process, not a one-off event, and may require renegotiation over 
time; it is an issue to which the anthropologist should return periodically.  
(d) When technical data-gathering devices such as audio/visual-recorders and photographic 
records are being used those studied should be made aware of the capacities of such devices 
and be free to reject their use.  
(e) When information is being collected from proxies, care should be taken not to infringe the 
'private space' of the subject or the relationship between subject and proxy; and if there are 
indications that the person concerned would object to certain information being disclosed, such 
information should not be sought by proxy.  
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(f) The long period over which anthropologists make use of their data and the possibility that 
unforeseen uses or theoretical interests may arise in the future may need to be conveyed to 
participants, as should any likelihood that the data may be shared (in some form) with other 
colleagues or be made available to sponsors, funders or other interested parties, or deposited in 
archives.  
(5) Rights to confidentiality and anonymity: Informants and other research participants 
should have the right to remain anonymous and to have their rights to privacy and 
confidentiality respected. However, privacy and confidentiality present anthropologists with 
particularly difficult problems given the cultural and legal variations between societies and the 
various ways in which the real interests or research role of the ethnographer may not fully be 
realised by some or all of participants or may even become invisible over time:  
(a) Care should be taken not to infringe uninvited upon the 'private space' (as locally defined) of 
an individual or group;  
(b) As far as is possible researchers should anticipate potential threats to confidentiality and 
anonymity. They should consider whether it is necessary or even a matter of propriety to record 
certain information at all; should take appropriate measures relating to the storage and security 
of records during and after fieldwork; and should use where appropriate such means as the 
removal of identifiers, the use of pseudonyms and other technical solutions to the problems of 
privacy in field records and in oral and written forms of data dissemination (whether or not this 
is enjoined by law or administrative regulation);  
(c) Researchers should endeavour to anticipate problems likely to compromise anonymity; but 
they should make clear to participants that it may not be possible in field notes and other 
records or publications totally to conceal identities, and that the anonymity afforded or 
promised to individuals, families or other groups may also be unintentionally compromised. A 
particular configuration of attributes can frequently identify an individual beyond reasonable 
doubt; and it is particularly difficult to disguise, say, office-holders, organizations, public 
agencies, ethnic groups, religious denominations or other collectivities without so distorting the 
data as to compromise scholarly accuracy and integrity;  
(d) If guarantees of privacy and confidentiality are made, they must be honoured unless there 
are clear and over-riding ethical reasons not to do so. Confidential information must be treated 
as such by the anthropologist even when it enjoys no legal protection or privilege, and other 
people who have access to the data should be made aware of their obligations likewise; but 
participants should be made aware that it is rarely, if at all, legally possible to ensure total 
confidentiality or to protect the privacy of records;  
(e) Anthropologists should similarly respect the measures taken by other researchers to 
maintain the anonymity of their research field and participants.  
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(6) Fair return for assistance: There should be no economic exploitation of individual 
informants, translators and research participants; fair return should be made for their help and 
services.  
(7) Participants' intellectual property rights: It should be recognised that research 
participants have contractual and/or legal, interests and rights in data, recordings and 
publications, although rights will vary according to agreements and legal jurisdiction.  
(a) It is the obligation of the interviewer to inform the interviewee of their rights under any 
copyright or data protection laws of the country where research takes place, and the 
interviewer must indicate beforehand any uses to which the interview is likely to be put (e.g., 
research, educational use, publication, broadcasting etc).  
(b) Under the UK Copyright Act (1988), researchers making audio or video recordings must 
obtain 'copyright clearance' from interviewees if recordings are to be publicly broadcast or 
deposited in public archives. Any restrictions on use (e.g., time period) or other conditions (e.g., 
preservation of anonymity) which the interviewee requires should be recorded in writing. This 
is best done at the time of the interview, using a standard form. Retrospective clearance is often 
time-consuming or impossible where the interviewee is deceased or has moved away.  
(c) Interviewers should clarify before interviewing the extent to which subjects are allowed to 
see transcripts of interviews and field notes and to alter the content, withdraw statements, to 
provide additional information or to add glosses on interpretations.  
(d) Clarification must also be given to subjects regarding the degree to which they will be 
consulted prior to publication.  
(8) Participants' involvement in research: As far as is possible anthropologists should try 
and involve the people being studied in the planning and execution of research projects, and 
they should recognise that their obligations to the participants or the host community may not 
end (indeed should not end, many would argue) with the completion of their fieldwork or 
research project. 1  
                                                             
1 http://www.theasa.org/ethics/guidelines.shtml 
Accessed 13 February 2011 
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APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF RESEARCH GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR 
RESEARCH WITHIN THE HOSPITAL TRUST 
Summary of Research Governance Framework for Research within the Hospital Trust: Dh 
4108962 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/legal_annexes_FINAL.pdf_31380575.pdf 
Accessed 10 March 2012 
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APPENDIX 3: UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND HUMAN RESEARCH 
ETHICS COMMITTEE CLEARANCE  
University of the Witwatersrand Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical) 
Clearance Protocol Number H110911 
  
  
 
 
230 
APPENDIX 4: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Wits Business School 
2 St David’s Place, Parktown,  
Johannesburg, 2193, South Africa 
 
P.O. Box 98, Wits, 2050, South Africa 
 
Participant information sheet 
On being a doctor in an acute NHS trust within the context of chronic fundamental 
structural, financial and cultural change: A classic grounded theory 
Mogamat Reederwan Craayenstein 
53 St Albans Crescent, Woodford Green, Essex, IG8 9EL, United Kingdom 
mrcraayenstein2@yahoo.co.uk 
Research & Development Project Number: 941 
Introduction 
As a PhD student, I herewith invite you to participate in the above-mentioned study, which is 
supervised by Prof. Terri Carmichael (terri.carmichael@wits.ac.za). 
Before you make your decision on participation, I would like to explain the reasons for the 
research and what participation would mean for you. Therefore I would appreciate if you would 
read the information below. If you have any further questions, or if you would like further 
information, please feel free to contact me (Reederwan Craayenstein- contact details above).  
The study 
The research project in which your participation is sought is concerned with the working life of 
an NHS doctor within the context of large-scale structural change in the NHS.  The goal is to 
identify the main issues faced by doctors and how they actually go about resolving those issues 
on a daily basis. This study aims to reflect the views of doctors about the principal concerns and 
how they actually address these challenges. 
Who would be involved? 
There are two aspects to data gathering. The first is a participant observation role where the 
researcher would like to develop an in-depth sense of what doctors face as they go about their 
daily practice/business. Then there will be formal interviews to explore some of the issues that 
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emerge from the observations. So it will be people that the researcher will have found are 
knowledgeable and willing to talk about the issues.  
What would you have to do if you choose to participate? 
If you agree to take part then it would initially mean allowing the researcher to observe your 
everyday work activities such as formal and informal meetings. You will be asked to sign a 
consent form at the beginning of the study, but that would not mean that you had to participate 
each day that you are on duty. The researcher would check with you at the beginning of the 
session about your willingness to be observed. The aim will be to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the issues.  
A further part of the study would include interviews with doctors. The focus will be on the 
problems that they face and how they address these on a daily basis. The interviews will not be 
audio/video recorded, as the researcher will make field notes. This will promote confidentiality 
and anonymity. The interviews would be carried out at work, in a quiet area, at a convenient 
time for the doctor and will last approximately 45-60 minutes. 
The final part of the study will involve the study of NHS and Trust documents such as annual 
and monthly reports that are available online, NHS policy, clinical guidelines, protocols and 
standards that may illuminate matters arising from the observations and interviews. 
Do you have to participate? 
You are free to participate or not to participate. If you refuse to participate then you do not have 
to justify your refusal. If however, you do decide to participate, then you are free to withdraw 
from the study at any time, without having to provide an explanation and you may ask that the 
information that you have provided be omitted from our records.  
If you decide to participate you would be asked:  
 To give written consent for participant observation (the researcher will also check with 
you for verbal consent before each occasion of participant observation); and 
 To give written consent for any interview that you grant the researcher. 
You will be given a copy of this information sheet and signed consent forms to keep. 
What happens next? 
I would be grateful if you could consider this request for your participation sympathetically and 
favourably. The aim is to develop a view of what doctors consider being the major issues that 
they face in their work and what they consider is needed to address these concerns. Therefore 
you are likely to derive indirect benefit from this study. I would be pleased to address any 
concerns that you may have regarding your initial decision on participation. Please feel free to 
contact me. 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. 
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APPENDIX 5: CONSENT FOR INTERVIEW FORM 
CONSENT FOR INTERVIEW FORM 
R&D Project Number: R&D 941 
Title of the Project: On Being a Doctor in an acute NHS Trust: A Grounded Theory of the main 
issues faced by NHS doctors within the context of major structural change. 
 
Name of the Researcher: Mogamat Reederwan Craayenstein 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated ……     
And have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason, and without my legal rights being affected.   
   
I agree that any word that I may say during the interview can be used, anonymously, in the 
written record of the research.         
I agree for the interviewer to make notes but should I stop the interview at any time and ask for 
the notes to be destroyed         
  
I agree to participate in the study.         
 
Name of the participant   Date   Signature 
Name of person taking consent  date   Signature 
(If different from researcher) 
Researcher    Date   Signature 
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APPENDIX 6: CONSENT FOR PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
 
CONSENT FOR PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
R&D Project Number: R&D 941 
Title of the Project: On Being a Doctor in an acute NHS Trust: A Grounded Theory of the main 
issues faced by NHS doctors within the context of major structural change. 
Name of the Researcher: Mogamat Reederwan Craayenstein 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated ……     
And have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason, and without my legal rights being affected.   
   
I agree that any word that I may say during the participant observation can be used, 
anonymously, in the written record of the research.      
     
I agree for the researcher to shadow me during my everyday activities at work, subject to my 
continuing agreement.           
I agree to participate in the study.         
 
Name of the participant   Date   Signature 
Name of person taking consent  date   Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
Researcher    Date   Signature 
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APPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Interview Number: Age Range: Gender:  M/F 
 
Speciality:                                                Length of service as practising NHS consultant: 
 
Introduction: 
1. What does being a doctor mean to you when you are at work? 
 Prompt: Structural, Cultural and Financial 
2. What are the different roles that you have to “play” whilst being a doctor? 
3. Please comment on the work-life balance of being a doctor 
4. How important is it being part of a team, and in what ways does it aid or hinder you as a 
doctor? 
Demands: 
5. How has the role of patients evolved in the way the service is delivered? 
6. How has this evolution impacted on you being a doctor? 
7. How has the role of NHS managers influenced you being a doctor? 
 Prompt: Structural, Cultural and Financial 
Skills: 
8. Please comment on the non-clinical skills needed to be a doctor 
9. In what contexts or roles are these skills needed? 
10. How are doctors prepared in this regard, and how adequate is the preparation? 
11. How do doctors cope in this matter? 
Concerns: 
12. What are the main issues/concerns/problems faced by doctors? 
 Prompt: Structural, Cultural and Financial 
13. How do doctors deal with these issues/concerns/problems? 
 Prompt: Structural, Cultural and Financial 
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14. What should be done about those issues/concerns/problems? 
 Prompt: Structural, Cultural and Financial 
Environment: 
15. How has the environment of practising as a doctor changed? 
16. How do NHS reforms affect being an NHS doctor in a tertiary care institution? 
 Prompt: Structural, Cultural and Financial 
17. How has medical revalidation and CPD affected being a doctor? 
18. What do you think of the role played by representative organisations (e.g. BMA, LNC) for 
doctors in terms of effectiveness? What changes or improvements should be made? 
Change: 
19. What needs to change in order for doctors to do their jobs better? 
 Prompt: Structural, Cultural and Financial 
20. If you could change one thing, what would you do to change things for the better? 
21. Why would you choose this one issue for change? 
22. Is there anything that had not been covered in the interview?                   
Thank you for your willingness to be available and to respond frankly. If needed, would 
you be prepared for a shorter follow-up interview (20 minutes max) at some future date 
within the next 12 months? If yes, then your name will be included for later contact. 
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APPENDIX 8: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW RESEARCH ENCOUNTERS 
Consultant 
ID Code 
Approximate 
Age 
Years as 
NHS 
Consultant 
Gender Speciality Group C/CL/CD/MD 
IG 58 20  Male Physician Divisional Director 
Bl 60 30 Male Radiologist None 
Mnj 40 4 Male Radiologist None 
Abd 55 20 Male Paediatrician None 
Cwd 45 10 Male Radiologist CL 
Akl 45 11 Male Radiologist None 
Nmy 63 30 Male Physician Past CD 
Gdst 64 30 Male Radiologist Acting CD 
MW 40 4 Male Surgeon None 
Sh 40  10 Male Neuro-rad None 
BP 35 2 Male Ophthalmologist None 
KW 40 7 Female Radiologist None 
SN 40 7 Male Physician None 
RG 63 30 Male Radiologist Past CL 
H  45 6 Male Surgeon None 
KA 45 6 Male Endoscopy None 
WR 65 40 Male Radiologist None 
AA 55 16 Male Oncologist None 
HE 42 3 Female Physician None 
AM 55 15 Male Paediatrician None 
SM 40 3 Male  A& E None 
AV 50 13 Male A&E CL 
MQ 55+ 18 Female Oncologist CL 
T 55+ 24 Female Gynae & Oncology CL 
RS 55- 2  Male  Radiologist None 
A- Gsp 35+ 7 Male A&E None 
Slb 50+ 18 Male  Physician CD 
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Consultant 
ID Code 
Approximate 
Age 
Years as 
NHS 
Consultant 
Gender Speciality Group C/CL/CD/MD 
Silva 55+ 17 Male Radiologist None 
R 40 3 Male ITU None 
DH 40- 3 Male A&E  CD 
RB 45- 9 Male Physician None 
SW 40- 4 Male ICU None 
AI 60- 21 Male  A&E Was CD 
CH 52 13 Male  Surgeon CL 
MV 60+ 30 Male Surgeon DD 
HD 40- 2 Female Gastro None 
MS 55+ 18 Female Physician DD 
AJ 40- 3 Male Renal Physic None 
KH 45- 8 Female Radiologist CL 
JA 55+ 18 Male Endocrinologist MD 
JS 40- 3 Female 47 None 
DR 60++ 30 Male Paed None 
SG 55 20 Female Surgeon None 
 
C: Consultant 
CL: Clinical Lead 
CD: Clinical Director 
MD: Medical Director 
DD: Divisional Director 
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APPENDIX 9: EXAMPLE OF FIELD NOTES FROM INTERVIEW 
Field Notes  
The doctor is in a very difficult situation in the NHS today. 
They are no longer afforded the authority and respect as in days gone by. 
Managers and their staff are being empowered at the expense of doctors. 
At our trust there are two main separate sites with different cultures. At one hospital the mainly 
overseas-trained nurses who will go the extra mile for the patient. 
At the PFI hospital site, the nurses will not easily delay going on lunch for the patient. How did 
this happen as we do not recruit the staff? 
Nurses at the first hospital feel that they have to work harder than those at the new site. 
I do not always like to be at work because you can be crushed on a daily basis. You have to be 
diplomatic and be careful whom you speak to. Power has shifted. It is very painful when 
secretaries – under instructions from their managers – tell experienced consultants what they 
can and cannot do.  
Sometimes doing the best for the patient is not sufficient to get one to come to work. 
Doctors struggle without support. Managers sit in front of computers sending out emails and 
seldom care to justify and defend their decisions when doctors are unable to do the best for 
patients. 
Managers decide on the number of beds, the number and quality of the staff, the equipment, the 
number of wards and theatres. We just deal with the patient. Yet we have the duty to deliver the 
best quality of care that meets the needs of every patient. 
I have clinics booked at both sites, on the same day at the same time. The managers control the 
bookings as they have targets to meet. Moreover, the clinics at both sites are over-booked. On 
paper the consultant is in charge whilst in reality managers call the shots. 
If I had a choice then I would leave the NHS not only this hospital, as it is the same everywhere in 
the NHS.  
When secretaries leave they are not replaced. The administrative work of the consultant goes to 
a pool of secretaries. So one has staffs that are typing up work without knowing anything about 
the speciality. The clerical incompetence is frustrating. It takes hours to correct spelling mistakes 
when I should be dealing with patients. 
The workload is very heavy because the demand is high and there are staff shortages. Sometimes 
nursing posts are frozen to balance the books. Managers for the same reasons close wards and 
theatres. So demand in the remaining wards is more intense. 
Locum nursing staff fills the gaps in the staffing. They do not know the patient. Every time a new 
locum nurse is on the ward then I have to start from zero because I know more about the patient 
than the nurse. The demand on nurses often means that they attend to the immediate needs of 
patients and leave the notes for later. Sometimes the notes do not get done. 
We have bed shortages. Often patients are well-enough to be discharged but because we do not 
control admission and discharge decisions that patient might block the bed because the home-
care team has been unable to handle an extra patient. 
Every day – without exception – my wife can see that I have had another dreadful day. It shows 
on my face. Life at home has become very mechanical. Yet, the clinical staffs are blamed for the 
state of healthcare in the hospital. 
Please keep my details anonymous and confidential. Throughout it was painful to see a broken 
doctor who was prepared to speak, yet so fearful and fragile. 
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APPENDIX 10: EXAMPLE OF OPEN-CODED DATA FROM INTERVIEW 
Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
The doctor is in a very difficult situation in the NHS today. Facing difficulties 
Finding it hard 
Taking strain 
Exasperating 
They are no longer afforded the authority and respect as in 
days gone by. 
Losing control 
Shifting ground 
Losing authority 
Managers and their staff are being empowered at the 
expense of doctors. 
Losing out 
Suffering loss 
At our trust there are two main separate sites with different 
cultures. At one hospital the mainly overseas-trained nurses 
who will go the extra mile for the patient. 
Operating differently 
Working harder 
Going extra mile 
At the PFI hospital site, the nurses will not easily delay going 
on lunch for the patient. How did this happen as we do not 
recruit the staff? 
Nurses at the first hospital feel that they have to work 
harder than those at the new site. 
Not bothering 
Being unprofessional 
Blaming managers 
Feeling cheated 
Working harder 
Getting away 
Competing professionalisms 
I do not always like to be at work because you can be 
crushed on a daily basis. You have to be diplomatic and be 
careful to whom you speak. Power has shifted. It is very 
painful when secretaries – under instructions from their 
managers – tell experienced consultants what they can and 
cannot do.  
Hating workplace 
Being repelled 
Distancing psychologically 
Undermining professionalism 
Insubordinating 
Subverting discursively 
Finding intolerable 
Feeling ill 
Bearing hostility 
Being judicious 
Being discreet 
Being smart 
Playing the game 
Sometimes doing the best for the patient is not sufficient to 
get one to come to work. 
Feeling inadequate 
Failing the patient 
Lacking motivation 
Dreading workplace 
Doctors struggle without support. Managers sit in front of 
computers sending out emails and seldom care to justify and 
defend their decisions when doctors are unable to do the 
best for patients. 
Lacking support 
Cowering manager 
Managing performance 
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Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
Chickening out 
Shirking accountability 
Failing patients 
Managing information 
Watching targets 
Managers decide on the number of beds, the number and 
quality of the recruited staff, the equipment, the number of 
wards and theatres. We just deal with the patient. Yet we 
have the duty to deliver the best quality of care that meets 
the needs of every patient. 
Controlling inputs 
Balancing the books 
Controlling costs 
Focusing on patient 
Prioritising care 
Competing priorities 
Managing resources 
Managing ratios 
I have clinics booked at both sites, on the same day at the 
same time. The managers control the bookings as they have 
targets to meet. Moreover, the clinics at both sites are over-
booked. Sometimes deliberately double-booking patients. 
On paper the consultant is in charge whilst in reality 
managers call the shots. 
Over-booking 
Enhancing efficiency 
Performance managing 
Managing targets 
Sweating assets 
Feigning control 
Balancing competing demands 
Resisting discursively 
Questioning legitimacy 
Competing values 
Focusing on patient  
Undermining managerialism 
If I had a choice then I would leave the NHS not only this 
hospital, as it is the same everywhere in the NHS.  
Feeling trapped 
Overwhelming 
Suffocating 
Realising limits 
Questioning meaning 
Having to find a way 
Surviving the system 
Exiting limits 
Negotiating the mess 
When secretaries leave they are not replaced. The 
administrative work of the consultant goes to a pool of 
secretaries. So one has staffs that are typing up work 
without knowing anything about the speciality. The clerical 
incompetence is frustrating. It takes hours to correct 
spelling mistakes when I should be dealing with patients. 
Cutting costs 
Managing targets 
Balancing the books 
Under-resourcing professionals 
Feeling under-valued 
The workload is very heavy because the demand is high and 
there are staff shortages. Sometimes nursing posts are 
frozen to balance the books. Managers for the same reasons 
close wards and theatres. So demand in the remaining wards 
is more intense.  
Overloading staff 
Cutting costs 
Freezing posts 
Balancing the books 
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Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
Pressurising wards 
Sweating the assets 
Challenging professional norms 
Locum staff fills the gaps in the staffing. They do not know 
the patient. Every time a new locum nurse is on the ward 
then I have to start from zero because I know more about 
the patient than the nurse. The demand on nurses often 
means that they attend to the immediate needs of patients 
and leave the notes for later. Sometimes the notes do not get 
done. 
Varying cost-base 
Under-manning wards 
Fragmenting care 
Compensating for systems 
Prioritising  
Falling through cracks 
We have bed shortages. Often patients are well-enough to be 
discharged but because we do not control admission and 
discharge decisions that patient might block the bed because 
the home-care team has been unable to handle an extra 
patient.  
Managing costs 
Bed-blocking 
Mismanaging discharge 
Delaying discharge 
Delaying transfer of care 
Increasing length of stay 
Unnecessary processing 
Mismanaging patient flow 
Needing beds 
Gridlocking patient flow 
Clogging up system 
Bursting seams 
Losing bed days 
Every day – without exception – my wife can see that I have 
had another dreadful day. Life at home has become very 
mechanical. Yet, the clinical staffs are blamed for the state of 
healthcare in the hospital. 
Taking toll 
Behaving poorly 
Disengaging family 
Denying recovery time 
Resisting psychologically 
Please keep my details anonymous and confidential. 
Throughout it was painful to see a broken doctor who was 
prepared to speak, yet so fearful and fragile. 
Seeking cover 
Hiding in the shadows 
Retreating 
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APPENDIX 11: EXAMPLE OF OPEN-CODED DATA FROM GROUP 
MEETING/OBSERVATIONAL STUDY 
Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
10pm. More than a hundred patients in the waiting room. 
The numbers have not decreased. Manager is desperate to 
clear the backlog. Clinicians hardly making a dent. 
Not coping 
Missing targets 
Staff taking strain 
Exasperating 
Many patients have been waiting for hours. A mixture of 
fractures, sprains, flu, respiratory disorder, vomiting, cuts, 
bruises and sprains. Some patients are older people with 
complex conditions. Others could not secure GP 
appointments. 
Varying clinical needs 
Diverging demands 
Varying demands 
Differing proximities to targets 
Default visiting 
Struggling GP appointments 
Failing social  
Only five doctors. Three are locum or agency staff. Four 
junior doctors. Four nurses for the resuscitation room,  two 
locum doctors and four nurses for majors and an SHO 
(junior doctor but not registrar yet) and a nurse for minors 
and one nurse for paediatrics. One of the nurses for minors 
also covers mental health patients. He also is the alcohol 
liaison nurse. One senior nurse oversees the nursing staff. 
Four nurses are also agency staff. A locum doctor and 
emergency nurse practitioner oversee minor traumas. The 
system is very fluid and separates out when demand is high 
in certain areas. Usually four ambulances arrive every hour. 
If all goes well it can take between 30 and 45 minutes to 
process (assess, imaging, review, treat/onward 
management) major trauma patients. At peak times, up to 
25 patients can arrive per hour. The demand in majors, 
minors and paediatrics differ between them and at various 
times during the shift. Planning reduces bottlenecks and 
enhances the quality of the service. 
allocating resources 
organising department 
streaming flow 
capacity planning 
fragmenting capacity 
segmenting potential demand 
balancing resources 
familiarising colleagues 
building teams 
getting to know 
scheduling 
creating cohesion 
leveraging resources 
tailoring resources to meet 
demand 
fast-tracking minors 
ticking over targets 
managing waiting room 
working with manager 
The phone rings. It always rings. Nurse takes the call. Makes 
announcement. Major trauma. Car accident. Female went 
through windscreen. Ambulance will arrive in 20 minutes. 
Trauma team readies itself. All other plans get adjusted. 
Between 19h00 and midnight this phone will ring almost 
four or five times in an hour. This is the bread-and-butter of 
A & E. This is where people are rescued from the jaws of 
death. It is a time when managers and clinicians fight over 
priorities. Doctors trying to save lives and managers trying 
to meet targets. The A&E receives up to 150 ambulances per 
day. Some serious trauma or hyper acute stroke patients. 
Many are alcohol-related trauma and elderly patients with 
Preparing  
Organising 
Priming 
Psyching up 
Setting up 
Advance warning 
Triaging 
Pre-warning 
Preparing response 
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Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
complex conditions. Feeling pressured 
Bombarding 
Straining oneself 
Sweating blood 
An intoxicated person fights with the vending machine 
because his money is stuck. He put the wrong coin in the 
slot. He calls out to the receptionist who ignores him. She 
probably has explained that the vending machine does not 
belong to the hospital. The vendor had been informed two 
days ago. 
Side tracking 
Distracting 
Exasperating 
Malfunctioning 
Infuriating 
Lacking coherence 
Extending waiting time (not able 
to help staff) 
Requiring more from staff 
An old lady lies on a trolley in the corridor. She has been 
there for a few hours already. She does have a heart 
condition as well as diabetes and mental health issues. Thus 
is the third time this week that she had been brought in by 
ambulance.  Every time she had been unwell but not acutely 
so. However, she has to be checked out by the doctors to 
ensure that nothing is wrong and she has to be given a bed. 
It might take two days to sort her out despite her lack of life-
threatening issues today. The manager is concerned about 
the target that is about to be breached. The doctors are 
already shouting that they are doing their best. They will get 
to her when they are able. The shift still has many hours to 
go.  
Access/bed blocking 
Playing the game 
Waiting on trolley 
Bottlenecking 
Soaking up demand 
Delaying non-urgents 
Prioritising urgents 
Highlighting near-breaching 
Tying-up resources 
Competing norms 
Trading-off competing goals 
Preparing  
Organising 
Priming 
Psyching up 
Setting up 
Messing up targets 
Revolving through A & E 
Managing targets 
Routinely re-attending 
Unplanned re-attending 
Fast-tracking minors 
Three young females have been brought in by ambulance. 
One has a severe head injury. She tripped on the steps to the 
underground train station and fell down a flight of 15 stairs. 
They clearly have had a bit too much to drink. It was a 
birthday that they are unlikely to forget soon. One of them 
seems rather loud and aggressive. She has a few scratches 
and a bruised eye. One shoe is still in her hand. The other 
one is just quietly sleeping it off. The last one is also worse 
for wear but apologises for having vomited on herself. She 
was not too well and says to whoever cares to listen that it 
was her birthday and they were at a club when a fight broke 
Treating everyone 
Postponing judgements 
Varying demand 
Increasing demand 
Slow processing 
Exit blocking 
Reducing capacity 
Diminishing efficiency 
  
 
 
244 
Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
out. She had to defend her friend with the bruised eye. All of 
them were involved in a fight. On a busy night there can be 
about 50 to 60 alcohol-related violent injury attendances at 
the A&E i.e. almost half of A&E attendances can be related to 
alcohol. Proper examination of acutely intoxicated trauma 
patients can consume a lot of scarce resources – especially 
imaging studies to overcome diagnostic difficulties. Merely 
sobering up and stitching wounds are often insufficient. 
Consuming monitoring resources 
Continuing demand 
Dissipating resources 
Depleting capacity 
Frittering away expertise 
 
The phone rings.  An 79-year old male. Acute abdominal 
pain. Ambulance expected to arrive within 20 minutes. The 
doctor who took the call asks the nurse to alert radiology 
that an abdominal scan could be needed. It might be a fatal 
aneurism. The trauma team readies itself again. They now 
have two patients being treated in the resus room. They 
have two more cubicles but do not have enough consultants, 
middle and junior grade doctors or nurses.  
Preparing  
Organising 
Priming 
Psyching up 
Setting up 
Varying demand 
Watching targets 
Reserving resources 
Lengthening waiting times 
Increasing breaches 
Triaging demand 
Trading off-competing goals 
Stressing to keep up 
Entering the coping-only zone 
 
A young drunken male, about 23 years old asks when he will 
be seen. There are doctors and nurses busy on computers, 
doing nothing whilst the waiting room is filling up. He has 
been there for six hours. He came to A&E because his GP 
could only see him after ten days. 
Demanding attention 
Becoming aggressive 
Antagonising 
Annoying 
Ruffling feathers 
Misreading situation 
Jumping the queue 
Gaming the system 
Prioritising care 
Competing priorities 
Managing resources 
Managing ratios 
It is only 12 o’clock. There are not any beds anywhere in the 
hospital and the A&E is full. Every area in A&E has patients. 
There are two patients in resus. In minors the junior doctor 
is stitching the finger of a teenage girl who cut her finger 
whilst peeling a pineapple. In the driveway are three 
ambulances with patients who are unwell but whose 
conditions are not life-threatening. The manager will only 
take transfer of the patients if it they are likely to be treated 
within target and the doctors will only treat them if their 
condition is clinically worse than anyone else who is waiting 
to be treated. A& E is relentless fire-fighting, prioritising, 
choosing and bumping. 
Lacking systemic flexibility 
Balancing competing demands 
Resisting discursively 
Questioning legitimacy 
Competing values 
Ring-fencing system 
Prioritising 
Choosing 
Focusing on patient  
Undermining managerialism 
  
 
 
245 
Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
The junior doctors have the results of the urgent CT scan 
that had been requested for the patient with a severe head 
injury. The senior doctor suggests that they call the neuro-
surgeon for a second opinion.   
Auditing 
Reviewing 
Developing skills 
Calling expert help 
Managing information 
Utilising staff efficiently 
Idling resources 
Blocking flow 
Managing patient 
Processing targets 
Delaying exiting 
01h00. Phone rings. Ambulance calls. Adult male. Gunshot 
wounds to the chest. ETA ten minutes. A team is assembled. 
Someone in another cubicle will have to wait just a bit 
longer. Perhaps someone more junior can take over and the 
more experienced clinicians could attend to this case, at 
least for the first twenty minutes. Hopefully the first patient 
will not complicate. There is always a continuum of 
criticality in A&E. One needs the more experienced clinicians 
when the situation is extreme and then the juniors can take 
over. However, juniors also have to be exposed to the 
extremes for them to learn. The operating creed learn, see, 
practice, prove, do, maintain.  The short version is see one, 
do one, teach one. In A&E the short one seems more 
appropriate. The adrenalin is visible. The drill is automatic. 
The senior doctor says what is needed and the team gets 
everything ready. Everyone knows what to do. If only there 
were enough of them. The team gets ready, whilst some are 
still completing some tasks on other patients. 
Organising 
Priming 
Psyching up 
Setting up 
Managing staff 
Bumping waiting times 
Prioritising 
Deploying staff 
Assembling teams 
Managing quality  
Teaching 
Heaving under 
Being on edge 
Working at limit 
Skating thin ice 
 
The phone rings. The ambulance is on the way. Expected 
arrival time is three minutes. The pregnant patient giving 
birth already. The senior doctor guides the ambulance crew, 
reassures the family member on-board and prepares the 
team to receive the ambulance crew. Who can be bumped to 
clear a cubicle? Which doctor can be drawn to the receiving 
team? Which nurses can be pulled into this team? Who will 
be able to look after the rest of the patients, without 
compromising their care too much? The manager is shouting 
on the phone for a bed, anywhere in the hospital. 
Organising 
Priming 
Psyching up 
Setting up 
Finding bed 
Failing to discharge 
Lacking staff 
Overcrowding 
Moving between  locations 
(waiting room, assessment 
cubicle, radiology, observation, 
treatment, post-treatment) 
Handing over 
The nurse practitioner in Minor Trauma calls the name of a 
man. He delivers pizzas he tells one of the other patients. He 
walks with a bad limp.  A truck driver had turned and did 
not see him. The truck did not hit him but the motorbike fell 
over and his leg was caught awkwardly. He cannot afford to 
Triaging 
Sharing stories 
Carrying injury 
Fretting, Worrying patient 
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Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
take sick leave. He is an immigrant and his family needs him 
to work. He only wants to know if anything is broken. The 
nurse practitioner checks him carefully. In A&E nothing can 
be taken for granted. This patient is so anxious to return to 
work that he might not be telling the whole truth about his 
condition. Ultimately, she concludes that the discomfort is 
due to a sudden movement and bruising of the soft tissue. 
He should be fine after a few days. She gives him painkillers 
and cream for the bruising. He waited for five hours and was 
diagnosed and discharged within twelve minutes. He thanks 
the nurse. The nurse practitioner is reminded that the 
waiting room is full. 
Having to work 
Checking carefully 
Ignoring waiting-time target 
Delivering quality care 
Meeting needs 
Doing what’s needed 
Competing expectations 
 
 
 
 
In minors the junior doctor is treating a young man who had 
twisted his ankle whilst other procedures will follow. He had 
consumed too much alcohol and had fallen. His head had a 
big bruise. He had to wait for a CT scan to see if everything 
in his head is fine. He was not very helpful when the triage 
nurse spoke to him. A cut to his leg is from a bottle, in his 
hand, that had cracked as he fell. A big piece of glass, was 
already removed by the ambulance staff but X-rays are 
needed to see is there are fragments of glass in the soft 
tissue. 
Staggering  
Delayed monitoring  
Delivering quality care 
Focusing on the patient in room 
Extending waiting times for others 
Stretching the staff 
The phone rings. The ambulance will arrive from a 
neighbouring county. An evening rugby match between two 
private colleges.  A serious injury to a male, 17 years old. 
Another clinical team needs to be assembled. There is not 
enough staff. This could be a neck or spinal injury.  This 
could be serious. The senior doctor calls for his colleague 
who is on second call to please come to the hospital. 
Apologises for the inconvenience. It has just been unending. 
The staffs are mentally, physically and emotionally 
exhausted. They have been on their feet for four hours 
without even a toilet break. The clinical work has not 
stopped. But the fights with the blue-uniformed nurse-
manager about the amount of time that is spent with patient. 
The waiting room is still full. Clinicians find this talk about 
targets, soul-destroying.  
Preparing  
Organising 
Priming 
Psyching up 
Setting up 
Managing costs 
Bed-blocking 
Mismanaging discharge 
Delaying discharge 
Delaying transfer of care 
Increasing length of stay 
Unnecessary processing 
Mismanaging patient flow 
Needing beds 
Gridlocking patient flow 
Clogging up system 
Bursting seams 
Losing bed days 
Waiting-time pressures 
Managing staff 
Delivering quality care 
Managing information 
A young couple brought their baby son to the hospital. He 
has had diarrhoea for two days and started vomiting in the 
morning. He also has a high fever. The parents did not want 
Worrying 
Seeking help 
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Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
to bring him immediately but they needed assistance 
because he seemed not to be getting better. The paediatric 
nurse practitioner and the junior doctor would examine him 
and just check with the senior consultant before making a 
final decision, should it be needed. Paediatric A & E normally 
see children with breathing problems, fever, diarrhoea, 
vomiting, abdominal pain and rashes. The paediatric nurse 
practitioner is very experienced. The hospital has recently 
become a major adult trauma referral centre and that has 
resulted in an unexpected yet significant increase in 
paediatric trauma cases. Road traffic accidents and falls are 
most common. Most paediatric trauma does not result in 
hospitalisation or referral to another speciality. More 
serious cases require imaging, emergency admissions and 
beds. A 24-hour paediatric observation unit attached to the 
A&E is used and avoids hospitalisation in wards. There is 
pressure on elective paediatric beds already. Luckily this 
baby appears to have only a viral infection. The paediatric 
nurse and junior doctor agree that the parents should 
observe him for a further 36 hours. If there is not an 
improvement then they must return the hospital without 
delay. The parents are happy with the extensive and 
unhurried examination of their child. They have struggled 
for the pregnancy. A child coming into A&E seems to be 
different from an adult. 
Examining 
Diagnosing 
Discharging 
Reassuring 
Emotionally draining 
Delivering quality care 
Taking necessary time 
Extending waiting times 
Getting lucky 
Not consuming may resources 
Providing leap-frogging card 
Pleasing family 
Breathing with relief 
 
 
 
 
 
The junior doctors are waiting to discuss their patients with 
the consultant. They are developing their skills and 
confidence in dealing with acute mental health conditions, 
cardiac arrests, collapse, elderly falls and acute back and 
abdominal pains.  They also develop their competence in 
doing suturing, ECGs and reading radiology images under 
pressure. However, they have been waiting for thirty 
minutes. Their patients are still in A & E and not completely 
diagnosed, treated and discharged.  The waiting lists are 
getting longer. Teaching takes place when the patient is 
received, the diagnosis is made and the junior doctor wants 
to confirm a treatment decision. There was not much 
teaching tonight. Over weekends it happens more often than 
not. Junior doctors have increased decision-making and 
unpredictable workloads in A&E. The junior doctors see 
about 2 patients per hour. Any delay will have knock-on 
effects. 
Suboptimal supervising 
Working at the limits 
Developing competencies 
Teaching 
Progressing patient management 
Conflicting goals i.e. teaching and 
productivity 
Meeting targets 
Processing patients 
Self-learning 
Slowing flow 
Bottle-necking 
Overrunning 
Submerging 
Engulfing 
One of the locums is new and to contribute. The clinical 
issue be it trauma or hyper acute stroke issues are fine. It is 
about everything else that makes it possible to care for the 
patient that this doctor was unable to do well enough. New 
people take a few days to work things out. This place has a 
high turnover of locums. It is a tough place to work. It is built 
for 90 000 A&E attendances. It receives 140 000. Then it has 
a shortage of beds in every department. There is also a 60% 
shortage of permanently employed A&E consultants and 
locum and agency staff, fill in some of the gaps in the rota. 
Middle grade and junior doctors do not like working here 
Inducting on-the-job 
Swimming against current 
Over-burdening 
Not fully contributing 
Extending waiting times 
Learning operating procedures 
Taxing the staff 
Demanding workplace 
Unrelenting work 
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Field Notes 
Open Code 
Action Verbs (Gerund) 
because they do not have much teaching and the pace is 
relentless.  Nurses also choose to be locum or agency staff 
because it is just too hard to work here. The rota makes a life 
outside the hospital impossible.  
No hiding place 
Unforgiving demands 
Unbalancing work-life 
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APPENDIX 12: EXAMPLES OF EARLY MEMOS 
All names within these memos have been changed to ID codes, to preserve anonymity 
A1512-7 MEMO 7 THE EXISTENTIAL PAIN 15 April, 2012 
Throughout it was painful to see a broken doctor who was prepared to speak, yet so fearful and 
fragile.  
 
A2312-3 MEMO 3 THE SYSTEM ALWAYS FIGHTS BACK 23 April, 2012 
Openly fighting managers does not pay. Must learn to defend professional independence. 
Survival is the key. Managers come and go. 
Has not given up the fight but working at how to deal with patients and limit the impact of 
managers. 
 
J3013-17 MEMO 17 EXITING NOT AN OPTION 30 June 2013 
Re-reading the field notes one notes how many times there are references to the grass not being 
greener elsewhere. Participants have to find ways of sticking it out and defending the interests 
of patients and themselves within the constraints. “Doing best for patient and defending 
yourself” are almost always linked. They cannot leave the arena. How they achieve these two 
goals varies from person to person. 
 
S1213-20 MEMO 20 RANGE OF COPING OPTIONS 12 September 2013 
Resigning, working within the system, taking up clinical leadership roles to defend profession 
and patients, waiting it out until retirement, waiting it out and doing what is required, fighting 
back and not giving in, taking up clinical management position to hold the line, thinking of 
leaving the country, waiting it out and practising defensive medicine, doing what you can, 
staying below the radar, gaming the system, looking out for number one, building coalitions, 
protecting self by fighting in shadows, following diktats, going with the flow, not fighting, 
obeying whilst cursing, calling to obeying, hitting brick walls, manipulating system, bending 
rules, winning managers over, persuading not fighting, using female touch, using spaces, 
focusing immediate tasks, gaming system, engaging under-handedly, concentrating own patch, 
ring-fencing commitments, focusing on patients and colleagues, struggling workload, sinking 
workload, feeling powerless, looking out for self, hoping for better days, practising safe 
medicine, flowing protocols, taking management responsibility, challenging quietly, playing 
poker, falling apart, working constantly, ignoring targets, focusing patient, doing best, staying 
positive, looking on bright side, fighting my corner, following guidelines 
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APPENDIX 13: EXAMPLE OF PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION FROM FIELD NOTES 
TO FINAL CONCEPT 
Field Note Open Coding Selective Coding Final Concept 
Management model is 
problem 
Fighting back; 
Undermining systemically 
Subverting Resisting 
Management comes and 
goes, Consultant for has 
a job for life. 
Slowing down 
managerialism 
Quibbling Resisting 
* Multiple indicators from field notes would be guided by the five basic questions for open coding (Section 
3.6.2.1). Note the increasing abstraction from empirical detail to concept. 
 
A0713-10 MEMO 10 DIMENSIONS OF RESISTING 7 AUG 2013 
Both subverting and resisting are at the resistance end of the resistance-compliance continuum. However, 
subverting seeks to strike big body blows at the key pillars of the management model with its focus on 
performance management and standardisation of clinical practice. Quibbling is also at the resisting end of 
the spectrum. However, the quibblers aim to put spokes in the wheels. They want the managerial train to 
be bogged down in details. 
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APPENDIX 14: MAIN CONCEPTS IN THE THEORY 
ROLLING WITH THE PUNCHES 
 OBSERVED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOURS 
 
 STABILISING TEMPORARILY 
  
 RESISTING 
  Quibbling 
  Subverting 
WEIGHING UP  
 Making sense LIMITING THE IMPACT 
 Deciding what to do  Lying low 
 Mode-shifting triggers  Faking it 
  
 ADJUSTING TO CHANGE 
  Going with the flow 
  Complying substantially 
  Complying fully 
  Waiting it out 
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APPENDIX 15: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST BETWEEN CLASSIC AND OTHER VERSIONS OF GTM (adapted from Jones 
and Noble, 2007: Table 1; and Mills et al., 2006) 
 Classic GTM Straussian GTM 
Charmaz (in Denzin and Lincoln, 
(Eds.) 2000; 1995) 
Clarke 
Ontology and Epistemology “Truth” emerges from data 
Multiple viewpoints but there is indeed an 
over-arching social reality and latent 
pattern of relations. 
 
Researcher “a distant expert” (Charmaz, 
2000, p.513). 
 
Meaning inheres in things in the world. 
Truth is enacted 
“1994: no pre-existing reality out there” 
 
 
Consensus theory of truth. Truth can 
be local, relative, and historicised, 
situational and contextual. 
Perspective and values of the 
observer influences what is seen. 
 
Data is theoretically saturated. 
 
Reality is not objective and unitary 
but relative and multiple and 
constructed inter-subjectively. Data 
not a window to reality (2000, p.254). 
Interaction researcher and participant 
produce data (1995, p.35). 
 
Researcher and participant co-
producers of experience and meaning. 
 
Researcher becomes analyst, 
bricoleur of sorts, cartographer. 
Knowledge is socially and 
culturally produced all knowledge 
is local, historicised and in flux 
(2003, pp. xxiv-xxv). Knowledge 
bears the inscriptions/“scars” 
(p.xxxviii) of its production 
process.  
Claims of universality considered 
naive and hegemonic practices that 
silence voices on the margin or 
periphery. 
Traditional GTM lacks attention on 
reflexivity of research process; 
over-simplification of negative; 
searches for grounded purity 
rather than accepting the 
messiness and situatedness of 
subject and object. 
Emergence and Researcher 
Distance 
Discover “truth” that emerges from data. 
No preconception or forcing. Trust in 
emergence. 
Correct use of method reduces impact of 
researcher. 
1987, 1990, 1998. 
 
1994: Truth is not out there but is 
enacted. 
Multiplicity of truths and perspectives.  
Researcher uses prior knowledge to 
enhance theoretical sensitivity. Logical 
deduction and preconception allowed to 
shape theorising. 
Researcher enters the research with a 
host of assumptions and needs to be 
reflexive about that. Does not enter as 
a blank slate. Have an open mind. Be 
theoretically agnostic (from Henwood 
and Pidgeon, 2003). 
Discovering an external reality, 
assumptions about truth and accuracy 
and a neutral unbiased observer are 
problematic, especially after the 
postmodernist turn. 2000: Not one 
Emphasises the situation 
(temporal, spatial) of action. 
Requires enhanced researcher 
reflexivity and accountability. 
Analyses and provokes the study of 
power, difference and inequity. 
Make silences speak, which raises 
issues of researcher accountability. 
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 Classic GTM Straussian GTM 
Charmaz (in Denzin and Lincoln, 
(Eds.) 2000; 1995) 
Clarke 
true reality but multiple realities. 
2005, 2006 move from human 
perspective towards pragmatism 
(especially its interpretive and 
democratic aspects) considering non-
human actors like institutions and 
organisations.  
Development of Theory Aim of GT is to generate a conceptual 
theory that accounts for the pattern of 
behaviour that resolves the main concern 
for participants. 
1987. Conceptually dense integrated 
theory the goal of GT. 
1990, 1998: Generation of theory not 
sole aim. Conceptual description 
allowed. Theories are interpretations 
(1998, p.5). 
2000: GT tells a story about people, 
social processes and situations. 
The research product is not a 
constitution of the reality of 
participants but is an interpretation, 
among multiple interpretations. Bring 
narrative/voice of participants to the 
fore (2000, p.256). 
The goal is to tell the most 
interesting analytic stories, 
accounts of BSPs. 
An analysis is but a perspective and 
rooted in its situation (p.xxxix). 
Outcome is “thick analysis”, takes 
full account of the situation rather 
than a basic social process (p.xxii). 
Voice, context, discourse, text and 
power. 
Grounded Theorising as opposed 
to theory. 
Procedures: 
Mandatory/Optional etc.  
GTM is a full package. All procedures are 
mandatory. 
1987: All GT procedures are mandatory.  
1990, 1998: Some procedures and 
techniques are optional, depending on 
the “tastes” of the researcher (1998, 
p.8). 
Techniques promote theoretical 
sensitivity. 
Coding, memoing, theoretical 
sampling are useful techniques and 
can be used in a variety of theoretical 
frames. 
Remodels GTM with situation 
analysis (informed by part-
structuralism [Foucault]) (2003, 
p.xxx). Argues that: Classic GTM is 
naive, Straussian does not capture 
full situation of phenomenon of 
interest, Charmaz’s constructivism 
is an improvement on Strauss.  
Three types of maps: 
Situation maps capture complexity 
(rather than simplification classical 
GT). 
Social worlds maps: institutional, 
organisational factors 
Positional maps: positions taken. 
Researcher is implicated in 
drawing maps. 
Aim to make invisible visible. 
Electrical pies and conduits 
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 Classic GTM Straussian GTM 
Charmaz (in Denzin and Lincoln, 
(Eds.) 2000; 1995) 
Clarke 
normally hidden. 
Extended critique of conditional 
matrix (attempt to ground GTM in 
situation) to making the situation 
itself the unit of analysis. 
Core Category The theoretical construct that resolves the 
main concern of the participants and the 
goal of GT is to generate a core category. 
Will always emerge (1978, p.95) 
Classic GT is about the discovery of a core 
category. 
1987: GT revolves around a core 
category that resolves the main concern 
of participants. But a main story line, 
main theme, story line or trajectory. 
1990, 1998: Core category replaced by 
main idea (1990, p. 121), main problem, 
and primary issue, what seems most 
striking, central integrative concept. 
Acknowledges role of researcher in 
constructing narrative (1994, p.281). 
1991: One care category, process not 
necessarily an outcome.  
Most important processes are tacit 
(2004, p. 982). 
 
Coding Discover latent patterns. Substantive 
(open, selective) and Theoretical coding 
with 18 coding families (Glaser, 1978).   
Theoretical codes are conceptual 
connectors to develop relationships 
between categories and their properties 
(1992, p.38). 
Open, Axial and Selective 
1987: selective coding based on memo 
sorting and integrative diagrams. 
1990: selective coding using the coding 
paradigm focuses on one theoretical 
code the “Six C’s”. 
1998: p.129 De-emphasise coding 
paradigm as guide not mandatory and 
integrative p.199 
conditional/consequential matrix. 
Focus on interactions. Brings broader 
context into analysis. 
Integrative diagramming and 
flowcharts to demonstrate complex 
interplay.  
 Like GTM since 1967. 
Situation maps augment basic 
coding. 
Literature No need to review substantive literature at 
beginning of study (1992, p.31). 
Literature from beginning of study will 
promote theoretical sensitivity (1998, 
p.15). 
Blank slate is impossible. Have open 
mind. Theoretical agnosticism is 
useful. 
No researcher is a tabula rasa. 
Researcher should be transparent 
and accountable about knowledge 
production. 
Logic of enquiry: Deduction, 
induction and abduction 
Inductive Inductive Bryant argues for abduction. Categories are inductively derived. 
Lenny Schatzmann: Dimensionalising a phenomenon 
